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ABSTRACT 
 
Orientation: Over the years, the increase in executive remuneration in both the 
private sector and state-owned entities (SOEs) has been the subject of intense 
discussions.  The poor performance of some SOEs with highly remunerated 
executives begs the question whether chief executive officers (CEOs) in South 
African SOEs deserve the high levels of remuneration they receive.  
Research purpose: The main purpose of the study was to determine whether there 
is a relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and company performance in South 
Africa’s Schedule 2 SOEs.  
Motivation for the study: A greater understanding of the relationship between 
CEO remuneration and organisational performance would expand knowledge when 
developing optimal CEO remuneration systems to ensure sustainability of SOEs in 
the South African context. If a relationship exists, it could justify the high 
remuneration received by CEOs. 
Research design, approach, and method: This quantitative, longitudinal study, 
conducted over a nine-year period, collected secondary data from the annual 
reports of 18 Schedule 2 SOEs.  The primary statistical techniques used in the study 
included were OLS multiple regression analysis and correlational analysis on a 
pooled dataset. 
Main findings/results: The primary finding was that there is a relationship between 
CEO remuneration and company performance (mainly an inverse relationship), with 
no consistent trend between the constructs. Turnover appears to be an important 
component, as it was the most stable measure of company performance during the 
study period. The results indicate that the CEOs’ remuneration continued to 
increase, even when the SOEs were performing poorly.   
Practical managerial implications: Since the study focused on the relationship 
between CEOs’ remuneration and company performance, it may aid policymakers 
in forming new rules and regulations that would help improve the country’s 
economic performance while attracting international investors. 
Contribution/value-add: The study provides new knowledge to the limited 
research available on SOEs in South Africa.  Further, this research focused on three 
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different components of CEOs’ remuneration, thereby shedding more light on the 
relationship between their remuneration and company performance. 
 
Key words: CEO compensation, CEO remuneration, fixed pay, company 
performance, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure, SOEs, short-term 
incentive, South Africa, total remuneration 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
“When we talk pay, we must talk pay for everyone.” 
Zwelinzima Vavi, COSATU General Secretary 2010 
 
Are South African executives paid too much, and is their remuneration linked to 
performance?  These are the questions that come to mind when reading various 
newspapers and academic and business articles.  On 17 October 2012, President 
Jacob Zuma called on chief executive officers (CEOs) and executive directors in the 
private sector and senior executives in the public sector to agree to freeze increases 
in salaries and bonuses for the next 12 months (Zuma 2012). 
 
Concerns regarding excessive remuneration packages of CEOs have been added 
to an ongoing concern about the widening gap between the remuneration of 
executives and ordinary employees, as well as their large termination payments with 
perceived lack of justification (Theunissen 2010b).  During the 21st century, there 
has been increased public scrutiny of escalating levels of remuneration of 
executives across the globe (Nicely 2009). 
 
1.1   BACKGROUND 
The concern over executive remuneration (compensation in the USA) is not new.  
In 2008, the then Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, indicated that “government 
was as concerned as ever about pay levels, especially where there is no relation to 
the performance of the company of the executives” (Financial Mail 2008).  Manuel 
also felt that excessive salaries were unjustified in the context of South Africa’s 23% 
unemployment rate, and mentioned: “In a country with the inequality and 
unemployment that we have, some of these exorbitant salaries are simply repulsive” 
(Theunissen 2010b:8). 
CEOs are usually highly skilled, have noteworthy leadership competencies, and are 
viewed as a scarce resource (Bussin & Modau 2015). The position of CEO, 
therefore, typical receives the most lucrative remuneration package of the executive 
management echelon, he or she is ultimately responsibility for the company’s 
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performance. These executives are highly incentivised through remuneration 
structures, in order to retain them, so that they may drive the performance of the 
organisation (Bussin & Modau 2015).  The position of the CEO is therefore the focal 
point of the discussion around executive remuneration.  
 
From past research on executive remuneration and company performance, there 
seems to be no real consensus on the relationship between executive remuneration 
and company performance. This is partially due to the diverse set of disciplines 
involved in these studies, the wide variety of methods used to investigate the 
questions (Florin, Hallock, & Webber 2010).  The subject of CEO remuneration and 
company performance is even more relevant today, due to the dramatic changes in 
the economy and the demands from various constituent groups to examine the 
remuneration of senior executives more closely (Florin et al. 2010). 
 
The focus of this study will be on state-owned entities (SOEs) in South Africa.  SOEs 
play vital a role in the economies of many countries, and the outrage over what 
many consider excessive CEO remuneration warrants research.  Take, for example, 
the following media headlines, abroad as well as in South Africa: Business Live, 
“Eskom directors earn R3 537m bonus” (Roberts 2011); Business Live, “Bonuses 
despite poor performance” (Volgraaff 2011); Business day, “Business joins call for 
lower executive pay in SA” (Anderson 2012); Accountancy News, “Can high 
executive pay rewards be justified?” (Aspinell 2012); Soweto Live, “Spotlight on high 
pay for executives” (I-Net Bridge 2012); The Telegraph, “CEOs and their salaries: 
because they’re worth it….? (Osborne 2012); and Times Live, “Eskom chief Brian 
Molefe earns almost R800 000 per month – excluding bonuses” (Sibanyoni 2016).   
 
The global financial crisis has legitimised state involvement in the economy, evident 
through government interventions in various countries.  During May 2012, the Prime 
Minister of France indicated that a cap would be placed on the salaries of CEOs of 
SOEs.  This came after the CEO of Electricitè de France earned €1.6 million in 2011 
and the CEO of Airports de Paris earned €736 000.  This is in stark contrast to the 
average annual wage of €16 800 (R228 985) in France (Patel 2012).  
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In Spain, the government renewed its crackdown on executive pay, and announced 
that the basic annual salaries of SOEs would be limited to €105 000 (R1 185 813).  
This would cut the average executive salary by up to 35% in about 4 000 SOEs 
(Tremlett 2012).  Sweden also introduced new guidelines regarding remuneration 
of executives of SOEs.  During 2009, Finnair paid its executives bonuses worth 
about €2.8 million through special bonuses, even though the company had 
undergone deep cutbacks to reduce the amount of red ink in its books (Sanomat 
2012: 1). 
 
Closer to home, in Botswana, a parliamentary committee found that CEOs, senior 
managers, and most staff of parastatals were overpaid, with hundreds of millions of 
pula, which the government invests in these entities, going towards substantial 
salaries and benefits.  Based on this, the committee recommended that the 
Botswana government institute investigations into the over-remuneration of staff 
(Benza 2012).  
 
SOEs, unlike private companies, receive the greater part of their revenue from the 
national treasury (who collects from the taxpayer), and are supposed to serve the 
public. However, the remuneration of top executives in SOEs seems to be 
competing with that of private companies.  A result of this is that consumers pay 
high tariffs for the products and services of SOEs such as Eskom, while consumers 
should be benefiting from the funding paid to Eskom by South Africa’s (SA’s) 
National Treasury (Ngwenya & Khumalo 2012). 
 
1.2   PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Executive remuneration is a serious problem in the global financial world, with 
several investors, shareholders, and the public becoming outspoken about the 
levels of remuneration of executives (Okasmaa 2009).  Particularly in the spotlight 
are companies that disclose poor performance, but whose executives still receive 
excessive remuneration, and dismissed CEOs who received large severance 
packages (Dommisse 2011).  
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Increases in CEO remuneration in the private sector and in SOEs have been the 
subject of intense discussions and sensational media reporting.  This excessive 
remuneration is not aligned with the performance of the SOEs (21st Century Pay 
Solutions 2012).  Two cases in point are the R7 million total remuneration that Brian 
Dames, a former Eskom CEO, received during 2012 (Massie, Collier, & Crotty 2014) 
and the 109% salary increases paid to Eskom executives for the financial year 
ending 31 March 2011 (Webb 2011). To add fuel to the situation, payouts to 
unsuccessful CEOs of South African SOEs have cost the taxpayer R262.1 million 
over the past ten years (Staff Reporter 2010).   
 
The main problem, which informed the present study, is therefore the excessive 
remuneration packages that CEOs in SOEs receive, despite the poor performance, 
and government “bailout” of some of these SOEs.  This has placed South African 
SOEs in the public eye in recent years (Khumalo 2009).  The purpose of this 
research will therefore be to analyse the relationship between CEO remuneration 
and company performance of Schedule 2 SOEs in South Africa.  If there is no 
relationship, it would justify the criticism that these CEOs’ remuneration is 
excessive, because it means that, when considering the performance of SOEs, the 
CEOs probably earn more than they deserve.  
 
1.3   RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Executive remuneration remains a controversial topic (Wray 2008; Okasmaa 2009; 
O’Reilly & Main 2010; Bouwmeester 2011), and has, especially in the last few years, 
attracted a lot of public attention, often for the wrong reasons (Ozkan 2011).  The 
aforementioned statement is supported by findings from the South African Country 
Review of Collective Bargaining (2010), which reported that, during 2010, the 
average annual remuneration for a CEO was R10 227 997.  To put this into context, 
a low-wage worker would have to work 255 years to earn this amount of money 
(South African Country Review of Collective Bargaining 2010: 34). 
 
The main objective of the present study will be to determine and analyse the 
relationship between the remuneration of CEOs and company performance in all 
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Schedule 2 South African SOEs.  Given the poor performance of some SOEs with 
highly remunerated CEOs, the question is whether CEOs in South African SOEs 
deserve the high levels of remuneration they receive.  
 
In order to achieve this objective, it would be necessary to consider, amongst others, 
the following issues: 
 
 whether there is a relationship between CEO remuneration and SOE 
performance for the period 2006 to 2014; 
 whether the relationship between CEO remuneration and SOE performance 
strengthened in the period 2006 to 2014; 
 the nature of the relationship between CEO remuneration and SOE 
performance for the periods 2006 to 2010 and 2011 to 2014; 
 whether SOEs’ CEO remuneration is affected by age, tenure, gender, race 
and level of education of the CEO; and 
 whether the size of the SOE has an effect on the CEO’s remuneration. 
 
1.4   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary question for this study will be: 
 
Is there a relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and the performance of 
South African Schedule 2 SOEs? 
 
The proposed study will be guided by the following specific research questions and 
sub-questions: 
 
Research Question 1:  
Is there a relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and the performance of SOEs 
for the period 2006 to 2014? 
 
Sub-question 1.1: Is there a relationship between CEOs’ fixed pay and SOEs’ 
performance? 
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Sub-question 1.2: Is there a relationship between CEOs’ short-term incentives 
and SOEs’ performance? 
Sub-question 1.3: Is there a relationship between CEOs’ total remuneration and 
SOEs’ performance? 
 
Research Question 2: 
Did the relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and SOEs’ performance 
strengthen over the period 2006 to 2014? 
 
Sub-question 2.1: Did the relationship between CEOs’ fixed pay and SOEs’ 
performance strengthen over the period 2006 to 2014? 
Sub-question 2.2: Did the relationship between CEOs’ short-term incentives and 
SOEs’ performance strengthen over the period 2006 to 2014? 
Sub-question 2.3: Did the relationship between CEOs’ total remuneration and 
SOEs’ performance strengthen over the period 2006 to 2014? 
 
Research Question 3: 
What is nature of the relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and the 
performance of Schedule 2 SOEs before and during the global financial crisis (2006 
to 2010) and afterwards (2011 to 2014)? 
 
Sub-question 3.1: What is the nature of the relationship between CEOs’ fixed pay 
and SOEs’ performance for the periods 2006 to 2010 and 2011 
to 2014?  
Sub-question 3.2: What is the nature of the relationship between CEOs’ short-
term incentives and SOEs’ performance for the periods 2006 
to 2010 and 2011 to 2014? 
Sub-question 3.2: What is the nature of the relationship between CEOs’ total 
remuneration and SOEs’ performance for the periods 2006 to 
2010 and 2011 to 2014? 
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Research Question 4:  
Is the remuneration of CEOs of South African SOEs affected by the variables age, 
tenure, gender, race, and education? 
 
Sub-question 4.1: What is the effect of the variables age, tenure, gender, race, 
and education on the fixed pay of CEOs of SOEs? 
Sub-question 4.2: What is effect of the variables age, tenure, gender, race, and 
education on the short-term incentives of CEOs of SOEs? 
Sub-question 4.3: What is the effect of the variables age, tenure, gender, race, 
and education on the total remuneration of CEOs of SOEs? 
 
Research Question 5:  
Is there a relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and the size of the South 
African SOEs? 
 
Sub-question 5.1: Is there a relationship between the fixed pay of the CEO and 
the size of the SOE? 
Sub-question 5.2:  Is there a relationship between the short-term incentives of the 
CEO and the size of the SOE? 
Sub-question 5.3: Is there a relationship between the total remuneration of the 
CEO and the size of the SOE? 
 
Given the background provided, as well as South Africa’s exceptional corporate 
context, the link between executive remuneration and company performance could 
be expected to be unlike what has been reported for developed countries and other 
developing countries (Ntim, Lindop, Osei, & Thomas 2013).  
1.5   RESEARCH CONTEXT 
The scope of this study will be limited to SOEs in South Africa.  For the purpose of 
the present study, an SOE is defined as an entity that operates as a business 
enterprise, with the main shareholder being the South African government (Otieno 
2011). 
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According to the Public Finance Management Act, Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA), there are 
87 SOEs in South Africa.  However, not all of these SOEs meet the criteria of the 
definition, or have the characteristics of, a government business enterprise (Otieno 
2011: 11), which are: 
 
 being financially and operationally independent; 
 able to operate according to ordinary business principles; and 
 being self-funding (PFMA 1999). 
 
Given the above characteristics of a government business enterprise, 21 SOEs 
meet these characteristics, and are listed as Schedule 2 public entities in the PFMA.  
The present study will be conducted within (and will be limited to) Schedule 2 SOEs 
in South Africa. Examples of these SOEs are: Eskom, Transnet, South African 
Airways, and Denel. 
  
Schedule 2 SOEs are major entities that should generate profits and declare 
dividends.  In terms of Section 66 (3) (a) of the PFMA, Schedule 2 SOEs may borrow 
money through their accounting authorities, which implies that they also have 
extensive borrowing powers (PFMA 1999). 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 3, SOEs play an important role in the South African 
economy, but their performance, as well as the remuneration of their CEOs, has 
been highlighted and slated by the media.  Considering the importance of SOEs in 
South Africa and the past performance of entities such as Eskom, public scrutiny of 
SOEs was to be expected. 
Research has found either a positive or a negative relationship between company 
performance and CEO remuneration. Therefore, one would expect a greater 
understanding of the relationship between company performance and CEO 
remuneration in SOEs. However, little attention has been devoted to this 
phenomenon within an SOE environment in South Africa.  Therefore, the proposed 
study will aim to address this gap in the body of knowledge by investigating the 
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relationship between South African SOEs’ performance and their CEOs’ 
remuneration. 
1.6   IMPORTANCE AND BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED STUDY 
Despite the widespread research interest in company performance and CEO 
remuneration, insufficient attention has been dedicated to explaining the link 
between company performance and CEO remuneration within SOEs, especially in 
the South African context. This oversight could be detrimental, considering the 
significant role that SOEs play in the economy (Govender 2010). 
 
In view of the fact that South Africa’s disproportional executive payments have been 
criticized by government, business, trade unions, academics, and the public 
(Business Wise 2012), a better understanding of the link between executive 
remuneration and company performance in the South African context is essential 
from both an academic and a business perspective.  Furthermore, considering that 
it is unclear what role executive remuneration plays in contributing or detracting from 
the success or failure of SOEs, and in light of what Minister Gordhan called for, it is 
important to improve understanding of the relationship between company 
performance and executive remuneration in South African SOEs.  The proposed 
study is important for the reasons discussed hereunder. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the proposed study will make two valuable 
contributions to the extant body of knowledge on the relationship between executive 
remuneration and company performance. Firstly, unlike previous studies in this 
field, which tended to focus mostly on international companies, the proposed study 
will provide insight into this phenomenon within the South African context.  
Secondly, this study will add to the knowledge on executive remuneration and 
company performance within South African SOEs by using two measures to never 
used before to test for company performance.  
 
With the wide media debate and increased interest from academia and the popular 
press in this topic, the proposed research could benefit various stakeholders in 
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South Africa, namely the management of organisations, organised labour, 
government, private and public companies, and SOEs. The findings could assist the 
aforementioned stakeholders to identify the main problems with executive 
remuneration, and to verify whether there is indeed a problem with executive 
remuneration in South Africa, especially in SOEs.  Furthermore, given the fact that 
the Presidential Review Committee on State-owned Entities was established to 
investigate CEO remuneration in SOEs, this study could add further value to the 
findings of the Committee.  
 
The findings could assist private and public companies to compare the 
remuneration of their CEOs with that of CEOs in SOEs. They could therefore 
determine their market competitiveness, as CEOs from SOEs are most likely to be 
attracted from private companies. In addition, public companies could use the 
results to determine how the remuneration of their executives compares to the 
remuneration of executives in SOEs. 
 
Furthermore, this study will add value to the debate on excessive remuneration of 
executives that has been prominent over the last few decades in many countries.  
Knowledge regarding relationship between company performance and executive 
remuneration could be used to determine whether the salaries paid to executives in 
SOEs are excessive.  A better understanding of the type of relationship that exists 
between company performance and executive remuneration can bring additional 
insight into this problem.  If there is no significant relationship between executive 
remuneration and organisational performance, it is unlikely that the billions of rands 
injected into SOEs are being administered effectively. 
 
Government as the shareholder of Schedule 2 SOEs may be interested to know 
whether the remuneration of CEOs is aligned with the SOEs’ performance, with 
regard to safeguarding the principal’s interests.  Moreover, government could use 
the findings from this study to determine appropriate remuneration frameworks for 
CEOs of SOEs. 
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1.7    RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, ANALYSIS, AND DATA    
COLLECTION 
The study will make use of a non-empirical, quantitative method, where the objective 
will be to describe the relationship between the following constructs: Company 
performance and CEO remuneration.  A literature survey will be used to identify the 
methodology that other researchers have applied in their research on the questions 
to be addressed in this study. Using a similar methodology will facilitate both a 
comparison with other studies, and provide assurance that the methodology to be 
used in the present study is statistically sound (Bradley 2011: 4). 
 
The present study will be a desktop study, archival in nature, where the researcher 
will gather information from a variety of secondary sources. This ex-post facto 
methodology focuses on reporting the characteristics of the variables, rather than 
playing any role in manipulating them (Blumberg, Cooper, & Schindler 2008).  The 
researcher will collect the information from SOEs’ annual reports.  As a result, the 
data will be considered credible, having been subjected to a financial audit.  Miller 
(1995) indicated that the most authoritative studies of executive remuneration rely 
upon secondary data, as are considered to provide valid and reliable data (Attaway 
2000). 
 
For the purpose of the present study, secondary data will be collected from the 
annual financial statements in the annual reports of each SOE. Legislation 
(Reporting by Public Entities Act, Act 93 of 1992, as amended by Act 30 of 1997) 
requires government business enterprises to compile annual financial statements.  
The variables considered will be the components of the CEOs’ remuneration and 
the components of company performance (as will be determined by this study) of 
each entity, denoted in rand value, for each year of the period specified for the 
proposed study (2006 to 2014). 
 
The entire population of Schedule 2 SOEs will be used in the study.  Organisational 
performance will be compared to the remuneration of the CEO, to determine 
statistical significance. 
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The collected data will be analysed statistically, using SPSS and EViews, to 
determine the correlation between the key constructs CEO remuneration and SOE 
performance.  “Pooling performance data into four to five years’ average reduces 
variables, provides a long-term indicator, and provides a more trustworthy and valid 
measure of company performance than annual measures” (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, & 
Hinkin 1987).  
 
1.8   RESEARCH VARIABLES 
The research variables to be used in this study are briefly discussed in this section. 
1.8.1 CEO remuneration components (dependent variables) 
Data on CEO remuneration will be obtained for a nine-year period, from 2006 to 
2014 (inclusive).  The data will be obtained from the selected SOEs’ annual reports. 
 
Because of strict disclosure requirements in South Africa, it is mandatory for 
companies to disclose, inter alia, the CEO’s remuneration. The researcher 
anticipates that certain aspects of CEO remuneration will have a stronger 
relationship with aspects of company performance than others. The researcher 
therefore deems it necessary to divide the constructs CEO remuneration and 
Company performance into components.  This is discussed in greater detail below. 
 
The components of CEO remuneration will be the dependent variables, because 
the intent will be to determine if these vary according to company performance.   
 
Remuneration is an all-encompassing word that includes a variety of reward 
components.  As indicated by 21st Century Pay Solutions (2010), remuneration 
includes the following. 
 
 Fixed pay is the guaranteed base pay that executives receive, which is 
normally a risk-free monthly payment (Ellig 2007). 
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 Benefits refers to all financial benefits (pension, medical, and car allowance, 
among others). 
 Guaranteed package refers to all components of remuneration that are 
guaranteed, including fixed pay and benefits. 
 Incentive pay includes all components of remuneration that are variable and 
accrue to an individual based on satisfactory achievement of measures of 
performance.  Incentive pay is made up of short-term and long-term incentives, 
and is also known as variable pay.  
o Short-term incentives (STIs) are all cash-based payments that accrue 
to an individual, based on company performance for a 12-month period. 
They are usually formula-driven and have some performance criteria 
attached depending on the role of the executive.  
o Long-term incentives (LTIs) are all monetary and equity awards that 
accrue to an individual, based on company performance over a period 
longer than 12 months. 
 Total remuneration includes fixed pay plus short-term incentives, and is also 
known as total cost of employment; and  
 Total earnings consist of fixed pay plus incentive pay (short- and long-term), 
and is also known as total cost to company. 
 
Based on past research, the CEO remuneration components that will be analysed 
in the present study are fixed pay, STIs, and total remuneration. In his study, Bradley 
(2011) used the same three remuneration components. Including these categories 
does not mean that other types of remuneration, such as benefits for executives, 
perquisites, and even provisions for severance pay are less important, but it is 
important to focus on the most common components of CEO remuneration 
(Okasmaa 2009).  
 
In the present study, a distinction will be made between the components fixed pay 
and STI.  The present study assumes that STIs will be more variable than fixed pay, 
and should therefore be separately analysed. LTIs will not be taken into 
consideration for this study, as SOEs are not listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE), and few have LTI schemes.  Bradley (2013) posits that most other 
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research on this topic excluded the value of LTIs.  LTIs were also excluded in the 
studies by Theunissen (2010b), Shaw (2011), Scholtz and Smit (2012); Oberholzer 
(2014), and Theku (2014By excluding LTIs from the present research, the findings 
will be easily comparable to those of other studies (Bradley 2013). Further, LTIs is 
not only complicated to define, but difficult to report on given the different schemes 
companies have implemented over the years (PwC 2016). 
 
Figure 1 sets out the CEO remuneration components to be used in this study. 
 
Figure 1 Components of CEO remuneration 
 
    Source: Adapted from Bussin (2012: 105) 
 
The definitions for the variables adopted for this research are: 
 
 fixed pay — basic salary and employee benefits; 
 variable pay – STIs (annual cash bonuses); and 
 total remuneration — fixed pay plus STIs. 
 
1.8.2 Company performance components (independent variables) 
In this study, the company performance components will be the independent 
variables. Mainly accounting measures will be used to determine company 
performance, because the data are “verifiable and widely understood” (Murphy 
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1999: 2490).  In addition, no market-based measures (such as Tobin’s Q, Market 
Value Added, Dividend Yield, Price-Earnings Ratio) are relevant to the present 
study.  Furthermore, external auditing checks bring more fairness and accuracy to 
these measurements of performance (Xu 2013).   
 
Murphy (1999: 2490) states that “the primary determinant of executive 
compensation is accounting profits.”  This study will use the following measures to 
evaluate company performance: 
a) turnover/revenue;  
b) operating profit (OP);  
c) net profit (NP);  
d) return on equity (ROE); 
e) return on capital employed (ROCE); 
f) liquidity ratio (LR);  
g) solvency ratio (SR);  
h) irregular, fruitless, and wasteful expenditure (IFWE); and 
i) audit opinion (AO).  
 
It is important to note that the last two measures have not been previously included 
in any study.  It therefore contributes to the uniqueness of the present study.  
Individual performance analysis will be limited to the CEOs of the chosen SOEs.  
 
Data will be collected from databases containing historical company performance 
information.  The researcher will use McGregor BFA as the primary source of annual 
reports.  Where data are not available in the database, the researcher will use 
individual company annual reports to collect the relevant data.  If annual reports or 
data are not available on either McGregor BFA or the SOEs’ websites, the 
researcher will contact the company secretaries to obtain the necessary 
information. 
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1.9   PROPOSED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Based on the research variables discussed in Sections 1.8.1 and 1.8.2 the 
theoretical framework that will be used in the present study to investigate the 
relationship between CEO remuneration and SOEs’ performance from 2006 to 2014 
is shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 2 Theoretical Framework 
 
The reason why fixed pay, STIs, and total remuneration are included in the model 
is to establish if there is a difference in each variable before and after adding Fixed 
pay, STIs and Total remuneration. 
 
Company performance 
 Turnover 
 Operating profit 
 Net profit 
 Return on equity 
 Return on capital employed 
 Liquidity ratio 
 Solvency ratio 
 Irregular, fruitless, and 
wasteful expenditure 
 Audit opinion 
CEO demographic 
variables 
 Age 
 Tenure 
 Gender 
 Race 
 Education 
Dependent variables Independent variables 
Company size 
CEO remuneration  
 Fixed pay  
Short-term incentives 
Total remuneration 
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1.10   ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The statements containing details of the CEOs’ remuneration and the organisations’ 
financial performance are readily available as public disclosure documents in the 
annual reports of the SOEs. This research will investigate CEOs’ remuneration in 
relation to company performance, but no reference will be made to a specific 
individual or SOE. 
 
Because the information required to conduct this study is publicly available from the 
annual reports of the SOEs, permission to utilise the data is not required.  However, 
the University of South Africa provided ethical clearance for the use of secondary 
data for the purpose of this study.  In addition, the researcher will not tamper with 
the data obtained from the various annual reports, which will be analysed using 
appropriate statistical techniques.  The researcher will report on the results in full. 
1.11   POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The proposed study has several limitations related to the context, constructs, and 
theoretical perspectives. Firstly, the study will be limited to the major SOEs 
(Schedule 2) in South Africa. This study will therefore exclude all SOEs not 
classified as Schedule 2 entities.  Secondly, the study will focus on the remuneration 
of CEOs.  Therefore, the researcher will not consider the remuneration of other 
executives of the SOEs. 
 
Other possible limitations are as follows. 
 The study will only refer to the specific relationship between performance and 
pay, and will not provide information on other casual factors influencing the 
relationship. 
 The standards set by the International Accounting Standards Board could 
have changed during the period 2006 to 2013. This could have had an effect 
on the SOEs reporting, and impacted the data analysed for this study.  
 As mentioned earlier, the researcher will obtain data on company performance 
vis-à-vis CEO remuneration from the SOEs’ annual reports.  While there may 
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be motivation to manipulate these figures, it is presumed that these figures are 
trustworthy.  This is due to the rigorous accounting practices that govern the 
preparation of financial reports, and the fact that the companies selected are 
all audited by independent professionals (Bradley 2011: 12). 
 
1.12   ASSUMPTIONS 
This study will make several assumptions: 
 
 All Schedule 2 SOEs report the CEO’s remuneration, as required by the PFMA 
and the third King Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa (King III). 
King IV that was released on 1 November 2006 will come into effect for financial 
years commencing from 1 April 2017. King IV builds on King III. 
 The SOE aims to maximize their profits and dividends. 
 The SOEs act in an ethical manner, and obey all local and international laws 
and regulations where applicable. 
 The data collected for analysis are accurate and true. 
 The measures utilised for measuring company performance will be applied 
across all industries — it will therefore not be industry-specific. 
 In analysing and interpreting the data from the annual reports, the following will 
apply across all industries/sectors of SOEs: 
 Where amounts are re-stated, the actual amounts as reported in the annual 
report will be used, and not the re-stated amounts.  The reason for this is 
that the actual amounts were used to calculate bonuses. 
 If CEO remuneration is not finalised at the year-end of a specific year, the 
following year’s comparatives will be used. 
 Permanent government funding forms part of the SOEs’ share capital. 
 Where investments under resale agreements are settled in less than 12 
months, these will be regarded as current assets. 
 Where funding under re-purchase agreements is settled in less than 12 
months, it will be regarded as a current liability. 
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 The performance of the pension/provident fund does not have a direct link with 
company performance.  The researcher will therefore not consider pension fund 
performance. 
 
The choice of research methodology was guided by the research objectives and 
the limitations identified, and is discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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1.13   TERMINIOLOGY 
Term Definition 
CEO Top executive responsible for a company's overall operations 
and performance. The CEO is leader of the company, serves 
as the main link between the board of directors (the board) and 
the company's various parts or levels, and is held solely 
responsible for the company's success or failure. One of the 
major duties of a CEO is to maintain and implement corporate 
policy, as established by the board. Also called President or 
managing director (BusinessDictionary.com 2017). 
Discretionary 
bonus 
A discretionary amount that bears some relationship to the 
individual’s performance (Bussin 2011: 413) 
Government Government refers to the body or bodies responsible for 
governing the State. In common usage, the term “government” 
is often used to refer to any part of the State and public 
administrative apparatus (Theunissen 2000). 
Other benefits The cost of additional guaranteed perquisite benefits 
(allowances), such as housing, low-interest loans, club fees, 
professional fees, subscriptions, cell phone allowances, 
computer allowances, or any other similar benefits (Bussin 
2011: 412)  
PFMA The Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act No. 1 of 1999) 
(as amended by Act No. 29 of 1999); the Act promotes the 
objective of good financial management in order to maximise 
service delivery through the effective and efficient use of 
limited resources 
LTIs All cash and equity-based awards that accrue to an individual 
based on company performance over a period longer than 12 
months (PwC 2016:3) 
Remuneration A broad term that encompasses a range of reward 
components (Shaw 2011); the terms remuneration and 
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compensation can be used interchangeably (remuneration will 
be used in the present study) 
Schedule 2 
SOEs 
Major public entities that are supposed to generate profits and 
declare dividends; these entities have the most autonomy of 
all the public entities, as they operate in a competitive 
marketplace and are run in accordance with general business 
principles.  In terms of Section 66(3) (a) of the PFMA, Schedule 
2 public entities may also borrow money through the 
accounting authority of that entity, which implies that they also 
have extensive borrowing powers (PFMA 1999). 
SOEs  Also known as state-owned enterprises, parastatals, public 
sector entities, or public entities. SOEs are independent bodies 
partially or wholly owned by government. They perform specific 
functions and operate in accordance with a particular Act 
(Wendy Owens and Associates 2003). 
 
1.14   STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
This study will be divided into seven chapters, as illustrated in Figure 3.  Chapter 1 
provides the introduction and background to the research.  Chapter 2 will critically 
review the existing literature on executive remuneration.  Chapter 3 will focus on 
company performance and provide insight into the SOE environment in South 
Africa.  Chapter 4 will deal with the empirical part of the research, describing and 
justifying the research methodology and process.  Chapter 5 will present the findings 
of the research.  Chapter 6 will provide a discussion of the findings of the research, 
linking these to findings of previous studies.  Finally, Chapter 7 will conclude the 
thesis by returning to the research questions, describing and reflecting on the 
contribution of the thesis, and provide suggestions for future research. 
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Figure 3 Structure of the study 
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1.15   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, the remuneration of CEOs is an issue that has attracted significant 
interest over the past couple of years from stakeholders, business groups, and the 
wider community. Across different sectors and within various countries, concerns 
have been put forward concerning excessive CEO remuneration practices.  Locally 
and internationally, various interventions were implemented (or are in the process 
of being implemented) to address the issue of high executive remuneration.   
 
Substantial growth in executive remuneration from the 1990s until recently, and 
cases of large payments regardless of poor company performance, have increased 
community concerns that executive remuneration is uncontained. The South African 
context is no different. In 2008, the then Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel 
indicated that government was concerned about pay levels, specifically where there 
was no relationship to the performance of the company and the executives’ 
remuneration. The concerns regarding excessive remuneration packages have 
become a prominent focus of community unease regarding the widening gap 
between the remuneration of executives and other employees, together with large 
severance packages without explanation.  
 
With inadequate academic contributions to the body of knowledge on the 
remuneration of CEOs and executives in South Africa, there exists an opportunity 
and a need to further develop the understanding of the relationship between 
company performance and CEO remuneration.  This study will therefore contribute 
to the on-going discussion of and limited literature on company performance and 
CEO remuneration in South Africa, specifically within the SOE environment. 
 
The relationship between components of CEO remuneration (Fixed pay, STIs, and 
Total remuneration) and two variables not previously used in studies of this nature, 
AO and IFWE (as reported by the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA)) will be 
used in analysing Company performance.  It is reasonable to assume that there 
would be a positive relationship between these two variables and the components 
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of CEO remuneration. In the following chapter, the literature review provides a 
discussion of executive remuneration in general. 
 42 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
“Excessive CEO pay is the mad cow disease of American boardrooms.  It moves 
from company to company, rendering directors incapable of applying common 
sense.” 
J. Richard Finlay, Chairman, Centre for 
Corporate and Public Governance, 2002 
 
2.1   INTRODUCTION 
The primary purpose of this study was to determine the relationship between 
company performance and CEO remuneration of Schedule 2 SOEs in South Africa.  
This chapter will provide an overview of the role of CEO, executive remuneration, 
and the underlying principles of the determination of remuneration for CEOs in the 
current business environment. The literature review will then continue with a 
discussion of problems associated with executive remuneration.  The chapter will 
conclude with a brief discussion on the history of the pay-for-performance debate, 
followed by a discussion of executive remuneration in South Africa. 
2.2   ROLE OF THE CEO 
Shaw (2011) posits that a number of academics, ranging from financial economists 
to organisational behaviourists, have contributed to the understanding of the field of 
executive remuneration. A number of prominent academics, e.g., Jensen and 
Murphy (2010), Edmans and Gabaix (2009), Yanadori and Milkovich (2002), and 
Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1994), have confined their attention to executive 
remuneration to specifically the remuneration of the CEO.  
 
A CEO’s job is extremely complex (Core & Guay 2010).  CEOs are often considered 
“superstars in both academia and the business environment” (Ayaba 2012: 6).  The 
CEO is responsible for the overall management of organisational activities, by 
providing strategic direction and leadership in execution (Andrews 1980).  Andrews 
(1980) describes a CEO as the architect of organisational purpose, an 
organisational leader, and a personal leader.  CEOs have to provide different forms 
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of leadership — strategic, moral, and human — and strike a balance between the 
three (Edersheim 2007). All leaders have three major functions to fulfil in an 
organisation: setting direction; aligning organisational goals, strategy, and 
processes; and motivating people (Farkas & Wetlaufer 1996).  Leadership requires 
charisma and vision, as well as the ability to cope with rapid change (Kotter 1999).  
In a study conducted by Glick (2011), the data supported the notion that the 
leadership role is one of the most important roles of a CEO, influencing all other 
roles within an organisation. 
 
As leader, the CEO has a significant effect on the performance of the company.  
This is believed to be the reason for the significant growth in executive remuneration 
over the past several decades (Montino 2008).  Furthermore, as the CEO performs 
one of the most important and powerful roles in an organisation in the midst of the 
turbulence of the 21st century, CEOs’ performance today is more important to the 
organisation than ever (Edersheim 2007; Glick 2013).   
 
Hambrick and Quigley (2014) maintain that CEOs have more flexibility than other 
executives, as their decisions can affect the entire company, instead of just a unit.  
The CEO plays a fundamental role in creating value and ensuring business 
continuity (Conlon & Smith 2010).  The CEO also plays an important role in shaping 
corporate policies (Tian 2013).  Moreover, the CEO is uniquely positioned to ensure 
that a company’s purpose, values, and standards are relevant to its business 
environment (Lafely 2009).  
 
To maintain a competitive advantage and growth, the CEO must ensure that the 
company competes with the competitors who matter most.  Jim (2009: 42) 
compares the role of today’s CEO to that of “an airline pilot navigating through 
stormy skies.  Even if they know that the ride will be rough, they recognize that 
employees, like passengers on the edge of their seats, are waiting for the reassuring 
voice over the loudspeaker.”  
 
The CEO, who is appointed by the board of directors, acts as the manager of the 
executives, and is responsible for leading the organisation in the delivery of 
corporate goals (Shaw 2011).  The CEO is the only one held responsible for the 
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performance and results of the company — not just its own objectives, but also the 
measures and standards of various, and often opposing, external stakeholders 
(Lafely 2009).  Shaw (2011) supports this view.  According to Core and Guay (2010), 
the CEO is the individual that is ultimately responsible for the company’s strategic 
investments, operating activities, human resource management, financing 
decisions, and overall company performance.  Moreover, because the CEO has 
specific knowledge that is useful for decision-making that is costly to transfer, it is 
problematic (or impossible) for the board or shareholders to give the CEO thorough, 
systematic directives on how this job should be carried out (Fama & Jensen 1983). 
 
Mascarenhas (2009) suggests that, over and above the core role(s) of CEO, CEOs 
of large companies must fulfil eight key responsibilities.  These are: developing 
growth avenues, raising productivity, competing for talent, managing diverse risks, 
tightening corporate governance, incorporating sustainability, creating innovation 
models, and building new infrastructure.  While Mascarenhas’s research focused 
specifically on multi-national companies, it is likely that the findings have 
widespread applicability (Shaw 2011). 
 
Taking the role of the CEO into consideration, based on the above discussion, these 
responsibilities are difficult, and require skills and competencies of well-educated 
and knowledgeable individuals.  Such talent is scarce.  To attract and retain CEOs, 
they have to be properly rewarded (Kim, Kogut, & Yang 2013). 
 
2.3   EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
There is no topic in business as controversial as the remuneration of executives, 
and commentators, as well as executives (Ulrich 2010), often misunderstand the 
term.  Ulrich (2010) posits that a possible reason for this is due to the use of 
alternative terms such as compensation, pay, and reward.  Executive remuneration 
refers to the fixed pay, STIs and LTIs, and related benefits awarded to those who 
occupy the most senior decision-making positions in private- and public-sector 
enterprises (Bussin 2011). 
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The next section examines the origins and development of executive remuneration, 
and on the consequent composition of executive remuneration packages. 
2.3.1 Origins and nature of executive remuneration 
Executive remuneration refers to the remuneration paid to CEOs and other senior 
executives of an organisation, including fixed pay, and STIs and LTIs. The 
remuneration of executives, identified as a key management challenge, found its 
way into economic thinking as early as the 1930s (Shaw 2011). 
 
According to Murphy (2012), executive remuneration has developed over time.  This 
is in response to changes in both the economic and the political environment.  
Frydman and Jenter (2009) theorise that the level and structure of CEO 
remuneration have changed noticeably over time. The post-WWII era can be 
divided into at least two distinct periods.  Before the 1970s, low levels of pay, and 
only moderate levels of equity remuneration were observed.  From the mid-1970s 
to the end of the 1990s, the components of some executives’ remuneration 
increased dramatically, and pay disparities between executives and across 
companies increased (Frydman & Jenter 2009). 
 
Shaw (2011) suggests that the first discussions regarding the remuneration of 
executives in the context of the modern business environment have widely been 
attributed to Chester Barnard’s book The Function of the Executive (Laffont & 
Martimort 2001).  In this pioneering work, Barnard points out that financial incentives 
are an important factor in encouraging individuals to provide their discretionary effort 
(Shaw 2011).  
 
This challenge of providing executives with some form of financial and non-financial 
incentive has developed and evolved over the decades, and the emergence of the 
principle-agent theory arose as the underlying economic principle driving executive 
remuneration (Shaw 2011). 
 
The next section will focus on the different components of executive remuneration 
and the way in which these can affect executive decisions. 
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2.3.2  Structure and components of executive remuneration 
Remuneration structure refers to the relationship between fixed pay and the 
performance-based, variable components of pay. The structure of executive 
remuneration packages is used increasingly as a strategic tool to attract, motivate, 
and retain executive skills in a globally competitive labour market.  Walker (2010) 
concurs with this notion, and postulates that companies can attract the best 
executives by providing a competitive remuneration package.  
 
Diamantopoulos (2012) postulates that the components of executive remuneration 
vary, and each component has its own, individual effect on the total remuneration 
that the executive will receive.  He further states that executive remuneration 
contains various elements, depending on the corporate governance of the company 
and the contract between the CEO and the board of directors. 
 
Executive remuneration packages usually consist of basic salary, benefits, STIs, 
and LTIs, therefore, a combination of fixed and variable pay (Bussin 2012).  
Executives of listed companies often receive a fixed monthly or annual salary.  The 
fixed portion includes salary and other benefits not linked to performance, whereas 
the variable portion differs according to the results of various measures of company 
performance (21st Century Pay Solutions 2010).  According to Frydman and Jenter 
(2009), considerable heterogeneity in pay practices exists across companies, and 
most CEOs’ remuneration packages comprise similar basic components. The 
relative importance of these remuneration elements, to executives and the company 
alike has, however, changed significantly over time.  
Huang (2010) posits that the structure of a CEO’s remuneration is more complicated 
than just a base salary plus a bonus.  It is, furthermore, important to understand the 
special structure of CEOs packages before considering whether CEOs are overpaid 
(Huang 2010). 
Ellig (2007) postulates that the design of an executive’s remuneration package will 
follow the path where it is the easiest for the executive to qualify for a payment.  
Should STIs be difficult to obtain due to factors outside the control of the CEO, the 
structure of the remuneration would lean towards a guaranteed cost to company or 
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fixed pay.  The contrary is also true; should STIs be easier to obtain, the structure 
of remuneration will lean towards more incentive pay (Nel 2012). 
WorldatWork’s Total Rewards Model positions remuneration as one of six key 
factors of a total rewards structure that collectively define an organisation’s strategy 
to attract, motivate, retain and engage employees (WorldatWork 2015).  These 
factors are: 
 
 compensation (remuneration) provided by an employer to its employees for 
services rendered and included both fixed and variable pay tied to 
performance levels 
 benefits are used to supplement the cash remuneration employees receive. 
This provide security for employees and their families; 
 work‒life effectiveness is a specific sect of organisational practices, policies 
and programmes that help employees achieve success at both work and 
home; 
 recognition can be formal or informal, that acknowledge or give special 
attention to employee performance and support business strategy by 
reinforcing behaviours that contribute to organisational success;  
 performance management includes establishing expectations, skill 
demonstration, assessment, feedback and continuous improvement; and 
 talent development provides the opportunity and tools for employees to 
advance their skills and competencies in both their short- and long-term 
careers. 
 
WorldatWork deems remuneration as one of many benefits that a company has to 
offer in order to attract, retain, and motivate employees (WorldatWork 2015).  This 
model is influenced by the characteristics and culture of the organisation, and 
include programmes, practices, elements and dimensions that organisations can 
use to offer and design a value proposition that benefits both the organisation and 
the employee (WorldatWork 2015).  Figure 4 provides a graphic representation of 
the Total Rewards Model. 
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Figure 4 Total Rewards Model 
 
Source: WorldatWork (2015) 
 
In the present study, it was important to consider the components of remuneration 
individually, in order to determine the most common types of CEO remuneration 
options (see Otieno 2011: 26).  The reason for this is that it would be expected that 
salaries and bonuses constitute the greatest part of the CEO’s remuneration 
variable.  A clear distinction needs to be made between the following components 
of a CEO’s remuneration package. 
The fixed pay (or base/basic salary) is the reward offered to the CEO for taking 
responsibility as the manager of the company (Swatdikun 2013).  Ellig (2007) 
regards it as the cornerstone of a remuneration programme. Performance is not 
linked to this remuneration component, and it therefore remains fixed (Ulrich 2010).  
The fixed pay is usually determined in line with industry norms of aligning salary 
levels within hierarchical level and functional areas, with consideration to the size of 
the company (Xu 2013).  Ellig (2007) argues that a fixed pay is a function of the 
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responsibility and workload of an individual. Generally, the annual fixed pay signifies 
a small percentage of a CEO’s total remuneration (Martocchio 2013).  In addition, 
an increase in the basic salary will have a positive influence on many other 
remuneration components (Murphy 1999), because, for example, bonuses are often 
calculated as a percentage of the fixed pay (Xu 2013). 
A bonus is a form of remuneration based on individual, group, or corporate 
performance, and is single payments for performance companies use to reward 
employees for attainment of specific, extraordinary goals (Martocchio 2013).  For 
most executives, it is based on group performance.  To encourage the achievement 
of short-term objectives, executives are awarded annual bonuses (Murphy 1998).  
Jensen and Murphy (2004) state that one advantage of bonuses is that these are 
quite accurate indicators of the actual performance of executives, because bonuses 
are awarded in respect of the achievement of operational objectives that lead to 
value creation.  On average, a CEO’s bonus is equivalent to approximately 50% of 
his or her fixed pay (Jensen & Murphy 2010).  However, Andersson, and Andersson 
(2006) posit that previous research indicate that bonuses do not make a difference 
for the performance of a company. For example, Weinberg 1995 found no 
relationship between CEO bonuses and company performance. Resnick (2013) 
suggests that South African CEOs’ bonuses are somewhat higher than in other 
countries, regardless of executive remuneration, overall, being lower than that of 
many other countries. 
 
Four types of bonuses are common in executive remuneration (Martocchio 2013). 
 Discretionary bonus: This is awarded to executives on a voluntary basis; the 
board of directors weighs four factors in establishing the amount of a 
discretionary bonus: company profits, the financial situation of the company, 
business circumstances, and predictions regarding the future of the company. 
 Performance-contingent bonus: This is paid when the CEO’s performance 
meets specific criteria.  The performance appraisal system for determining 
bonus awards is often the same system used for establishing merit increases 
or salary increases. 
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 Predetermined allocation bonus: This is calculated using a fixed formula.  
The amount available to pay as bonuses depends on company profits. 
 Target plan bonus: This is linked to the CEOs’ ability to meet targets, and is 
thus directly linked to their performance.  The bonus amount increases to 
match performance.  In theory, executives do not receive bonuses when their 
performance is lower than minimum acceptable standards. 
For the purposes of the present research, all four types of bonus were considered. 
Executives are paid STIs to recognise their progress toward fulfilling the strategic 
goals of the company. These STIs are designed to reward CEOs for meeting 
intermediate performance criteria (Martocchio 2013). 
Executive remuneration comprises a fixed and a variable portion.  The fixed portion 
comprises the fixed pay and other benefits not linked to performance, whereas the 
variable portion varies according to specific measures of company performance 
(21st Century Pay Solutions 2010). 
According to Resnick (2013), the large number of components that make up 
remuneration packages makes the executive remuneration structure in South Africa 
complex.  This author furthermore indicates that research by Debert, Torres, and 
Papadakis (2008) revealed that these components are regularly integrated into 
salary packages and additional incentives. 
Various research contributions point out that, in remuneration, the following 
variables are considered to be significant: fixed pay, benefits, STIs, LTIs, ad hoc or 
other payments, and share ownership (Shaw 2011: 22).  Within the framework of 
the pay-for-performance relationship, fixed pay (the sum of base pay and benefits), 
STIs, and LTIs are the measures that appear to be the most widely used.  Ad hoc 
or other payments are hardly ever included, as they are, by their own admission, 
unrelated to performance. (Shaw 2011: 23). Despite a bonus being considered 
performance-based remuneration, it is often inadequately tied to performance.  
Bonuses are often based on easily achievable performance targets that do not 
reflect good performance relative to that of peer companies (Bebchuk & Fried 2003). 
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Although Van Blerck (2012) posits that LTIs should ideally be integrated in studies 
on CEOs’ remuneration and companies’ performance, Lippert and Porter (1997) 
observe that several studies have only utilised fixed pay and STIs as measures of 
remuneration, due to time constrains (Murphy 1985).  LTIs will not be included in 
the present study. Shaw (2011) noted that several credible studies have focused on 
fixed pay and STIs, and that the validity of these studies were not compromised by 
the exclusion of LTIs.  Moreover, Bradley (2013) stated that most other research on 
this topic left out the value of LTIs from the data set.  Omitting these from the current 
research, the findings are comparable with those of other studies. 
 
2.3.3 Key issues in executive remuneration 
While any discussion on executive remuneration seems to invite controversy, a few 
major issues have recently attracted much attention, such as the perceived 
excessive remuneration of CEOs compared to company performance (Surve 2008).  
De Wet (2012) concurs with this, stating that the media regularly reports a growing 
number of remuneration practices where there is no alignment between executive 
pay and company performance.  Okasmaa (2009) posits that, despite the large 
number of studies on the topic of executive remuneration, it remains difficult to 
explain. One reason for this is the almost “inexistent” link between performance and 
pay, making it uncertain what economic logic remuneration packages have 
(Okasmaa 2009: 43). Kirkpatrick (2009) posits that, although the academic world 
notes the risks of excessive CEO remuneration, these are not widely discussed and 
analysed. 
Few CEOs would concede, at least openly, that they are overpaid. Concern 
regarding executive remuneration has, however, been growing for some time.  It is 
a delicate matter for many CEOs and for the boards of the companies that employ 
them (Morrow 2012).  The remuneration of CEOs has been a topic of much interest 
for journalists and academic researchers over the last 30 years, due to the sharp 
increase in CEO remuneration since the late 1980s (Diamantopoulos 2012: 4).  This 
trend is best illustrated by a Forbes study that revealed that, in 1986, USA’s Top 10 
highest paid CEOs, in aggregate earned US$57.88 million.  In 2012, the top ten 
CEOs in terms of remuneration earned US$616.4 million, which was ten times as 
much as the 1986 total (after taking inflation into account) (Sforza 2013).  
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Newspapers often report on the disproportionate pay of executives compared to the 
salary of general employees (Diamantopoulos 2012). 
According to Bussin (2011), the three issues that continuously emerge in public 
remarks on executive remuneration are: Do executives deserve the amounts they 
are paid? Are the variable components linked to suitable measures of performance?  
Is the overall remuneration structured in a way that is justifiable and trustworthy to 
shareholders, the business media, and the community as a whole?  By far the most 
controversial issue is the amount of remuneration that executives receive (Surve 
2008).   
 
The main criticism against executive remuneration is the widening gap between 
executive remuneration and that of other employees. Ulrich (2010) states that 
nobody should earn more than five times the wage of an ordinary worker, while 
Drucker, as far back as the mid-1980s, argued that the difference should not be 
greater than 20 times, and that the growing gap may threaten the credibility of 
business leadership.  Interestingly, in South Africa, executives earn more than 400 
times the salary of an ordinary employee (Ulrich 2010).  
 
Bussin (2011) asks whether the amounts paid to executives are warranted.  There 
is the concern of supply and demand.  There is general concurrence that rare 
capabilities and skills are required to succeed in organisational leadership roles.  
This poses a challenge, as the available talent pool is small, and a number of 
business situations require highly specialised skill sets that are not easily obtained 
(Bussin 2011). 
 
Apart from high executive remuneration, another key issue is the different ways in 
which executives are paid.  If executives were paid a fixed pay only, it would be 
straightforward to assess salaries paid to executives (within a company, or across 
companies, industries, and countries).  It would then also be possible to identify the 
highest salary, to ascertain how executive pay changed over time, and how 
executive pay compares to wages paid in other occupations.  However, the following 
needs to be considered (Murphy 2012: 6). 
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 Executives receive remuneration in an array of forms, consisting of fixed 
salaries, annual bonuses, LTIs, restricted stock, performance shares, and 
retirement benefits, amongst others.  
 Several of these types of remuneration are calculated using performance 
measures over a single or multiple years, and it is not always clear how (or 
when) these were calculated. 
 Executives receive lump-sum amounts at different points in time, such as 
signing-on bonuses when joining a company, and severance payments upon 
departure.  Additionally, some payments ‘earned’ while employed (such as 
defined benefit pension payouts) are not paid until long after the executive has 
departed and his remuneration is no longer reported.  It is not clear how, or 
when, to measure these aspects of remuneration. 
 
Hayes and Schaefer (2009) present the ‘Lake Wobegon Effect’ as a possible reason 
for the surge in CEO pay.  According to radio host Garrison Keillor, all the children 
in his fictional home town of Lake Wobegon are above average, all the women are 
strong and all the men are good-looking.  The Lake Wobegon effect is the tendency 
of people to overestimate their abilities and performance in relation to those of 
others (Van Vugt 2013: 2).  This seems to be the case with CEOs (Theunissen 
2012).  Hayes and Schaefer (2009) claim that no company wants to concede to 
having an inept CEO, so each company wants its CEO’s remuneration to put 
him/her above the median pay level of comparable companies.  Hence, when one 
company’s CEO receives an increase, another (competing company’s) CEO gets 
one too, irrespective of performance (Hayes & Schaefer 2009).  The result is an 
endless benchmarking exercise, with companies pushing CEO remuneration ever 
higher, without taking their companies’ specific conditions into consideration 
(Theunissen 2012). 
 
2.3.4 Theoretical perspectives on executive remuneration 
This section examines different theories on executive remuneration by uniquely 
combining various management theory lenses. Mustapha (2012: 52) postulates that 
“theory acts as the basis to identify and raise research problems.”  It, furthermore, 
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helps to identify relevant factors, concepts, variables, and relationships, and aids 
interpretation and understanding of observations and data.  (Mustapha 2012). 
 
A number of theories were developed over time to explain executive remuneration.  
However, due to the ever-changing nature of the field, there is not yet a faultless 
theory (Ulrich 2010). Snieder (no date) posits that a few theories have been 
influential in this regard, namely agency theory, the managerial power approach, 
and stewardship theory. However, most of the studies on executive remuneration 
adopted multiple theories to explain executives’ remuneration (Sun, Zhao, & Yang 
2010; Mustapha 2012). 
  
South African studies have used the following theories: agency theory, social 
comparison theory, stakeholder theory, managerial power theory, and the 
tournament theory (Ulrich 2010).  In Otieno’s (2011) study, the focus was on the 
relationship between financial performance and executive remuneration from an 
agency theory perspective.  Shaw (2011) discussed the managerial power theory, 
labour market theory, optimal contracting theory, and principal‒agent (or agency) 
theory.  Van Blerck (2012) discussed principal‒agent theory, optimal contracting 
theory, and the managerial power approach/theory.  
 
Mbo and Adjasi (2013) examined the fundamental drivers of SOEs’ performance in 
Africa.  These authors concluded that SOE performance could be explained in terms 
of the following organisational theories: resource-based theory, agency theory, 
stewardship theory, and the public choice theory.  Mbo and Adjasi (2013) suggest 
that the factors affecting and influencing SOEs’ performance are varied, and that 
there is no particular theory to best clarify or predict the relationship between SOEs’ 
performance and executives’ remuneration.  In fact, in his article, Bussin (2014) 
contests the idea that there is one central theory that underpins CEOs’ 
remuneration. 
 
For the purpose of the present study, only the theories found by Mbo and Adjasi 
(2013) that explains SOE performance, and illustrated in Figure 5, will be discussed, 
The reason for including these  theories are, due to the fact that that Mbo and Adjasi 
(2013) found that SOEs’ performance could be explained in terms these theories. 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
55 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
Second, the remuneration benchmarking theory provides a possible explanation of 
the theoretical CEO remuneration framework. Annexure A lists more 
comprehensive explanations of the different theories that explain the composition 
and importance of executive remuneration packages.  
 
Figure 5 Overview of Theories of Executive Remuneration 
  
 
2.3.4.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory considers a contracting problem between principal and agent with 
competing interests (Jensen 1983). It describes a principal-agency relationship as 
an agreement in which one or more people employ and delegate there authority to 
another to manage business on their behalf (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
Shareholders are viewed as the principals, and management is considered the 
agents (De Wet 2012).  In the case of SOEs, the CEOs are the agents.  According 
to De Wet (2012: 59), agency theory is the ‘golden thread’ that governed previous 
research on executive remuneration and company performance.  This theory 
addresses the potential conflict of interest between shareholders and management, 
which are referred to as agency problems (Theku 2014). Otieno (2011) posits that 
the agency problem has received attention because the costs associated with it can 
reduce the value SOEs and, consequently, reduce shareholder wealth.  
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In large organisations, the agents who control the company operations are 
separated from the shareholders who invest their money in the firm 
(Diamantopoulos 2012). The shareholders (in the case of SOEs, it is mostly 
government) delegate day-to-day decision-making in the company to the CEO and 
directors, who are the agents.  This is where a problem arises. Agents do not 
necessarily make decisions in the best interest of the principal (the shareholder), 
because of conflicting interests.  CEOs set as their primary goal the pursuit of their 
own personal ambitions, such as high bonuses.  On the other hand, shareholders 
aim to maximise their wealth (Diamantopoulos 2012). In practice, managers 
therefore focus on company investments that provide high short-term profits, 
because their remuneration depends on these profits. Diamantopoulos (2012) 
states that these actions occur at the cost of the maximization of shareholders’ 
wealth that is achieved by long-term growth and prosperity. 
 
In addition, in the case of SOEs, the difficulty of defining the ultimate principals of 
SOEs impedes the development of suitable procedures for aligning the agent’s 
interest with those of the principal (Mbo & Adjasi 2013).  This problem, also noted 
by Toninelli (2000), leads to executives in SOEs being ‘agents without principals.’  
As much as the owner of an SOE is the government, there is often confusion with 
regard to who is representing government. Is it the central government, local 
government, bureaucrats, or the public (Mbo & Adjasi 2013)?  Li and Xia (2007) 
highlighted the importance of the agency problem in the case of SOEs and 
questioned the ability of the principal to monitor the agent.  This inability creates 
more opportunities for SOE executives to participate in wasteful projects to their 
own advantage, for instance, empire building at investors’ cost (Li & Xia 2007). 
 
Although the agency theory has been the prevailing rationale in linking executive 
remuneration and company performance, some researchers have questioned the 
soundness of this view (De Wet 2012).  Mengistae and Xu (2004) examined the 
extent to which the agency theory explained CEOs’ remuneration in SOEs in China 
during the 1980s.  They found that the ability of the CEO’s remuneration to influence 
company performance decreases with the variance in performance. Mustapha 
(2013: 58) postulates that the agency theory is criticised mostly because of its 
“unrealistic assumptions.”  Mustapha mentions, for example, that the agency theory 
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adopts a causal relationship between the executives’ actions and company 
performance, disregarding the effect of other factors.  This theory has also been 
criticised as under-socialised, due to its failure to explain cross-country differences 
(Bruce, Buck, & Main 2005; Filatotchev & Allock 2010). 
 
Toninelli (2000) suggests that the agency problem remains in SOEs, because it may 
not be clear who exactly represents the principal.  Nonetheless, there have been 
instances where politicians, acting as the principal, have applied pressure on an 
SOE and put in place incentives and policies to encourage agents to act in the 
principal’s interest (Mbo & Adjasi 2013).  Notwithstanding the above arguments, 
Mwaura (2007) and Fudanga and Mwaba (2006) ascribed the failure of some SOEs 
to the agency problem itself. 
 
2.3.4.2 Resource-based theory 
According to the resourced-based theory, a company derives a competitive 
advantage from its unique resources and capabilities.  Resources include capital in 
various forms, land, employees with special skills, and other types of resources, 
whereas capabilities are a company’s ability to integrate and utilise its resources to 
gain a competitive advantage (Li & Xia 2007).  Resource-based theory proposes 
that a company develops its strategy based on its specific resources and 
capabilities. 
 
The resource-based theory was popularised by, among others, Hamel and Prahala 
(1994), who visualised organisations as bundles of assets, which, dependent on 
how these assets are utilised, make one company perform better than the next (Mbo 
& Adjasi 2013).  Consistent with this suggestion, Grant (2003) holds the view that a 
company’s resources are its primary source of good performance.  
 
Mbo and Adjasi (2013) posit that SOEs present a thought-provoking example with 
regard resource-based theory. These authors posit that it is very noble that 
resources offer extraordinary performance if they are exceptional and imperfectly 
imitable. However, in many cases, SOEs remain monopolies under legislation 
providing them with exclusive rights to own and operate specialised assets.  Classic 
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examples include power transmission assets owned by electricity corporations, 
such as South Africa’s Eskom. 
 
2.3.4.3 Stewardship theory 
The stewardship theory offered by Donaldson and Davis (1989; 1991) holds that 
executives, instead of being motivated by individual goals, act as stewards whose 
efforts are aligned with the expectations of shareholders (Cao, Lemmon, Tian, & 
Pan 2009). This theory presumes that executives do not always act in self-interested 
ways, and, if a situation of a conflict of interests arises, they often place the interests 
of the company above their own (Sun et al. 2010).  According to Donaldson and 
Davis (1991: 51) this theory holds that the executive wants to “do a good job, to be 
a good steward of the corporate assets.  As a result, stewardship theory maintains 
that there is no inherent, general problem of executive motivation.” 
 
According to the stewardship theory, there is no need to monitor or control the CEO 
using techniques such as bonuses (Grahan & Högfeldt 2010).  Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) furthermore argue that a company will perform better if the CEO has a more 
independent role, as the CEO is the person who knows the company the best.  
Donaldson and Davis (1991) propose that the stewardship theory holds that 
differences in performance result from whether the structural situation in which the 
executive is placed enables effective action by the executive.  De Wet (2012), in 
addition, postulates that managers, according to this theory, focus on intrinsic 
rewards that are not easily measured.   
 
2.3.4.4 Public Choice theory 
Public choice theory is a subdivision of economics that advanced from studies on 
taxation and public spending. It was developed in the 1950s, and received extensive 
public attention in 1986, when James Buchanan, one of its two leading designers 
(the other was his colleague Gordon Tullock), was awarded the Nobel Prize in 
economics (Shaw 2008). 
 
Public choice takes the same philosophies that economists use to analyse people's 
actions in the marketplace and applies them to people's actions in collective 
decision-making.  Economists who study behaviour in the marketplace assume that 
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people are motivated mostly by self-interest.  While most people align their actions 
with their concern for others, the dominant motive for people's actions in the 
marketplace —— is self-interest.  Public choice economists have the same opinion 
— that even though people acting in the political sphere have some concern for 
others, their primary consideration, irrespective of their roles, is self-interest (Shaw 
2008). 
 
The public choice theory assumes that, even if political leadership has some 
concern for the interest of others, such concern is minimal, as the most important 
interest they serve is their own (Mbo & Adjasi 2013).  SOEs are government’s own 
vehicles for service delivery, and since politicians run governments, it follows that 
politicians may have control over the direction of SOEs (Mbo & Adjasi 2013).   
 
According to the public choice theory, economic efficiency of SOEs is challenged 
by the fact that the politicians do not have a personal equity stake in these entities 
(Mwaura 2007). Consequently, they have no financial incentive to ensure that 
executives effectively manage SOEs.  This theory therefore assumes that SOEs will 
operate in line with the interests of politicians, and not necessarily according to the 
executives’ interests. This undermines the core principles of the agency theory, 
resulting in poor performance (Mbo & Adjasi 2013: 8).   
 
Moreover, the public choice theory appears to be in conflict with the view that 
stakeholder interests can be considered, as it clearly considers political interests as 
having a supreme influence, to the disadvantage of good performance (Mwaura 
2007). 
 
2.3.5 Determinants of executive remuneration 
A number of studies have examined the determinants of executive remuneration 
and the relationship between executive remuneration and company performance.  
As shown by Murphy (1999) in his broad review of the literature, most empirical 
papers have focused on CEOs’ pay in the USA, and used data sets that were 
collected from samples consisting of listed private companies (Menozzi, Erbetta, 
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Fraquelli, & Vannoni 2011). The literature on SOEs from a South African perspective 
is sparse.  
 
Examples of studies focusing primarily on the determinants and/or effects of CEO- 
and top management remuneration are those by Gibbons and Murphy (1990), 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia (2000), Aggarwal 
and Samwick (2003), Jensen and Murphy (2010), Grund and Kräkel (2012), and 
Kampkӧtter (2012).  Prior research, when examining the pay‒performance link, 
found that determinants differ across the various components of remuneration 
(McKnight & Tomkins 1999).  
 
According to Shah, Javed, and Abbas (2009), a number of factors play a key role in 
determining CEO remuneration, as illustrated in Figure 6.  
Figure 6 Model of Determinants of CEO Remuneration 
 
Source: Adapted from Shah et al. (2009) 
 
The model in Figure 6 offers an outline of the determinants of CEO remuneration, 
including a corporate governance view, as well as the company’s size and a 
performance view.   
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A study conducted by Lee (2010) investigated three different categories of 
remuneration, namely guaranteed pay, STIs, and LTIs, and the determinants that 
are currently utilised in setting these categories (from a South African perspective).  
Lee’s findings suggest that the most popular determinants are: complexity of work, 
job size, executive track record, affordability (for the purpose of Lee’s study, 
affordability refers to whether or not the company has the funds for executive 
remuneration), and organisational growth.  To determine the executives’ STIs, the 
most popular determinants taken into consideration are affordability, organisational 
growth, economic value-add, and shareholder return.  Table 1 presents the different 
determinants/variables of executive remuneration obtained from the literature.  
Table 1 Determinants of Executive Remuneration 
Source: Adapted from Bussin (2011) 
 
From Table 1, it is evident that different determinants/variables are used in setting 
executive remuneration.  Figure 7 illustrates that the CEO’s age, the organisation’s 
size, and the organisation’s performance may have a direct influence on the CEO’s 
remuneration.  These are briefly discussed below. 
  
1. Organisation size Turnover, number of employees, and value of 
assets  
2. Organisation 
performance 
Profitability, return on investment, and value 
added 
3. Executive-specific factors
 
Age, tenure, and education 
4. Organisational structure Holding, subsidiary or single-unit organisation, 
capital- or labour intensive 
5. Job- or position-specific 
factors 
Level of decision-making, consequences of 
error, and organisational level 
6. Job complexity The size if the job, measured by job-sizing 
instruments 
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Figure 7 CEO and Company characteristics and remuneration 
 
Source: Adapted from McKnight, Tomkins, Weir, & Hobson (2000) 
 
Various theoretical approaches are used to develop hypotheses regarding 
determinants of remuneration, which are typically categorised into three different 
dimensions, namely job-, employee-, and organisational characteristics 
(Kampkötter 2012). 
 
According to Sharma and Fayyaz (2000), previous research found four classes of 
relevant variables, namely (1) company size, (2) company performance, (3) 
industry, and (4) human capital attributes (i.e. education and tenure).  For the 
purpose of the present study, the focus will be on CEO characteristics (age, tenure, 
gender, race and education), and company size and company performance as 
company characteristics.  Interestingly, however, Falk, Murphy, Shirreff, Volkart, 
and Widmer (2004) posit that cases of excessive executive remuneration are 
difficult to explain using the traditional determinants of executive remuneration, such 
as the company’s performance, its size, etcetera.  These authors investigated a key 
determinant of excessive executive remuneration — conflicts of interests within 
boards.  This aspect is discussed in Section 2.4. 
 
2.3.5.1 CEO characteristics as determinants of remuneration 
In an organisation, the CEO is first among equals.  A CEO’s characteristics in terms 
of for example age, and education, have been found to have an important 
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relationship with his or her remuneration (Sarkar 2013).  The literature advocates 
that a number of CEO-specific characteristics have an effect on a CEO’s 
remuneration (Sarkar 2013; Pereira Alves, Couto, & Francisco 2014). 
 
Sharma and Fayyaz (2000) categorise employee characteristics as human capital 
variables.  The logic underlying the link between human capital variables and pay 
levels is that individuals who make personal investments in job-relevant skills and 
experience should earn a premium (Sharma & Fayyaz 2000: 82).  The profile and 
personal attributes of an executive have a link with his or her level of remuneration, 
but it is difficult to measure to what extent which attribute has an impact (Okasmaa 
2009).  In this regard, Gomez-Mejia, Paulin, and Grabke (1995) state that personal 
attributes play a greater role in setting the fixed pay than in setting variable 
remuneration. 
 
(a) CEO’s age 
Age is a proxy for experience, and has been the subject of much research in labour 
economics (Cole & Mehran 2008: 10).  CEOs with more experience should have 
more knowledge, skills, and experience (Baptista 2010).  However, previous 
research provided varied results with regard to CEOs’ age (McKnight & Tomkins 
2009: 28).  The reason for these contradicting findings may be partially clarified by 
the fact that prior research has, in general, depended on a single measure of CEO 
remuneration — total of fixed pay plus bonus (McKnight &Tomkins 2009).  
 
Deckop (1989) argues that a CEO’s age has little effect on his or her remuneration, 
whereas Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) found an inverted u-shaped relationship 
between CEOs’ age and their remuneration.  The results of their study indicate that 
CEO cash remuneration increases until the age of 59 years, where after it starts to 
decline. McKnight et al. (2000) further support this where their findings also indicate 
that CEO remuneration positively relates to a certain age, but it starts to decline 
from the age of 53 as the personal preferences of CEOs towards the mix in pay 
components change. This is in line with the notion that the need for cash will weaken 
as one gets older because of a decrease in human life-cycle related obligations and 
dependencies (e.g. siblings) (McKnight et al. 2000).  
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Conyon and Murphy (2000) propose a significant, concave CEO age-earnings 
profile for cash (fixed pay), turn downward after the age of 55, and for total 
remuneration, after the age 43.  However, Conyon and Murphy used data for only 
one year.  Nulla (2014) posits that the aforementioned relationship is consistent with 
the view that earnings over time are in line with CEOs’ need for cash, which tends 
to decrease as expenditures such as child-rearing expenses are no longer a 
consideration. 
 
On the other hand, Bradley (2013) found that bonuses positively correlate with age.  
For every year by which the CEO’s age increases, the bonus payable to the CEO 
increases.  Bradley (2013: 560) explains that, while not likely, it is possible that older 
CEOs can demand greater bonuses, solely owing to their increase in rank and 
status within the company.  Lin, Kuo, and Wang (2013) found that older CEOs 
receive higher fixed pay  This finding offers support for the argument that a CEO’s 
age relates to the CEO’s ability to influence the board’s pay determination process 
(Lin et al. 2013: 38). 
 
(b) CEO’s tenure 
Tenure has also received some attention from CEO remuneration researchers.  
Researchers measure tenure by the number of years the executive has served as 
CEO (Shah et al. 2009), and can be seen as a proxy for entrenchment (Baptista 
2010).  Lengthy tenure increases the chances of the CEO influencing the selection 
of board members, and it generally leads to stronger relationships with board 
members.  Because board members play a significant role in the determination of a 
CEO’s remuneration, tenure could explain a CEO’s remuneration (Banghøj, 
Gabrielsen, Petersen, & Plenborg 2010; Baptista 2010).  McKnight and Tomkins 
(2004) state that, through increased tenure, the CEO may gain control over the pay-
setting process and, in turn, be able to design remuneration schemes to suit his/her 
preferences. 
 
In the literature, the empirical evidence of the relationship between tenure and CEO 
remuneration is mixed. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) found a curvilinear 
relationship between executive pay and tenure (if graphically depicted, will show a 
U-shaped curve), whereas O’Reilly, Main, and Crystal (1988) found a negative 
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association.  Hill and Phan (1991) maintained that tenure has little or no effect on 
CEO remuneration.  Attaway (2000) found a positive association, whereas Randhøy 
and Nielsen (2002) found no association between tenure and level of pay.  
Carothers (2004) found that CEO pay significantly relates to the number of years a 
CEO remains with the company. This is supported by Bertsch and Mann (2005) who 
found a strong relationship between CEO pay and tenure.  Baptista (2010) found 
that tenure significantly influences the cash remuneration (basic salary, director’s 
fees, cash bonus, benefits in kind and director’s fees) of CEOs, and that CEOs are 
paid more as their tenure increases.  Baptista (2010: 24) explains this as follows: 
“This fact can be explained by increased ability from CEOs to influence the Board 
of Directors, the Remuneration Committee or the HR department as they spend 
more time managing the company.  On the other hand, the higher pay can also be 
compensation for their higher knowledge of their company’s resources and 
business.” 
 
Bradley (2013) found that CEOs’ bonuses negatively correlate to years of service 
(tenure). Thus, for every year of service, the CEOs’ bonuses decline (Bradley 2013).  
A possible explanation is that is the period in which the study was conducted.  
Because bonuses are variable in nature and dependent on the performance of the 
company, these would have decreased because of the decline in the global 
economy.  Bradley furthermore found that CEOs’ cash salary positively correlate to 
years of service. Bradley postulated that, as CEOs’ experience increases, their 
worth to the company increases, which results in them being able to demand higher 
salaries.   
 
Rankin (2006) suggests that, while CEO tenure relates to the level of fixed pay and 
total remuneration, there is no relationship between tenure and either STIs or LTIs.  
Aaron, McMillian, and Dunn (2015) posit that CEOs with a longer tenure will perform 
better when offered a greater portion of fixed remuneration relative to performance-
based remuneration. Interestingly, Henderson, Miller, and Hambrick (2006) 
postulate that the positive or negative influence of a CEO’s tenure is industry-
specific. 
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In addition, Shah et al. (2009) and Banghøj et al. (2010) suggest that earlier 
empirical studies do not provide convincing evidence that CEO tenure relates to 
CEO remuneration.  From the literature, it is clear there is no agreement on the 
matter. 
 
(c) CEO’s education 
Human capital theory (Becker 1974) holds that employee characteristics such as 
educational attainment increase remuneration over a lifetime. It has also been 
suggested that the effect of a CEO’s educational background on company 
performance varies across industries (Wasserman, Nohria, & Anand 2001). 
 
A CEO’s education theoretically affects a CEO’s abilities in three similar, non-
exclusive ways. Firstly, education could, in theory, contribute to the CEO’s 
knowledge and comprehension of technical and abstract concepts. Secondly, a 
higher education could be a sign of the CEO’s intelligence and ability to persist in 
challenging intellectual activities.  Finally, the social networks created in college and 
graduate schools can, in future, be helpful professionally (Bhagat, Bolton, & 
Subramanian 2010).  In addition, the higher a CEO’s educational level is, the higher 
his/her expertise will be, justifying higher remuneration (Finkelstein 1992; 
Ramaswamy, Veliyath & Gomes 2000). 
 
Berkeley (1991), in his study using a sample size of 224 companies, found a positive 
relationship between a company’s performance and the educational level of the 
CEO. Chung and Pruitt (1996) found a positive but insignificant relationship 
between educational level and executive remuneration.  However, Jalbert, Rao, and 
Jalbert (2002) found that CEOs without a college degree earn more than those with 
a college degree. Cole and Mehran (2010) found a significant positive relationship 
between CEOs’ level of education and their remuneration in private companies.  
Banghøj et al. (2010) found that educational level is an important differentiator in 
executive remuneration. This indicates that there seems to be a positive relationship 
between executives’ educational level and their remuneration.   
 
Aron and Matthew (2010) investigated whether the educational background of the 
CEO had any effect on company performance. They found no proof supporting the 
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notion that a company managed by a CEO who had an MBA performed better than 
companies headed by CEOs who possesses liberal arts degrees or law degrees.  
Their study also failed to find any evidence that companies managed by CEOs with 
a postgraduate degree performed better than companies managed by CEOs with 
an undergraduate degree. In addition, Bhagat et al. (2010) found no statistical 
relationship between CEO education and company performance, signifying that a 
CEO’s education may be an insufficient proxy for CEOs ability. 
 
The results of a study conducted by Ayaba (2012) indicated that a CEO’s 
educational level has a limited effect in accounting for differences in company 
performance.  Ayaba’s (2012) results show that, while the CEO may bring to the 
company specific educational skills, these skills may progressively be redefined to 
meet the challenges of the environment. 
 
This finding is comparable to those of Bhagat et al. (2010) who found that the CEO’s 
educational level could sway CEO selection.  It does not, however, have an effect 
on the long-term performance of the company.  This therefore suggests that, when 
companies are considering candidates for the CEO position, environmental and 
business challenges (contingency factors) play an important role (Ayaba 2012). 
 
(d) CEO’s gender 
Although previous studies suggest that diversity has a positive impact on the bottom 
line, the link between gender diversity and a company’s financial performance has 
not been firmly established (Catalyst 2004).  In this regard, Khan and Vieito (2013: 
56) postulate that the relationship between the CEO’s gender and company 
performance is a “relatively new area of inquiry.” Further, even though practitioners 
assert that female executive systematically receive lower pay levels than their male 
counterparts (e.g. Catalyst 2000; Hay Group 2010), the academic evidence 
substantiating these gaps is mixed (Carter, Franco & Gine 2017). 
 
According to a report by the South African Board for People Practices (SABPP) in 
2015, South African women earn 15% less than their male counterparts (Scheepers 
2015). Gender equitable remuneration practices has been the subject of many 
academic research papers over the past five years, and a large economic literature 
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on gender pay differentials is available. However in this section, and for the purpose 
of this study, the researcher discusses studies examining gender pay gaps across 
female CEOs/executives, as they are most comparable to this study 
 
In their study, Cole and Mehran (2008) found that female CEOs are paid less than 
their male counterparts. This is consistent with the findings of for example Muñoz-
Bullõn (2010) as well as Cole and Mehran (2016).  
 
Smith et al. (2006) observed the relationship between management diversity and 
company performance in Danish companies.  After controlling for factors that are 
traditionally considered to influence company performance (company age, size, 
etcetera), Smith et al. (2006) found a positive gender‒company performance 
relationship, using a selection of accounting-based performance measures.  They, 
however, warn that any outcome is closely tied to the characteristics of individual 
female executives.  
 
Muñoz-Bullõn (2010) found that a large percentage of the gender pay gap in total 
remuneration was attributable to differences in variable pay between the genders.  
They found that this difference in variable pay accounted for much more of the 
difference in average total remuneration between the genders than did fixed pay 
(roughly 90% vs 10%).  
Statistics from the South African Revenue Service (SARS) indicate that, for the 2011 
tax year, women, overall, earned a taxable income of R160 702, and were liable for 
tax of R26 919, at an effective rate of 16.8%.  Men, on the other hand, earned an 
average taxable income of R223 550, and were liable for tax of R50 885, at a 
nominal rate of 22.8%. Women, overall, earn 28.1% less than men, as measured 
through taxable income (BusinessTech 2013). 
 
In a more recent study, using a sample of executives from ExecuComp from 1996 
to 2010, Carter et al. (2017) found that female executives receive significantly lower 
salaries and total remuneration levels compared to male executives. After 
controlling for job responsibilities and other personal- and company-level 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
69 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
determinants of pay, these authors found salary and total remuneration gaps of 
about 7% and 15% respectively. 
 
(e) CEO’s race 
Research on CEO remuneration and the CEO’s race from a South African 
perspective seems to be scant. The majority of the studies on CEOs’ race and 
remuneration were conducted in the USA (Barret 2014).  Various studies show that 
the probabilities are against previously disadvantaged individuals progressing to the 
top levels of executive management and being paid remuneration similar to that of 
their white male colleagues (Barret 2014: 27). 
 
One of Barret’s (2014) research objectives was to determine the degree of 
remuneration equity between black African and white CEOs in South Africa.  Barret 
found no significant differences between the level and structure of remuneration 
between black African and white CEOs, pointing to the existence of remuneration 
equity between black African and white CEOs.  Unfortunately, Barret only focused 
on two race groups, namely black and white.  
 
Another interesting finding by Barret (2014) was that black CEOs’ mean total 
remuneration in 2013 was R8 751 000, having grown annually by 9.7% since 2008.  
On the other hand, white CEOs’ mean total remuneration was R8 278 000 in the 
same year, and experienced a slower growth rate (7.3% per year) over the 2008 to 
2013 period (Barret 2014).  
 
2.3.5.2 Company characteristics as determinants of CEO remuneration 
 
(a) Company performance 
Company performance is considered the most significant determinant of CEO 
remuneration (Shah et al. 2009).  The “economic argument” for this statement is 
obvious (Sharma & Fayyaz 2000: 82).  As the CEO is, in general, the individual 
responsible for the performance of the organisation, his or her rewards should be 
dependent on company performance (O’Reilly III, Main, & Crystal 1988).  Ngwenya 
and Khumalo (2012) state that economic literature demonstrates that the 
remuneration received by CEOs should be linked to company performance for 
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economic reasons. However, because of the high salary increases executives 
receive, shareholders believe that there is no link between executive pay and 
company performance (Attaway 2000). 
 
The literature emphasises that executive remuneration should be based on 
company performance. Performance in academic research is measured by different 
profit-related variables (Shah et al. 2009). Although the argument is logical, as 
Sharma and Fayyaz put it, findings regarding a clear link between company 
performance and rewards are mixed. 
 
Deckop (1998) defined company performance as profits and revenue, and found 
that these had a positive relationship with the total remuneration of executives.  
Firth, Tam, and Tang (1999) also found a positive association between a company’s 
profitability and executives’ total remuneration. However, Minhat and Abdullah 
(2014) conducted a study with the aim of investigating the characteristics of, inter 
alia, executive pay and the pay‒performance relationship in government-controlled 
companies in Malaysia, and found no evidence of a relationship.  Cambini, De Masi, 
and Rondi (2014) concur with this finding. These authors found that executive 
remuneration decreases when a company is under the control of the state.  
Moreover, Tariq (2010) found a weak negative relationship between CEOs’ 
remuneration and company performance. This negative relationship can have 
unfavourable consequences for the company and the shareholders, as it implies 
that the CEO is not being paid for high performance (Tariq 2010).  Research on 
company performance is discussed in depth in Chapter 3. 
 
(b) Company size 
Researchers believe that there is a correlation between executive remuneration and 
company size (Menozzi et al. 2011; Morton & Blair 2013).  This is a reasonable 
notion, as one would expect that a larger company would be in a stronger financial 
position to offer top-level staff attractive remuneration (Morton & Blair 2013).  
Sharma and Fayyaz (2000) postulate that there are numerous studies linking 
company size to CEO remuneration. 
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Van Blerck (2012) postulates that empirical evidence suggests that CEOs’ 
remuneration is strongly associated with the size of the company.  The rule of thumb 
is that the CEO’s pay increases by 3% for every 10% increase in company size (Van 
Blerck 2012).  In addition, company size is likely to affect the expertise required of 
the CEO (Rankin 2006).  According to Lin et al. (2013: 39), company size is “the 
most important determinant of CEO remuneration.” 
 
Throughout much of the literature (Finkelstein & Hambrick 1996; McKnight 1996; 
Canarella & Gasparyan 2008), the relationship between a company’s size and the 
CEO’s salary is maintained.  One explanation for this is that a company’s size is 
associated with job complexity (Agarwal 1981; McKnight et al. 2000). Job 
complexity can be defined and measured according to the span of control (number 
of persons directly supervised), number of functional divisions, number of 
management divisions, and the geographical diversity of the company (Agarwal 
1981). 
 
In his study, Agarwal (1981) found that the four job complexity measures mentioned 
above were positive and significant, confirming that, as executives’ jobs become 
more complex, they receive higher levels of remuneration (Rankin 2006).  Agarwal’s 
findings therefore confirm that company size is closely linked to, for example, job 
complexity, and that this variable succeeds in capturing the variance in executive 
remuneration accounted for in prior studies.  Menozzi et al. (2011) posit that the 
complexity of the job, the skills required, and the number of hierarchical structures 
managed lead to large companies paying their executives more. 
 
As an organisation grows larger and becomes more complex, the level of knowledge 
and understanding required for the position of CEO becomes more challenging 
(McKnight & Tomkins 2009).  A company’s size therefore reflects the demand for a 
high-quality CEO, which, in turn, relates to the level of the CEO’s remuneration 
(Rankin 2006).   
 
The management of complex organisations places significant demands on the 
executive, and calls for more skills and experience, compared to the management 
of smaller, simpler organisations (Hallock 2002). In the same way, large 
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organisations require higher-calibre executives to run their operation competently; 
therefore, in order to attract and retain these high-calibre executives, a company 
will have to table a competitive offer, which often equates to higher levels of 
remuneration (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker 1999; Morton & Blair 2013). 
 
Studies by various researchers (Ciscel 1974; Finkelstein & Hambrick 1989; 
Chalmers, Koh, & Stapledon 2006) revealed that company size is considered the 
strongest determinant of CEO remuneration when measured in terms of total 
assets.  However, Agarwal (1981) argues that, even though prior research found a 
statistical relationship between company size and executive remuneration, it is 
unclear what aspect of company size relates to the level of executive remuneration.  
Lambert (1991) found weaker relationships between company size measured by 
sales and executive remuneration than suggested by previous researchers, and 
argues that organisational size is not the primary determinant of CEO remuneration 
(Shah et al. 2009).  In their study of the South African banking sector, Deysel and 
Kruger (2015) found no correlation between CEO remuneration and company size. 
 
In conclusion, the literature revealed several determinants that are positively related 
to CEOs’ total remuneration, namely company size, company performance, and the 
CEOs’ age, education, gender, and race.  The next section contains a discussion of 
challenges associated with executive remuneration in South Africa and abroad. 
 
2.4 CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH EXECUTIVE 
REMUNERATION 
It is evident that previous research on executive remuneration and performance has 
produced varied and inconclusive results, and that there is a need for sound and 
innovative remuneration policies that will support the long-term strategies of 
companies.  De Wet (2012) believes that company performance will continue to be 
an important factor in explaining executive remuneration. 
 
There have been heated debates about excessive executive remuneration 
damaging a company and its stakeholders, as well as worker morale and the 
economy in general (Ulrich 2010; Swatdikun 2013).  Hill (1997) contends that the 
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main concern regarding executive remuneration is the potential conflict of interests 
in determining executive remuneration packages. This conflict of interests is 
between executives being responsible for the company’s performance and, as 
board members, being able to propose higher CEO salaries, which will lead to 
higher remuneration for themselves.  The board, based on recommendations made 
by its remuneration committee, generally determines executive pay.  This conflict is 
discussed in greater detail hereunder. 
 
2.4.1 Excessive executive remuneration 
Research on executive remuneration is not a new phenomenon.  As Florin et al. 
(2010) indicate, it can be traced back to the work of Roberts (1956), and even as 
far as that of Berle and Means (1932).  Papers by Masson (1971), Lewellen and 
Huntsman (1970), Coughlin and Schmidt (1985), and Jensen and Murphy (1990), 
among others, also discuss this matter.  Florin et al. (2010) are of the opinion that 
Murphy’s study in 1985 can be regarded as a landmark study — data were obtained 
from 461 executives in 71 firms from 1964 to 1981. Murphy introduced ‘fixed-effects’ 
models, and found a strong relationship between executive pay and company 
performance. 
 
Executive remuneration has been the focus of much discourse, and has led to 
disagreement in both the business world and academia (Nichols & Subramaniam 
2001).  Despite the large number of studies conducted on executive remuneration, 
it is noteworthy how difficult it is to explain executive remuneration as research 
results are remarkably incoherent (Okasmaa 2009).  Most people who voice an 
opinion on executive remuneration seem to think that it has become excessive, 
which opinion is grounded in arguments regarding equity or fairness. These 
arguments often are either (1) that executive pay is inequitable relative to other 
workers’ pay, or (2) that the amounts are unjustified when compared to the 
company’s or the SOE’s performance (Nichols & Subramaniam 2001).  However, 
Ulrich (2010: 112) states that “the controversial issue of excessive executive 
remuneration is not a phenomenon of the modern era.”  In support, Ulrich (2010) 
mentions as an example the remuneration of the president of Bethlehem Steel, 
which was US$1.65 million in 1929, which translates to more than US$15 million in 
2003 (Grant 2003). 
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Szondy (2003) believes that excessive executive remuneration, which has been a 
general trend since the 1990s, is fuelling immense investor anger towards executive 
greed whereby executives, instead of adding value to organisations, destroy it.  He 
further argues that excessive executive remuneration does not support the interests 
of shareholders.  This phenomenon is described as an unparalleled crisis (Szondy 
2003). These arguments are based on the widespread view that executive 
remuneration levels are excessive compared to the salaries paid to ordinary 
workers, which often bear no relationship to the performance of the executives 
(Ulrich 2010). 
 
2.4.2 Conflict of interest 
The main problem with executive remuneration has traditionally been assumed to 
be the conflict between the interests of shareholders and those of self-serving 
executives (Hill 2006).  To understand this conflict of interests, it is essential to look 
at the key role players in determining CEO remuneration.  Figure 8 illustrates these 
role players. 
Figure 8 Key role players in determining CEO remuneration 
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The mere fact that there are so many role players involved in determining CEO 
remuneration creates various possible conflicts of interests (Martocchio 2013), 
which are highlighted below. 
 
a) Board of directors: The board of directors is supposed to represent the 
shareholders and serve their interests. Members of a board of directors 
generally include: (1) CEOs and executives from the company, (2) prominent 
community leaders, (3) well-regarded professionals, and (4) executives of 
other companies. The board of directors is responsible for the final approval 
of recommendations made by the remuneration committee. A conflict of 
interests arises when CEOs use remuneration to co-opt board members’ 
support and nominate candidates for board membership who will support their 
own interests (Martocchio 2013).  Martocchio (2013) posits that there is a 
statistical relationship between how highly the CEO is paid and how highly 
other members of the board of directors are paid.  Collier, Idensohn, and 
Adkins (2010) posit that the relationship between board members and the 
company’s CEO, who may be actively involved in the selection of board 
members, is regarded as a potential source of a conflict of interests in setting 
executive pay.  In addition, this conflict of interests seems to be an important 
factor in explaining recent cases of excessive executive remuneration (Falk et 
al. 2004).  Falk et al. (2004) note that, for example, CEOs also acting as board 
chairmen of large boards with many external directors who are appointed by 
the CEO, or boards’ agendas being set by the CEO, may have an inflationary 
effect on the level of executive remuneration. 
 
b) Remuneration committee: A remuneration committee comprises members 
of the board of directors from within and outside of the company.  External 
board members also serve on remuneration committees, in order to minimise 
the effects conflicts of interests.  External directors normally hold most of the 
committee’s authority (Martocchio 2013). 
 
c) Remuneration consultants: Remuneration consultants normally provide 
recommendations regarding pay packages. The independence of 
remuneration consultants may be compromised, because they are paid by 
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companies to assist with the determination of executive remuneration.  This 
could result in peer group pay recommendations, rather than performance-
based recommendations (Collier et al. 2010). This could lead to higher 
recommended levels of CEO remuneration, due to the consultants’ desire to 
“cross-sell” their services through the board member from other companies 
and to secure “repeat business” (Murphy & Sandino 2010: 1).  Conyon, Peck, 
and Sadler (2009) found that the use of pay consultants is associated with 
higher levels of total CEO remuneration. 
 
Martocchio (2013) also mentions the issue of remuneration consultants’ 
intentionally recommending higher remuneration than is warranted for 
executives, in the hope of gaining their favour and other consulting 
opportunities. However, Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist (2009) found no 
evidence suggesting that this phenomenon is a primary driver of excessive 
executive pay. Murphy and Sandino (2010), on the other hand, found evidence 
in the USA and Canada that CEO remuneration is higher in companies where 
the remuneration consultants also provide other services.  They furthermore 
found that remuneration is higher in Canadian companies when the fees paid 
to the consultants for other services are large relative to the fees for their 
services related to executive remuneration. 
 
d) Executives are strategically involved in the remuneration-setting process, 
resulting in a positional conflict of interests (Hill & Yablon 2002).  Neither the 
increased use of independent directors on remuneration committees, nor 
specialist remuneration consultants, is a “complete panacea to management’s 
strategic priority in the pay-setting arena” (Hill & Yablon 2002: 22).  The 
influence of executives can also lead to pay packages being tailored to 
prevailing stock market conditions.  During a bear market, for example, it is 
normal to see executives’ pay reflecting a higher share of fixed pay, rather 
than share options, compared to a bull market.   
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that numerous recent studies have postulated 
that the problems with performance-based pay go further than the structure thereof.  
Even cautiously designed remuneration packages will often afford business 
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managers incentive to use their strategic advantage within the company to favour 
their own gains at the cost of shareholders’ interests. 
 
Determining best practices in remuneration has been an attempt to align competing 
interests through different methods of incentivisation (Ulrich 2010).  Allcock and 
Pass (2006), who advocate mechanisms to motivate executives to align their own 
interests with those of shareholders, support such attempts.  
 
2.4.3 Determining executive pay 
Bussin (2012) is of the opinion that CEO remuneration is more complex than it 
appears. A strategic perspective on remuneration calls for research that looks 
further than purely how much CEOs earn (Bussin 2012).  Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
chartered the thinking about the underlying process of setting CEO remuneration 
(Shaw 2011).  This was continued by numerous other academics, who focused on 
understanding the ‘How?’ and not the ‘How much?’ of executive remuneration.  
Recent studies have shown that CEOs have a significant ability to influence the 
decision-makers involved in setting and evaluating CEO remuneration (Shaw 2011).  
Stabile (2000) is of the opinion that current executive pay-setting processes do not 
sufficiently regard shareholders’ interests.  
 
Ulrich (2010) states that there is merit in Stabile’s view, but that it does not address 
whether the executive pay-setting process represents the interests of other 
stakeholders in the organisation, which are at least as important as the interests of 
shareholders. 
 
Ferrarini, Moloney, and Vespro (2003) believe that the process of setting executive 
remuneration takes place in an inherently confrontational arena consisting of 
executives and shareholders, where both parties wish to advance their own 
interests. The potential conflict situation is aggravated in dispersed ownership 
organisations and where the board has surrendered control to powerful executives.  
Under such conditions, the pay-setting process could easily turn into a wealth-
skimming process, where pay negotiations do not take place at arm’s length (Ulrich 
2010).  According to Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002), one of the significant 
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problems in setting a CEO’s remuneration is the pervasive influence of the CEO on 
the pay-setting process. 
 
Ferrarini et al. (2003) suggest that current pay-setting practices are characterised 
by a number of structural defects that make it possible for self-serving executives to 
hide enormous wealth transfers from shareholders.  
 
2.5 ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
The directors of a board each has responsibility for the management of a specified 
portfolio. In the majority of cases, executive remuneration is delegated to a 
remuneration committee.  This remuneration committee makes recommendations 
regarding remuneration of executives, and submits these to the board of directors 
for final approval.  Normally, the board will implement a multi-year remuneration 
programme for executives (Bebchuk et al. 2002). 
 
Although the board of directors acts on the recommendations made by the 
remuneration committee, the board is ultimately accountable for any decisions made 
in respect of remuneration policies and levels (Ulrich 2010).  Ulrich (2010) states 
that various governance guidelines and practices have been established to 
address the issue of responsibility, but, in practice, it has been found that even 
the most noble of intentions in board governance are at risk of being manipulated 
by self-interested executives. 
 
The overall role of the board of directors is to focus on the bigger picture and make 
sure that the policies and strategies needed for the company’s optimum 
performance are in place (Bebchuk et al. 2002). The board of directors and the 
remuneration committee both play a significant role in linking executive pay to 
company performance, as well as in aligning the interests of managers with those 
of shareholders (Sun & Cahan 2009).  
 
It is of crucial importance for a company to set its CEO pay correctly. The reason 
for this is on the one hand, the company needs to attract, motivate and retain good 
executives while tough corporate governance and media attention places 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
79 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
remuneration decision-makers in a difficult position as pay needs to be fair and 
equitable (Bussin 2013). 
 
2.6 BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE 
DEBATE 
The issue most often discussed with regard to executive remuneration literature is 
the relationship between CEO remuneration and company performance.  The topic 
has been under scrutiny for more than seven decades, resulting in the literature 
covering more than 300 studies (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia 1998). Therefore, 
summarising the considerable amount of literature on the CEO pay-for-performance 
debate is not an easy task (Florin et al. 2010).  
 
Creating an effective link between pay and performance is an important issue for 
executives, shareholders, and the remuneration committee.  This link is, above all, 
difficult to determine.  As the world attempts recover from the credit crisis and the 
economic collapse in 2008, the matter of executive remuneration has received more 
attention than ever (Crafford 2012). This contentious issue has also received 
growing attention in South Africa, especially when the strike in the platinum sector 
during 2014 entered its fifth month. 
 
Bevan (2013) states that one of the public’s concerns about executive remuneration 
is that CEOs’ remuneration does not always mirror company performance or, even 
worse, keeps increasing while company performance declines.  Bevan (2013) asks 
the following question: “Is executive remuneration and company performance 
disconnected?”  His response to this question is that “it depends on for example, 
the measures of performance used, the time-period over which the measures were 
made and the component of the reward package being examined” (Bevan 2013: 6). 
 
Executive remuneration is a popular topic of discussion in magazines and 
newspapers. Salaries and substantial bonuses received by top executives 
worldwide are regularly published. These large amounts spur criticism from political, 
social, and economic players.  Some observers consider executives’ remuneration 
to be excessive, compared to their companies’ performance (Okasmaa 2009). 
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Organised labour often expresses disgruntlement at the irregularities in bargaining 
unit remuneration management compared to that of executives. These frustrations 
result in increased industrial unrest, leading to protests, ‘go-slows’ and full-blown 
strikes, which, in turn, lead to lost working days and declining productivity (Crafford 
2012).  
 
An example of the above is the mining strike of 2014, which lasted for almost five 
months.  Relative inequity was mentioned as the source of the fury of employees in 
gold-, platinum-, and coal mines (De Wet 2014).  In early May 2014, while employers 
were trying to persuade employees to end the crippling strike, the platinum sector 
announced the details of the bonuses and incentive schemes for its directors.  The 
company concerned announced rewards of R76.45 million in total, to be paid to 12 
individuals (De Wet 2014).  Although these directors would have to wait three years 
to obtain cash from the company shares awarded to them, it would take employees 
in this sector more than 40 years, uninterrupted by strikes, to earn the average 
bonus of the directors.  The latter would only be possible if employees realised the 
R12 500 per month basic salary they demanded (De Wet 2014). 
 
In addition, shareholder unease and important changes in corporate governance in 
the UK, the USA, and even South Africa ignited significant academic debate 
regarding the determinants of the remuneration paid to CEOs and, in particular, the 
relationship between CEO pay and company performance.  As reported by PWC 
(2011), it is proposed that flaws and discrepancies in these measurements play a 
part in the vague weak link between executive pay and company performance. 
 
According to Florin et al. (2010), there are many methodological issues regarding 
determining the relationship between pay and performance.  For instance, 
researchers do not use the same data sources, companies have diverse 
remuneration and business strategies, and there are numerous factors that are not 
easily measured.  However, according to Florin et al. (2010), methodological issues 
are one of the reasons why this debate has not yet been resolved. 
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2.7   THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
The global recession of 2008 – 2009 was marked by global economic decline that 
began in December 2007, and for the most part, took a sharp downward turn in 
September 2008 (Colander 2010). The role that incentive remuneration played in 
causing the financial crisis is evident in the significant corporate governance and 
regulatory changes that have occurred since the economic recession of 2008 
(Bussin 2014). 
 
Globally the discontent with remuneration received by executives gained 
momentum as a result of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis that began in United 
States (US) and spread across many global economies (Modau 2013). At the centre 
of the issue is the perceived weak relationship between company performance and 
CEO remuneration. In South Africa, and indeed many other emerging economies, 
the financial system has not experienced the level of financial losses seen in more 
developed economies (Bussin, Shaw & Smit 2013). 
 
Van Veenen (2012) investigated the impact of the global financial crisis on the 
remuneration of CEO’s of listed firms in the Netherlands. From the research it 
becomes clear that the level of total remuneration has declined since 2008. This 
decrease can be attributed to the variable compensation and the stocks/options, 
since the level of fixed compensation has rarely seen any change over the period 
2006 to 2011. During the crisis years, 2008 and 2009, both the variable 
remuneration and stocks/options declined since the targets, on which the 
remuneration was based, were not achieved. 
 
In his study, Modau (2013) found that there have been some structural changes that 
have occurred to the total remuneration of CEOs after 2008. He further found that 
fixed pay slowed down during the recession period. Barret (2014) found that mean 
total remuneration of black CEOs decreased slightly during the global recession 
years of 2008 to 2009. However, for white CEOs, he found that mean total 
remuneration continued to increase over the recession period, decreasing slightly 
in 2010.  
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In addition, Kuboya (2014) found some evidence that the level of total remuneration 
and variable bonuses for CEOs in JSE-listed companies decreased during the 
economic recession period (2007 to 2009), although not significantly. His results 
further showed strong evidence of a decline in bonus’ payments and growth during 
the economic recession. Further, base salary for CEOs indicate a constant upward 
trend during the economic recession. Vemala, Nguyen, Nguyen, and Kommasani 
(2014) found that financial crisis has a small but significant effect on CEO 
remuneration. 
 
2.8    EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The literature pertaining to the remuneration of CEOs and executives in the South 
African context is limited (Shaw 2011: 39).  Crotty and Bonorchis (2006) attempted 
to uncover some of the issues related to executive pay in South Africa.  Shaw (2011) 
noted that some of the criticisms of Crotty and Bonorchis (2006) regarding the 
apparently excessive levels of CEO pay are applicable to the South African context.  
 
In South Africa, the platinum sector strike in 2014, the election manifesto of the new 
Economic Freedom Fighters party, and public statements in the press and on other 
platforms have resulted in the gap between executives’ and entry-level workers’ pay 
coming under the national spotlight (PwC 2014).  Remuneration practices within 
SOEs are noticeably responsible for deepening inequality, despite SOEs assuming 
a public mandate to align executives’ and general workers’ remuneration and 
bonuses (21st Century Pay Solutions 2012). 
 
The wage gap continues to be a challenging problem in South Africa’s unequal 
society.  In 2014, Mergence Investment Managers conducted an analysis of pay 
practices at the top ten JSE-listed companies.  Their research showed an upward 
trend over the last five years, with the gap between total remuneration and average 
employee remuneration increasing from just under 120 times in 2009 to over 140 
times in 2013 (Lamprecht 2014).  Figure 9 illustrates the development of the wage 
gap over time.  It should be noted that the CEOs’ total remuneration included base 
pay, benefits, cash, bonuses, and share-based payments.  The trend seems to have 
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been driven by real increases in remuneration packages, instead of just variability 
in bonuses and share grants (Lamprecht 2014). 
Figure 9 South Africa’s wage gap over time 
 
Source: Lamprecht (2014: 1)  
 
Inequality has become a source of concern internationally, as high levels of 
inequality are detrimental to economic growth and limit the eradication of poverty 
(PwC 2014).  
 
Crotty and Bonorchis (2006) studied the seemingly excessive levels of CEO pay, 
and indicate that the wage gap continues to be a particularly challenging dilemma 
in an unequal society.  The authors refer to the Gini coefficient, a measure of 
inequality in a society, indicating that South Africa has one of the highest inequality 
scores in the world (Crotty & Bonorchis 2006).  South Africa’s Gini coefficient was 
recorded at 0.65% according to the World Bank’s calculations (PwC 2016a).   
 
A study conducted by Prophet Analytics (2012) of 212 listed South African 
companies revealed that 41% of CEOs were overpaid in relation to their equals, of 
which 31% were overpaid by more than R1 million per annum, and 9% were 
overpaid by more than R5 million per annum. The ten most overpaid CEOs 
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represented almost 47% of the overall amount of excess CEO remuneration for the 
2011 financial year (Prophet Analytics 2012). 
 
Moreover, over the last decade or so, CEOs’ incentive remuneration has increased 
substantially in South Africa.  Incentives, together with bonuses and share awards, 
previously averaged around 60% of their guaranteed packages.  However, in 2013, 
it stood at almost 200% (PwC 2013).  
 
Mergence Investment Managers’ analysis of variable remuneration packages in 
2012 and 2013 furthermore showed that approximately 50% of CEOs in the sample 
received 100% or more of the value of their fixed pay as variable remuneration.  The 
other half received between 0% and 100%.  During 2013, 26% of CEOs received 
variable pay of more than 200% of the value of their fixed pay, with 74% receiving 
50% or more (Lamprecht 2014). 
 
The above is alarming, as it may indicate that the targets for variable pay and 
bonuses might not be demanding enough, as it appears that CEOs could receive 
variable remuneration without any great effort (Lamprecht 2014). 
 
In addition to the remuneration issues mentioned above, the increasing role of 
governance in the South African context must be recognised (Shaw 2011).  King III 
is a comprehensive framework for good corporate governance, comparable to the 
UK’s Corporate Governance Code (Collier et al. 2010). 
 
An important aspect of King III is the condition that remuneration of the CEO and 
executives be linked to measures of corporate performance (Institute of Directors of 
South Africa 2009).  This is stated in practice guidelines for all the components of 
CEO remuneration, including fixed pay, STIs, and LTIs.  King III operates on a 
‘comply or explain’ basis, where the company has to clearly articulate the reason(s) 
for non-compliance (Collier et al. 2010).  However, King IV (to be implemented 1 
April 2017) assumes application of all principles, and requires SOEs to explain how 
the principles are applied – thus, apply and explain. While the King Report on 
Corporate Governance does not constitute formal legislation, it seems to be having 
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a noteworthy effect on the way in which CEO remuneration is calculated (Shaw 
2011). 
 
Whereas King III included provisions regarding the remuneration policies of 
organisations, King IV addresses the contentious issue in a more concise manner 
by requiring that remuneration policies in detail include arrangements towards 
ensuring that the remuneration of executive management is fair and responsible in 
the context of overall employee remuneration in the organisation (Myburgh & De 
Costa 2017). 
 
The Companies Amendment Act, Act No. 3 of 2011, which came into effect on 1 
May 2011, contains specific requirements pertaining to CEOs’ and executive 
remuneration (PwC 2011).  The trend over the past decade has been a significant 
move towards more comprehensive governance. At the same time, formal 
regulation in some form or other, generally with respect to disclosure of executive 
remuneration, is becoming part of the South African CEO remuneration context 
(Shaw 2011). 
 
Prophet Analytics (2012) posits that two factors contributed to increased CEO 
remuneration in South Africa: immigration laws, which created a scarcity of talented 
company executives, and new technologies that elevated the need for scarce 
executive skills.  However, no other previous studies have observed these factors, 
and it may be a recommendation for future research (Prophet Analytics 2012).  
 
Notwithstanding the discussions in the above paragraphs, a survey in 2007 
uncovered that South African executive earn less (in US dollars) than their 
counterparts in the USA, Australia, Hong Kong, and the Netherlands (Ebert et al. 
2008). 
 
2.8   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on the role of the CEO and executive remuneration, as well 
as the underlying principles that drive the determination of remuneration for CEOs 
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in the current business environment.  The main role players in the determination of 
executive pay, as well as the challenges faced by companies when determining 
executive pay, were also discussed.  This chapter then focused on problems 
associated with executive remuneration.  The next chapter will focus on company 
performance and the different measures of company performance.  The relationship 
between CEO pay and company performance will also be discussed.  The chapter 
will end of with a discussion of SOEs in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE SOE ENVIRONMENT AND COMPANY 
PERFORMANCE 
 
3.1   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter starts with an overview on SOEs in South Africa.  The discussion then 
focuses on the issues and challenges with regard to remuneration of SOE 
executives, and outlines the state-sponsored reviews of their CEOs’ remuneration 
and the frameworks applied.  An international perspective on remuneration in SOEs 
is also provided. This is followed with a discussion of the company performance 
measures used in the present study. Finally, a discussion of the relationship 
between executive remuneration and company performance will refer to general 
research and report on previous studies conducted on SOEs.  
 
3.2   OVERVIEW OF SOES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
SOEs are autonomous bodies, in part or exclusively owned by government, and 
play an important role in the South African economy (Western Cape Government 
2013). These entities are an extension of the public sector, and perform specific 
functions in accordance with South African legislation (Rabushka 1997; Wendy 
Owens and Associates 2013). 
 
3.2.1 Understanding SOEs 
Arries (2014) states that SOEs differ from other companies, in that they maintain an 
equivocal position between the public environment and the corporate environment, 
having their own dynamics. In addition, unlike other areas of the public sector, SOEs 
are legal entities, with the government being both the supervisory body and a 
stakeholder. SOEs perform profit-making activities and pursue financial objectives 
to generate returns on investment through dividends (PwC 2015).  
 
As SOEs make use of state funds, it is understandable that SOEs should be 
answerable to the taxpayers of the country. However, at the same time, SOEs 
cannot be “cast in the same category as the arms and organs of state or other 
similar public entities that are also accountable to the same taxpayer” (Presidential 
Review Committee on State-owned Entities, 2013: 15). The reason for this 
difference is that the level of skills required to manage a large SOE are similar to 
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the level required to manage a JSE-listed company. SOEs recruit executives from 
both the public and private sectors. Therefore, remuneration has over the years, 
been set at rates comparable to those of the private sector. These rates currently 
exceed, for example, the remuneration of the president of South Africa.  In many 
cases, it also exceeds private-sector remuneration (Presidential Review Committee 
on State-owned Entities 2013). 
 
SOEs are not conventional commercial businesses.  They have a directive to attain 
longer-term strategic economic objectives (even though there are foreseeable 
short-term losses while capabilities are being built).  This requires a fine balance — 
if the strategic purpose challenges commercial discipline, the business will fail, but 
if commercial considerations outweigh strategic purposes, government objectives 
will be conceded (Gigaba 2012). 
 
In line with international trends, corporatisation (the transformation of state assets 
or agencies into state-owned corporations) in South Africa was introduced in some 
sectors. The reason for this was to promote more effective and efficient service 
delivery following the 1994 democratic elections.  All over the world, using public 
authorities rather than full privatisation (the transfer of ownership of property or 
businesses from a government to a privately owned entity) is seen as taking 
advantage of private-sector efficiencies while maintaining public accountability 
(Wendy Ovens and Associates 2013).   
 
An understanding of the nature of SOEs is important, and should be grounded in an 
understanding of the notion and structure of the state, as illustrated in Figure 10.  
Misconceptions often occur when the government and the state are seen as the 
same.  A clarification on the difference between the state and the government helps 
to clarify the ownership of SOEs by the state. 
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Figure 10 Configuration of the State 
 
Source: Adapted from Presidential Review Committee on State-owned Entities (2013: 32) 
 
The term state represents a broad concept that encompassess all social formations, 
such as the government and people, underpinned by the concept of autonomy.  
Government’s roles in an SOE are complex, as these are diverse and often 
conflicting, including (Massie et al. 2014):  
 
 owner; 
 shareholder; 
 maker of policies that impact on the environment in which the SOE operates; 
and 
 enforcer of policies. 
 
Government is ultimately responsible to the public for delivering on its mandate.  
Government’s involvement in an SOE means that the SOE is essentially protected 
from concerns such as insolvency and takeovers.  This can result in a self-righteous 
board and management team, often comprising suspect appointments made on the 
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basis of political support rather than ability.  Good governance is therefore critical 
(Massie et al. 2014). 
 
3.2.2 Brief history of SOEs in South Africa 
Prior to 1994, the South African government’s approach to SOEs was to utilise some 
of them as instruments to help the Apartheid state survive sanctions and 
embargoes.  Table 2 provides an overview of the history of SOEs in South Africa 
from 1880. 
Table 2 History of SOEs in South Africa 
Political environment Rationale Examples 
1880 – 1910 
This period is characterised by 
economic self-sufficiency, during 
which monopoly businesses were 
afforded to private citizens. 
 
Sovereignty and 
economic self-
sufficiency of the 
Afrikaner 
 
 
South African Railways
1910 ‒ 1940s 
This was a period of high 
unemployment that witnessed the 
creation of a number of key state-
owned corporations. 
 
 
Strategic 
industries 
Job-creation 
 
Eskom, Iscor, and IDC, 
and South African Post 
Office 
1948 ‒ 1970s 
The government used state 
instruments to enhance the living 
standards of a few.  After 1960, with 
growing isolation, the focus was on 
self-sufficiency. 
 
 
Upliftment 
Strategic 
industries 
Self-sufficiency 
 
Aventura, South 
African Bureau of 
Standards, Sasol, 
Science Council, Land 
Bank 
1976 – mid-1980s 
The Soweto Uprising and conflict in 
Angola motivated the development of 
the state security establishment.  In 
addition, the government formed 
entities to side-step sanctions.  In the 
mid-1980s, the government followed a 
trend of fostering the private sector 
and privatising some key state 
industries. 
 
 
Avoid 
parliamentary 
scrutiny 
Negating 
sanctions 
Privatisation 
 
Central Energy Fund, 
Denel, Armscor, 
Mossgas, Iscor and 
Sasol) 
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Political environment Rationale Examples 
Late 1980s – early 1990s 
Political change became unavoidable.  
Government used the instruments of 
state to “win the hearts and minds” of 
the new voters. 
 
Working around 
the existing 
structure of 
government 
 
Independent 
Development Trust,  
Eskom and Telkom 
1994 ‒ present 
New government concentrated on 
poverty relief, developing a 
competitive economy, and improving 
the functioning of government.  A 
strong emphasis on creating 
independent bodies to carry out new 
functions, and a tendency to move 
functions out of government to “create 
something new” or influence 
“transformation.” 
 
Regulatory 
functions 
independent of 
government 
A move away 
from privatisation 
 
National Energy 
Regulator  of South 
Africa, Nuclear 
Regulator, Competition 
Commission, SA 
National Parks, 
Museums, water 
boards, etc. 
Source: Adapted from Presidential Review Committee on State-owned Entities (2013) 
 
In 1994, there were more than 300 SOEs, which employed approximately 300 000 
people. However, during their investigation, the Presidential Review Committee 
(2013) estimated that there were approximately 715 SOEs (including subsidiaries), 
trusts, and Schedule 21 entities.  
 
Post-1994, SOEs in South Africa were tasked with delivering quality services to all 
citizens, and with strengthening the apartheid-era economy and driving economic 
growth (News24 2014). 
 
When the ANC government took over in 1994, they continued to commercialise 
some of the state’s assets and to sell large sections of its equity in some SOEs.  For 
example, a 30% share in Telkom was sold to SBC Communications (an American 
multinational telecommunications conglomerate) (18%) and Telkom Malaysia 
(12%).  Black empowerment groups purchased an additional 3%. In 2010, SOEs 
had grown in number, had generated jobs to reach an expected total employment 
of about 150 000 people, and had combined assets of R175 billion (Presidential 
Review Committee on State-owned Entities 2013: 38). 
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South African SOEs currently face wide-ranging objectives.  They must attend to 
the needs of capital-intensive industry, provide continuous employment, help 
government to implement and learn from implementing industrial policy, and remedy 
disparities in access to water, sanitation, and electricity (Arries 2014: 7). The 
importance of these entities makes it essential that they operate efficiently and in 
the public interest over the long term (Presidential Review Committee on State-
owned Entities 2013). 
 
3.2.3 Importance of SOEs in South Africa 
State-owned entities are independent bodies that are partially or wholly owned by 
government (Western Cape Government 2013), and play a significant role in the 
South African economy.  Schedule 2 SOEs play an important role in the economy, 
contributing more than 8% of South Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Presidential Review Committee on State-owned Entities 2013).  
  
SOEs1 are of extreme importance throughout South Africa (Corporate Governance 
of State-owned Enterprises in Africa 2009) because: 
 
 they are functioning in significant infrastructure and service industries, such as 
water, energy, financial services and transportation; 
 these services are important to the welfare of all; 
 many South African citizens are employed by the major industrial sectors such 
as mining and textiles; and  
 SOEs are funded by means of taxpayers’ contributions. 
 
The important role that SOEs play can be seen through, for example, their total 
assets.  During the 2009/2010 financial year, the total assets of all SOEs amounted 
to over R450 billion (Business Report 2010).  However, during the same period, 
Eskom, Alexcor, Broadband Infraco, and Denel declared losses totalling a 
combined loss of R310 million. 
                                             
1 SOEs are also referred to as parastatals or public entities.  For purposes of this study, the term 
state-owned entity will be used.  Where necessary and appropriate, however, use will be made of 
the terms parastatal or public entity. 
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Globally, SOEs account for 20% of global investments and 5% of total employment, 
and up to 40% of total output in some countries (Mbo & Adjasi 2013: 3).  The 
importance of SOEs is felt particularly in infrastructural development, with the 
majority of infrastructural services being delivered by SOEs, ahead of the 20% to 
25% contribution by the private sector (Vagliasindi 2008). Therefore, determining 
and understanding the link between executive remuneration and company 
performance in SOEs is very important. 
 
Further, SOEs are important stakeholders in and contributors toward supporting and 
promoting urban growth and development (Wendy Owens and Associates 2013).  
Moreover, SOEs are significant to economic growth, job-creation, building the 
capability and technical capacity of the state, international co-operation, meeting 
the basic needs of the people, and, in the long term, building a successful, non-
racial society (Presidential Review Committee on State-owned Entities 2013).  
 
The state’s enterprises should not play a role as “employer of last instance”.  They 
should play an important role in upgrading labour skills and raising social standards 
through appropriate policies of corporate responsibility.  Their importance is further 
compounded by the fact that they tend to be focused on ‘strategic’ sectors.  These 
include infrastructure and utilities (air and rail transport, electricity, gas, water 
supply, broadcasting, natural resource extraction, and telecommunications), and 
finance (banking and insurance), which are fundamental to the competitive position 
of the private-sector economy (Balbuena 2014). 
 
The ‘big four’ South African SOEs — Transnet, Denel, Telkom, and Eskom — once 
accounted for 91% of the assets of the top 30 SOEs, and employed 77% of  SOE 
employees (Southall 2007).  The economic importance of SOEs is concentrated in 
the top 30 companies, with four accounting for 91% of SOE assets, 86% of turnover, 
and 77% of SOE employment (Government of South Africa 2011).  Because SOEs 
play an important role in providing critical services for urban development, there is 
concern around the poor performance of some SOEs, for example, Eskom’s poor 
performance in terms of building infrastructure.  This has led to an escalation in the 
Chapter 3: The SOE environment and company performance 
 
94 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
cost of its new power stations and their completion being delayed by almost four 
years. 
 
Furthermore, a growing number of Eskom’s power stations has been breaking down 
more regularly, with breakdowns topping 30% of capacity at one time during a five-
month period. This imposed rolling blackouts that became an almost daily 
occurrence in South Africa (Mantshantsha 2015). The consequence of these 
blackouts was a decline in South Africa’s economy, as many businesses had to 
close for hours at a time.  It also dealt a devastating blow to an economy whose 
growth averaged 5% in the five years before the recession, but has weakened to 
below 2% since.  It also limited foreign investment (Reuters 2015). 
 
The performance of SOEs is frequently under public scrutiny for two reasons.  
Firstly, they often deliver services directly to the taxpayer. Secondly, taxpayers 
justifiably have the opinion that they are indirect shareholders of SOEs, as a great 
deal of the funding and equity of SOEs flows directly from the tax base of the country 
(Crafford 2012). Appropriately functioning SOEs with proper administration (and 
remuneration) practices in place are important to the “perception of the Government 
as servant of the people who elected it into power” (Crafford 2012: 7).  
Taking into account the significance of SOEs, including, inter alia, the need to 
sustain job-creation, skills development, and retention, as well as contributing to the 
government’s developmental and transformation agenda, it has become necessary 
to ensure that the link between company performance and CEO remuneration is fair 
and justified (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2010). 
3.2.4   SOEs’ legal framework 
SOEs are regulated by various specific legislative requirements.  It is, furthermore, 
important to note that the regulatory framework for SOEs changed during the period 
2003 to 2007 (Department of Public Enterprises 2001‒2014).  An established and 
sound legal and regulatory framework is an important feature of ensuring 
accountability of both the state acting as owner and the SOE itself, in that it 
establishes a clear division of responsibilities, objectives, and expectations 
(Balbuena 2014).  
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The policies, legislation, and the key terminology associated with SOEs in the three 
areas of national, provincial, and municipal government are summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3 Policies and legislation related to SOEs 
 Public entities Policies and law Key terms used 
Na
tio
na
l p
ub
lic
 
en
titi
es
 
Economic development 
Infrastructure development
Education and training 
 RSA Constitution 
 Companies Act 
 Establishment acts 
 Department protocols 
 Executive authority 
regulations 
 State-owned entities
 State-owned 
enterprises 
 Parastatals 
 Government-owned 
business enterprises
 
Pr
ov
inc
ial
 en
titi
es
 Supporting democracy 
Service delivery 
Regulatory services 
Research and 
development 
 RSA Constitution 
 Companies Act 
 Establishment acts 
 Provincial department 
policies, regulations, and 
protocols 
 Provincial legislations 
 Public corporations 
 Public entities 
 Public enterprises 
 Municipal 
entities/Enterprises 
 State-owned 
companies 
 
Mu
nic
ipa
l e
nti
tie
s Statutory advisory 
Agencies 
Financial intermediaries 
 RSA Constitution 
 PFMA 
 MFMA 
 MSA 
 Companies Act 
 Council policies and by-
laws 
 Commercial SOEs 
 Non-commercial 
SOEs 
 Government-owned 
corporations 
 Government entities 
Source: Presidential Review Committee on State-owned Entities (2012: 43) 
 
The governance framework for SOEs was derived from overlapping laws, codes, 
and policy documents, the applicability of which would depend, in each case, on the 
classification of a particular SOE.  Massie et al. (2014: 122) describe the operational 
environment of SOEs as “conflicting, inadequate and chaotic and fragmented.”  
SOEs, firstly, have to conform to more legislation and laws than non-SOEs.  They 
must adhere to (Arries 2014): 
 
 their own enabling Act; 
 the PFMA; 
 the Companies Act; and 
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 National Treasury regulations. 
 
Secondly, SOEs must adhere to the stipulations of King III (and from 1 April 2014, 
King IV).  Although not legislated, its prescriptions are regarded as international best 
practice (Arries 2014) provide guidance on: 
 
 principles of management of ownership; 
 directors’ responsibilities; 
 roles of the board; and 
 establishment of committees. 
 
Despite numerous pieces of legislation, according to the Public Service Review 
Committee on State-owned Entities (2013), there is no dedicated, all-encompassing 
SOE legislation framework in South Africa. 
 
The PFMA provides the financial framework, giving SOEs managerial and 
operational sovereignty. It also provides reporting mechanisms (such as the 
Shareholder Compact) to guide the SOE’s executives in their strategic thinking 
(Balbuena 2014).  However, not all PFMA provisions apply to all SOEs.  Different 
types of entities with a number of commercial or non-commercial objectives are 
categorised according to Schedules of the PFMA. The Municipal Financial 
Management Act, Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA), fulfils the same role as the PFMA in the 
local government sphere (Balbuena 2014).   
 
The Companies Act includes provisions relevant to incorporated SOEs, some of 
which are also found either in SOE’s establishing acts, or in the PFMA or the MFMA.  
Although the Companies Act permits the development, financial administration, 
governance, partnerships, rescue, and termination of corporate entities in South 
Africa, most SOEs are not corporatized (Public Service Review Committee on 
State-owned Entities 2013).  Those SOEs that are not companies are therefore not 
subject to the Companies Act, but remain bound by the PFMA and their founding 
legislation.  The goals of the Companies Act are largely aimed at controlling the 
relationship between the managers who generate profit and the owners of the SOE.  
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SOEs are not only compelled to make a profit, they also have to deliver on social 
mandates that do not necessarily generate any profit (Public Service Review 
Committee on State-owned Entities 2013). 
As can be seen from the above discussion, there is a large number of laws 
governing South African SOEs, and this does not seem to be an exclusively South 
African problem.  The multiplicity of laws regulating SOEs lead to replications, 
repeated provisions, and opposing provisions dealing with the same issues. This 
means that SOEs need to reconcile diverse fragments of legislation in an effort to 
co-ordinate application of and compliance with these laws, while also ensuring their 
performance (Public Service Review Committee on State-owned Entities 2013).  
 
3.2.5    Performance of SOEs 
Even though CEOs of SOEs receive substantial amounts of money, several South 
African SOEs received bailouts from government to keep these SOEs afloat. 
Corruption and poor management have also been blamed for the billions of rands 
in losses these companies have recorded in recent years (Mutiso 2016). During 
2009, government paid R1.4 billion to the SABC. This bailout brings the total amount 
of financial assistance for the SABC to R2.24 billion over four years, and the total 
financial assistance for SOEs amounting cumulatively to R243.25 billion during that 
time period (Harris 2009).  
 
In 2015, the South African government spent nearly 10 percent of its total annual 
budget in servicing debts and paying money to help struggling SOEs. For example, 
SAA, reported a loss of R2.5 billion during 2015. Smith (2016) reports that the SAA’s 
total bailout amounts to R29 billion in bailout funds, loan guarantees and convertible 
loans since the financial year 2004/2005. Broadband Infracro, responsible for 
providing broadband infrastructure, needed a bailout of R500 million from 
government during 2015 to help sustain its operations. This SOE has made losses 
since 2010 and only survived to date due to bailouts from government (Mutiso 
2016). The South African Post Office received a R650 million bailout while being 
shook by fraudulent reports from the Public Protector (SABC News 2016). 
 
3.2.6 Current issues regarding remuneration in SOEs 
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The performance of SOEs is continuously under public scrutiny, partly because a 
large portion of their funding and equity flows directly from the tax base of the 
country.  Considering that government uses SOEs as instruments to address the 
developmental needs of the country, the correct functioning of SOEs, which 
includes rigorous remuneration practices, are important to support the view that the 
government is serving its citizens (Public Service Review Committee on State-
owned Entities 2013). 
 
The remuneration practices of private companies and SOEs continue to be a 
contentious issue in many countries. As the world economy attempts to recover 
from the credit crisis and economic collapse, the concern over executive 
remuneration is even more in the public eye (Public Service Review Committee on 
State-owned Entities 2013). 
 
The salaries and bonuses paid to SOE executives have triggered an outcry in recent 
years.  For example, dismissed South African Airways (SAA) CEO Khaya Ngqula 
received a reimbursement of R8 million. His two predecessors departed with ‘golden 
handshakes’ worth R232 million and R3.6 million respectively.  Denel’s 2009/2010 
annual report indicated that its CEO, Talib Sadik, was being paid R5.6 million per 
annum (R466 666 per month).  Denel declared a loss of R544 million during 2009, 
an improvement on the R1.6 billion lost in the year to March 2006.  The trade union 
Solidarity protested that Denel executives had paid themselves a further R4.3 
million in bonuses for the year to March 2009, despite the loss. Armscor’s 
2009/2010 annual report revealed that ex-CEO Sipho Thomo received a R3.27 
million remuneration package (DefenceWeb 2010).  This shows that executives of 
SOEs are playing a part in their excessive remuneration, contributing to the pay gap 
between executive remuneration and the earnings of the average worker in South 
Africa, leading to inequality in income distribution (Theunissen 2010b). 
 
According to Crafford (2012), there are diverse views held by various shareholders 
regarding how SOEs should benchmark their remuneration.  As will be discussed 
in subsequent paragraphs, the remuneration guidelines of the Department of Public 
Enterprises (DPE) have mostly been ignored by SOEs, who insist that they need to 
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be benchmarked against the private sector (Crafford 2012).  As shown in Figure 11, 
this has steered SOEs to paying bigger salaries and wages at virtually every level 
of employment. 
Figure 11 SOE remuneration benchmarked against private sector 
 
It should be noted that Paterson grading used, as indicated on the X axis above, where A1 (Band A, 
Grade 1) represents the most junior (unskilled) role, and FU (Grade F Upper) represents the highest 
end strategic management role. 
 
Source: 21st Century Pay Solutions (2012) and Crafford (2012) 
 
 
As can be seen from the figure above, SOE median total guaranteed packages  are 
outliers when compared to those for similar positions in the private sector (21st 
Century Pay Solutions 2012; Crafford 2012).  The outliers are especially evident for 
the Paterson Grades DU (Management/Professional) to FU (Strategic intent).  Even 
though the SOE median total guaranteed packages may seem in line with that of 
private sector companies, this is troubling for two reasons. First, SOE remuneration 
is funded from the tax coffer, and, secondly, as has been previously stated, SOEs’ 
performance is currently problematic.  Therefore, remunerating SOE CEOs on par 
with the private sector is contentious. 
 
Table 4 shows the comparative ratio (compa-ratio) of the median of the sample of 
SOEs compared to that of the private sector (focusing only on the levels E (Strategic 
execution) and F (Strategic intent).  
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Table 4 Pay medians comparison — SOEs vs private sector 
Paterson 
Band 
Example job title Level SOE 
median 
Private-
sector 
median 
Compa-ratio: 
SOE vs Private 
sector 
E Lower Senior management/
Professional 
Strategic 
execution 
1 040 583   984 464 106 
E Upper 1 486 246 1 331 646 112 
F Lower  
Top management 
Strategic 
Intent 
1 981 795 1 841 044 108 
F Upper 3 104 933 3 041 555 102 
Source: 21st Century Pay Solutions (2012: 28) 
 
As an example, a compa-ratio of 112 at the E-Upper median indicates that the 
median is 12% ahead of the private sector median at this level.  It is therefore 
evident that, in every instance, the SOE median is above the private sector median, 
which difference ranges from 2%, at the level Strategic intent — Paterson Band F 
Upper (FU), to 12%, at the level Strategic execution — Paterson Band E Upper EU).  
From a remuneration point of view, a compa-ratio below 75 and above 125 indicates 
areas that require investigation (Public Service Review Committee on State-owned 
Entities 2013; Crafford 2012).  Although the compa-ratios reflected in Table 4 are 
not above 125, there are causes for concern when considering the poor 
performance of SOEs. 
 
During 2011, the Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan stated in media reports that 
South Africa’s Gini coefficient was recorded as 0.68%, ranking as one of the highest 
in the world.  In addition, the exorbitant remuneration received by executives of 
SOEs could not be aligned with the performance of the relevant SOEs (21st Century 
Pay Solutions 2012). The Gini coefficient for SOEs (as at 2012) was 34.8 (21st 
Century Pay Solutions 2012), while South Africa’s overall Gini coefficient was 65.0 
(placing South Africa third on the list of countries) (Central Intelligence Agency 
2012).  Even though the SOEs’ Gini coefficient is considerably lower than the rest 
of the country’s, the sustainability of this practice is questionable (Crafford 2012).  
SOEs (at the median level) pay anywhere between 102% and 112% of private 
sector’s salaries at senior and top management level (refer to Table 4, above).  This 
suggests that, when executive remuneration increases, so too do salaries at the 
lower level.  Eventually, the liability becomes too large for the entity to bear, who 
then needs to revert to the state for financial assistance (Crafford 2012).  
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Being mechanisms of state, SOEs need to lead the way in systemic change.  If 
SOEs continue to pay above private-sector levels, the reaction from the private 
sector may be to disregard “calls for more responsible remuneration practices” 
(Crafford 2012: 35). 
 
3.2.7   Challenges regarding remuneration in SOEs 
Based on his review, Crafford (2012), as well as the Presidential Review Committee 
on State-owned Entities (2013), outlined the following challenges with regard to 
SOEs’ remuneration. 
 
 Inconsistencies in remuneration in SOEs 
The remuneration of the executives and senior staff of SOEs is notably inconsistent 
between SOEs, and there is no clear reason why CEOs in some SOEs are 
remunerated at considerably higher levels than in others.  The National Treasury’s 
review of board and executive remuneration of Schedule 1, 2, 3A, and 3B entities 
(per the PFMA, released in September 2010) found that there were significant 
differences in the salary increases awarded to the CEOs of various SOEs.  
According to the Public Sector Search Centre, the reasons for the anomalies include 
a lack of clear guidelines for setting the remuneration of CEOs, executives, and 
senior management.  Furthermore, where there are indeed guidelines, such as the 
DPE’s remuneration guidelines, some SOEs did not follow the guidelines. 
 
 No standard implementation of guidelines for determining SOE 
remuneration 
Despite the fact that the DPE set guidelines in 2007 for the SOEs’ remuneration, 
the implementation thereof was not consistent across SOEs.  It appears that some 
SOEs do not to pay attention to guidelines other than those of the Department of 
Public Service and Administration for the public sector. The various departmental 
ministries apply different approaches, and, even within ministries, there appears to 
be a lack of common standards.  Examples would be the National Treasury that 
deals differently with its public entities, e.g., the South African Social Security 
Agency (SASSA) and SARS.  SASSA’s remuneration structure is aligned with public 
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sector pay, whereas SARS’s is aligned with that of the private sector (Crafford 
2012). 
 
 Correlation between SOEs and the private sector 
SOEs generally pay more than the public sector (Crafford 2012). The statistics show 
that, for the measure of guaranteed pay, SOEs pay above the market in almost 
every job category.  The private sector, however, at the upper executive level, pays 
higher than SOEs.  A number of factors could explain this, for example company 
size, complexity, and industry characteristics.  
 
 No common mechanism with which to consider sizing and other 
factors influencing remuneration 
The inconsistency in SOEs’ remuneration occurs in the absence of a properly 
developed and adopted sizing or positioning model.  Without such a standard, SOEs 
deal with remuneration in an inconsistent manner.  By not having a properly ratified 
model, government is placing itself at significant risk of manipulation.  
 
As is clear from the above discussion, SOEs’ remuneration practices are noticeably 
responsible for increasing inequality, despite SOEs having a public mandate to 
achieve alignment (21st Century Pay Solutions 2012). 
 
 The income disparity between executives and workers 
PwC conducted a study in 2010 that was commissioned by the Presidential Review 
Committee on State-owned Entities.  It was found that the remuneration levels of 
executives were moving further and further away from those of workers on the 
lowest level.  This is creating a constantly widening wage gap (Public Service 
Review Committee on State-owned Entities 2013). 
 
 
 
 Absence of a centralised authority to manage SOEs’ remuneration 
Due to the lack of a centralised authority to manage SOEs’ remuneration, the boards 
of SOEs and their CEOs are responsible for determining salaries.  The result thereof 
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is that salaries differ considerably from the equality and market line.  CEOs being 
involved in the determination process may be leading to them serving their own 
interests.  Demirer and Yuan (2011: 1) posit that “managers have incentives to 
pursue self-serving goals that may not maximize the shareholder value.”  They 
further postulate that shareholders often do not have enough information regarding 
executives’ activities.  It is therefore difficult to verify whether executives are acting 
in the best interests of the shareholders. 
 
In this regard, Bussin and Modau (2015) found that CEO remuneration contracts 
are influenced by the tendency of executives to enrich themselves. These 
remuneration contracts are therefore no longer aligned with the goals of 
organisations and their shareholders (Bussin & Modau 2015). 
 
3.3 STATE-SPONSORED REVIEWS OF SOUTH AFRICAN SOE 
REMUNERATION PRACTICES AND FRAMEWORKS 
The subject of SOE’s remuneration has prompted a number of reviews by executive 
oversight departments, especially the DPE, as it oversees key commercial 
enterprises.  However, it appears that the focus of the remuneration reviews is 
private entities, and that the large number of SOEs do not have a standardised 
approach or framework for remuneration.  Table 5 highlights previous reviews 
conducted on SOEs.  
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Table 5 List of research initiatives on SOEs 
Initiative and year Initiator Affected SOEs 
DPE remuneration 
guidelines for SOEs 
(2007) 
DPE SOEs under the DPE 
Remuneration overview 
for SOEs (2010) 
DPE SOEs under the DPE 
Board and CEO 
remuneration review 
(2010) 
National treasury PFMA Schedule 2, 3A, 
and 3B entities 
Presidential Review 
Committee on State-
owned Entities (2012) 
President of South Africa All SOEs in South Africa 
Source: Adapted from Crafford (2012) and Presidential Review Committee on State-owned 
Entities (2013)  
 
3.3.1 DPE remuneration guidelines for SOEs (2007) 
In 2007, the DPE issued guidelines for SOE remuneration, based on market data 
sourced from 600 South African companies. These guidelines were aimed at 
assisting SOE boards and remuneration committees in negotiating and determining 
remuneration (Massie et al. 2014). In these guidelines, the DPE distinguished 
between four broad categories within which SOEs could fall, based on size, as 
determined by assets and revenue.  Table 6 lists the four categories. 
Table 6 SOE Categorisation — assets and revenue 
SOE size 
 
Assets 
 
Revenue 
 
SOE category 
A 
>R16.3bn >R2.54bn Very large SOE 
B 
R1.55bn – R16.3bn R243.2m – R2.54bn Large SOE 
C 
R143.5m – R1.55bn R22.8m – R243.2m Medium SOE 
D 
Up to R143.5m Up to R22.8m Small SOE 
         Source: DPE 2007 (State-owned Enterprises Remuneration Guidelines: 6) 
 
The DPE guidelines (Crafford 2012: 11) include the following: 
 Guaranteed executive pay, STIs, and LTIs are not to exceed the median 
value of the model developed by the DPE — the median value remains the 
threshold throughout. 
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 Boards are required to obtain approval, and have to provide a strong 
motivation if they contravene the above.   
 Written agreement by the shareholder to attest that the pay of executives 
adheres to these guidelines is required. 
 Full disclosure of all components of executive pay shall be carried out in line 
with the Companies Act, the PFMA, and King IV. 
 The total value of STIs and LTI’s shall not exceed 125% of guaranteed 
annual pay of CEOs and 85% of other executives. 
 The role of the remuneration committee is to ensure that there is a well-
defined and direct link between remuneration and contribution to company 
performance.  Furthermore, shareholders are fully informed on remuneration 
policies applied (including management of deviations from the guidelines), 
and the contracts with executives are to ensure that SOEs would not be at 
risk to pay in the event of executive failure. 
Although the guidelines are relatively extensive, seemingly supported by vigorous 
research and analysis, the disadvantage is that these guidelines are, for the most 
part, focused on SOEs that report to the DPE.  They are therefore not applicable to 
the majority of SOEs (Crafford 2012). 
 
3.3.2 DPE-commissioned remuneration review of SOEs (2010) 
The objective of the review commissioned by the DPE in 2010 was to determine the 
degree of compliance of SOE remuneration practices with DPE guidelines.  A further 
objective was to assess the remuneration practices of SOEs against general market 
practices.  If compliance was found to be unsatisfactory, the reason for this had to 
be determined (Crafford 2012). Noteworthy findings of the review included the 
following (Crafford 2012: 12): 
 SOEs do not follow the DPE guidelines issued in 2007 and updated in 2009. 
 SOE remuneration practices are in line with those of the private sector. 
 Instances of non-compliance mostly related to guaranteed or fixed pay.  
Surprisingly, there was greater compliance with regard to incentive schemes. 
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 Although STIs and LTIs were aligned to the guidelines, corroborating 
evidence lacked to verify that payments corresponded to achievements. 
 There was a notable absence of standardisation in the way in which 
remuneration was determined, with some SOEs using the guidelines, and 
others not. The approval process followed and the structuring of the 
remuneration packages also lacked standardisation. 
 Employment contracts for CEOs and executives did not comply with the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act, Act 11 of 2002, in terms of detailing 
work, job descriptions, job specifications, job outputs, and benefit 
components.  
 
Table 7 shows some of the pay discrepancies of executive remuneration (at the 
median level) with the DPE guidelines. 
Table 7 Inconsistencies in remuneration to median as per DPE guidelines (DPE 
2010) 
State-owned 
enterprise (DPE 
oversight) 
Executive 
remuneration % 
ABOVE median 
Executive 
remuneration % 
BELOW median 
Alexkor  8% 
Aventura 66%  
Denel 15%  
Eskom  31% 
Infraco  10% 
PBMR 26%  
SA Express  8% 
SAA 18%  
Safcol  27% 
     Source: Adapted from Crafford (2012:12) 
 
Table 7 shows that, even in this small sample of SOEs (those reporting to the DPE 
at the time), the inconsistency in remuneration guidelines is noteworthy (Crafford 
2012). 
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The DPE review further highlighted a problem with the executive oversight role 
played by state departments. The inconsistency with guidelines points to a 
disappointing degree of monitoring and evaluation, caused “either by the lack of 
capacity, or by ignorance” (Crafford 2012: 14).   
 
3.2.3 National Treasury’s review of SOE remuneration (2010) 
In September 2010, the national treasury published a review of board and executive 
remuneration of Schedule 1, 2, 3A, and 3B entities (per the PFMA).  The period 
under review was 2007 to 2010 (Crafford 2012).  The review was presented to the 
Public Sector Research Centre in the form of a presentation, and included important 
information about irregularities in, particularly, executive remuneration in SOEs.  
Noteworthy findings from this study, with reference to Schedule 2 entities, included 
the following (Crafford 2012: 15):  
 Within a three-year period, and with no clear reason, the total remuneration 
of the CEO of Transnet went from R11 million to R19 million, and back to 
R11 million. During the same period, SAA’s total remuneration increased 
from R7 million to R14 million, and then back to R4 million.   
 The fixed pay of CEOs ranged between R2 million and R4 million. The 
remainder of the remuneration consisted of bonuses, expenses, and a 
category called ‘Other’ 
 Eskom and Transnet are equally critical to the economy and development of 
the country.  However, the Transnet CEO earned double what the CEO of 
Eskom earned. 
 
3.3.4 The Presidential Review Committee on State-owned Entities (2013) 
As indicated above, government has been active in its review of SOE remuneration 
policies.  The Presidential Review Committee on State-owned Entities, established 
in 2010, made 21 recommendations in its 2012 report, one of which related to 
differential aspects of the remuneration policies of SOEs (Massie et al. 2014).  The 
Presidential Review Committee on State-owned entities also contracted 21st 
Century Pay Solutions to conduct an analysis of SOEs’ remuneration practices.  21st 
Century Pay Solutions concluded that “SOEs’ remuneration practices are 
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demonstrably responsible for a deepening inequality and SEOs bear a public 
mandate to which alignment needs to be achieved, both in Executive and General 
pay bonuses” (21st Century Pay Solutions 2012: 22). 
The Presidential Review Committee on State-owned Entities pointed out that one 
of the key problems with the current SOE remuneration framework was the non-
existence of a centralised authority for SOE remuneration, resulting in SOE boards 
and the CEOs determining their own remuneration (Massie et al. 2014).  With regard 
to remuneration practices, the Presidential Review Committee on State-owned 
Entities recommended replacing the current disjointed system with a central 
remuneration authority (CRA), which should: 
 “be assigned a large degree of self-sufficiency along with the needed authority 
to develop an all-encompassing framework for remuneration in SOEs; 
 make available guiding principles and parameters within which the board may 
apply its discretion on remuneration; 
 offer direction on remuneration of SOEs’ boards and executives;  
 notify government on the suitability of the remuneration policies, practices and 
both short and long-term incentive approaches developed by SOEs; 
 every so often review the significance and relevance of executive incentives 
or benefits paid outside the executive’s total package; 
 conduct benchmarking and set standards for annual remuneration; and 
 deliver a SOE remuneration update on a yearly basis for government to 
promote transparency processes.” (Presidential Review Committee on State-
owned Entities 2013: 123). 
 
The Presidential Review Committee on State-owned Entities, in addition, 
recommended that boards retain their discretion to act in the best interests of SOEs, 
but that limits for the boards’ discretion be set by the CRA, and that any deviations 
from the CRA parameters require its approval.  It was also recommended that an 
official from the National Treasury chair the CRA (Masse et al. 2014). 
 
Massie et al. (2014) support the idea of a consolidated framework for SOEs 
encompassing a CRA.  The developmental suggestions by the Presidential Review 
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Committee on State-owned Entities would provide SOEs with a modern, coherent, 
and flexible framework within which to operate. This would provide certainty to 
administrators and uniformity in the pay practices across SOEs, alleviate potential 
duplication across institutions, reign in opportunistic executives, and be to general 
benefit to society (Massie et al. 2014).  
 
3.4   INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOE REMUNERATION 
In November 2011, a subgroup of the Presidential Review Committee on State-
owned Entities undertook a benchmarking tour to Europe to visit countries such as 
Poland, Norway, Germany, Netherlands, and France.  Although the group was 
asked to gather information on remuneration, the sharing of information by these 
countries was limited.  It appeared that the issue of remuneration is as much a 
problematic, if not confusing, area for these European countries as it is for South 
Africa (Crafford 2012: 21).  Some of the key findings of this investigation included 
the following: 
 
 In the Netherlands, shareholders have the right to determine the 
remuneration policies of SOEs (within a system of three categories of SOEs, 
with capped upper ranges in each category).  These categories are: (1) SOEs 
with a role in the economy and who are close to government (e.g., services), 
(2) SOEs with a clear public role and interest, who are also competing with 
private-sector companies, and (3) SOEs that are clearly private companies, 
e.g., airports companies. 
 In Germany, salaries of SOEs are kept below the market average.  How they 
achieve competitiveness is not clear. 
 In Norway, the government’s Ownership Department issued guidelines for 
moderation (including a limit of 50% of overall remuneration on variable pay); 
SOEs should submit their remuneration policy to government.  
 In Poland, there is a draft bill to abolish capped pay for CEOs of SOEs.  With 
this capped-pay policy, the treasury has to be notified when pay exceeds 
predetermined levels, even when the state holds less than 50% of the shares.  
The capping of CEO pay, however, means that, in some companies, about 
150 people earn more than the CEO. 
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 In France, CEO remuneration levels in SOEs have to be approved by the 
shareholders, although the remuneration levels remain the responsibility of 
the board.  
 
From these international perspectives, it can be inferred that executive 
remuneration in SOEs is a sensitive and concerning issue worldwide (Crafford 
2012). 
3.5   MEASURING COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
According to Musvasva (2013), company performance is the overall performance of 
a company.  The literature defines performance as a determining factor of executive 
remuneration, and looks at other possible factors that can affect the executive 
remuneration (Gabay 2005). 
 
Canarella and Gaparyan (2008) hypothesise that, in the literature on remuneration, 
there is no accord on the ideal measure of company performance.  Jeppson, Smith 
and Stone (2009: 82) assert that there is no consensus on the meaning of company 
performance, and that “prior studies have used a variety of financial and non-
financial measures.”  Moreover, Sarkar (2013: 100) describes the relationship 
between executive remuneration and company performance as “seemingly 
complex.” 
 
3.5.1 Effect of executive remuneration on company performance 
An important aspect of ensuring that executive remuneration is equitably and 
appropriately constructed is the use of company performance measures (Chen, 
Zhang, Xiao, & Li 2011).  These company performance measures should take into 
account a company’s long-term objectives, as a company’s success is essentially 
explained by its performance over an extended period (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen & 
Murphy 2004).   
 
Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) postulate that studies predicting how executive 
remuneration affects company performance are limited.  Nonetheless, according to 
motivation theories, remuneration could be expected to increase enthusiasm, which 
Chapter 3: The SOE environment and company performance 
 
111 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
ought to influence company performance in a positive way (Swatdikun 2013).  To 
encourage executives to exert more effort will drive not only the individual but also 
organisational performance. For the reason that large amount of earnings will return 
to the executive when they put in more effort (Fakhfakh & Perotin 2000). 
 
Researchers have, since the earliest studies on remuneration, been conscious that 
it is necessary to understand whether CEO remuneration has the power to influence 
company performance (Heugens, Van Essen, & Van Oosterhout 2009).  According 
to Swatdikun (2013), various authors proclaim that executive remuneration is a 
predictor of company performance; however, performance proxy-accounting-based 
versus market-based measures of performance are still under discussion. For 
example, Leonard (1990) finds that ROE correlates with STIs and Abowd (1990) 
finds that executive remuneration has links to company performance in the next 
year. 
 
Swatdikun (2013) provides evidence that executive remuneration affects company 
performance; however, the measures of company performance are still under 
debate.  This sentiment is echoed by Bussin (2014).  In the literature on 
remuneration, there is no accord regarding the perfect measure of company 
performance, because researchers have measured organisational performance in 
a variety of ways (Bussin 2014). 
 
3.5.2  Company performance  
Various measures and categories of measures have been used as a proxy for 
company performance in studies on remuneration. The core classifications of 
performance measures include accounting measures, financial measures, relative 
performance, and subjective performance measures (Florin et al. 2010). A 
measurement of the performance of a company should enable the comparison of 
levels of performance over different periods (Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, & Fadzil 2014).  
However, no specific measurement with the ability to measure every performance 
aspect has been proposed to date (Al-Matari et al. 2014).  
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What is of importance is that the link between executive remuneration and company 
performance, to some extent, seems to be influenced by the performance 
measurement employed (Florin et al. 2010).  For example, Abowd (1990) found that 
the link was considerably stronger for market measures than for accounting 
measures. Market return, accounting income, and cash-flow performance have 
been extensively discussed, but a definitive opinion on the use of performance 
assessment has not yet been found (Swatdikun 2013). 
 
Swatdikun (2013) claims that one concern challenging researchers’ understanding 
of the relationship between executive remuneration and company performance is 
researchers’ understanding of the methods used to measure company 
performance. 
 
3.5.2.1 Methods of measuring company performance 
Researchers generally use financial performance as a measure of company 
performance (Demirer & Yuan 2011).  Numerous studies have used accounting-
based measures, such as NP, ROE, and ROA, together with market-based 
measures, such as stock-price and total shareholder return (Nourayi & Mintz 2008).  
Accounting-based measurements are generally believed to be an effective indicator 
of a company’s profitability, and can be categorised into residual and ratio terms 
(Xu 2013).  Market-based measurements are characterised by a forward-looking 
aspect, objectivity, and consideration of the expectations of the shareholders 
relating to the company’s future performance (Swatdikun 2013).  
 
Accounting measures have been used for many years as key indicators of company 
performance, with previous research detailing a noteworthy relationship between 
accounting-based performance measures and executive remuneration (Ittner 
1997). Wang and Moini (2012) indicate the following advantages of using 
accounting measures for company performance: the measures generate provable 
data, realised returns are reported, and it is simple to implement. In addition, Xu 
(2013) states that accounting measures exclude factors that are beyond executives’ 
control, such as an economic recession. 
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Otieno (2011) claims that another advantage of using accounting information is that 
it can show the productivity of the entity, thereby providing executives with a 
monitoring tool. Researchers often use accounting performance measures to 
evaluate executive performance.  This is largely because of the observability and 
relatively high degree of correlation between accounting performance and 
executives’ efforts (Chen, Shen, Xin, & Zhang 2012). Furthermore, accounting 
measures or rates of return are appropriate for both listed and unlisted entities 
(Otieno 2011). 
 
Researchers have recognised that each of these performance measures has 
shortcomings.  From a shareholder’s viewpoint, return is generated from stock price 
variables, and is not defined in accounting terms. In principle, market-based 
measures are forward-looking measures of company performance, as they indicate 
managerial decisions that encourage future profitability (Nourayi & Mintz 2008).  On 
the other hand, accounting-based measures of performance use historical data, and 
the results are thus less relevant to shareholders’ (Nourayi & Mintz 2008).  Murphy 
(1999) states that, because profits are backward-looking, managers may become 
too focused on short-term objectives, thereby becoming unwilling to reduce current 
profitability, even when it would result in improved cost-effectiveness in future.  
Another disadvantage of using accounting measures for company performance is 
that these can be influenced by accounting practices, such as the different methods 
applied to valuations of tangible and intangible capital (Musvasva 2013).  
 
Otieno (2011) noted that executives can manipulate accounting profits, reporting 
economic income that does not reflect reported income. In addition, Alon, 
Adithipyangkul, and Zhang (2009) posit that accounting data are based on history 
and may be focused on the short term, and may therefore not encapsulate the 
CEO’s actions that will add to long-term business success.   
 
Despite the shortcomings of accounting measures, these remain the main tool for 
evaluating company performance. One reason for this is that accounting information 
has to be available free of charge under the requirements of commercial law 
(Swatdikun 2013). 
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Abowd (1990) found a relatively weak relationship between accounting measures 
of company performance and CEO remuneration (Van Blerck 2012).  Contrary to 
this, Attaway (2000), in his study, used present ROE (an accounting-based 
approach), and found a small put positive relationship between company 
performance and CEO remuneration.  Damen (2011) investigated the relationship 
between ROA and annual stock return, and found that ROA had a significant 
positive effect on CEO total remuneration in the banking industry.  Sigler (2011) 
measured company performance using ROA and the market-based measure of 
annual stock return to total return on common stock, and found that ROA was 
insignificant in explaining CEO remuneration in the retail industry.  He, however, 
found that market-based performance measures positively and significantly related 
to CEO remuneration.   
 
Merchant (2006), however, proposes that none of these three measures is perfect, 
and that more studies are required on the advantages and disadvantages of each 
company performance measurement. 
 
3.5.2.2 Trends in the measurement of company performance 
Boards of directors use several measures that effortlessly track and measure 
company performance (Resnick 2013).  Resnick (2013) indicates that research by 
Murphy (1998) showed that there is no fixed trend in the selection of performance 
measures and their alignment of company performance with the CEO’s 
remuneration. Blair (2014) posits that the results of previous studies on 
remuneration vary widely, depending on the performance measures used.  Motala 
and Fourie (2014) postulate that, although academics, in earlier research, 
documented various indicators of company performance, they hold opposing views 
on which indicators are most appropriate. 
 
Murphy (1998) posits that Western countries (the USA, UK, and member states of 
the European Union) focus more on short-term financial performance, while Eastern 
nations (Japan, China, India, etc.) tend to address long-term performance and 
sustainability, which may be financial and non-financial. Murphy’s 1998 study 
showed that sales growth, share-price growth, earnings per share (EPS), ROE, and 
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economic value added (EVA) are the most popular performance measures in 
Western countries. 
 
Building on Murphy’s (1985) seminal work, Tosi et al. (2000) extended the definition 
of company performance to take account of a broader set of corporate performance 
measures: absolute financial performance, ROE in both the short and the long term, 
ROA, share-price performance, market returns, and internal performance 
indicators.  
 
In their study, Smith et al. (2006) used the following four measures of company 
performance: gross profit/net sales, contribution margin/net sales, operating 
income/net assets, and net income after tax/net assets. 
 
Jeppson et al. (2009) studied 200 large public companies for the period 2007 to 
2008. These researchers used the following variables to study company 
performance: total revenue, percent change in net income, and percent change in 
total shareholder return. These researchers found that company performance as 
measured by total company revenue was a significant factor in determining base 
salaries, bonuses, benefits, and the value of stock awards.  
 
Dommisse (2011) found a strong relationship between CEO remuneration and 
turnover, total income, and profit margins.  Otieno (2011), in determining the 
relationship between financial performance and executive remuneration in South 
African SOEs within the context of the agency theory, used NP, revenue, and total 
assets as measures of financial performance. Gigliotti (2012) examined the 
relationship between company performance and remuneration of Italian companies 
listed on the Milan Stock Exchange for the period 2004 to 2009 using ROE, ROA, 
and return on investment (ROI) to measure company performance.  
 
In addition to using the ‘traditional’ performance measures of ROA and ROE, De 
Wet (2012) used EVA and market value-add (MVA) to test the relationship between 
executive remuneration and company performance. Although De Wet’s (2012) 
findings revealed a significant relationship between executive remuneration and 
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EVA and MVA, the relationship between executive remuneration and results of the 
traditional measures (ROA and ROE) was stronger.  De Wet (2012) concluded that 
South African companies need to shift the emphasis from traditional performance 
measures to value-creation measures when designing and implementing executive 
remuneration plans, because the former are susceptible to manipulation. These 
measures also do not fully point out the risk to a company related to the share price 
(Motala & Fourie 2014).  Lee and Kim (2009) postulate EVA as an overall measure 
of financial performance, as it reflects a company’s true performance.  
 
In his study, Diamantopoulos (2012) used two pure accounting measures that are 
considered good indicators of performance, namely ROA and return on sales 
(ROS).  The researcher then used annual holding period returns (AHPRs) as a 
proxy for market performance, and, lastly, a performance measure that combines 
accounting and market values, namely Tobin’s Q.  In Van Blerck’s (2012) study, the 
research questions evaluated the relationship between executive remuneration, 
EVA, and equity-based measures of performance, such as ROE and share price.  
In his study, Nel (2012) observed the relationship between the financial 
performance of South African retail and consumer goods companies in terms of 
ROE, profit margin, asset turnover, and financial leverage.  
 
Bradley (2013) performed a study over a period of five years on the largest 40 
companies on the JSE, and found no relationship between CEO remuneration and 
ROE, ROA, and EPS. In his study, Resnick (2013) selected the following company 
performance measures: revenue, share price, NP, and net assets.  A study of listed 
Chinese logistics companies demonstrated no linear relationship between executive 
remuneration and company performance when using EPS and ROE as 
performance measures (Fang, Ya-xuan, & Hui 2013). 
 
Nulla (2014) investigated the effect of CEO roles with accounting performance 
towards CEO remuneration in the New York Stock Exchange companies for the 
period 2005 to 2010. One hundred and twenty companies was selected for the 
study. Nulla (2014) used the following accounting performance measures: ROA, 
ROE, EPS, cash flow per share (CFPS), net profit margin (NPM), book value per 
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common stock outstanding (BVCSO), and market value per common stock 
outstanding (MVCSO). From the study it was found that there was a relationship 
between CEO salary, CEO bonus, CEO total remuneration, and accounting 
performance. 
 
Theku (2014) used both accounting and market measures to measure 
organisational performance, using data from the McGregor BFA database, such as 
organisations’ financial statements, directors’ reports, and JSE performance 
archives.  This author used the following as company performance measures: ROE; 
ROA; asset turnover; revenue; earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and 
amortisation (EBITDA); headline earnings per share (HEPS), change in share price, 
and market capitalisation. 
 
From the above, it is clear that there is not a single, agreed-upon measure of 
company performance; rather a range of different company performance measures 
should be used to determine the performance of a company.  
 
The company performance measures used in the present study will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4, Section 4.6.2.  It should be noted that, for the present study, 
mainly accounting measures were used, because accounting data are verifiable and 
commonly understood (Murphy 1999).  
 
3.6   PREVIOUS STUDIES ON EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION AND 
COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
 The importance of the relationship between company performance and executive 
remuneration has been well documented in corporate governance and other 
literature (Diamantopoulos 2012).  Several empirical studies, especially in the last 
two decades, attempted to provide convincing evidence about the relationship 
between executive remuneration and company performance.  The results of these 
studies are, however, not explicit, because, in most cases, only a weak pay‒
performance relationship was found.  Contrary to these findings, other studies 
reported a strong pay‒performance relationship, while still other studies reported a 
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negative relationship between executive remuneration and company performance 
(Grivas 2013). 
 
Tariq (2010) postulates that various studies have tried to answer the question 
whether the remuneration of the CEO is related to the performance of the company, 
but that the results are ambiguous and, in some cases, contradictory.  Despite all 
the research conducted, the results remain inconclusive and unclear (Bootsma 
2009; Ntim et al. 2013). 
 
Ebert et al. (2008) presented a paper indicating that a straightforward relationship 
between executive remuneration and company performance is difficult to establish, 
and that such a relationship would be country-specific.  It would seem that the matter 
of linking executive remuneration to company performance is influenced by 
economic, institutional, and cultural characteristics predominant in the countries 
under examination (Ntim et al. 2013).  According to Bevan (2013), the research 
aimed at examining the link between remuneration and company performance has 
been far from scientific.  
 
The results of previous such studies, particularly in South Africa, varied, and are 
inconclusive.  The reason for this is that previous studies did not consider whether 
the company performance measures chosen had relationships with executive 
remuneration in each industry (Blair 2014).  Bruce et al. (2005) rightly posit that past 
research investigating the link between executive remuneration and company 
performance reveals a lack of consensus.  
 
The findings of previous research can be separated into three categories of findings: 
(1) executive remuneration is positively related to company performance, (2) 
executive remuneration is negatively related to company performance, and (3) there 
is no relationship between executive remuneration and company performance.  
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3.6.1 Studies revealing a positive relationship between CEO remuneration 
and company performance 
A number of researchers concluded that there is a positive relationship between 
CEO remuneration and company performance, for example Murphy (1985), Jensen 
and Murphy (1990), Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2001), Kato and Long (2004), 
Mengistae and Xu (2004), Gabay (2005), Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007), Buck, Lui, 
and Skovoroda (2008), Unite, Sullivan, Brookman, Majadillas, and Taningco (2008), 
Ozkan (2011), Junarsin (2011), Zigler (2011), Demirer and Yuan (2013), Feng and 
Johansson (2013), Tian (2013), and Dai (2014).  The bulk of these studies were 
conducted in the UK and the USA. 
 
Studies conducted on SOEs, and where a positive relationship was found between 
CEO remuneration and company performance are those of Xin and Tan (2009), 
Chen, Ezzamel, Cai (2011), and Chen et al. (2012).  Otieno (2011) and Ngwenya 
and Khumalo (2012) conducted studies on South African SOEs.  Otieno (2011) 
aimed to determine the relationship between financial performance and executive 
remuneration in South African SOEs within the context of the agency theory. 
Otieno’s findings revealed a positive relationship between executive remuneration 
and company performance. Ngwenya and Khumalo (2012) found a positive 
relationship between CEO remuneration (base salary) and the size of SOEs as 
measured by total revenue and number of employees. 
Studies conducted on the subject in South Africa that found a positive relationship 
were those of Dommisse (2011), Shaw (2011), De Wet (2012), Scholtz and Smit 
(2012), Van Blerck (2012), Modau (2013), Blair (2014), and Bussin and Modau 
(2015). Findings from Modise’s (1993) study supported the hypothesis that changes 
in executive remuneration are positively related to changes in corporate 
performance, although the effect was very small.  Dommisse (2011) found a strong 
relationship between CEO remuneration and turnover, total income, and profit 
margins.  Shaw (2011) found there was generally a positive relationship between 
CEO remuneration and company performance in the South African financial 
services industry for the period 2005 to 2010. De Wet (2012) found a positive 
relationship between CEO remuneration and company performance across all 
industries, but only used ROA and ROE as measures.  Scholtz and Smit (2012) 
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investigated the link between company performance and short-term executive 
remuneration of companies listed on the South African Alternative Exchange (AltX).  
They found a strong relationship between executive remuneration and some 
company performance indicators, such as total assets, turnover, and share price.  
Van Blerck (2012) tested the interrelationships between executive remuneration, 
EVA, ROE, and growth in share price in South African banks.  The findings 
suggested a strong positive correlation between executive remuneration and the 
results of the performance measures, which included EVA. The correlation 
strengthened before the financial crisis.  Modau’s (2013) study of the Top 40 JSE-
listed companies for the period 2006 to 2012 found a generally positive relationship 
between CEO remuneration and company performance.  Bussin and Modau (2015) 
found a relationship between CEOs’ STIs and company performance, using 
accounting-based organisational performance measures. 
Blair (2014) conducted a study on the relationship between the CEO remuneration 
and the financial performance measures of JSE-listed companies in five industries 
for the period 2008 to 2012.  Blair calculated total CEO earnings utilizing the Black 
Scholes method to determine the long-term portion of CEO remuneration. The 
results suggested a positive and significant relationship between CEO remuneration 
and company performance in four of the five industries investigated.  Finally, Theku 
(2014) found a moderate to strong relationship between CEO remuneration and 
organisational performance in the South Africa mining industry.  Theku studied 30 
mining companies over a five-year period (2009 to 2013). 
3.6.2 Studies revealing a negative relationship between CEO remuneration 
and company performance 
A small number of previous studies found a negative relationship between CEO 
remuneration and company performance (Wilson, Chacko, Shrader, & Mullen 1992; 
Grunditz & Lindqvist 2003; Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome, & Weintrop 2007; Duffhues 
& Kabir 2008). From a SOE perspective, Kyalo (2015) found a weak negative 
relationship between executive remuneration and financial performance. 
From a South African perspective, Bussin and Nel (2015) found that CEOs’ 
guaranteed cost to company has shown no sensitivity to company financial 
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performance in terms of the DuPont analysis.  These authors furthermore found a 
negative relationship between ROE and the guaranteed cost to company of the 
CEOs in the South African retail and consumer goods sector.  
3.6.3 Studies revealing no relationship between CEO remuneration and 
company performance 
Few researchers found either a low or no relationship between CEO remuneration 
and company performance (Zhou 2000; Elayan, Lau, & Meyer 2001; Abdu 2011; 
Zhou, Georgakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, & Vaseileiou 2011; Gigliotti 2012).   
Gregg, Jewell, and Tonks (2010) confirmed an asymmetric relationship between 
executive pay and company performance.  Diamantopoulos (2012), in his empirical 
study of Standard & Poor’s top 500 firms for the period 2005 to 2011, obtained 
ambiguous results, and stated that there was not a significant relationship between 
CEO remuneration and the performance of large firms in the USA.  Kua, Lin, and 
Wang (2012) propose that the weak link found between CEO remuneration and 
company performance may be explained by the fact that previous studies have 
ignored the possibility of a nonlinear-relationship between CEO remuneration and 
company performance. 
In a South African study, Bradley (2013) investigated the relationship between CEO 
remuneration and company performance in the 40 largest public companies listed 
on the JSE for a five-year period.  He found no relationship between CEO 
remuneration and measures of performance such as ROE, ROA, and EPS. In 
another South African study, Ngwenya and Khumalo (2012) investigated the 
relationship between CEO remuneration and the performance of South African 
SOEs, using data for the period 2009 to 2011.  Their results indicated no positive 
relationship between CEO remuneration and SOE performance as measured by 
ROA. 
Finally, Motala and Fourie (2014) investigated the remuneration structure of 19 
South African retail companies for the period 2008 to 2013. The aim of their study 
was to identify the level of share-based awards expensed by the company.  They 
found little evidence to support the proposition that a relationship exists between 
equity-based remuneration and company performance. 
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3.6.4 Conclusions regarding the relationship between company 
performance and executive remuneration 
Large executive cash remuneration may attract criticism, and, as a result, SOEs will 
probably make use of other forms of payment to reward their CEOs (Alon et al. 
2009: 10).  Prior studies, especially in South Africa, have focused predominantly on 
listed public companies.  The remuneration‒performance relationship in SOEs in 
South Africa is therefore not fully understood.  Furthermore, the literature regarding 
the remuneration practices of SOEs is inadequate, and the findings regarding the 
relationship between CEO remuneration and SOEs’ performance remain vague 
(Reddy & Whang 2014) 
 
Research conducted by PWC (2014) revealed that the relationship between 
executive remuneration and company performance is slowly growing stronger.  
PwC, in 2013, using a cross-sectional dataset of 286 listed South African companies 
found that 32.5% of current-year executive remuneration was based on company 
performance, compared to 21.1% in 2000.  
 
Based on these studies, it is clear that the relationship between CEO remuneration 
and company performance is not clear (Tariq 2010).  In this regard, Blair (2014: 22) 
noted, “It is clear that the research to support the link of CEO pay to company 
performance metrics is not definitive, and that the results of the research varies 
depending on the performance metrics that were investigated.”  
 
3.7   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
After more than four decades of research, there is still no proven result concerning 
the nature of the remuneration‒performance relationship.  The issues remain 
unresolved for various reasons, namely the different datasets used, diversity of the 
methods used to analyse the datasets, heterogeneity in terms of recognised factors 
of countries, and the endogeneity of variables not being considered (Reddy & 
Whang 2014).  
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From the literature, it is evident that the current remuneration practices in SOEs are 
far from perfect.  There is a clear lack of standardisation of remuneration practices 
across SOEs, and instances of unsubstantiated and excessive remuneration are 
certain to continue.  Part of the problem is the inconsistent regulatory framework for 
SOEs, together with non-compliance with existing guidelines.  The complexity of the 
current framework places a burden on the officers of SOEs. 
 
Previous studies primarily focused on companies in the USA and the UK, and, as a 
result, literature relating to South Africa in this area is relative scarce.  Despite 
various studies having been conducted on the pay‒performance relationship in 
SOEs, most of these were conducted abroad.  The findings of these studies were 
often inconclusive, and the researchers identified the different remuneration 
structures as the main obstacle in establishing a link between executive pay and 
company performance. 
 
Although various measures and categories of measures are used as proxy for 
performance throughout the literature on executive remuneration, no specific 
measurement with the ability to measure every performance aspect has been 
proposed to date. 
 
The issue of remuneration of CEOs and executives remains sensitive worldwide.  It 
is no different in South Africa, and what gives further weight to the significance of 
the issue in this country is the problem of inequality. CEO remuneration is 
categorised by high inconsistency, significant inequality, and concerns regarding 
sustainability of what appears to be ‘runaway’ remuneration levels. 
 
This concludes the discussion on SOEs and company performance measures.  The 
next chapter provides a discussion of the research methodology of the present 
study. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research is to see what everybody else has seen and to think what nobody else has 
thought. 
Albert Szent-Gyorgyi (1893‒1986) 
4.1   INTRODUCTION  
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the research methodology employed to determine 
the relationship between company performance and executive remuneration.  The 
discussion of the research methodology is followed by a description of the research 
objectives and the research questions.  
 
Having discussed the research methodology, an explanation is provided on the 
sampling strategy, the variables used, the data-collection process, and the 
measurement of the variables.  This chapter concludes by looking at the limitations 
and ethical considerations pertaining to this study.  The assumptions and anomalies 
relating to the data are also outlined. 
 
4.2   OVERVIEW OF PAST RESEARCH DATA AND METHODOLOGIES 
This section will provide an overview of past research data and methodologies used, 
mainly focusing on South African studies.  Wilson et al. (1992: 497) claim that a number 
of studies, using a variety of company performance measures have found that there is 
“little or no relationship between executive pay and company performance.”  Wilson et 
al. (1992) also emphasise that the differences in the findings not only related to the 
relationship between executive pay and company performance, but also the 
methodologies and variables required to study this phenomenon.   
 
In general, empirical research on the relationship between executive pay and company 
performance was typically based on econometric regression models that took into 
account a number of economic variables (see, for example, Barber, Ghiselli, and Deale 
(2006), Jeppson et al. (2009), Farmer, Alexandrou and Archibold (2010), and Callan 
and Thomas (2012).   
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Research on the relationship between executive remuneration and company 
performance has been a source of numerous debates amongst a number of 
researchers (Otieno 2011).  One of the difficulties in comparing the immense volume 
of results of all the academic papers on this topic is that very few of these evaluate the 
same model (Florin et al. 2010).  
 
During 2011, Otieno, employing a quantitative methodology, aimed to determine the 
relationship between financial performance and executive remuneration in South 
African SOEs within the context of the agency theory, for the period 2007 to 2009.  
Secondary data were obtained from annual financial reports of Schedule 2 SOEs, and 
NP, revenue, and total assets were used as measures of financial performance.  Step-
wise regression analysis was used to analyse the numerical data. In order to determine 
whether regression analysis was necessary, the correlation between the measures of 
remuneration and the measures of company performance were first established.  In 
addition, given the possibility of a lagged relationship between the variables of 
remuneration and performance, a lagged step-wise regression analysis was 
conducted.  This was done by lagging the performance measure by one year, and 
using the current year’s remuneration. 
 
Shaw (2011) used bivariate regression analysis to determine the co-efficient of 
determination between CEO remuneration components (fixed pay, STIs, and total 
remuneration) and four measures of organisational performance.  The analysis was 
then extended to incorporate multiple regression analysis, to determine the most 
suitable predictors of the dependent variable (CEO remuneration), by using four 
explanatory variables for organisational performance). The multiple regression was 
hierarchical in nature, introducing variables in stages. Shaw (2011) used the F-test 
statistic to determine the level of significance, and secondary statistical analyses to 
support the primary statistical techniques of bivariate and multiple regression analysis, 
as well as repeated measures of ANOVA.  On two occasions, a paired-sample t-test 
was required to analyse data by comparing one group under two different conditions.  
Due to the nature of the data, Shaw used a Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
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De Wet (2012) researched the relationship between executive remuneration and EVA 
and MVA of companies by making use of data supplied by McGregor BFA.  The sample 
of the study consisted of companies listed on the JSE, and spanned a five-year period, 
from 2006 to 2010.  De Wet used regression analysis, with total remuneration as the 
dependent variable, and created nine models, each with a different blend of 
explanatory variables.  The explanatory variables consisted of standardised EVA and 
MVA, weighted average cost of capital, ROA, and ROE.  In addition, the recommended 
robustness tests of endogeneity, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and stationary 
were carried out. 
 
Ngwenya and Khumalo (2012) investigated the relationship between CEO 
remuneration and performance of SOEs in South Africa, using data for the period 2009 
to 2011. Data was obtained from SOEs that fall directly under DPE (five) and five SOEs 
that do not fall directly under DPE. Secondary data was acquired from SOE annual 
reports. Their hypotheses were tested using Pearson Product-Moment Correlation and 
linear least squares regression analysis. SOE performance was measured through 
ROA, and CEO remuneration through total remuneration (limited to base salary and 
cash bonus only). 
 
Nel (2012) investigated the relationship between the financial performance of South 
African retail and consumer goods companies and the fixed salaries of their CEOs.  
The study spanned a six-year period, from 2006 to 2011.  Nel (2012) performed a 
simple linear regression analysis to determine the relationship between the dependent 
variable (guaranteed cost to company) and the explanatory variable (company 
financial performance). Nel’s study utilised the DuPont Model in analysing the 
relationship.  DuPont analysis is an expression that divides ROE into three parts, 
namely profitability (measured by profit margin), operating efficiency (measured by 
asset turnover), and financial leverage.  Nel performed repeated measures of ANOVA 
to compare the means of various groups and the explained and unexplained variances.  
The F-ratio was used to describe the level of significance. 
 
In their study, Scholtz and Smit (2012) explored the link between executive 
remuneration and company performance in South African companies listed on the 
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AltX.  Data of 58 companies were obtained from McGregor BFA for the period 2003 to 
2010.  These authors performed a regression analysis, using executive remuneration 
as the dependent variable.  The explanatory variables in Scholtz and Smits’ study were 
turnover, EBITDA, total assets, and share price. 
 
Bradley (2013) grouped companies into industries, which made it possible to make 
meaningful comparisons between sectors.  Bradley (2013) used multivariate analysis 
to identify the independent variables that influenced the dependent variable, with the 
CEO remuneration variables initially assumed to be the independent variables.  Data 
regarding CEO remuneration was obtained from the Profile’s Stock Exchange 
Handbook for five years, from 2006 to 2010.  Bradley (2013), furthermore, applied six 
econometric models to analyse the data, to determine the variables that may affect the 
relationship between CEO remuneration and company performance.  Durbin-Watson 
(DW) statistics was applied to test for autocorrelation of the disturbances. The Breusch-
Pagan Godfrey test was also used, to test for homoscedasticity of the disturbances 
against the alternative heteroskedasticity.  Bradley also conducted the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test on residuals, to test for normality of the disturbances. 
 
In the quantitative, archival study of Modau (2013), the purpose was to determine the 
link between executive remuneration and organisational financial performance for the 
period 2008 to 2012.  The primary data source was McGregor BFA.  In cases where 
the research data were not available on the McGregor BFA database, financial 
statements of the organisations were used.  The dependent variables in Modau’s study 
were fixed pay and STIs. The independent variables were company performance 
measures, namely market capitalisation, EPS, ROE, EVA, and MVA. The main 
statistical techniques used by Modau were multiple correlation analysis, bivariate 
regression analysis, multiple regression analysis, and stepwise regression analysis.  
Modau also tested for multicollinearity. 
 
Resnick (2013) conducted a quantitative study to establish the relationship between 
executive remuneration and company financial performance, using the 20 largest 
companies listed on the JSE.  Secondary data were collected for a three-year period, 
from 2008 to 2010. Resnick (2013) conducted descriptive statistical analysis to 
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describe the data set, and employed the Pearson correlation method to establish a 
relationship between salary payouts, board structures, and performance indicators 
(revenue, share price, NP, and net assets). 
 
Xu (2013) investigated the relationship between CEO remuneration and company 
performance for the weak economic period of 2008 to 2012.  Company performance 
was examined in terms of simultaneous and lagged accounting performance and stock 
market performance. Xu retrieved the data from Standard & Poor’s Compustat 
ExecuComp database for the Standard & Poor’s 1500 Index firms.  The empirical study 
adopted a quantitative test of pay‒performance sensitivity to investigate the 
relationship between CEO remuneration and company performance.  Ordinary least 
square regressions were applied in the empirical analysis. 
 
The purpose of the study by Motala and Fourie (2014) was to identify whether the 
proportion of total executive remuneration granted in the form of share-based 
payments had an impact on company performance for 18 companies listed on the JSE.  
The study spanned a six-year period, from 2008 to 2013, using data collected from 
annual reports. The dependent variable for this study was company performance 
measures, and the independent variable was share-based executive remuneration.  A 
comprehensive regression analysis was employed in analysing the data.  Motala and 
Fourie (2014) employed additional variables in the regression analysis as explanatory 
variables, namely natural log of total assets, percentage of total remuneration as share-
based awards, and percentage ownership of ordinary shares by executive directors. 
 
Theku (2014) sourced information from McGregor BFA, and used information 
contained in the organisations’ financial statements, directors’ reports, and JSE 
performance archives.  The purpose of his study was to gain a better understanding of 
the relationship between executive remuneration and the performance of the South 
African mining industry.  The study was conducted for the period 2009 to 2013.  The 
statistical analysis techniques used in Theku’s (2014) study included analysis of 
variance and multivariate regression.  The Kruskal-Wallis test was used for comparison 
between the years for each of the variables, due to the smaller group sizes and high 
number of outliers.  The Shapiro-Wilk test was also used to test for normality.  The 
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Bonferroni adjustment was performed to minimise the probability of biased results.  
Other statistical techniques performed included Pearson’s product-moment 
correlation, multicollinearity tests, and the DW and Cochrane-Orcutt methods. 
 
Deysel and Kruger (2015) conducted a quantitative and qualitative study over a seven-
year period in the South African banking sector. The purpose of the study was to 
determine whether there was a long-term correlation between CEO remuneration and 
company performance.  Data were sourced from annual reports.  The SPSS statistical 
program was used to perform a correlation analysis of CEO remuneration and each of 
the independent variables.  The researchers also considered certain variables affecting 
the data during the analysis and interpretation, namely endogenous and exogenous 
factors.  
 
For the purpose of the present research, the researcher followed a quantitative 
approach over a nine-year period, from 2006 to 2014. The researcher sourced data 
from audited annual financial statements in the annual reports of the SOEs under 
study. The SPSS statistical program was used for the descriptive analysis, while 
EViews, a software package for econometric analysis, was used to run multiple 
regression models on pooled datasets.  The statistical analysis techniques used in this 
study were Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficient test and multiple regression 
analysis. The researcher used three CEO remuneration components as the dependent 
variables, namely Fixed pay, STIs, and Total remuneration.  The independent variables 
for the study comprised accounting measures of Company performance (Turnover, 
OP, NP, ROE, ROCE, LR, SR, IFWE, and AO), CEO demographic variables, and 
Company size.  This allowed for a robust enquiry into the relationship between CEO 
remuneration and company performance for Schedule 2 SOEs.  
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4.3   RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The main research objective was to investigate whether there is a relationship between 
the remuneration of CEOs and the performance of South African Schedule 2 SOEs. 
 
The results will facilitate a deeper understanding of the relationship between CEOs 
remuneration and company financial performance.  Specific objectives following from 
the main research objective include: 
 
 To determine whether there was a relationship between CEO remuneration and 
SOEs performance  for the period 2006 to 2014; 
 To determine whether the relationship between CEO remuneration and SOEs’ 
performance has changed in the period 2006 to 2014; 
 To investigate the relationship between CEO remuneration and SOEs’ 
performance in the period before and during the financial crisis of 2008 (2006 to 
2010), and afterwards (2011 to 2014);  
 To determine whether the demographic variables age, tenure, gender, race, and 
education influence CEOs’ remuneration in South African SOEs; and 
 To determine whether there is a relationship between CEO remuneration and 
company size. 
 
4.3.1 Research questions 
The research questions originated from the challenges that were outlined in the 
literature review.  The literature indicates that, despite the large body of knowledge on 
the topic having emanated from developed economies, there is limited understanding 
of the relationship between CEO remuneration and company performance in South 
African SOEs. The research questions provided the direction in investigating this 
relationship.  
 
Furthermore, given the poor performance of some SOEs with highly remunerated 
executives, there is a question whether CEOs in South African SOEs deserve the high 
levels of remuneration they receive.  Given this research problem, the primary research 
question that needed to be addressed was: 
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Is there a relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and the performance of 
South African Schedule 2 SOEs? 
 
The study was guided by the following research questions and sub-questions: 
 
Research Question 1:  
Is there a relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and the performance of South 
African SOEs for the period 2006 to 2014? 
 
Sub-question 1.1: Is there a relationship between CEOs’ fixed pay and SOEs’ 
performance? 
Sub-question 1.2: Is there a relationship between CEOs’ short-term incentives and 
SOEs’ performance? 
Sub-question 1.3: Is there a relationship between CEO’s total remuneration and 
SOEs’ performance? 
 
Research Question 2: 
Did the relationship between CEO remuneration and SOEs’ performance strengthen 
over the period 2006 to 2014? 
 
Sub-question 2.1: Did the relationship between CEO’s fixed pay and SOEs’ 
performance strengthen over the period 2006 to 2014? 
Sub-question 2.2: Did the relationship between CEOs’ short-term incentives and 
SOEs’ performance strengthen over the period 2006 to 2014? 
Sub-question 2.3: Did the relationship between CEOs’ total remuneration and SOEs’ 
performance strengthen over the period 2006 to 2014? 
 
Research Question 3: 
What is the nature of the relationship between CEO remuneration and the performance 
of Schedule 2 SOEs before and during the global financial crisis (2006 to 2010) and 
afterwards (2011 to 2014)? 
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Sub-question 3.1: What is the nature of the relationship between CEOs’ fixed pay 
and SOEs’ performance for the periods 2006 to 2010 and 2011 to 
2014?  
Sub-question 3.2: What is the nature of the relationship between CEOs’ short-term 
incentives and SOEs’ performance for the periods 2006 to 2010 
and 2011 to 2014? 
Sub-question 3.2: What is the nature of the relationship between CEOs’ total 
remuneration and SOEs’ performance for the periods 2006 to 
2010 and 2011 to 2014? 
 
Research Question 4:  
Is CEO remuneration in South African SOEs affected by the variables age, education, 
tenure, and gender? 
 
Sub-question 4.1: What is the effect of the CEO variables age, tenure, gender, race, 
and education on CEO’s fixed pay? 
Sub-question 4.2: What is the effect of the CEO variables age, tenure, gender, race, 
and education on CEO’s short-term incentives? 
Sub-question 4.3: What is the effect of the CEO variables age, tenure, gender, race, 
and education of the have on CEOs’ total remuneration? 
 
Research Question 5:  
Is there a relationship between CEO remuneration and the size of South African 
SOEs? 
 
Sub-question 5.1: Is there a relationship between the CEOs’ fixed pay and the size 
of the SOEs? 
Sub-question 5.2: Is there a relationship between the CEOs’ short-term incentives 
and the size of the SOEs? 
Sub-question 5.3: Is there a relationship between the CEOs’ total remuneration and 
the size of the SOEs? 
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4.4   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Because executive remuneration is not an exact science, studies using comparable 
material and sources will not necessarily reveal the same results (Okasmaa 2009).  
The present researcher believes that it is difficult to generalise findings regarding 
executive remuneration, because company performance involves much more than 
mere financial performance. Paying skilled executives high salaries does not 
guarantee the success of the organisation.  This is why the present study did not intend 
to find answers applicable to any company.  Corporate structure, the environment, and 
national culture are all reasons for caution when studying executive remuneration.  
Past and present trends can, however, serve as indicators for the future. 
 
The research approach adopted is important factor in the rationality of a research study 
(Cresswell & Clark 2007).  In a discipline that is often considered more an art than a 
science, due to the influence of human behaviour in complex situations, academic 
contributions can bring the study of executive remuneration closer to a science by 
utilising scientific research methodologies and processes (Ulrich 2010).  
 
A scientific research approach was applied in the present study, as the researcher 
employed various analytical tools and techniques.  Scientific research is characterised 
by the following (Cooper & Schindler 2006): 
 
 a clearly defined research purpose; 
 a detailed research process, (explained in the research proposal); 
 a well-planned research design; 
 clearly stated research limitations; 
 adequate data analysis that exhibits relevance and significance; 
 appropriate methods of data analysis; 
 unambiguous presentation of research findings; and 
 justifiable conclusions that are supported by the research data. 
 
Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2012) recommend that the research process be 
designed in the way one would peel off the layers of an onion, and that each layer 
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represents a particular phase before the data collection process can begin (Ulrich 
2010).  This approach is illustrated in Figure12.  The research philosophy, research 
approach, research strategies, time horizons, and the data-collection method form the 
different layers of the onion, representing each component of the research process.  
The process involves peeling each layer one at a time to reach the centre, which is the 
main question the research aims to answer. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 12, the first layer relates to the selection of a research 
philosophy.  The second is the research approach that follows from the philosophy.  
The third layer is the research strategy.  The fourth layer refers to the time horizon for 
the research, and the fifth layer relates to the data-collection methods. 
Figure 12 The research approach 
 Source: Adapted from Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill (2012) 
 
The red circles in the research process illustrated in Figure 12 indicate how the present 
study was conducted.  The relationship between various quantifiable variables was 
investigated, thus, the chosen philosophy was positivistic.  The research approach was 
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deductive, as the research was based on earlier literature.  The research methodology 
was, in essence, exploratory and archival in nature, while the time horizon was 
longitudinal. Data collection for this study was performed using a literature analysis 
and a desktop study for extracting the data from the annual reports of the SOEs under 
study.  The methodology was quantitative. The research process and the reasons for 
selecting the above options for this study are discussed in detail below. 
 
4.1.1 Research methodology and design 
As the process illustrated in Figure 12 suggests, it was important to first develop a 
research philosophy, approach, and strategy, before the process of data collection, 
analysis, and interpretation could commence. The researcher followed the process 
suggested by Saunders et al. (2012), discussed hereunder. 
 
4.1.1.1 Research philosophy 
 
Saunders and Thornhill (2007) define a research philosophy as the establishment of 
the research background, research knowledge, and its nature. The research 
philosophy directs the way in which the research will be conducted and how knowledge 
will be developed (Ulrich 2010).  Saunders and Thornhill (2007) identify three different 
philosophical approaches: positivism, realism, and interpretivism. 
 
A positivist philosophy usually demands observable social realities that can be 
replicated through a highly structured methodology (Ulrich 2010).  Statistical analysis 
of quantitative data is usually required in this process (Gill & Johnson 1997).  For the 
purpose of the present study, the positivist philosophy was considered appropriate, 
due to the quantitative nature of the study. 
  
4.1.1.2 Research paradigm 
A research paradigm can be characterised as either deductive or inductive.  With a 
deductive approach, the researcher develops and tests theory and hypotheses.  The 
inductive approach calls for the collection of data, followed by the development of 
theory from the data analysis (Saunders et al. 2012).  Saunders et al. (2012) suggest 
that the deductive approach is often best suited to a positivist research philosophy.  
The present study is characterised by the use of a deductive approach, because 
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financial data were used to answer the research questions.  The research started with 
the theory that there is a positive relationship between CEO remuneration and 
company performance. This theory was then tested, using financial data to provide 
answers to the research questions. 
 
4.1.1.3 Research strategy 
This study was a desktop study, archival in nature, where the researcher gathered 
secondary data from annual reports.  This ex-post facto approach focuses on reporting 
the characteristics of variables, rather than playing any role in manipulating them 
(Blumberg et al. 2008).  Considering the fact that the researcher collected information 
from public companies’ annual reports that had been subjected to financial audits, the 
data were regarded as accurate and credible.  The data were longitudinal in nature, as 
the data were collected and analysed repeatedly over an extended period (2006 to 
2014) (Blumberg et al. 2008).  
 
Panel data allows the researcher to analyse cross-sectional and time series 
information at the same time.  This has a number of advantages.  More data points 
can be used.  N (cross-sectional units) and T (time series units) allow the researcher 
to make use of a panel of N*T data points, which increases the number of degrees of 
freedom.  This means that information can be analysed longitudinally (Blair 2014).  
However, there are also potential challenges in using a panel data set. It can be difficult 
to ensure that all data are collected using the same methodology, as some cross-
sectional units may report in a different way to others (Blair 2014). 
 
4.1.1.4 Research method 
 
The present study followed a quantitative methodology.  The purpose of quantitative 
research is to identify relationships among two or more variables and, based on the 
results, confirm or challenge existing theories or practices (Leedy & Ormrod 2015).  
Quantitative research expresses the relationship between variables using descriptive 
and inferential statistics.  This enables the researcher to describe the magnitude of 
observed values, trends, and relationships, as well as the probability that they occurred 
by chance (Morlino 2008). 
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4.1.1.5 Research process 
      
The research process followed in the present study is summarised and illustrated in 
Figure 13.  In an attempt to ensure reliability, every effort was made to describe the 
research process in such a way that a replication thereof will produce a reliable 
conclusion (Oberholzer 2014).  The planning phase of the study included identifying 
and formulating the research problem, the research objectives, and the research 
questions. The research objectives were formulated based on the literature review that 
had been performed. 
Figure 13 Research process 
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After formulating the research objectives, the research methodology was developed.  
This, firstly, involved the design of a research strategy, which included the type, 
purpose, period, scope, and background of the study.  Secondly, a sample frame and 
sample were determined from the research population. The next step was to determine 
the data-collection process.  
 
The present study followed a multi-phased data collection process.  In the first phase, 
the researcher obtained all the annual reports, followed by population selection or 
elimination (as illustrated in Figure 14).  In the second phase, all the financial data for 
the SOEs and their CEOs were collected from the annual reports and captured in an 
Excel spreadsheet. In the final data-collection phase, the researcher personally 
contacted the company secretaries of the Schedule 2 SOEs, to obtain information 
about their CEOs regarding education and age (if the data were not available in the 
annual report). The researcher followed a quantitative research approach and 
performed appropriate statistical analyses.  Finally, the researcher drafted the thesis. 
 
4.5   TARGET POPULATION 
A target population is the entire group of individuals or objects to which researchers 
wish to generalise the conclusions derived from their research.  Bloomberg (2008) 
defines a population as the total collection of elements about which the study seeks to 
make suggestions. The population of the present study was SOEs in South Africa.  
These SOEs are listed in the PFMA.  At the time of this study, there were 87 SOEs in 
existence, divided into Schedule 1, 2, and 3 public entities, with government as the 
main shareholder.  Table 8 provides a definition for each of the different schedules of 
SOEs (PFMA 1999).  
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Table 8 Definition of Schedule 1, 2, and 3 State-owned Entities 
State-owned entity 
type 
Definition 
 
Schedule 1 
A constitutional institution that does not carry out a 
business activity according to ordinary business principles 
so as to provide goods or services 
 
Schedule 2 
A government business enterprise that has been given 
managerial autonomy to carry on a business activity 
according to ordinary business principles, in order to 
provide goods or services 
 
Schedule 3 
A government business enterprise that carries out a 
business activity according to ordinary business 
principles, in order to provide goods or services, but has 
limited managerial autonomy 
Source: Adapted from PFMA (1999) 
 
The target population for the present study was Schedule 2 SOEs.  Using the definition 
of the PFMA, all SOEs that were not Schedule 2 public entities were eliminated, and a 
population was then defined.  A total of 21 SOEs were identified as Schedule 2 SOEs, 
and were therefore included in the study.  Table 9 provides a list of the Schedule 2 
SOEs.  
Table 9 Schedule 2 Public Entities as at 30 April 2015 
Number Public entity Ministerial portfolio 
1 South African Broadcasting Corporation 
Limited 
Communications 
2 Armaments Corporations of South Africa 
Limited 
Defence and Military 
Veterans 
3 CEF (Pty) Ltd  
Energy 4 South African Nuclear Energy Corporation 
Limited 
5 Development Bank of Southern Africa  
Finance 6 Land and Agricultural Development Bank of 
South Africa 
7 South African Airways Limited 
8 Alexkor Limited  
 
 
Public Enterprises 
9 Broadband Infraco Limited 
10 DENEL (Pty) Ltd 
11 ESKOM 
12 South African Express (Proprietary) Limited 
13 South African Forestry Company Limited 
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14 Transnet Limited 
15 Independent Development Trust Public Works 
16 South African Post Office Limited Telecommunications and 
Postal Services 17 Telkom SA Limited 
18 Air Traffic and Navigation Services 
Company Limited 
 
Transport 
19 Airports Company of South Africa Limited 
20 Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority Water and Sanitation 
21 Industrial Development Corporation of South 
Africa Limited 
Economic Development 
Source: Adapted from National Treasury (2015; 2017) 
 
The researcher did not make use of sampling, due to the small target population.  All 
21 Schedule 2 SOEs were therefore included in this study. Such a small target 
population is uncharacteristic of quantitative samples; they are normally large.  As can 
be seen in Table 9, the 21 SOEs engage in a number of different business activities in 
pursuit of government’s objectives.   
 
In order for government to meet its objectives and monitoring SOEs’ financial 
performance, each SOE is required to provide certain information in its annual financial 
report. The requirements regarding this information are prescribed in the PFMA and 
Treasury’s regulations. The information required includes, amongst others, the 
remuneration of the CEO, which information was collected for the purposes of this 
study.  
 A Schedule 2 SOE was included in the study only if two criteria were met.  Firstly, the 
annual reports had to be available on either the McGregor BFA database or the 
company website.  Secondly, the researcher only considered SOEs could show a nine-
year financial history, which had to include the CEO’s remuneration. Figure 14 
illustrates the population-selection and -elimination process applied in this study.  
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Figure 14 Population-selection/-elimination process 
 
There were two reasons for setting these criteria. Firstly, as is evident from previous 
studies (Core et al. 1999, Chhaochharia & Grinstein 2009; Shaw 2011; Ntim et al. 
2013), the criteria ensured that the conditions for a balanced panel analysis would be 
satisfied.  Secondly, the researcher was of the opinion that the examination of nine 
years’ data with time-series properties may be useful in providing a long-term view of 
the perceived link between executive remuneration and company performance. 
 
After implementing the selection criteria for inclusion of Schedule 2 SOEs, as illustrated 
in Figure 14, 18 of the 21 Schedule 2 SOEs were included in this study.  Based on the 
elimination process depicted above, the researcher excluded the following SOEs from 
the study: 
Table 10 SOEs not included in the study 
SOE Reason for non-inclusion 
Broadband Infraco Limited Only came into operation in 2007 
South African Express (Proprietary) 
Limited 
Only 5 years’ annual reports were 
available/accessible 
Independent Development Trust 
 
All Schedule 2 Public Entities (21 SOEs)
Nine-years' (2006 - 2014) annual reports 
available from McGregor BFA database or 
company website
Nine-years' financial data on CEO's 
remuneration available
Eigteen SOEs included in study
Chapter 4: Research methodology 
 
142 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
The SOEs eliminated from the study do not dominate key strategic sectors of the South 
African economy. They could therefore be regarded as ‘smaller’ role players in the 
South African SOE environment.  The present researcher was therefore of the opinion 
that the exclusion of their data would not have a significant impact on the outcomes of 
the study, although it may limit the number of observations. 
 
4.6   RESEARCH COMPONENTS 
This section provides a discussion on the components that were used in this research.  
As mentioned earlier, researchers use different measures to measure company 
performance and CEO remuneration. Prior studies on executive pay and company 
performance have become more complicated over time as the number and variety of 
variables included in the models increase (Zhou et al. 2011). 
 
The present researcher thoroughly considered the variables used to answer the 
research questions.  There were three groups of components used in this study: CEO 
remuneration, Company performance, and CEO demographic variables. 
 
4.6.1   Dependent variables 
For the purpose of the present study, the researcher used three components of CEO 
remuneration, namely Fixed pay, STIs (variable pay/bonuses), and Total remuneration 
(fixed pay, STIs, and employee benefits, — the sum of the other types of cash 
payments, employers’ contributions to medical aid, group life, and pension/provident 
funds).  
 
 
As a rule, severance packages were not included; only the remuneration paid out 
during the active career of the CEOs was taken into account (Grahan & Högfeldt 2010).  
However, as indicated in the limitations, there were cases where the severance 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ൌ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦, 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 െ 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠, 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦 ൌ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 ሺ𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 ൅ 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠ሻ 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 െ 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 ൌ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠/𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ൌ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦 ൅ 𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑠 ൅ 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 
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payment was included in the CEO’s fixed pay, and the annual report made no clear 
distinction between the fixed pay and the severance payment.  The employer’s 
contribution to the pension fund and medical aid fund were included, as these formed 
part of the total benefits of the CEOs. 
 
4.6.2     Independent variables 
For the purpose of this study, the researcher used three groups of independent 
variables.  The first group was the SOEs’ company performance measures, and the 
second was the CEOs’ demographic variables, and the third group was company size.  
Year of company performance was also added, because of the structure of the panel 
data. 
 
4.6.2.1 Company performance measures 
Researchers have measured company performance in different ways, with some using 
accounting measures (Abowd 1990; Al-Matari et al. 2014), and others using financial 
and other subjective performance measures. According to Swatdikun (2013), all 
performance measures are, in some way, flawed.  In an attempt to reduce the effect of 
these flaws on establishing the relationship between CEO remuneration and company 
performance, the present research used accounting measures. Blair (2014) posits that 
the two main measures of performance in South Africa are accounting-based and 
market-based. The present researcher used primarily accounting-based measures, 
because there were no market-based measures relevant to this study. 
 
The use of multiple measures of performance ensures that the results obtained are 
robust and remain invariant (Gabay 2005). Using several performance measures 
should provide better conclusions than using a single measure (Brown & Caylor 2006).  
Based on this, the present study used the following financial performance measures:  
 
(a) Turnover 
Turnover is the money generated by a company through its business activities during 
a specific period.  A company needs to collect revenue to justify the fixed and variable 
expenses related to operating a business.  In simplest terms, zero or low revenue leads 
to an unprofitable business and negative financial results (Kokemuller 2014).  Previous 
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researchers who used turnover/revenue as a measure of company performance were: 
Jeppson et al. (2009), Otieno (2011), Nel (2012), Scholtz and Smit (2012), Theku 
(2014), and Bussin and Nel (2015). 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 ൌ 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 
 
(b) Operating profit 
Also termed operating income, operating profit/(loss) is the profit/(loss) from a 
company’s regular primary business operations, also known as earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT) or operating income. This displays the relationship between 
revenue earned from customers and expenses incurred in producing this revenue.  
Operating income is used to assess the cost-effectiveness of a company’s basic or 
core business operations, and excludes other types of revenue and expenses 
(Williams, Haka, Bettner, & Carcello 2006).  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 ൌ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ൌ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 ൌ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 
 
(c) Net profit/(loss) 
Several equity investors believe that NP (also termed net income) is the most important 
figure in a company’s financial statements.  This amount usually represents the overall 
increase (or decrease) in owners’ equity from all profit-directed activities during the 
period. This measurement offers an indication of management’s proficiency in 
controlling expenses and retaining a realistic share of its revenue as profit (Williams et 
al. 2006). 
NP is one of the most closely followed numbers in finance, and it plays a large role in, 
for example, financial statement analysis.  Shareholders look closely at NP, because 
it is the primary source of remuneration of shareholders of the company (by means of 
dividends and share buybacks).  If a company cannot make enough profit to sufficiently 
remunerate owners, the value of the shares will drop.  Krugel and Kruger (2006) used 
this measure in their research. 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡/ሺ𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠ሻ ൌ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡/ሺ𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠ሻ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥 
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(d) Liquidity ratio 
LR refers to a company’s ability to pay its short-term liabilities with its current assets 
(Williams et al. 2006).  The LR is also known as the current ratio.  The LR is a projected 
indication of a company’s ability to service its current obligations, which is important 
for the survival of any business. The higher the current ratio is, the more liquid the 
company appears to be (Williams et al. 2006).  In general, companies’ aim to maintain 
a current ratio of at least 1.  This is to make sure that the value of their current assets 
cover at least the amount of their short-term obligations (Gallo 2015).  A current ratio 
greater than 1 provides added protection against unexpected eventualities that may 
occur in the short term.  For example, a LR of 1.8: 1 means that the company’s current 
assets are 1.8 times the value of as its current liabilities (Williams et al. 2006).  
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
(e) Solvency Ratio 
The SR, also referred to as the debt ratio, is the ratio between the total liabilities of a 
business and its total assets.  It is a measure of solvency and of creditors’ long-term 
risk (Williams et al. 2006).  The smaller the portion of total assets financed by creditors 
is, the smaller the risk will be that the business may become unable to pay its debt.  
From creditors’ point of view, the lower the SR is, the safer their position is (Williams 
et al. 2006).  A SR ranges from zero to 1.  Lower values of a SR are satisfactory, and 
a higher value indicates that a higher portion of the company's assets are claimed by 
its creditors.  This, by implication, means higher risk, as the business could find it 
challenging to obtain loans for new projects.  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
(f) Return on Capital Employed 
ROCE is a financial ratio that measures a company's profitability and the effectiveness 
with which its capital is employed. ROCE is particularly useful for comparing the 
performance of companies in capital-intensive sectors such as utilities and telecoms.  
The reason for this is that, unlike ROE, which only reflects profitability related to a 
company’s common equity, ROCE also takes into account debt and other liabilities.  
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This offers a better indication of the financial performance of companies with major 
debt.  A higher ROCE value is indicative of the company generating higher earnings 
per rand of capital employed. ROCE is the most important profitability ratio to investors, 
and is typically seen as the bottom-line measure of company performance (Peavler 
2014). 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 ሺ𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒ሻ
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑  
 
(g) Return on Equity 
ROE is often used as a measure of how well a company is performing.  ROE is a ratio 
that measures an organisation’s efficiency in generating profit for each unit of 
shareholder equity. ROE measures an organisation’s profitability by showing how 
much profit an organisation generates with the money shareholders have invested 
(Modau 2013).  This is important, because the financial improvements of the company 
are directly related to how well it is being managed by the CEO (Resnick 2013).  The 
higher the value of the ROE is, the higher the efficiency in generating income from new 
investments is (Ismail, Yabai, & Hahn 2014). ROE is “most meaningful when evaluating 
publicly owned companies” (Siciliano 2003: 11). It is a commonly used performance 
measure, both in evaluating management performance and in determining executive 
remuneration (Pandya & Rao 1998). 
 
Previous researchers who used ROE as a measure of company performance were: 
Andersson and Andersson (2006), Shaw and Zhang (2010), Bradley (2011), Shaw 
(2011), Sigler (2011), De Wet (2012), Nel (2012), Van Blerck (2012), Deysel (2013), 
Modau (2013), Motala and Fourie (2014), and Theku (2014).  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  
 
(h) Audit opinion 
An AO is a certification of financial statements prepared by an independent auditor.  
The auditor’s opinion will set out the scope of the audit and the auditor’s opinion of the 
procedures and records used to generate the financial statements.  It will also set out 
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the auditor’s opinion of whether the financial statements are an accurate 
representation of the company’s financial position. An AO is therefore a good indication 
of how responsibly the company applies accounting and financial controls.  
 
 An unqualified opinion is often called a clean opinion.  It is an audit report that 
is released when an auditor has concluded that each of the financial records 
provided by the business is free of any misrepresentations. An unqualified opinion 
shows that the financial records have been maintained in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). An unqualified opinion is the 
best report a business can receive (Henderson 2014). 
 
 A qualified opinion is released when a company’s financial records have not 
been maintained in accordance with GAAP, but no misrepresentations have been 
identified (Henderson 2014). If the financial statements contain material 
misstatements in specific amounts, or there is sufficient evidence for the Auditor-
General of South Africa (AGSA) that specific amounts included in the financial 
statement are not materially misstated, a company will receive a qualified audit 
opinion (AGSA 2014). 
 
 An adverse opinion is the worst type of financial report that can be issued.  This 
indicates that the company’s financial records do not conform to GAAP 
standards. Therefore, the financial records provided by the business contain 
gross misrepresentations. Although this may occur bona fide, it is often an 
indication of fraud (Henderson 2014).  
 
 An emphasis of matter paragraph is included in the auditor’s report, which refers 
to a matter properly presented or disclosed in the financial statements that, in the 
auditor’s judgment, is of such importance that it is fundamental to users’ 
understanding of the financial statements (International Standards on Auditing 
706 2009). 
 
 Disclaimer of opinion is where an auditor is unable to complete an accurate 
audit report. This may due to, for example, the company having provided 
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insufficient evidence in the form of documentation on which to base an AO. The 
lack of sufficient evidence could relate to specific amounts or a significant portion 
of the information contained in the financial statements (AGSA 2014). 
 
No previous studies included the AO as a company performance measure.  AO was 
tested using dummy variables, due to its categorical nature, with AO 3 (Adverse) being 
the reference category. The following categories were used: 
0 ൌ 𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛/𝑢𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 
1 ൌ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 
2 ൌ 𝐸𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟 
3 ൌ 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒/𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛 
4 ൌ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑟 
 
(i) Irregular, fruitless, and wasteful expenditure 
IFWE is expenditure made in vain, which could have been avoided, had reasonable 
care been exercised. According to the PFMA, SOEs need to report, on an annual basis, 
any IFWE. The PFMA furthermore requires entities to include notes in their annual 
financial statements of particulars of any material losses and any IFWEs, including any 
significant unauthorised expenditure that occurred during the financial year, and 
whether this is recoverable. In most part, such expenditure is incurred because of non-
compliance with legislation (AGSA 2012). This measure is classified into three 
categories:  
 
 Irregular expenditure, as defined by the PFMA, means expenditure, other than 
unauthorised expenditure, that is incurred in contravention of, or not in 
accordance with, any applicable legislation (not just the PFMA) (South African 
Qualifications Authority 2013).  
 
 Unauthorised expenditure is the overspending on an approved budget, 
spending not in line with the original approved budget item, or expenditure without 
the appropriate approval (South African Qualifications Authority 2013).  
 
Chapter 4: Research methodology 
 
149 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
 Fruitless and wasteful expenditure, as defined in the PFMA, is expenditure that 
was made in vain, and could have been avoided, had reasonable care been 
implemented.  Such expenditure may be of an operational or a capital nature 
(South African Qualifications Authority 2013).  
 
4.6.2.2 CEO demographic variables, company size, and year 
The CEO demographic variables (independent variables) were the CEO’s age, tenure, 
gender, race, and education. Previous studies have included CEOs’ demographic 
variables as independent variables (Lilling 2006). The present researcher used 
Company size as an independent variable.   
 CEO’s age 
Age reflects the age of the CEO as at December of each year, and was measured in 
number of years.  Age is readily observable, and it was, in most instances, obtained 
from the annual report. The determination of the age groups were done by studying 
the frequency tables and roughly divide them according to the cumulative percentage 
value (closest to a third and two thirds) into 3 groups  In the regression models, the 
actual age of the CEO was included. 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒 ൌ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐸𝑂 
 
 CEO’s tenure 
Research by Lin and Lin (2014) suggests that there is a positive relationship between 
CEO tenure and CEO remuneration.  This means that shorter tenure is associated with 
lower remuneration.  Hill and Phan (1991) measured the CEO’s tenure in the number 
of years an individual held the CEO position. Thus, for the purpose of the present study, 
Tenure was regarded as the number of years that the CEO held the position as CEO.  
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 ൌ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
 
 CEO’s education 
The literature postulates that the higher a CEOs education level is, the higher his or 
her expertise will be, therefore justifying higher pay (Finkelstein 1992).  Banghøj et al. 
Chapter 4: Research methodology 
 
150 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
(2010) found that level of education is one of the important sources of variation in 
executive remuneration.  In the present study’s regression model, Education was 
included as a dummy variable, with Undergraduate degree used as a reference 
category.  Education was categorised as follows:  
0 ൌ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
1 ൌ 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 
2 ൌ 𝐻𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 
3 ൌ 𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟ᇱ𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 
4 ൌ 𝐷𝑜𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 
 CEO’s gender  
Although previous studies suggest that diversity has a positive impact on the bottom 
line of an organisation, the link between gender diversity and company performance 
has not been firmly established (Catalyst 2004).  In this regard, Khan and Vieito (2013: 
56) note that the relationship between gender and company performance is a 
“relatively new area of inquiry.”  In the present study, Gender consisted of the following 
categories: 
1 ൌ 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 
2 ൌ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 
 
 CEO’s race 
Research on South African CEOs’ remuneration and the race of the CEOs seems to 
be limited.  The majority of such studies were conducted in the USA (Barret 2014).  In 
the present study’s regression model, Race was included as a dummy variable, with 
White used as a reference category. For the purpose of this study, the researcher 
categorised Race as follows: 
1 ൌ 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 
2 ൌ 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 
3 ൌ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 
4 ൌ 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒 
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 Company size 
Gayle and Miller (2009) indicate that the design of CEO remuneration could largely be 
explained by the company’s size.  Zhou (2000) postulates that CEO remuneration 
increases with the growth of the company.  Company size was included in the present 
study, due to the differences in the size of the companies in the population.  In order 
to determine the size of the SOEs, this study used the DPE’s organisation size grid 
categorisation, as shown in Table 11, as a guideline.  Based on the organisation size 
grid (Table 11), the DPE classifies SOEs according to the following categories: 
 Size 1 – 6 is a small SOE (It should be noted that none of the SOEs fell within 
this category) (Company size 1 in this study); 
 Size 7 – 9 is a medium SOE (Company size 2 in this study); 
 Size 10 – 11 is a large SOE (Company size 3 in this study); and 
 Size 13 – 16 is a very large SOE (Company size 4 in this study). 
 
Organisation size was included as a dummy variable in the regression analysis.  Since 
none of the SOEs fell into the Company size 1, as shown in Table 11, Company size 
2 was used as a reference category.  The researcher applied the following categories: 
 
1 ൌ 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 
2 ൌ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 
3 ൌ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 
4 ൌ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 
 
 Year of company performance was also added, because of the structure of the 
panel data.  In a prosperous economic environment, companies tend to raise 
executive remuneration annually, with or without any increase in the company’s 
performance. During an economic recession, however, companies tend to 
decrease their executives’ remuneration, even though the executives might not 
have been responsible for the poor financial performance of the company 
(Swatdikun 2013). 
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Table 11 Organisation Size Grid 
Revenue R0 ‒
R0.45m 
R0.45 ‒
R0.98m 
R0.98 ‒
R2.11m 
R2.11m ‒
R4.77m 
R4.77 ‒
R10.4m 
R10.4 ‒
R22.8m 
R22.8 ‒
R50.2m 
R50.2 ‒
R110.6m 
R110.6 ‒
R242.3m 
R242.3 ‒
R534.9m  
R534.9m ‒
R1.22b 
R1.22 – 
R2.54b 
R2.54 – 
R5.62b 
R5.62 – 
R12.5b 
R12.5 – 
R27.6b 
>R27.6b 
Assets 
R0 – 
R1.22m 
1 2 2              
R1.22 -
R2.8m 
1 2 3 3             
R2.8 -
R6.0m 
2 2 3 4 4            
R6.0 – 
R13.5m 
 3 3 4 5 5           
R13.5 – 
R29.7M 
  4 4 5 6 6          
R29.7 – 
R65.3m 
   5 5 6 7 7         
R65.3 – 
R143.5m 
    6 6 7 8 8        
R143.5 – 
R315.8m 
     7 7 8 9 9       
R315.8 – 
R694.7m 
      8 8 9 10 10      
R694.7m 
– R1.55bn 
       9 9 10 11 11     
R1.55 – 
R3.33b 
        10 10 11 12 12    
R3.33 – 
R7.42bn 
         11 11 12 13 13   
R7.24 – 
R16.3bn 
          12 12 13 14 14  
R16.3 – 
R35.78bn 
           13 13 14 15 15 
R35.78 – 
R78.8bn 
            14 14 15 16 
>R78.8bn           15 15 16 
        Source: DPE 2007 (State-owned Enterprises Remuneration Guidelines: 7) 
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4.7   DATA COLLECTION 
This section will discuss the collection of data for this study. 
 
4.7.1 Sources and nature of data 
As previously stated, the researcher collected secondary data for this research from 
the annual reports of the SOEs under study. The compilation of annual reports by 
SOEs is required by law, and these are available to the public (Otieno 2011).  
Research conducted by Odainkey and Simpson (2013) revealed that SOEs’ annual 
reports are useful tools in ensuring accountability. Other authors also used data 
from annual reports, for example Otieno (2011), Shaw (2011), Modau (2013), 
Resnick (2013), Theku (2014), and Deysel and Kruger (2015).  The audited financial 
statements mainly provide quantitative data, while the rest of the information is 
primarily available from narratives in the annual reports (e.g. CEO age, tenure, 
gender, race, and education).  
 
These annual reports contain annual financial statements of the SOEs, where 
information regarding company performance measures and executive management 
information can be found. For the purpose of the present study, the information 
obtained included CEO remuneration and financial performance measures of each 
SOE.  Data on executive remuneration also provided a breakdown of the CEOs’ 
fixed pay, total remuneration, and, in some instances, variable pay. 
 
Certain authors are of the opinion that the annual report is the only comprehensive 
financial statement accessible to the public. They are further of the opinion that 
annual reports are fundamental mechanisms whereby the public sector is held 
accountable for their use of public resources (Rutherford 2000; Coy, Fisher, & 
Gordon 2001).  However, other authors argue that the annual report is a complex 
report, that the quality of reporting is poor, and that it is delivered mainly to internal 
stakeholders (Steccolini 2004; Mack & Ryan 2007).  Nevertheless, the annual report 
remains an important instrument for performance monitoring and evaluation of 
SOEs (Odainkey & Simpson 2013).  
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Using secondary data holds a number of advantages.  Secondary data are publicly 
available, eliminating the problem of non-response or lack of access to data, which 
is normally associated with primary data.  Secondary data are also readily available 
and inexpensive to acquire (Otieno 2011).  A further advantage is that the data are 
higher in quality than primary data, because these have been prepared to a 
standard pattern, rather than for a particular objective (Swatdikun 2013).  Collecting 
secondary data also has fewer resource requirements than primary data (Swatdikun 
2013).   
 
4.7.2 Data collection and data collection process 
As previously mentioned, the primary source for the data used for this study was 
the audited financial statements in the published annual reports of the SOEs.  The 
annual reports were obtained from the McGregor BFA database.  In cases where 
the data required for the research were not available in the McGregor BFA 
database, annual reports of the SOEs were obtained from the SOEs’ websites.   
 
For each of the Schedule 2 SOEs, the researcher obtained the CEO’s name, age 
(as at 31 December for each year under study), tenure (as at 31 March for each 
year under study), gender, race and education.  The following CEO remuneration 
data were collected for the years 2006 to 2014: 
 
 fixed pay; 
 STIs — annual performance bonus/variable pay; and 
 total remuneration  — cash salary, STIs, and other allowances/benefits.  In the 
present study, it further included all unusual payments that occurred during a 
year, such as sign-on payments, gratuitous payments, loss-of-office 
payments, and any other unusual payments (Shaw 2011). 
 
The following company financial data were collected for the years 2006 to 2014: 
turnover, OP, LR, SR, ROCE, ROE, AO, and IRWE.  The researcher selected the 
2006 to 2014 period with the aim of establishing whether the global financial crisis 
influenced the relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and the SOEs’ 
performance. 
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In a few cases, despite further research and communication with the company, the 
researcher was unable to obtain certain CEOs’ demographic data.  The statistical 
analysis treated this data as missing, as the researcher yielded to the fact that the 
quantity of missing data should be minimal enough not to compromise the results.  
The information required to answer the research question and to provide descriptive 
information was collected, as described below. 
 
Each annual report contained the financial statements of the respective SOE, as 
well as the income statement (statement of comprehensive income) and the 
balance sheet (statement of financial position).  The bulk of the annual reports also 
contained demographic information on the SOEs’ executive management in terms 
of their age, education, date of appointment, and, if applicable, termination of 
employment. 
 
The researcher obtained the details of the CEOs’ remuneration and IFWE in the 
notes of the financial statements.  CEO remuneration details were available under 
the heading “Disclosure of remuneration in terms of Section 55 of the PFMA and 
Treasury Regulation 28.1.1.”  The researcher obtained the data relating to the AO 
from the section in the annual reports that contain the independent auditors’ report. 
 
The researcher obtained the rand amount for turnover, OP, and NP from the income 
statement for each of the 18 SOEs for the nine-year period.  These figures were 
readily available in the statement of comprehensive income.  There were therefore 
no missing entries.  
 
From the balance sheet, the rand amount of current assets, total assets, total equity 
(capital and reserves), and current liabilities were obtained for each of the SOEs for 
the nine-year period.  Again, this information was explicitly available in the balance 
sheet.  There were therefore no missing data.  Because the company performance 
measures used in this study were not explicitly available from the annual reports, 
the researcher applied the financial formula discussed in Section 4.6.2.   
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In terms of the definition of a CEO, it is standard practice in SOEs to refer to the 
head of the SOE as the CEO. In some SOEs, the CEO is referred to as the 
Managing Director or Chief Executive.  This was assumed to mean the same as 
CEO for the purposes of the study, as they were reported to be the SOE. 
 
The remuneration of the CEO included the sum of the CEO’s fixed pay, STIs, and 
other remuneration, as declared in the notes of the annual financial statements.  
King III and the PFMA require the declaration of the CEOs’ remuneration 
(Groenewald 2012; PwC 2016b). The fixed-salary component is the core 
component of the CEOs remuneration for all SOEs.  The STI component of CEO 
remuneration was not available for all the SOEs, and, in some cases, the STI 
component was termed “bonus” or “incentive.”  The last component of remuneration 
was “other,” which included remuneration that was not salary or bonus.  Items 
included under “other” remuneration for some of the SOEs included pension, 
medical aid allowance, travel allowance, fringe benefits, Unemployment Insurance 
Fund contributions, and, in some cases, share-based payments.  The researcher 
employed “other” remuneration simply for calculating total remuneration. 
 
The narrative of the annual report provided demographic information of the CEO.  
This included the CEO’s age, tenure, education, and gender.  In some of the SOEs’ 
annual reports, not all of this demographic information was available or complete.  
In such cases, the researcher contacted the company secretary of the SOE to obtain 
the relevant information. 
 
Having obtained the key variables, a data table (data matrix) was set up in a 
Microsoft Excel document, which contained all the information collected for the nine 
years under study for each of the 18 SOEs.  The purpose was to capture the data 
and to calculate the formulas/ratios as set out in Section 4.6.2.1.  Actual figures from 
the annual reports are displayed in either thousands or millions in the data matrix.  
It is important to note that the researcher did not adjust the numbers for inflation, 
although the total remuneration was adjusted for tenure (1% per year).  The data 
matrix was subsequently imported into SPSS and EViews 8.0 for analysis, and 
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arranged to represent pooled panel data.  An example of the data matrix is 
presented in Table 12, below. 
 
Table 12 Data matrix used for this study 
Company DBSA (R’000) 
 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
CEO Package 
CEO salary          
CEO total benefits          
Employers contribution to 
medical aid, GL, Prof fund 
         
Other Allowances/payments 
and benefits 
         
CEO bonus/STI   
Total CEO Remuneration   
CEO Characteristics 
Race   
Gender   
Age (in years)   
Qualification          
Tenure (in years)          
Company Performance Measures 
Turnover          
Operating profit/loss          
Net Profit for year          
Profit/loss for the year 
(Before tax) 
         
Liquidity ratios   
Current assets   
Current liabilities   
Solvency ratios   
Total assets   
Total liabilities   
ROCE   
Operating profit/loss          
Total assets          
Current liabilities          
ROE          
Net profit (after tax)          
Total Equity          
Audit opinion          
Total irregular, fruitless 
and wasteful expenditure 
         
Irregular expenditure   
Fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure 
         
Material loss due to criminal 
conduct 
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The data set consisted of a panel of 162 observations.  Dougherty (2002) claims 
that research making use of time series data (data collected over a period) implies 
that one variable is tested several times within the same time interval.  Panel data 
is a mix of cross-sectional (data collected at one point in time) and time series data 
(Dougherty 2002).  Panel data is a special type of pooled data, in which the same 
cross-sectional unit is surveyed over a period, and has a space- as well as a time 
dimension (Gujarati & Porter 2009).  In the present study, panel data were used, 
since the total remuneration of the CEOs of all 18 SOEs was tested against several 
variables during the years 2006 to 2014, and the data therefore became 
multidimensional (Resnick 2013). 
 
Because of incomplete CEO demographic data for some years, the researcher 
adopted an unbalanced data panel approach with appropriate regression estimates, 
using EViews 8 software. For company performance measures, the researcher 
followed a balanced panel data approach. 
 
4.7.3 Treatment of data 
In order for this study to be replicable, it is important to note how some of the data 
were considered.  The remuneration- and financial data were reflected as at 31 
March of each year. 
 
In calculating Fixed pay and Total remuneration, CEO turnover was taken into 
account. CEO incumbents changed during some financial years. CEO remuneration 
values may therefore not have been in respect of a full financial year (1 April to 31 
March) or of their functions as CEO.  Of the 162 observations, there were 36 cases 
where CEO incumbents changed. To compensate for these changes, the 
researcher chose the CEO who had been in the position for the longest time during 
the financial year, if he or she had received remuneration.  In order to (a) not exclude 
these observations from the sample, and because the calculations involved were 
straightforward, and (b) for remuneration data not to be misrepresented, the 
researcher annualised the remuneration, to reflect a full year’s remuneration.  There 
were 39 cases where the researcher annualised CEO remuneration (Fixed pay and 
benefits).  Baptista (2010) applied the same methodology.  
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In six cases, the researcher used the remuneration of the acting CEOs.  In these 
cases, the researcher employed the unadjusted CEO remuneration data. There 
were three cases where termination payments were included in the fixed pay portion 
of the package.  In order to not distort the remuneration data, the researcher used 
the fixed pay of the previous year and a percentage package increase calculated 
for that year. In each of these three cases, the researcher applied the expected 
salary increase, provided in the relevant SOEs’ annual reports.  This method does 
not generate a significant misrepresentation of the CEO remuneration data, 
because the remuneration values calculated were in line with the rest of the CEO 
remuneration data collected for the SOEs. 
 
In one case where a CEO incumbent changed during a financial year, the 
remuneration and demographic details of the CEO with the longer service were 
reflected.  Where the current and previous CEOs tenure was equal during a financial 
year, both CEOs’ remuneration was reflected.  However, in both these cases, the 
researcher used the demographic details of the current/latest CEO in the data 
matrix. This might have had an influence on the relationship between CEO 
remuneration and Tenure. 
 
4.8   DATA ANALYSIS 
The researcher used the Statistical Package for the Social Science programme 
(SPSS Version 22) for the descriptive analysis of the data.  EViews (Version 8), a 
software package for econometric analysis, forecasting, and statistics (Haley 2010), 
was used to run multiple regression models on the pooled dataset comprising a 
cross-section of 18 SOEs for a nine-year period.  In his article, Polakow (2015) 
raised concerns regarding the use of standard statistical techniques in financial 
analysis that ignore autocorrelation and stationarity. Using EViews (econometric 
modelling) in the analysis of the present study addressed Polakow’s (2015: 53) 
concern regarding autocorrelation and stationarity being ignored by some analysts, 
which contributes to “broad market inefficiency.” 
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Data analysis can be viewed as the procedure whereby data are separated into 
important parts, to find answers to research questions (De Vos, Strydom, Fouché, 
& Delport 2011).  According to Trochim (2006), data analysis typically involves the 
following three main stages: 
 
(1) cleaning and organising the data for analysis; 
(2) describing the data; and  
(3) testing the research hypotheses and models. 
 
In the final stage, Stage 3, the present researcher used correlational and inferential 
(multivariate) statistics to examine thesis statements and research questions.  The 
conclusions from the inferential statistics were used to make deductions from the 
data to more general situations, and descriptive data were used only to explain 
patterns in the data.  The data analysis for this study comprised three major stages, 
as depicted in Figure 15:  
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Figure 15 Data analysis process 
 
 
4.8.1 Stage 1: Descriptive statistical analysis 
Descriptive statistics is a method of statistical analysis of numerical data, discrete 
or continuous, that provides information on centring, spread, and, where applicable, 
normality of the data. The outcomes of this type of analysis can be presented in 
tabular or graphic layout. The descriptive statistics applied in this study for the 
dependent and independent variables were frequency tables, means, standard 
deviations, minimum values, maximum values, skewness, and kurtosis (De Vos et 
al. 2011).  This stage consisted of the following steps: 
 
(1) data cleaning; 
(2) determining the means and standard deviations, kurtosis, and skewness of 
the continuous variables; 
Stage 1: 
Descriptive 
statistical 
analysis
Data cleansing
Means, standard 
deviations, kurtosis 
and skewness and 
frequency of  
financial data (CEO 
remuneration and 
company 
performance 
variables)
CEO demographic 
profile
Stage 2: Basic 
inferential 
statistics
Correlation analysis
Correlation analysis for 
year-on-year 
comparison
Stage 3: 
Inferential and 
multiveriate 
statistics
Establish regression 
equiation/regression 
models
Testing relevant 
assumptions/diagnostic 
checking
Conducting regressions 
in an itterative process 
to obtain optimum 
regression model in 
each case
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(3) Determining the demographic profile of the CEOs of the SOEs for the period 
2006 to 2014. 
 
4.8.1.1 Step 1: Data cleaning, accuracy of data, and missing values 
The data cleaning and organising step consisted of scrutinising the data, checking 
the data for accuracy, capturing the data into the software program, transforming 
the data, and developing and documenting a database structure that incorporates 
the different measures.  
 
In an attempt to ensure accuracy of the data, screening was conducted for possible 
incorrect capturing.  Frequency statistics of each of the variables were requested 
(by way of the SPSS 22 frequency procedure). These were examined in terms of 
minimum and maximum values, along with means, standard deviations (SDs), 
skewness, and kurtosis. Further, the assistance of a chartered accountant was 
obtained to (a) assist with the interpretation of the financial statements and to (b) 
verify the correctness of the financial measures.  
 
There were missing values for some of the demographic information of CEOs, 
namely age and education.  For the purpose of this study, the missing values were 
not replaced, because no assumptions could be made regarding these missing 
values, and these were treated as such. 
 
4.8.1.2 Step 2: Means, SDs, kurtosis, skewness, and frequency tables 
Descriptive statistics was conducted for the dependent and independent continuous 
variables.  The mean, median, SD, minimum value, maximum value, skewness, and 
kurtosis were investigated, to determine the distribution, as well as possible 
outliers/wrong values for the nine-year period.  From this, several uncertainties were 
identified, which were verified by the researcher and corrected where needed.  All 
variables related to these changes were also adjusted. 
 
SD measures the extent to which a group of scores vary from the mean 
(Christensen 2001).  A small SD shows that the scores cluster closely around the 
mean, whereas a large SD shows that the scores vary significantly from the mean 
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(Christensen 2001).  In economics, SD gives, for example, an indication of a fund’s 
volatility.  A higher dispensation (indicated by a high SD) shows that the value of 
the asset has fluctuated over a wide range. 
 
Skewness and kurtosis were also determined in this study.  Skewness is a measure 
of symmetry (or lack thereof).  Distribution of data is regarded as symmetrical if it 
looks the same on each side of a central point.  An example of possible skewed 
data concerns income, an economic variable that is uneven in most societies, with 
the majority of the income being held by a few at the top (Gujarati & Porter 2009).  
Kurtosis measures whether data are either peaked or flat with regard to the normal 
distribution.  
 
One of the main reasons why researchers construct frequency tables is to describe 
the distribution of scores of a variable (Tredoux & Durrheim 2002).  Because CEO 
demographic variables, AO, and Company performance were categorical, the 
results were presented by means of frequency tables. 
 
4.8.1.3 Step 3: CEO demographic profile 
The demographic profiles of the CEOs were described in terms of Age, Tenure, 
Gender, Race, and Education.   
 
4.8.1.4 Step 4: Test for assumptions/diagnosis checking 
In most situations, the objective of research is to make valid interpretations from a 
dataset.  The following assumptions were made in this study:  
 
(1) testing for normality; 
(2) stationary process/unit root test; 
(3) autocorrelation/serial correlation; 
(4) outliers; 
(5) heteroskedasticity; and 
(6) multicollinearity. 
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These assumptions provided reliability/validity of the tests, called the ‘robustness 
test’ by Barton, Hansen, and Pownall (2010).  Yan, De, Ting, Bing, and Pin (2015) 
refer to it as ‘diagnosis checking,’ which is necessary to avoid econometric 
problems. 
 
4.8.1.4.1 Testing for normality 
A normal distribution is important, as it is a fundamental assumption of many 
statistical tests (Razali & Wah 2011). Deviations from normality make statistical 
tests inaccurate.  Under the normality assumption, the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) 
of statistics suggests that the normal distribution of the sum is achieved as the 
number of independent variables increases (Gujarati & Porter 2009).  The normality 
test is conducted to determine whether the error terms abide by the normal 
distribution (Yan et al. 2015). Parametric statistical analysis assumes a normal 
distribution of the data.  If the assumption of normality is violated, interpretation and 
extrapolation might not be reliable or valid.  It is thus essential to test for this 
assumption before proceeding with any appropriate statistical procedure (Razali & 
Wah 2011).  
 
CEO remuneration and Company performance components were tested for 
normality, using the Shapiro-Wilk test.  The Shapiro-Wilk test is more appropriate 
for small sample sizes (< 50), and is based on the correlation between the data and 
the corresponding normal scores (Laerd Statistics 2015a).  This test assesses the 
normality of the distribution of the data.  A non-significant result (significance value 
of more than 0.05) indicates normality.  
 
4.8.1.4.2 Stationary process/Unit root test 
The present researcher conducted a unit root test to test the stationarity in the data.  
A time series is stationary if its mean and variance do not vary systematically over 
time (Gujarati & Porter 2009). Because trending data are very common in 
economics, non-stationary data are frequently encountered (Hill, Griffiths, & Judge 
1997).  Non-stationary data in a time series occur when there is not a constant mean 
𝜇, no constant variance 𝜎௧ଶ, or either of these properties.  It can originate from, inter 
alia, the unit root (Ssekuma 2011).  
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A test of stationarity (or non-stationarity) that has become popular in recent years is 
the unit root test (Gujarati & Porter 2009). Unit root tests provide a basis for 
assessing whether a time series is non-stationary and integrated in a particular 
order (Hill et al. 1997).  For the purpose of the present study, the researcher used 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to test the stationarity of each variable used 
in the regression.   
 
The ADF test adds lagged values of the dependent variable ∆𝑌௧.  The ADF test 
consists of estimating the following regression (Gujarati & Porter 2009): 
∆ 𝛾௧       ൌ  𝛽ଵ ൅  𝛽ଶ𝑡 ൅ 𝛿𝛾௧ିଵ  ൅  ෍ 𝛼∆𝛾௧ି௜  ൅  𝜀௧
௠
௜ୀଵ
 
 
where 𝜀௧ is a pure white noise error term, and where ∆𝛾𝑡െ1 ൌ  ൫𝛾𝑡െ1 െ 𝛾𝑡െ2൯, 
∆𝛾௧ିଶ ൌ  ሺ𝛾௧ିଶ െ  𝛾௧ିଷሻ, etcetera. The number of lagged difference terms to 
include is often determined empirically. The idea is to include enough terms so that 
the error term indicated above is serially uncorrelated, so that an unbiased estimate 
of 𝛿, the coefficient of lagged 𝛾௧ିଵ (Gujarati & Porter 2009), can be obtained.  
According to Gujarati and Porter (2009: 756), the null hypothesis of the ADF test is: 
 
H0:𝛿 ൌ 0 (i.e. there is a unit root, or the time series is non-stationary) 
versus the alternative hypothesis of  
 
H1:𝛿 ൏ 0 (i.e. the time series is stationary). 
 
4.8.1.4.3 Autocorrelation/Serial correlation 
Autocorrelation is the error term for whichever observation is associated with the 
error term of the other observation (Gujarati & Porter 2009).  Autocorrelation (serial 
correlation) may exist in a regression model when the order of the observation in 
the data is relevant or important.  With time-series, panel-, and longitudinal data, 
autocorrelation is a concern.  When a regression model is estimated using data of 
this nature, the value of the error in one period may be related to the value of the 
error in another period (autocorrelation), which results in a violation of a classical 
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linear regression model assumption (Pedace 2013). The possibility of 
autocorrelation should always be accommodated when time-series data are 
involved (Hill et al. 1997).  Autocorrelation complicates the application of statistical 
tests by reducing the number of independent observations.  It can further complicate 
the identification of significant covariance or correlation between time series 
(Notes_3 GEOS 2015). 
 
Normally, autocorrelation is presumed to be characterised by a first-order auto-
regression, indicated by AR(1). Generally, an autoregressive process arises any 
time the value available in one period can be modelled as a function of values of 
the same variables in previous periods.  In the case of autocorrelation, the random 
variable displaying this characteristic is the error term (Pedace 2013). Given the 
statistical definition of the term, autoregressive processes and models all naturally 
suppose that past values have some effect on future values (About Education 
2015). 
 
In the present research, the DW test was used to detect autocorrelation of an AR(1) 
process.  Although the DW is an old test (Hill et al. 1997), it is the most celebrated 
test for detecting serial correlation (Gujarati & Porter 2009). The DW test is, 
furthermore, easy to compute, reliable in small samples, and has optimal power 
properties against first-order serial dependence (Dufour & Dagenais 1985). The DW 
test begins by assuming that, if autocorrelation is present, it can be described by an 
AR(1) process.  As a result, the DW is used to test if the autoregressive process is 
such that the value of the error in period 𝑡 depends on its value in period 𝑡 െ 1.  The 
value produced by the DW test is called a 𝑑-statistic (Pedace 2013), which is defined 
as: 
 
𝑑 ൌ ∑ ሺ௨೟       ି ௨೟షభሻଶ೟స೙೟సమ ∑ ௨೟మ೟స೙೟సభ  . 
In the numerator of the d statistic, the number of observations is n – 1, because one 
observation is lost in taking successive differences (Gujarati & Porter 2009).  The 
following are classifications of the DW test results (Campbell 2014): 
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<2 = Positive serial correlation 
2 = No serial correlation 
>2 = Negative serial correlation 
As an approximate rule, serial correlations corresponding to DW outside the range 
of 1.5 to 2.5 are large enough to have a noticeable effect on the inference 
techniques. 
 
4.8.1.4.4 Outliers 
An outlier is an observation that is considerably different (either very small or very 
large) with respect to the observations in the sample (Gujarati & Porter 2009).  In 
informal language, outliers are extremely high or extremely low values in a data set, 
which can confound the statistics (Tukey 1977).  One reason for the significance of 
identifying the presence of outliers is that they have a potentially powerful effect on 
the estimates of the parameters of a model that is being fitted to the data. The 
inclusion or exclusion of an outlier, particularly if the sample size is small, can 
significantly change the results of regression analysis (Gujarati & Porter 2009).  This 
could lead to flawed conclusions and inaccurate predictions (Caroni, Karioti, & 
Pierrakou (no date)). 
 
To ensure that all possible extreme values were investigated, the Explore function 
in SPSS was used, which highlighted the five lowest and five highest values for 
each variable (see Annexure B).  These were investigated in conjunction with the 
other variables for a specific company, so as not to blindly delete values that were 
important. This procedure highlighted several other anomalies, which were 
investigated and corrected.  
 
CEO remuneration of one of the CEOs for the year 2008, with a value of R19 028 
580, was excluded from further analysis, due to the effect of this value on the 
modelling results. 
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4.8.2.3.5 Homoscedasticity 
Homoscedasticity, also called equal spread or equal variance, implies that the Y 
populations corresponding to the X values have the same variance.  Simply put, the 
variation around the regression line is the same across the X values; it increases or 
decreases as X varies (Gujarati & Porter 2009).The assumption of homoscedasticity 
for ungrouped data implies that the inconsistency of scores for one continuous 
variable is roughly the same for all values of another variable (Ferreira 2014).  This 
assumption is strongly related to the assumption of normality, since the assumption 
of multivariate normality is met; the correlations between the variables are 
homoscedastic (Tabachnick & Fidell 2013).  
 
4.8.2.3.6 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when two explanatory variables are highly correlated (r = 
0.90) (Westhoff 2013).The presence of such high correlations indicates that 
variables do not hold any additional information needed in the analysis (Tabachnick 
& Fidell 2013). The present researcher made use of the tolerance and variance 
inflation factor (VIF) information in the regression models to test for the presence of 
multicollinearity.  Kemalbay and Korkmazoglu (2011) and Shui Yan, Wei De, Li Ting 
and Siao Pin (2015) applied the same method in testing for multicollinearity. 
 
The VIF shows how estimator variance is inflated when there is a multicollinearity 
problem (Gujarati & Porter 2009).  As a rule of thumb, if the VIF of a variable is 
greater than 10, multicollinearity is present.  However, if the VIF test result is equal 
to 1, there is no multicollinearity problem in the model (Gujarati & Porter 2009).  No 
multicollinearity problems were identified in the present research. 
 
4.8.2 Stage 2: Basic inferential analysis  
Non-parametric correlation statistics was used to test the direction (positive or 
negative) and strength of the relationship between CEO remuneration and 
Company performance variables. Non-parametric correlation statistics were used 
to test for the CEO remuneration variable STIs with the other relevant variables, 
because a third of the sample declared zero bonuses.  AO (an ordinal variable that 
can assume the values of 0 to 4) was also analysed by means of correlations. 
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The researcher used the Spearman rank order correlation coefficient ሺ𝑟௦ሻ to 
calculate the positive or negative direction and strength of the relationship between 
variables.  In accordance with Albright, Winston, and Zappe (2008), if the correlation 
(r) equals −1, it suggests a perfect negative relationship, and should the correlation 
be equal to 1, it depicts a perfect positive relationship between the variables in the 
correlation. The closer r is to zero, the weaker the relationship between the 
constructs is (Laerd Statistics 2015b). According to GraphPad Statistics Guide 
(2015), Spearman’s correlation coefficient has the same range as Pearson’s 
product-moment correlation coefficient. The guideline of Albright et al. (2008) 
therefore also applies to Spearman’s tests.  For the purpose of the present study, 
the researcher employed a cut-off point of r ൒ 0.30 (medium effect) at 𝜌 ൑ 0.05,  to 
determine the practical significance of correlation coefficients (Cohen 1988).  The 
following table shows the expected r results and strengths applied in this study.  The 
accepted ranges for correlations are set out in Table 13, below. 
Table 13 Correlation value strengths 
r = +0.70 or higher Very strong positive relationship 
r = between +0.40 to +0.69 Strong positive relationship 
r = between +0.30 to +0.39 Moderate positive relationship 
r = between +0.20 to +0.29 Weak positive relationship 
r = between +0.01 to +0.19 No or negligible relationship 
r = between -0.01 to -0.19 No or negligible relationship 
r = between -0.20 to -0.29 Weak negative relationship 
r= between -0.30 to -0.39 Moderate negative relationship 
r = between –0.40 to -0.69 Strong negative relationship 
r = -0.70 or higher Very strong negative relationship 
    Source: Nel (2012: 50) 
4.8.3 Stage 3: Inferential and multivariate statistical analysis 
Inferential and multivariate statistics were carried out to permit the researcher to 
make conclusions pertaining to the data. Gujarati and Porter (2009: 15) describe 
regression analysis as follows: “Regression analysis is concerned with the study of 
the dependence of one variable, the dependent variable, on one or more other 
variables, the explanatory variables, with a view to estimating and/or predicting the 
Chapter 4: Research methodology 
 
170 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
(population) mean or average value of the former in terms of the know or fixed (in 
repeated sampling) values of the latter.” 
 
In the current study, multiple regression was performed to determine the proportion 
of variance that is explained by the independent variables (Company performance 
components and CEO demographic variables) and the dependent variables (CEO 
remuneration components). The nature of the data required the application of 
different econometric models to capture several possible relationships between 
CEO remuneration and Company performance (Grunditz & Lindqvist 2003).  Barton 
et al. (2010), Farmer et al. (2010), and Bradley (2013) also made use of different 
econometric models. 
 
According to Terre Blanche and Durrheim (2000), multiple regression analysis is 
one of the most frequently used multivariate methods to study the separate and 
collective contributions of a number of independent variables towards the variance 
of the dependent variables.  Multiple regression results emphasise two points.  First, 
the 𝑅ଶ values indicate how well a set of variables explains a dependent variable, 
and secondly, the regression results measure the direction and size of the effect of 
each variable on a dependent variable (Neuman 2000). 
 
In the present study, during the process of statistical analysis, regression analyses 
were performed to identify the Company performance variables that were 
statistically significant predictors of CEO remuneration variables, the dependent 
variables.  For the nominal and ordinal variables, Race, Education, Company size 
and AO dummy variables were created.  The next section will discuss the regression 
theory. 
 
4.8.3.1 Regression theory 
Pooled analysis combines times series for several cross-sections.  Pooled data are 
characterised by having recurring observations (most often years) on fixed units 
(companies).  This implies that pooled ranges of data combine cross-sectional data 
on longitudinal units (N) and time periods (T) to produce a data set of N x T 
observations (Červenà 2006).  For the purpose of the present study, the typical 
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range of units of analysis was 18, with each unit observed over a nine-year period 
(2006 to 2014). 
 
In view of the above explanation, the generic pooled linear regression model 
estimable by ordinary least squares (OLSs) procedure was formulated as follows 
(Podestà 2000): 
𝑌௧ ൌ 𝛽ଵ ൅  ෍ 𝛽௞ 𝜒௞௜௧ ൅ 𝑒௜௧
௞
௞ୀଶ
 
where: 
i = 1,2,…; N  refers to a cross-sectional unit; 
t = 1,2,…; T refers to a time period; and 
k = 1,2,...; K refers to a specific explanatory variable. 
 
Thus, 𝛾௧ and 𝜒௜௧ refer, in turn, to dependent and independent variables for unit i and 
time t; 𝑒௜௧ is a random error, and 𝛽ଵ and 𝛽௞  refer, respectively, to the intercept and 
the slope parameters. Furthermore, one can represent the NT x NT variance-
covariance matrix of the errors with typical element 𝐸 ൫𝑒௜௧  𝑒௝௦൯ by Ω.  Estimating this 
kind of model and some if its variants solves various problems of the traditional 
methods of comparative research (i.e. time series analysis and cross-sectional 
analysis).  A number of reasons support this, as discussed below. 
 
The first reason involves the ‘small N’ problem experienced in both time series- and 
cross-sectional analysis.  The limited number of spatial units and the limited number 
of available date over time led data sets of these two techniques to infringe the basic 
assumption of standard statistical analysis. Most specifically, the small sample of 
conventional comparisons shows an imbalance between too many explanatory 
variables and too few cases.  Therefore, within the contest of the small sample, the 
total number of the potential explanatory variables exceeds the degree of freedom 
required to model the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables.  In contrast, due to pooled time series cross-section (TSCS) designs, this 
restriction can be limited.  This is because, within the pooled TSCS research, the 
cases are “SOE-year” (NT observations) starting from the SOE  in year t, then SOE 
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i in year t+1 through SOE z in the last year of the period under investigation. This 
allows the researcher to test the influence of a large number of predictors of the 
level and change in the dependent variable within the framework of multivariate 
analysis (Schmidt 1997). 
 
The second reason supporting pooled TSCS analysis concerns the likelihood of 
capturing, not only the difference of what materialises over time or space, but the 
variation of these dimensions all together. This is because, as an alternative of 
testing a cross-section model for all companies at one point in time or testing a time 
series model for one company using time series data, a pooled model is tested for 
all companies over time (Podestà 2000). 
 
Furthermore, with panel/cross-sectional data, the most commonly estimated models 
are probably fixed effects and random effects models (Williams 2015).  A random 
effects model is probably the most suitable when there are no omitted variables, or 
if the omitted variables are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the model.  
If there are omitted variables, and these variables are correlated with the variables 
in the model, then fixed effects models may provide a means for controlling for 
omitted variable bias.  In a fixed effects model, subjects serve as their own controls.  
The rationale is that, whatever effects the omitted variables have on the subject at 
one time, will also have the same effect later. These effects will therefore be 
constant or ‘fixed’.  A fixed effects model will not work if subjects do not change over 
time.  There needs to be within-subject variability in the variable if subjects are used 
as their own controls.  Williams (2015), however, cautions that, for this to be true, 
the omitted variables must have time-variant values with time-invariant effects.  
 
4.8.3.2 Multiple regression 
In the present research, the researcher conducted multiple regression analysis.  
This type of regression analysis examines the dependence of one variable on more 
than one explanatory variable (Gujarati & Porter 2009).  Multiple regression analysis 
furthermore attempts to determine the individual effect of each explanatory variable 
(Westhoff 2013). 
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Multiple regression involves having more than one independent variable in the 
model.  This allows researchers to determine how the many explanatory variables 
of more sophisticated models influence a single dependent variable. Multiple 
regression allows researchers to determine the relationship between each 
independent and dependent variable while controlling for the effects of other 
independent variables in the model (llvento (no date)).  
 
The approach to determine the optimum regression model is an iterative process, 
whereby insignificant independent variables are deleted until the explanatory power 
and the associated F-statistic of the regression do not show an increase and 
decrease respectively. The regression model in this study was as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧ = 𝛼 ൅  𝛽ଵ ሺ𝑇ሻ ൅ 𝛽ଶ  ሺ𝑂𝑃ሻ ൅  𝛽ଷ ሺ𝑁𝑃ሻሻ ൅ 𝛽ସ  ሺ𝐿ሻ ൅  𝛽ହ  ሺ𝑆ሻ ൅
 𝛽଺ ሺ𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸ሻ + 𝛽଻ ሺ𝑅𝑂𝐸ሻ ൅ 𝛽଼ ሺ𝐼𝐹𝑊𝐸ሻ ൅ 𝛽ଽ ሺ𝐴𝑂ሻ ൅ 𝐷𝑉  ൅ 𝜀௧  ൅ 𝐴𝑅 ሺ1ሻ 
 
where:  
 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧  = Total CEO remuneration (fixed pay, STIs and total 
remuneration in rand denomination) paid to the CEOs of the sample SOEs 
in year t; 
 𝛽௜ ൌ Respective coefficient; 
 𝑇 ൌ 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟; 
 𝑁𝑃 ൌ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡; 
 𝑂𝑃 ൌ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡; 
 𝐿𝑅 ൌ 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜; 
 𝑆𝑅 ൌ 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜; 
 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸 ൌ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑; 
 𝑅𝑂𝐸 ൌ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦; 
 𝐼𝐹𝑊𝐸 = Irregular, fruitless, and wasteful expenditure; 
 AOൌ Audit opinion; 
 DV ൌ Dummy variable ሺCEO demographic variables and Company sizeሻ 
 𝑡 ൌ the tth observation; 
 𝜀 ൌ the error term; and 
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 𝐴𝑅ሺ1ሻ ൌ 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 
 
The F-statistic is the regression mean square divided by the residual mean square.  
A statistically significant F-test indicates that the data provide evidence that the best-
fitting linear model of the type specified has at least one predictor with a non-zero 
coefficient (Misinterpreting the Overall F-Statistic in Regression 2014).  The Betas 
(βs), or standardised coefficients, indicate which individual predictors contribute 
most to explaining the variation in the dependent variable.  The t-value (t-statistic) 
indicates the individual predictor’s statistical significance.  If a coefficient has a t-
value well below -2 or above +2, this normally signifies that the relevant predictor 
has a statistically significant influence (Shields, O’Donnell, & O’Brien 2003).  The R-
squared and adjusted R-squared statistics included in all the regression analysis 
models measure the proportion of variance (fluctuation) of one variable that is 
predictable or explained by the independent variables included in the model.  An 
assumption may be made that, under normal circumstances, the larger the R-
squared is, the stronger the predictive power or the explanatory power of the 
regression analysis is.  Hence, the general findings and conclusion of the regression 
model can be based on the R-squared and adjusted R-squared values (Kuboya 
2014).  
 
4.8.3.3 Econometric model 
 Panel data technique 
Panel data are a combination of cross-sectional and time series data, and provide 
multiple views on each individual in the sample (Hsiao 2014). Furthermore, panel 
data are more informative and have more variability, more degrees of freedom, 
more efficiency, and less co-linearity among variables (Yan et al. 2015).  Moreover, 
panel data can be used to investigate and estimate effects that cannot be examined 
in pure cross-sectional or pure time series data (Gujarati & Porter 2009).   
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 Pooled OLS Model 
One of the methods for measuring panel data is pooled OLS by means of the 
regression model. The pooled OLS regression model assumes that the independent 
variables are strictly exogenous to the error terms of the model (Gujarati & Porter 
2009). In addition, the pooled OLS regression model also assumes that the 
intercepts and slopes are constant across the observations (Baltagi 2008).  For the 
purpose of the present study, the pooled OLS model was used. 
 
4.9   ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Ethics in research ensure that no harm is caused to any involved party 
(respondents, interested individuals, subjects in the population, or intellectual 
property owners) in any form (Collins & Hussey 2009).  As further described by 
Collins and Hussey (2009), ethical considerations relate to informed consent, 
anonymity, and confidentiality of the information.  These issues do not pertain to the 
present study, as it did not make use of research participants.  Moreover, the data 
extracted from the annual reports were publicly available and open to scrutiny by 
the public. To ensure ethical standards were adhered to in the present study, the 
researcher ensured that the data were correctly extracted and included in the data 
matrix. The researcher performed multiple reviews to ensure that there were no 
errors in the extraction of the data.  
 
It is important to be careful to collect accurate data, and not to be biased and 
manipulate data for a specific purpose, especially given the political nature of SOEs 
(Otieno 2011).  Accuracy was ensured by objectivity, scientific investigation, and 
high standards.  As far as the analysis and reporting of the results are concerned, 
valid and reliable statistical methods were used.  All the results were reported and 
interpreted in the context of the study, and no distortion of data occurred. The results 
were not extrapolated to other SOEs, and were reported in full. 
   
The researcher believes that the challenge of confidentiality does not exist in this 
research, because the analysis was based on published annual reports.  However, 
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the researcher took special care to ensure that the language of the research and 
conclusions are presented in a positive manner, pointing to positive actions.  
Notwithstanding the above, the researcher obtained ethical clearance from the 
University of South Africa to proceed with this study and to use secondary data (Ref 
#:2013_CEMS_022) (Annexure C). 
 
4.10   VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
Validity and reliability determine whether the outcomes and conclusions of a study 
can withstand scrutiny by interested experts (Saunders et al. 2012).  In addition, it 
is important that a study will produce the same results if it is replicated (Resnick 
2013). 
 
Reliability refers to the trustworthiness of the results of a study.  The data for the 
present research were exclusively secondary data obtained from the annual reports 
of the SOEs under study.  Miller (1995) indicates that secondary data are the most 
suitable for studies on executive remuneration. Secondary sources used by 
scholars of executive remuneration are considered to provide valid and reliable data 
(Attaway 2000). Further, as all South African Schedule 2 SOEs are required to 
disclose certain financial and remuneration information by law and according to 
GAAP, the validity of this type of secondary data is considered high (Nel 2012; Shaw 
2012; Van Blerck 2012; Barret 2014). However, despite the fact that corporate 
financial results are prepared according to specific guidelines, there is room for 
interpretation in the application of certain accounting and reporting policies.  
Accounting practices may therefore differ from SOE to SOE, which could affect the 
validity of direct comparisons (Barret 2014). 
 
In the present study, financial figures for CEO remuneration and Company 
performance were extracted from the annual reports of the SOEs.  This was done 
with the assistance of a chartered accountant. While the SOEs could have 
manipulate these figures, these were considered reliable, as the published annual 
reports had been audited by external auditors and prepared in accordance with 
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rigorous accounting standards. These records could thus be considered reliable 
(Grahan & Högfeld 2010; Bradley 2013; Resnick 2013).  
The most important criterion to keep in mind when conducting quantitative research 
is that the statistical tests should measure what they aim to measure.  Various 
statistical techniques were employed to determine the relationship between CEO 
remuneration and Company performance, and the results (as discussed in the next 
chapter) clearly show that the tests did enable the researcher to draw conclusions 
about the relationship.  
 
4.10   POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The researcher identified the following limitations of the present study:  
 The research was limited to the South African Schedule 2 SOEs, and therefore 
excluded all public entities not classified as Schedule 2 entities. The 
conclusions may therefore not be generalisable to other sectors without more 
research. 
 The research focused on the remuneration of the CEOs only. 
 The accounting standards set by the International Accounting Standards 
Board may have changed during the period 2006 to 2014. This could have had 
an influence on the SOEs’ reported results and, therefore, an impact on the 
data analysis of this study. 
 The relationship between CEO remuneration and SOE performance might be 
endogenous. 
 In some annual reports, long-term bonuses and termination payments were 
included in the CEOs’ remuneration, with no indication of the exact amount.  
This could have had an effect on the results of the present study. 
 The changes in CEO incumbents in many of the SOEs, could have led to new 
incentive programmes, new bonus programmes, or different remuneration.  
This could have influenced the results and resulted in potential outliers. 
Further, a new CEO could have had an impact on data in a longitudinal study. 
 The use of audited financial results does not ensure standardisation of 
accounting policies.  Practices may therefore vary from SOE to SOE.  This 
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could have had a material effect on the results.  Another challenge faced by 
the researcher relating to data collection was the timing differences in the 
release of SOEs annual reports.  The time differences in data collection may 
have caused slight anomalies in comparisons of annual performance.  
However, this was not a significant drawback, as all the data for the 18 SOEs’ 
year-end figures were correctly matched. 
 The use of profitability as a measure of company performance is subject to 
criticism, as executives can manipulate profitability indicators (Attaway 2000; 
Ngwenya & Khumalo 2012); therefore, the use of these measures in the 
present study could have had an effect on the results. 
 
4.11   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a discussion on the research methodology. The research 
methodology applied in this study was in line with other research done on the 
relationship between CEO remuneration and company performance.  
 
The researcher employed a deductive research approach, based on a descriptive 
quantitative research design.  It study was longitudinal, in order to conduct analysis 
of secondary time series data over the study period (2006 to 2014). The target 
population of the study was Schedule 2 SOEs, and, due to the small target 
population, no sampling methodology was applied.  
 
The differing views on executive remuneration and company performance led to the 
use of the following company performance measures: turnover, OP, NP, ROE, 
ROCE, LR, SR, AO, and IFWE.  The CEO remuneration components used in this 
study were: Fixed pay, STIs, and Total remuneration.  
 
The next chapter will discuss the results and findings of the study. The researcher 
will address each of the research questions and make recommendations regarding 
the remuneration of CEOs. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
5.1   INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter, the objective is to present the results and findings of the analysis 
done in order to answer the main research question: 
 
Is there a relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and the performance of 
South African Schedule 2 SOEs? 
 
This is followed by a discussion and interpretation of the results and findings in 
relation to the research questions and objectives. 
 
This chapter presents a broad analysis of the descriptive statistics and the results 
used to address the research questions. The results were generated using the 
sample selected for the research, which consisted of 18 Schedule 2 SOEs, for the 
period 2006 to 2014. To address the research question, the nature and extent of 
the relationship between CEO remuneration and Company performance was 
explored. 
 
The chapter starts with a description of the CEOs’ profiles, followed by a discussion 
on the descriptive statistics for each of the components of CEO remuneration and 
Company performance for each of the nine years.  The researcher then focuses the 
discussion on the results of the correlation analysis. Lastly, a discussion on the 
results of the diagnostic checking for the assumptions of regression models is 
provided, where after the results of the multiple regression analysis of the effect of 
CEO remuneration on Company performance will be explained. The correlation and 
regression analyses address the research questions and sub-questions. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the research results. 
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5.2   DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
In the current study, the target population was South African Schedule 2 SOEs (N 
= 21).  After applying the elimination process indicated in Figure 14, a sample of 18 
Schedule 2 SOEs was identified as usable for the purpose of the study (n = 18).  
With the study period being nine-years, there were 162 (9 x 18) panel observations.  
All the data required for this study and applicable to this population were obtained 
from the McGregor BFA database or from the SOEs’ websites, in the form of 
captured records and annual reports. Where the most senior member of the 
executive management was called the Managing Director or Executive Director, 
instead of CEO, the remuneration information of these members were used. Of the 
SOEs in the sample, most had more than one CEO for the period under study, and 
eight SOEs had acting CEOs during this period.  
 
Because there were many instances of significant differences in the descriptive 
results between the means and medians for the components of CEO remuneration 
and Company performance, the researcher reported the medians. The reason for 
this is that potential outliers generally do not influence medians (Weiers 2010).  In 
addition, the median gives a better indication of the actual growth pattern (Pohl 
2015). 
 
This section starts with a brief description of the demographic profiles of CEOs of 
the 18 SOEs under study. This is followed by a discussion on the descriptive 
statistics of each of the components of CEO remuneration and of Company 
performance for the 18 SOEs over the nine-year period.  
 
5.2.1  CEO demographic variables 
The data analysis provided a demographic profile of the CEOs.  Over the nine-year 
period, there were 52 individuals appointed as CEO across the 18 SOEs.  The 
discussion below will address each of the components of CEO demographic 
variables. This is followed by a summary of the CEOs’ profiles and the results of 
CEO remuneration as the average remuneration of the 52 CEOs over the nine-year 
period. 
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5.2.1.1 Age of CEOs 
In this research, an average age was calculated for each CEO, which was classified 
into three age groups: 40.5 ‒ 44.9 years, 45 ‒ 48.5 years, and 48.5 years and older.  
There was an equal number of CEOs in the age groups 45 ‒ 48.5 and above 48.5 
(16 each), i.e. 30.8% respectively.  Eleven of the CEOs (21.2%) were aged 40.5 ‒ 
44.9 years.  According to a Hay Group (2014) news release, the most CEOs globally 
are aged 50 to 60 years.  From the results of the present study, it can be seen that 
CEOs in South African SOEs are younger than the average age of CEOs in China 
(50), Australia (53), the UK (52), Malaysia (52), and the USA (56.9)(Romei 2015; 
Sherman, 2015).  The mean age of the CEOs over the nine-year period was 47.63 
years (excluding nine missing values).  
 
5.2.1.2 Race composition of CEOs 
The majority of CEOs were black African (69.2%), followed by white (19%), 
Coloured (8%), and Indian (3.8%). 
 
5.2.1.3 Gender of CEOs 
There were 42 (80.8%) male CEOs and 10 (19.2%) female CEOs for the 18 SOEs 
over the nine-year period. 
 
5.2.1.4 Education CEOs 
Of the 52 CEOs, the majority, 23 (44.2%), had a Masters’ degree, followed by 17 
(32.7%) who have a bachelor’s degree, nine (17.3%) who had an honours or 
postgraduate degree, and only three (5.8%) who had a doctorate. 
 
5.2.1.5 Tenure of CEOs 
Table 14 shows that the mean of Tenure of the CEOs was 2.47 years.  This is lower 
than the average tenure found by Wowak, Hambrick, and Henderson (2011) of 4.48 
years, as well as Yan et al. (2015), who found a mean tenure of 11.30.  The CEOs’ 
tenure might indicate that, within SOEs, CEOs may not have as much power to 
dictate their remuneration; Ozkan (2011) proposes that CEOs with a longer tenure 
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have a tendency to prescribe their worth. The minimum average Tenure in the 
present was five months, and the maximum was nine-and-a-half years. 
Table 14 Average CEO Tenure for the nine-year period 
 
 CEO tenure in years 
(n=52)
Mean 2.47 
Median 1.97 
Std. Deviation 2.06 
Minimum 0.42 
Maximum 9.50 
 
Table 15 provides a summary of CEO demographic variables of the CEOs 
according to race, gender, age, and education. 
Table 15 Summary of Frequency Distribution: Demographic profile of CEOs 
 Frequency Percent 
Race Black African 36 69.2 
Coloured 4 8 
Indian 2 3.8 
White 10 19 
Total 52 100.0 
   
Gender Female 
Male 
Total 
10
42
52
19.2 
80.8 
100.0 
Age 40.5 ‒ 44.9 
45 ‒ 48.5 
48.5 and older 
Total 
Missing 
11
16
16
43
9
21.2 
30.8 
30.8 
17.3 
    
Education Undergraduate degree 
Postgraduate degree 
Master’s degree 
Doctorate 
Total 
17
9
23
3
52
32.7 
17.3 
44.2 
5.8 
100.0 
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In summary, the demographic profiles of the CEOs indicate that they were 
predominantly black African males between the ages of 40.5 and 48.5 years, who 
held a Master’s degree.  
 
5.2.2 CEO remuneration components 
The CEO remuneration components were: Fixed pay, STIs, and Total remuneration, 
and were the dependent variables for all 18 SOEs under study.  
 
The period of the global financial crisis, which was marked by global economic 
decline that began in December 2007 and took a sharp downward turn in September 
2008, is indicated by grey shading in the figures below, as is the August 2011 stock 
market fall. 
 
5.2.2.1 Fixed pay  
The median of Fixed pay increased steadily from R1.67m to R3m from 2006 to 
2014. This represented an average year-on-year increase of 8%, and a total 
increase of 82% over the period. Table 16 summarises Fixed pay for the period 
2006 to 2014.   
Table 16 Descriptive statistics – Fixed pay 
Year Mean SD Median 
2006 1 994 250.19 1 052 027.05 1 679 000.00 
2007 2 372 378.39 1 242 189.05 2 062 141.50 
2008 2 509 763.41 1 325 793.61 2 044 607.00 
2009 2 668 468.03 1 203 410.04 2 470 000.00 
2010 2 769 787.70 1 034 832.47 2 550 500.00 
2011 3 160 985.56 1 394 699.82 2 808 50000 
2012 3 586 606.11 1 243 883.04 3 319 96400 
2013 3 184 005.83 1 459 638.89 3 182 000.00 
2014 3 523 151.89 1 487 536.39 3 063 420.50 
It was expected that Fixed pay would continue to grow, regardless of weakening 
market conditions.  Fixed salaries are often determined according to industry market 
surveys (Murphy 1999); therefore, the proportion of fixed pay in most cases is not 
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expected decline during periods of poor financial performance (Kuboya 2014).  
Shaw (2011) posits that it is rare for fixed pay to experience a decline in declining 
market conditions. 
 
The increase in the median of Fixed pay for the 2006 to 2007 financial year was the 
highest, with a 23% increase.  The lowest increase in the median of Fixed pay was 
for the 2009/2010 financial year, at 3%.  This could have been due to the fall-out of 
the global economic slowdown. It is observed that a negative growth in Fixed pay 
was experienced in the following financial years: -0.85% in 2007/2008, with, -4% in 
the 2012/2013 financial year, -4% in the 2013/2014 financial year.  This seems to 
reflect the trend in some of the SOE’s Company performance components.  In 
particular, the trend appears to be similar to those found for OP, NP, and ROCE. 
 
Figure 16 illustrates the mean and median for Fixed pay tabulated in Table 16.  
While the researcher did not consider inflation, it is evident from the graph that the 
increase in the mean and median fluctuated throughout the period of analysis.  
Figure 16 Fixed pay (2006 – 2014) 
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2007, with the highest median of Fixed pay being in 2012.  This suggests that the 
August 2011 stock market fall did not have an effect on the CEOs’ fixed pay.  
 
5.2.2.2 Short-term incentives (bonuses)  
CEOs’ STIs have raised criticism in the wake of the financial crisis (Shaw 2011).  
Table 17 summarises STIs for the period 2006 to 2014. 
Table 17 STIs (2006 to 2014) 
Year Mean SD Median 
2006 914 263.33 1 161 731.723 421 762.50
2007 930 669.78 990 919.99 650 000.00
2008 1 380 996.22 1 729 113.55 761 500.00
2009 1 186 322.50 1 224 651.04 1 156 762.50
2010 1 170 384.94 1 208 646.01 896 500.00
2011 945 902.89 995 133.60 784 990.00
2012 1 423 860.56 1 837 371.69 757 238.50
2013 911 290.00 1 028 744.98 428 543.50
2014 1 140 483.67 1 562 708.50 301 450.50
 
The data show that STIs decreased during this period, as reflected in the median 
value decreasing from R421 762.50 to R301 450.50 over the nine-year period.  This 
represents an average year-on-year decline of 4% and a total decrease of 29% over 
the period. The increase in the median of STIs in the 2006/2007 financial year was 
the highest, at 54%. The 52% increase in STIs during the 2008/2009 financial year 
indicates that the effect of the global economic down turn did not have an effect on 
CEOs being awarded STIs.  It could also suggest that the STIs were not based on 
company performance. A decline was experienced in STIs from 2010 onwards.  
STIs reached the lowest level during the 2013/2014 financial year.  The predictions 
of a continued slowed economic recovery could have kept CEOs’ STIs depressed 
below what they would normally be, even though South Africa was not officially in a 
recession anymore. 
 
Similar to the trend in Fixed pay, at face value, the decline in STIs appears to mirror 
the trend in some of the components of Company performance.  In particular, the 
Chapter 5: Research results 
 
186 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
trend appears to be similar to the trends of OP, Net profit, ROCE, and ROE.  These 
results are worth mentioning, as they start to form a foundation for the notion that 
there is some relationship between STIs Company performance. The statistical 
significance of this relationship was explored further in the research.  Figure 17 
illustrates the means and medians for STIs for the period under study. 
Figure 17 STIs (2006 – 2014) 
 
The decrease in the median of STIs in the 2009/2010 financial year could be 
attributed to the economic downturn.  Taking into consideration the 8% increase in 
Fixed pay during the nine-year period, the 4% decline in STIs is cause for concern, 
as this may indicate that the structure of CEOs’ remuneration changed to focus 
more on fixed pay.  This will be discussed further in Chapter 6.  
 
5.2.2.3 Total remuneration 
Table 18 provides a summary of Total remuneration from 2006 to 2014. 
Table 18 Total remuneration (2006 – 2014) 
Year Mean SD Median 
2006 3 332 067.96 2 265 677.94 2 325 750.00 
2007  3 807 600.78 2 136 055.98 3 132 787.50 
2008 4 237 731.59 2 744 345.78 3 970 035.00 
2009 4 802 590.06 2 716 499.95 4 525 037.50 
2010  4 531 525.29 2 300 189.77 3 959 000.00 
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2011 4 868 698.06 2 666 919.72 4 111 500.00 
2012  5 743 642.19 3 174 628.91 4 641 500.00 
2013 4 577 509.56 2 634 924.46 4 072 000.00 
2014 5 241 013.27 2 695 857.11 4 490 227.27 
Total remuneration, as reflected in the median value, increased from R2 325 750.00 
to R4 490 227.27 over the nine-year period. This represents an average year-on-
year increase of 9% and a total increase of 93% over the period. The increase in 
Total remuneration in the 2006/2007 financial year was the highest, at 35%. A 
decline of 13% in Total remuneration was found for the 2009/2010 financial year, 
and again in the 2012/2013 financial year, at 12%.  A possible explanation for the 
decline during the 2009/2010 financial year could be the fallout from the economic 
recession, while the 2013 decline could possibly be attributed to the great number 
of acting CEOs during that period.  The median of Total remuneration increased to 
its highest level in 2014. Figure 18 illustrates the means and medians of Total 
remuneration.  
Figure 18 Total remuneration (2006 – 2014) 
 
It is clear that Total remuneration fluctuated during the period under study.  At face 
value, the trend above appears to mirror the trend of some of the components of 
Company performance. Specifically, the trend appears to be similar to that of 
Turnover, OP, LR, ROCE, and ROE. These results are significant, in that they 
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remuneration and Company performance. The extent of this relationship was further 
explored, and is reported on later in this paper.  
 
5.2.3  Components of Company performance  
The following components of Company performance (independent variables) were 
used for the purpose of this research: turnover, OP, NP, ROE, ROCE, LR, SR, AO, 
and IFWE.  Table 19 provides a summary of the medians, and Table 20 provides a 
summary of the standard deviations of the descriptive statistics for each component 
of Company performance (except AO) for the 18 SOEs for the period 2006 to 2014. 
 
In the subsequent paragraphs, each component of Company performance is 
discussed individually.  It should be noted that the information provided in these 
paragraphs contains the results of median of the components of Company 
performance for the entire period for all the SOEs.  
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Table 19 Medians of Company performance components 
(2006 ‒ 2014) 
Year Turnover OP NP LR SR ROCE ROE IFWE 
2006 2 452 772 500.00 610 426 500.00 434 574 500.00 1.36 1.70 0.13 0.12 0.00
2007 2 935 435 500.00 1 093 511 512.00 266 969 500.00 1.25 1.94 0.14 0.12 0.00
2008 3 373 951 500.00 770 996 616.00 349 167 000.00 1.27 1.80 0.11 0.08 0.00
2009 3 608 791 000.00 505 362 500.00 254 127 000.00 0.99 1.52 0.08 0.08 0.00
2010 3 581 736 500.00 407 669 500.00 230 156 000.00 1.15 1.48 0.06 0.04 0.00
2011 4 122 956 000.00 532 792 055.50 142 390 500.00 1.35 1.55 0.05 0.05 121 871.50
2012 4 707 705 000.00 360 963 391.00 172 968 000.00 1.46 1.49 0.05 0.06 870 135.00
2013 4 882 121 500.00 228 674 780.00 147 827 000.00 1.89 1.64 0.03 0.05 4 615 500.00 
2014 5 183 220 000.00 267 699 009.00 308 056 627.50 2.24 1.74 0.03 0.06 6 532 500.00 
 
Table 20 indicates the standard deviations for the Company performance components for the same period.  
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Table 20 Standard deviations of Company performance components (2006 ‒ 2014) 
 (n = 18 per year) 
Year Turnover OP NP 
 
 
 
LR SR ROCE ROE IFWE 
 
2006 14 029 089 736.97 4 077 494 496.67 2 487 634 508.85 2.39 1.25 0.27 0.60 3 768 925.14 
2007 15 250 858 652.69 4 464 230 191.10 2 858 114 094.06 1.99 1.33 0.26 0.33 15 535 439.79 
2008 16 470 407 093.20 3 995 448 365.57 2 236 625 996.73 1.82 1.37 0.21 0.23 19 827 142.80 
2009 15 374 995 271.63 2 817 253 267.84 3 055 558 612.50 2.61 1.90 0.69 0.32 29 295 525.61 
2010 17 939 019 529.13 4 432 694 813.84 8 793 504 985.39 2.19 2.09 0.17 0.39 178 657 442.77 
2011 22 583 327 858.44 3 782 249 093.03 2 140 105 364.53 2.45 1.68 0.11 1.17 1 994 354 065.92 
2012 27 896 579 286.56 5 542 880 950.90 3 258 931 720.40 2.15 1.36 0.14 0.51 168 527 770.81 
2013 31 093 882 717.85 4 617 394 390.09 3 313 899 759.05 1.41 1.33 0.16 0.37 564 377 137.34  
2014 33 731 318 826.90 4 036 611 855.17 2 399 121 949.77 1.75 1.68 1.04 0.22 965 285 484.85 
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5.3.3.1 Turnover 
The Turnover median rose from R2 billion to R5 billion.  This represented an average 
year-on-year increase of 10% for the nine-year period and a decline of 111% over 
period. Figure 19 illustrates the Turnover mean and median from 2006 to 2014, 
indicating the period of the global financial crisis of 2008/2009 and the August 2011 
stock market fall as shaded areas.  
Figure 19 Turnover (2006 ‒ 2014) 
 
 
The average Turnover median indicated a relatively stable relationship during the study 
period.  The average Turnover median experienced a marginal decrease of 1% during 
the 2009/2010 financial year.  This could have been because of the global financial 
Crisis.  The largest growth in Turnover, 15%, was experience during the 2007/2008 
and 2010/2011 financial years.  The increase during the 2010/2011 financial year was 
at the peak of the August 2011 stock market fall.  The median of Turnover reached its 
highest level during 2014, at R5.18 billion.  
 
5.3.3.2 Operating Profit 
The median of OP decreased from R6 million to R2 million from 2006 to 2014.  This 
represented an average year-on-year decrease of 10%, and a total decrease of 56% 
over the period.  Figure 20 illustrates the OP mean and median from 2006 to 2014.  
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Figure 20 Operating Profit (2006 ‒ 2014) 
 
 
The median OP experienced a decline from 2007 to 2010, reaching its lowest level 
during the 2012/2013 financial year (-37%). A possible explanation for the negative 
growth could be that SOEs’ overhead costs might have increased, or their debt-service 
cost had increased.  Another possible explanation for the negative growth could be the 
global economic slowdown.  It can be reasonably concluded that the decline in OP for 
the 2008/2009 financial year (-29%) and 2009/2010 financial year (-19%) was due to 
the global financial crisis.  The decline in OP during the August 2011 stock market fall 
resulted in a decline of 32% in OP for the 2011/2012 financial year. An increase of 17% 
was experienced during the 2013/2014 financial year.  
 
5.3.3.3 Net Profit 
The median NP decreased from R4 million to R3 million from 2006 to 2014. This 
represented an average year-on-year decrease of 4% and a total decrease of 29% 
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Figure 21 Net Profit (2006 ‒ 2014) 
 
 
Similar to OP, it is clear from Figure 21 that the median NP declined from 2007 to 2011, 
with a slight recovery in the 2007/2008 financial year. This decline could possibly be 
attributed to the effects of the global financial crisis.  The highest negative growth was 
experienced during the 2010/2011 financial year, with a decline of 38%.  This decline 
in NP could possibly be due to the August 2011 stock market fall.  Further, a decline 
in NP could have been due to higher expenses and loss of productivity. During the 
2013/2014 financial year, a growth of 108% is seen in NP.  NP is important to 
shareholders, because it is the source of remuneration to shareholders of the 
company, and if a company cannot generate enough profit to remunerate owners, the 
value of the company’s shares will drop.  
 
5.3.3.4 Liquidity ratio 
The higher the LR is, the better the company’s liquidity position is (Williams et al. 2006).  
The medians of LR changed noticeably over the nine-year period, with a total increase 
of 65% over the nine-year period, and an average year-on-year increase of 7%.  Figure 
22 illustrates the means and medians of LR for the period under study. 
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Figure 22 Liquidity ratio (2006 – 2014) 
 
 
The data indicate that the median LR reached its lowest level in the 2008/2009 financial 
year, with a negative growth of 22% during the global economic slowdown from 2007 
to 2009.  The negative growth in LR could be attributed to an increase in short-term 
debt, a decrease in current assets, or a combination of the two. A decline in LRs means 
that, during the 2008/2009 financial year, SOEs’ ability to generate cash decreased. 
 
It can be concluded that, during the 2008/2009 financial year, SOEs’ financial standing 
was less favourable than in other years, as their LR were below one.  However, a very 
high LR may suggest that funds are being tied up, and may not be earning high returns 
(Ho (no date)).  It appears that, from 2010 onwards, SOEs were in a better position to 
pay their short-term obligations, as the LR was higher than 1.  
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total increase of 2% for the period 2006 to 2014.  Figure 23 indicates that the mean 
and median SR remained consistent, as illustrated by a more or less horizontal line.  
Figure 23 Solvency ratio (2006 – 2014) 
 
 
The data indicate that the growth in median SR during the 2006/2007 financial year 
was the highest, indicating that SOEs had taken on more risk during that period.  The 
descriptive statistics indicated that median SR reached its highest level during this 
period, with a 14% growth.  This was followed by a negative growth in the 2008/2009 
financial year, with a 15% following the financial crisis of 2008.  Negative growth in the 
SR was experience from 2008 to 2010.  A decline in solvency may suggest that SOEs 
might have paid off their short-term debt, or possibly refinanced their short-term debt 
by means of long-term debt.  A low SR suggests that a company is less dependent on 
leverage, for example, money borrowed from and/or owed to others (Loth 2016).  
 
5.3.3.6 Return on Capital Employed 
ROCE, in total, decreased by 74% over the nine-year period, with an average year-on-
year decline of 16%.  Figure 24 illustrates the mean and median of ROCE for the period 
under study. The ROCE expressed as a percentage, complements the ROE by adding 
a company’s debt liabilities or funded debt, to equity, to reflect a company’s total capital 
employed. This measure allows for a better understanding of a company’s ability to 
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generate returns from its available capital base. As a rule, ROCE should be at or above 
a company’s average borrowing rate (Loth 2015).  A low ROCE is caused either by a 
low profit margin or large sums of capital employed.  
Figure 24 Return on Capital Employed (2006 ‒ 2014) 
 
 
Similar to SR, the median ROCE experienced a negative growth from 2008 to 2011.  
From Figure 24, it is clear that the decline in ROCE followed the financial crisis of 2008, 
with a decrease of 25% during the 2009/2009 financial year.  At the peak of the August 
2011 stock market fall, the median ROCE increased by 11%. During the 2012/2013 
financial year, the median ROCE reached its lowest level, 0.03% (a decrease of 48% 
from the previous financial year).  A decline in ROCE could be attributed to possible 
changes in profit margins, asset utilisation, or errors in inventory counting (Ho (no 
date)).  
 
5.3.3.7 Return on Equity 
The data indicate that the median ROE experienced a total decline of 52% over the 
nine-year period, with an average 9% year-on-year decline. The data further indicate 
that the median ROE experienced a negative growth during the 2007/2008 financial 
year, with a decline of 28%.  This suggests that, during this period, SOEs experienced 
a 28% loss in profit on every rand invested by shareholders. The largest negative 
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growth in the median ROE was during the 2009/2010 financial year, with a decline of 
45%.  This can possibly be attributed to the global financial crisis, and suggests that 
SOEs may not be resilient during economic downturns.  Figure 25 illustrates the mean 
and median of for ROE from 2006 to 2014. 
Figure 25 Return on Equity (2006 ‒ 2014) 
 
The descriptive statistics indicated that the highest growth in median ROE was for the 
2010/2011 financial year, at 19%.  Ndzi (2014) posits that the smaller the value of ROE 
is, the higher the risk is for SOE in difficult economic times.  The reason for this is that, 
the more debt a company has, the less profit it makes. The ROE showed a decline 
during the period under study. Based on the observations in Figure 25, it can be argued 
that the 2008 global financial crisis and the August 2011 stock market fall did not have 
a serious impact on the ROE of SOEs.  
 
5.3.3.8 Irregular, fruitless, and wasteful expenditure 
Figure 26 illustrates the mean and median for IFWE from 2006 to 2014.   
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Figure 26 Irregular, fruitless, and wasteful expenditure (2006 ‒ 2014) 
 
The descriptive statistics indicated that median IFWE grew by 614% during the 
2011/2012 financial year. The average increase in median IFWE for the period 2011 
to 2014 was a staggering 362%. A possible explanation for this could be that not all 
SOEs may have reported IFWE expenditure prior to 2010. A more plausible 
explanation could be that SOEs incurred expenditure that could have been avoided, 
had reasonable care been implemented.  
 
5.3.3.9 Audit opinion 
Figure 27 illustrates the AOs over the nine-year period.A total of (63%) 
clean/unqualified AOs were received, while (32%) emphasis-of-matter AOs were 
received. Furthermore, six (4%) adverse opinions were received, and two (1%) 
disclaimer opinions were received during the nine-year period. 
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Figure 27 Audit opinions (n = 162) 
 
5.4   DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF TOTAL DATA SET 
The previous section provided the descriptive statistics of each of the CEO 
remuneration components, as well as each component of Company performance, for 
the 18 SOEs for the period 2006 to 2014.  The purpose of this section is to provide the 
descriptive statistics of the entire data set (n = 162) over the nine-year period. 
  
Table 21 provides a summary of the CEO remuneration components, with 162 
observations between 2006 and 2014. 
Table 21 CEO remuneration components for data set 
(2006 ‒ 2014)  
 Fixed pay 
 
 
STIs Total 
remuneration 
Mean 2 863 266.34 1 111 574.88 4 663 172.36
Median 2 582 000.00 600 000.00 3 989 017.50
SD 1 348 299.09 1 319 400.00 2 863 294.56
Skewness 0.84 1.41 1.57
Kurtosis 0.64 2.03 3.83
Minimum 468 000.00 0 636 000.00
Maximum 7 751 643.00 6 473 000.00 19 108 837.00
 
63%
4%
32%
0%1
Descriptives of Audit opinion
Clean/unqualified
Qualified
Emphasis of matter
Adverse/going concern
Disclaimer
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The data show that the median Fixed pay for the period 2006 to 2014 was R2 582 
000.00.  The median STIs for the nine-year period was R600 000.00 and the median 
Total remuneration was R3 989 017.50. The highest Total remuneration was 
R19 108 837.00, and the lowest was R636 000.00. The difference between Fixed pay 
and Total remuneration could be because the industries of the SOEs are different, 
which could have an effect on their total remuneration.  It is important to note that an 
amount of R19m for the year 2008 was omitted from the regression analysis, as it was 
identified as an outlier that had a significant impact on fitting a regression model.  The 
zero STIs can be ascribed to the fact that there were indeed no bonuses received, or 
that these were not disclosed separately, but included in the total remuneration. 
 
It is noted that the median of all the CEO remuneration components was, throughout 
the study period, lower than the mean. This suggested that the data were skewed to 
the right.  It can also be seen from Table 21 that Fixed pay was slightly skewed, while 
STIs and Total remuneration were highly skewed, per the guidelines suggested by 
Bulmer (1979). According to George and Mallery (2010), values of skewness and 
kurtosis of between -2 and +2 are considered acceptable to prove a normal univariate 
distribution. The data displayed in Table 21 indicate that Total remuneration was not 
normally distributed. 
 
According to Table 22, the mean Turnover for the nine-year period was over R12bn, 
while the mean OP was R2 024 505 570.55.  The mean NP for the nine-year period 
was R1 198 456 114.76, with a mean LR of 2.12.  This suggested that SOEs, in total, 
had, on average, R2.12 in current assets for every rand in current liabilities.  To put it 
differently, SOEs had 2.12 times as many current assets as current liabilities. The 
mean SR was 2.21.  Acceptable SRs vary from industry to industry, but, as a rule, an 
SR of 20% is considered financially healthy.  Based on the results of the present study, 
the SOEs were more than able to meet their financial obligations as their SR, on 
average, was 221%.  The mean ROCE was 0.13, with a minimum of -0.48 and a 
maximum of 4.46.  It is clear that the ROCE figures of the SOEs were volatile and 
fluctuated from year to year.  In general, companies with stable and rising ROCE 
figures are favoured.  The mean ROE was 0.10.  The mean IFWE for all 18 SOEs was 
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R149 434 056.36.  Overall, the results for Company performance were skewed, and 
not normally distributed. 
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Table 22 Descriptive statistics for Company performance components 
  Turnover 
 
OP 
 
 
 
NP 
 
 
LR SR ROCE  ROE 
 
 
IFWE 
Mean 12 846 687 444.51 2 024 505 570.55 1 198 456 114.76 2.12 2.21 0.13 0.10 149 434 056.36 
Median 3 906 150 000.00 427 877 500.00 187 401 000.00 1.29 1.64 0.07 0.07 0 
SD 22 409 083 681.46 4 172 812 904.44 3 880 533 795.92 2.07 1.54 0.45 0.53 756 117 926.82 
Skewness 3.25 2.07 5.29 2.02 2.27 7.11 4.91 8.73 
Kurtosis 12.77 5.80 48.96 4.40 6.32 62.23 46.20 87.29 
Minimum 93 908 207 -11 047 000 000.00 -11 499 000 000.00 0.44 0.82 -0.48 -1.90 0 
Maximum 139 506 000 000.00 22 329 000 000.00 37 585 000 000.00 10.49 9.77 4.46 4.99 8 300 500 000.00 
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5.5   RESULTS OF DIAGNOSTIC CHECKING 
Regression analysis is a technique generally used to quantify economic 
relationships (Pedace 2013). For the purpose of the present study, multiple 
regression analysis was used for panel data, in which all the independent variables 
were entered into the equation concurrently. The researcher then evaluated each 
independent variable in terms of its predictive power, over and above that offered 
by all the other independent variables. The results with regard to testing of the 
assumptions of regression (diagnostic checks), namely normality, stationarity, 
autocorrelation, outliers, and multicollinearity, are discussed in this section. 
 
5.5.1 Normality Test 
The researcher tested CEO remuneration and Company performance for normality, 
using the Shapiro-Wilk test.  Razali and Wah (2011: 32) found the Shapiro-Wilk test 
to be “the most powerful test” of normality for all sample sizes.  A non-significant 
result (a Sig. value of more than 0.05) indicates normality. Table 23 presents the 
results for the normality test for CEO remuneration and Company performance. 
Table 23 Test of Normality – CEO remuneration 
 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. 
CEO remuneration 
Fixed pay 0.93 162 0.00 
STIs 0.82 162 0.00 
Total remuneration 0.88 162 0.00 
Total remuneration adjusted for Tenure 
(1% per year) 0.87 162 0.00 
Company performance 
Turnover 0.58 162 0.00 
OP (R’000) 0.70 162 0.00 
NP  (R’000) 0.52 162 0.00 
LR 0.78 162 0.00 
SR 0.75 162 0.00 
ROCE 0.41 162 0.00 
ROE 0.53 162 0.00 
Total IFWE 0.19 162 0.00 
 
The figures in Table 23 show that the significance values for all the variables were 
below p < 0.05, suggesting violation of the assumption of normality. The CEO 
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remuneration data as well as those for Company performance therefore deviated 
from a normal distribution.  
 
5.5.2 Stationarity Test 
For the purpose of this study, the researcher performed the ADF test to determine 
the stationarity of each variable. Stationarity indicates that the variance and means 
will not change throughout the periods (Yan et al. 2015). Table 24 indicates the 
results of the ADF test and significance value for each component of Company 
performance and CEO remuneration. 
Table 24 Stationarity test for Research components 
Variable Test 
statistic 
Probability 
Fixed pay 28.56 0.81 
Total remuneration 43.44 0.13 
Turnover 36.32 0.45 
OP 47.89 0.01 
NP 19.48 0.99 
LR 45.84 0.13 
SR 42.81 0.20 
ROCE 73.05 0.00 
ROE 58.86 0.01 
Total IFWE 30.24 0.11 
    
Table 24 shows that OP (p = 0.01), ROCE (p = 0.00), and ROE (p = 0.01) were 
stationary, and did not contain a unit root.  A time series is stationary if its mean and 
variance do not vary systematically over time (Gujarati & Porter 2009). This 
suggests that a stationary time series’ statistical properties will be the same in the 
future as they were in the past. The null hypothesis of the ADF test, as proposed by 
Gujarati and Porter (2009), for these components of Company performance is 
therefore rejected.  
 
With regard to the other Company performance components, as well as Fixed pay 
and Total remuneration, the null hypothesis, as proposed by Gujarati and Porter 
(2009), of the ADF test is not rejected (p > 0.05). Therefore, Fixed pay, Total 
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remuneration, Turnover, NP, LR, SR, and IFWE were all non-stationary and did 
contain a unit root. These Company performance components’ means and 
variances therefore varied systematically over time. 
 
5.5.3  Autocorrelation 
For the purpose of this study, the DW test for autocorrelation was used.  The DW 
statistic varies from zero 4.  A value of 2 means that there is no autocorrelation in 
the sample.  A value of zero indicates positive autocorrelation, and a value of 4 
indicate negative autocorrelation (Investopedia 2015 (b)).  Acceptable thresholds 
for the absence of autocorrelation lie between 1.5 and 2.5.  Addressing existence 
of autocorrelation formed part of the modelling process, and is discussed in detail 
in subsequent paragraphs.  
 
5.5.4 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity takes place when two explanatory variables are highly correlated (r 
= 0.90) (Westhoff 2013).  In their study, Agerberg and Mirzaii (2010) deem an 
absolute value of r > 0.80 as problematic.  Annexure D provides detailed results for 
the correlations of the independent variables that were, for the purpose of this study, 
the explanatory variables.  As can be seen from the results in Annexure D, none of 
the explanatory variables was highly correlated with another.  Thus, no problems 
were detected in the tests.  Due to the absence of multicollinearity in this research, 
all the Company performance components were included in the multiple regression 
analysis, without fear that high correlations among independent variables would 
lead to unreliable and unstable estimates of regression coefficients.  
 
5.6   RESULTS OF RESEARCH QUESTION 1 
This section discusses the results of the correlational and regression analysis in 
addressing Research Question 1, which aimed to determine whether there was a 
relationship between CEO remuneration and SOEs’ performance over a nine-year 
period (2006 to 2014).  The expectation was that a negative relationship would exist 
between CEO remuneration and Company performance, in light of the poor 
performance of SOEs over the past few years.  
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In addressing the various research sub-questions, separate regressions were run 
for the CEO remuneration components Fixed pay and Total remuneration. Because 
a third of the SOEs declared zero bonuses, it was not possible to make use of 
regression analysis for STIs. The Pearson correlation coefficient analysis was 
therefore performed to test the strength and statistical significance of the correlation 
between STIs and Company performance. To determine the influence of CEO 
remuneration (Fixed pay and Total remuneration) on Company performance, OLS 
multiple regression models for panel data were used.  This allowed for the testing 
of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The 
dependent variables were the components of CEO remuneration respectively 
(Fixed pay and Total remuneration), and the independent variables were the various 
Company performance components. This approach indicates how much unique 
variance in the dependent variable is due to the influence of each of the independent 
variables (Pallant 2013). In the present study, multiple regression analysis was 
performed on panel data with 162 observations (nine years, with 18 companies).  
For all the regressions, AO was tested using dummy variables, due to its categorical 
nature, with Audit Opinion 3 (Adverse) being the reference category. 
  
In all the regressions, preliminary analyses were conducted to determine if any of 
the assumptions were violated. Further, in order to ensure that stationarity and serial 
correlation concerns were addressed, an auto-regressive term (AR1) was included 
in the regression. 
 
Complete multiple regression measurement model/iterations and tables are 
presented in Annexure E. This section presents only a summary of the multiple 
regression tables for the various CEO remuneration components. 
 
It is important to note that, in the literature and in general statistical terms, 
researchers refer to the results of the regression as ‘models’ and not ‘frameworks.’  
Various studies have used this methodology; see, for example, Tariq (2010), De 
Wet (2012), Lundqvist and Erazo (2014), and Kuboya (2014).  The present study 
therefore used the same terminology. Further, an optimal regression model can 
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include statistically significant predictors and non-statistically significant predictors, 
as the aim of a regression is to, for the model, determine the optimal set of 
independent variables that optimize the percentage variance explained.  Thus, even 
if some of the measures are not statistically significant, they still contribute to a 
higher percentage of variance explained, making their inclusion necessary (Pohl 
2016). 
 
The approach to determine the optimum regression model is an iterative process, 
whereby insignificant independent variables are deleted, until the explanatory power 
does not show an increase, and the associated F-statistics of the regression does 
not show a decrease. 
 
5.6.1 Relationship between Fixed pay and Company performance 
The regression model included 144 balanced panel observations and 18 cross-
sectional units over a period of eight years, due to the inclusion of the AR(1) term.  
Five iterations were run to determine the optimum final regression model for Fixed 
pay.  Refer to Annexure E.1 for the different iterations.  With regard to Fixed pay, 
Model 5 was regarded as the optimum model, and is discussed in subsequent 
paragraphs.  Table 25 provides a summary of each individual regression model 
(with the t-statistics in parentheses).  
Table 25 Regression: Fixed pay and Company performance components 
Dependent variable: Fixed pay 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 
Constant 2 774 276.00 2 750 492.00 2 736 442.00 2 765 884.00 2 877 548.00
AR(1) 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.64
Turnover 302 000.00*
(3.87)
302 000.00*
(3.93)
304 000.00*
(3.98)
340 000.00* 
(4.94) 
335 000.00*
(5.04)
OP 441 000.00
 (0.96)
445 000.00
(0.99)
448 000.00
(1.00)
 
  
NP -734 000.00*
(-2.46)
-744 000.00*
(-2.56)
-745 000.00*
(-2.57)
-503 000.00* 
(-2.98) 
-491 000.00*
(-2.89)
Dependent variable: Fixed pay 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 
LR 65 696.59
(1.01)
64 197.29
(1.10)
63 404.60
(1.10)
58 383.31 
(1.01) 
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SR -8 801.99
(-0.08)
 
ROCE 104 220.50
(0.70)
104 960.10
(0.72)
104 575.70
(0.72)
 
ROE -18 989.40
(-0.19)
 
IFWE -987 000 
(-1.26)
-997 000 
(-1.30)
-0.000102 
(-1.34)
-0.000111 
(-1.47) 
-0.000112 
(-1.47)
Dum_Qualified 
Audit opinion 
-20 617.58
(-0.06)
 
Dum_Emphasis 
of matter 
-28 699.62
(-0.14)
 
Dum_Disclaimer -356 500.10
(-0.45)
-354 703.10
(-0.45)
 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
20.28
(0.00)
31.33
(0.00)
35.99
(0.00)
50.22 
(0.00) 
62.54
(0.00)
DB stat 2.54 2.54 2.54 2.54 2.52
R2 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64
Adjusted R2 0.618 0.629 0.631 0.632 0.632
Note: (i) Coefficients reported with t-statistics in parenthesis; and (ii) Unstandardized beta coefficients are presented 
* indicate significance at the 5% level. 
 
Model 1, the first multiple regression performed (baseline model) in Table 25, 
included all the Company performance components.  The DW statistic tests for 
autocorrelation, expressed as a value of between 0 and 4.  A value of 2 indicates 
that there is no autocorrelation in the selected sample.  As can be seen from Table 
25, the DW test statistic was 2.5, indicating no serious serial correlation. 
 
The last regression, Model 5 in Table 25, was regarded as the optimum model, as 
the F-statistic increased to 62.54, in conjunction with an improvement of the 
adjusted R2.  The optimum model indicated that 63% (adjusted R2 = 0.63) of the 
variation in Fixed pay was explained by Company performance. The increase in 
adjusted R2 showed that these variables were the optimal set of independent 
variables among the variables considered in predicting Fixed pay.  Further reduction 
— taking out IFWE — resulted in a decrease in the F-statistic and adjusted R2 value.  
In addition, the increase in the adjusted R2 and the F-statistic was also an indication 
of the reliability of the regression model.  The results of Model 5 showed that the 
major determinants of Fixed pay among Company performance measures were 
Turnover, NP, and IFWE.  However, only the p-values of NP and Turnover were 
statistically significant (p < 0.05), suggesting a stronger relationship between Fixed 
pay and these two Company performance components. 
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As expected, NP was negatively related to Fixed pay.  A possible explanation for 
the negative relationship could be that the SOEs’ net profit decreased during the 
study period, and labour costs (such as salaries) increased.  For every R1 million 
increase in NP, Fixed pay decreased by R491 000. Turnover was positively 
significantly linked to Fixed pay.  For every R1 million increase in Turnover, Fixed 
pay increased, on average, by R335 000.  IFWE related negatively to Fixed pay, 
although this relationship was not statistically significant. This suggests that a higher 
IFWE will result in a lower Fixed pay, and vice versa.   
 
Table 25 further indicates that AO does not play a role in the determination of Fixed 
pay.  It was further noted that the coefficient of NP was negative for all the models 
tested.  
 
5.6.2 Relationship between STIs and Company performance components 
Despite the fact that a third of the SOE had declared zero bonuses, an analysis 
using zero STIs was done, because it accurately reflected cases where CEOs did 
not receive a bonus (for whatever reason).  
 
A zero-bonus value might have existed because (1) the CEO did not meet the 
minimum performance threshold or (2) SOEs did not award a bonus during a 
specific financial year.  Table 26 lists the correlations coefficients between STIs and 
Company performance over the entire study period, while Figure 28 illustrates the 
relationship.  
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Table 26 Correlations: STIs and Company performance (2006 – 2014) 
  Turnover OP NP LR SR ROCE ROE IFWE 
STIs Pearson 
correlation 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
N 
0.60** 
 
0.01 
 
108 
0.35** 
 
0.00 
 
108 
0.23* 
 
0.02 
 
108 
-0.16 
 
0.11 
 
108 
0.01 
 
0.94 
 
108 
-0.18 
 
0.06 
 
108 
0.04 
 
0.65 
 
108 
0.49 
 
0.62 
 
108 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
The results show that there was a statistically significant weak to strong positive 
correlation between STIs and OP, and between STIs and NP, ሺ 𝑟ை௣௘௥௔௧௜௡௚ ௉௥௢௙௜௧ ൌ
0.35, 𝑝 ൌ 0.00;  𝑟ே௘௧ ௉௥௢௙௜௧ ൌ 0.23, 𝑝 ൌ 0.02ሻ and a strong positive correlation 
between STIs and Turnover (𝑟 ௨௥௡௢௩௘௥ ൌ 0.60, 𝑝 ൌ 0.01ሻ. 
Figure 28 Correlation between STIs and Company performance 
 
 
5.6.3 Relationship between Total remuneration and Company performance 
The regression model included 142 unbalanced panel observations and 18 cross-
sectional units over a period of nine years.  Five iterations were run to determine 
0.60
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the optimum final regression model for Total remuneration.  Refer to Annexure E.2 
for the different iterations.  Regarding Total remuneration, Model 5 was regarded as 
the optimum model, as discussed in subsequent paragraphs.  The results of each 
individual regression model are summarised and presented in Table 27 (with the t-
statistics in parentheses). 
Table 27 Regression: Total remuneration and Company performance 
Dependent variable: Total remuneration 
Models 1 2 3 4 5
Constant 4 734 563.00 
(6.00) 
4 545 667.00 
(6.86)
4 536 532.00 
(6.93)
4 436 095.00 
(6.88)  
4 647 930.00 
(7.55)
AR (1) 0.74 
(12.70) 
0.73 
(12.60)
0.73 
(12.64)
0.74 
(13.00) 
0.75 
(14.16)
Turnover 113 000.00 
(0.67) 
121 000.00 
(0.74)
122 000.00 
(1.64)
121 000.00 
(1.65) 
OP 0.000270* 
(3.11) 
0.000267*
(3.10)
0.000267*
(3.12)
0.000273* 
(3.22) 
0.000293*
(3.67)
NP -0.000184* 
(-3.38) 
-0.000181*
(-3.35)
-0.000181*
(-3.36)
-0.000184* 
(-3.45) 
-0.000191*
(-3.68)
LR 167 115.50 
(1.37) 
145 303.30 
(1.30)
144 970.80 
(1.30)
140 075.50 
(1.27) 
137 633.10 
(1.25)
SR -93 446.08 
(-0.44) 
 
ROCE -305 089.10 
(-1.11) 
-294 257.70 
(-1.08)
-294 233.80 
(-1.08)
-285 637.60 
(-1.06) 
-280 666.90 
(-1.05)
ROE 82 217.63 
(0.46) 
 
IFWE -0.000163 
(-1.14) 
-0.000169 
(-1.20)
-0.000170 
(-1.21)
-0.000170 
(-1.22) 
-0.000156 
(-1.14)
Dum_Qualified 
Audit opinion 
-457 843.30 
(-0.68) 
-464 156.30 
(-0.69)
-463 094.10 
(-0.69)
 
Dum_Emphasis 
of matter 
-302 816.00 
(-0.77) 
-300 267.4 
(-0.77)
-299 320.40 
(-0.77)
 
Dum_Disclaimer -212 477.00 
(-0.14) 
-183 179.90 
(-0.12)
 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
21.14 
(0.00) 
25.64
(0.00)
28.70
(0.00)
37.15 
(0.00) 
43.41
(0.00)
DW stat 2.71 2.70 2.70 2.72 2.74
R2 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.65
Adjusted R2 0.631 0.636 0.638 0.642 0.642
Note: (i) Coefficients reported with t-statistics in parenthesis; and (ii) Unstandardized beta coefficients are 
presented 
     * Significance at the 5% level.  
 
Model 1, in Table 27, the baseline model, included all the Company performance 
components. As can be seen from Table 27, the DW test statistic was 2.74, 
indicating no serious serial correlation. 
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The last regression, Model 5, in Table 27, was regarded as the optimum model, as 
the F-test statistic increased to 43.41, indicating an optimal fit for the model.  Further 
reduction of independent variables resulted in a decrease in the F-statistic and 
adjusted R2 value. The optimum model also explained 64% (adjusted R2 = 0.64) of 
the variance in Total remuneration.  The adjusted R2 is slightly higher than that of 
Model 1 (0.63). 
 
The findings from Model 5 indicate that there is a relationship between Total 
remuneration and each of the following components: OP, NP, LR, ROCE, and IFWE 
in South African SOEs. However, the p-values of OP and NP were below the 
significance level of 5% (p < 0.05), suggesting a stronger relationship between Total 
remuneration and these two performance variables than the relationship between 
Total remuneration with LR, ROCE, and IFWE respectively.  
 
The results from Model 5 show that Total remuneration had a: (a) statistically 
significant positive relationship with OP, (b) a statistically significant negative 
relationship with NP, (c) a positive, non-statistically significant relationship with LR 
and ROCE, and (d) a negative, non-statistically significant relationship with IFWE.  
 
5.6.4 Correlation between CEO remuneration components and AO 
The correlation between AO (an ordinal variable that can assume the values of 0 to 
4) and CEO remuneration was analysed by calculating non-parametric correlation 
coefficients.  
 
To address Research Question 1, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
analysis was performed to test the strength and statistical significance of the 
relationship between CEO remuneration components and AO.  Table 28 lists the 
correlations between CEO remuneration and AO for the period 2006 to 2014. 
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Table 28 Correlation: CEO remuneration and AO  
  STIs Fixed pay Total 
remuneration
AO Correlation 
coefficient 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-0.30* 
 
0.00 
162 
-0.18** 
 
0.02 
162 
-0.27* 
 
0.00 
161 
         **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
The higher the level of AO is, the poorer the AO is.  The results showed a statistically 
significant moderate weak to negligible, negative relationship between the CEO 
remuneration components and AO (𝑟஼ாை ௌ்ூ ൌ  െ0.30, 𝑝 ൌ 0.00;  𝑟஼ாை ௙௜௫௘ௗ ௦௔௟௔௥௬ ൌ
 െ0.18, 𝑝 ൌ 0.02; 𝑟஼ாை ௧௢௧௔௟ ௥௘௠௨௡௘௥௔௧௜௢௡ ൌ െ0.27, 𝑝 ൌ 0.00ሻ.  In fact, the relationship 
with Fixed pay was found to be negligible.  This means that poor AOs were 
associated with low Fixed pay, STIs, and Total remuneration.  These results indicate 
that (a) STIs moderately decreased, (b) Fixed pay negligibly decreased, and (c) 
Total remuneration moderately decreased with an increase in AO. 
 
5.7   RESULTS OF RESEARCH QUESTION 2 
The second research question sought to determine whether the relationship 
between the CEO remuneration components and Company performance 
strengthened over the nine-year period. The nonparametric Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient was therefore used to test whether there was a correlation 
between each of the three CEO remuneration components and Company 
performance.  The correlation coefficients per year were used to chart the trend over 
the nine-year period.  
 
The expectation was that the relationship would have strengthened, based on 
increased regulations and monitoring of SOEs, such as the Companies Act (2008) 
and King III, which require CEO remuneration to be linked to some form of 
organisational performance.  However, the poor performance of SOEs, as widely 
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mentioned in the media (for example, Donnelly 2015), could negate this 
expectation.  The results are briefly discussed below. 
 
5.7.1 Strength of relationship between Fixed pay and Company 
performance  
Table 29 provides the correlation coefficients (𝒓𝒔) for the relationship between Fixed 
pay and all the components of Company performance per year.   
Table 29 Correlation: Fixed pay and Company performance (n = 18 per year)  
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Turnover 0.63** 0.51* 0.51* 0.77** 0.71** 0.51* 0.64** 0.65** 0.74** 
OP 0.43 0.45 0.28 0.28 0.55* 0.44 0.58* 0.10 0.72** 
NP 0.41 0.37 0.17 -0.19 0.29 0.34 0.49* -0.23 0.66** 
LR -0.26 -0.34 -0.17 -0.14 -0.23 -0.16 0.09 -0.55* -0.41 
SR -0.22 -0.26 -0.15 -0.11 -0.07 -0.04 -0.00 -0.38 -0.23 
ROCE -0.26 -0.01 -0.35 -0.27 -0.17 0.04 -0.34 -0.50* 0.19 
ROE 0.36 -0.43 -0.34 -0.20 0.12 -0.12 -0.00 -0.20 0.14 
IFWE 0.53* -0.02 -0.00 -0.18 0.07 0.14 0.17 -0.23 -0.18 
** p < .01 (2-tailed) 
* p < 0.05 (2 tailed) 
 
From Table 29, it is clear that there was a strong to very strong, statistically 
significant positive relationship between Fixed pay and Turnover (𝑟ଶ଴଴଺ ൌ 0.63, 𝑝 ൌ
0.00; 𝑟ଶ଴଴଻ ൌ 0.51, 𝑝 ൌ 0.03ሻ; 𝑟ଶ଴଴଼ ൌ 0.51, 𝑝 ൌ 0.03; 𝑟ଶ଴଴ଽ ൌ 0.77, 𝑝 ൌ 0.00, 𝑟ଶ଴ଵ଴ ൌ
0.71, 𝑝 ൌ 0.00, 𝑟ଶ଴ଵଵ ൌ 0.51, 𝑝 ൌ 0.03;   𝑟ଶ଴ଵଶ ൌ 0.64, 𝑝 ൌ 0.00, ; ൌ 0.651, 𝑝 ൌ
0.00; 𝑟ଶ଴ଵସ ൌ 0.74, 𝑝 ൌ 0.00ሻ.  Most of the other components showed differing 
degrees of correlation over time.  In some cases, the correlation was stronger, and, 
in other cases, there was almost no or a negligible relationship.  While ROE showed 
a weak positive correlation with Fixed pay (with no significance), ROE showed a 
declining relationship with Fixed pay during the period under study. Figure 29 shows 
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the strength of the relationship between Fixed pay and statistically significant 
components of Company performance from 2006 to 2014.  
Figure 29 Fixed pay and Company performance 
 
Figure 29 illustrates that the relationship did not strengthen over this period, but that 
it did fluctuate.  The results in Figure 29 further show mostly a positive relationship 
throughout the period between Fixed pay and Turnover.  The relationship with the 
other components of Company performance seemed to fluctuate between positive 
and negative throughout the study period. The figure further shows mostly a 
negative relationship between Fixed pay and ROCE during the study period, except 
for the years 2011 and 2014.  It was noted that there was a sharp decline in the 
strength of the relationship between Fixed pay and NP during 2009 (during the 
financial crisis), and an upward movement in the strength of the relationship 
between Fixed pay and almost all of the Company performance components during 
2014 (except with IFWE, which remained relatively stable).  
A sharp decline is evident in the strength of the linear relationship between Fixed 
pay and all the Company performance components during 2013 (except with 
Turnover). This suggests that the linear relationship between Fixed pay and 
Company performance was at its lowest during 2013.  A possible explanation for 
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this decline could be the fragility of the global economy, political uncertainty, and 
unemployment.  Another explanation could be the 16% decline of the rand’s value 
during 2013.  An upward movement in the strength of the linear relationship between 
Fixed pay and almost all the components of Company performance during 2014 is 
visible.  The most stable relationship was between Fixed pay and Turnover. 
 
5.7.2 Strength of the relationship between STIs and Company performance 
Table 30 provides the correlation coefficients (𝒓𝒔) for the relationship between STIs 
and all the components of Company performance per year.   
Table 30 Correlations — STIs and Company performance 
2006 
(n = 13) 
2007 
(n = 
15) 
2008 
(n = 12) 
2009 
(n = 
12)
2010 
(n = 
13)
2011 
(n = 
12)
2012 
(n = 
11) 
2013 
(n = 
10) 
2014 
(n = 
10)
Turnover 0.63* 0.77** 0.55 0.31 0.40 0.07 0.38 0.35 0.76*
OP 0.31 0.44 0.34 0.15 0.48 0.57 0.71* -0.28 0.82**
NP 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.05 0.43 0.48 0.58 -0.29 0.86** 
LR -0.62* -0.09 -0.18 0.04 -0.45 0.01 0.11 -0.19 -0.53 
SR -0.39 0.09 0.18 0.15 -0.48 0.34 0.36 -0.37 -0.19 
ROCE -0.10 -0.39 -0.40 -0.59* -0.14 0.42 -0.19 -0.70* 0.38
ROE 0.34 -0.64* -0.47 -0.64* 0.32 0.25 -0.13 -0.30 0.42
IFWE -0.21 -0.15 -0.41 -0.27 0.05 -0.39 0.14 -0.48 0.18 
** p < .01 (2-tailed) 
* p < 0.05 (2 tailed) 
 
 
The results show that there was a statistically significant strong or very strong 
positive correlation between STIs and the following components of Company 
performance: Turnover, OP, and NP in a number of years ൫𝑟 ௨௥௡௢௩௘௥మబబల ൌ 0.63, 𝑝 ൌ
0.02; 𝑟ை௣௘௥௔௧௜௡௚ ௉௥௢௙௜௧మబభమ ൌ 0.71, 𝑝 ൌ 0.01;  𝑟 ௨௥௡௢௩௘௥మబభర ൌ 0.79, 𝑝 ൌ
0.01; 𝑟ே௘௧ ௉௥௢௙௜௧మబభర ൌ 0.86, 𝑝 ൌ 0.00൯. The results further show a strong statistically 
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negative relationship between STIs and the following Company performance 
components: LR, ROCE, and ROE in a number of years (𝑟௅௜௤௨௜ௗ௜௧௬మబబల ൌ െ0.62, 𝑝 ൌ
0.02;   𝑟ோைா_ଶ଴଴଻ ൌ െ0.64, 𝑝 ൌ 0.01; 𝑟ோை஼ாమబబవ ൌ െ0.59, 𝑝 ൌ 0.01; 𝑟ோைாమబబవ ൌ
െ0.64; 𝑝 ൌ 0.02ሻ. 
 
Figure 30 shows the trend of the relationship between STIs and the components of 
Company performance for the period 2006 to 2014. This figure shows unstable 
linear relationships between STIs and Company performance components, and that 
the trends are not consistent across the nine-year period. 
Figure 30 STIs and Company performance components 
 
Figure 30 shows that the components of Company performance did not show a 
consistent, positive trend across the nine-year period, casting doubt on whether a 
range of performance targets were used to determine STIs for the CEOs.  It is clear 
from the above figure that there is an unstable linear relationship between STIs and 
Company performance. This result may suggest that STIs were determined 
independently from company performance in the SOEs under study. The unstable 
linear relationship between STIs and Company performance could be cause for 
concern, as will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.   
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5.7.3 Strength of the relationship between Total remuneration and 
Company performance  
Table 31 provides the Spearman correlation coefficients and their associated p-
values for the relationship between Total remuneration and Company performance 
components. 
 
The results in Table 31 indicate that there was very strong statistically significant 
positive relationship between Total remuneration and Turnover for the years 2006, 
2008, and 2009, and for the period 2011 to 2014 (𝑟ଶ଴଴଺ ൌ 0.72; ൌ 0.70; 𝑟ଶ଴଴଼ ൌ
0.79; 𝑟ଶ଴଴ଽ ൌ 0.74;  𝑟ଶ଴ଵଵ ൌ 0.71; 𝑟ଶ଴ଵଶ ൌ 0.73; 𝑟ଶ଴ଵଷ ൌ 0.76; 𝑟ଶ଴ଵସ ൌ 0.74).  This 
suggests that, as Turnover increased, Total remuneration increased, and vice 
versa.  However, 2010 was an exception, where the relationship was strong 
(𝑅ଶ଴ଵ଴ ൌ 0.50ሻ.  Most of the other components of Company performance showed 
different levels of correlation over time, in some cases stronger, and in others 
weaker.   
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Table 31 Correlations — Total remuneration and Company performance components 
  2006 
(n = 13) 
2007 
(n = 15) 
2008 
(n = 12) 
2009 
(n = 12) 
2010 
(n = 13) 
2011 
(n = 12) 
2012 
(n = 11) 
2013 
(n = 10) 
2014 
(n = 10) 
Turnover 0.72** 0.70** 0.79** 0.74** 0.50* 0.71** 0.73** 0.76** 0.74** 
OP 0.46 0.36 0.21 0.20 0.66** 0.66** 0.75** 0.26 0.79** 
NP 0.53* 0.29 0.32 0.24 0.59** 0.58** 0.53* 0.14 0.69** 
LR -0.52* -0.17 0.05 0.03 -0.39 -0.33 -0.28 -0.63** -0.11 
SR -0.22 -0.03 0.25 0.34 0.06 0.10 0.29 -0.30 -0.11 
ROCE 0.01 -0.10 -0.32 -0.44 -0.13 -0.00 0.21 -0.11 0.39 
ROE 0.31 -0.53* -0.31 -0.31 0.29 -0.06 0.07 -0.24 0.07 
IFWE 0.01 -0.20 -0.19 -0.21 -0.14 -0.23 0.20 -0.13 -0.12 
** p < .01 (2-tailed) 
* p < 0.05 (2 tailed) 
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Figure 31 illustrates the strength of the relationship between Total remuneration and 
Company performance components from 2006 to 2014. 
 
Figure 31 Total remuneration and Company performance components 
 
Figure 31 illustrates a fluctuation in the strength of the linear relationship between 
Total remuneration and the components of Company performance.  In the case of 
ROE, it was noted that there was a sharp downward trend in the strength of the 
linear relationship during 2007. During the 2007/2008 financial year, ROE 
experienced a negative growth of 28%, while, at the same time, Total remuneration 
increased by 27%.  Similarly, concurrent with a negative growth of 43% in ROCE 
from 2007 to 2009, Total remuneration increased by 44% during the same period.  
As with Fixed pay, there is again a sharp downward trend in the strength of the 
linear relationship between Total remuneration and the components of Company 
performance during 2013, and an upward trend in the strength of this relationship 
during 2014. Once again, Turnover showed the most stable trend with regard to the 
strength of the relationship.  
Because AO was an ordinal variable, the statistical analysis to determine the 
relationship between CEO remuneration components and AO was run separately 
from those for the other Company performance components. 
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5.7.4 Relationship between CEO remuneration components and AO 
The nonparametric Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was used to test 
whether there was a correlation between each of the three CEO remuneration 
components and AO over the nine-year period.  Once again, correlation coefficients 
were used to chart the trend over the nine-year period.  Table 32 shows the results 
for the period for the 18 SOEs. 
Table 32 Correlation — CEO remuneration components and AO 
          Fixed pay STIs Total remuneration 
2006 -0.36 -0.10 -0.39 
2007 -0.10 -0.33 -0.16 
2008 -0.17 -0.15 -0.02 
2009 -0.11 -0.29 -0.23 
2010 -0.25 -0.26 -0.34 
2011 -0.13 -0.24 -0.24 
2012 -0.35 -0.11 -0.52* 
2013 -0.34 -0.32 -0.33 
2014 -0.55* -0.42 -0.55* 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
The results showed that there was a statistically significant strong, negative 
relationship between Fixed pay and Total remuneration with AO in some years 
(𝑟஼ாை ௧௢௧௔௟ ௥௘௠௨௡௘௥௔௧௜௢௡_ଶ଴ଵଶ ൌ  െ0.52, 𝑝 ൌ 0.03;  𝑟஼ாை ௙௜௫௘ௗ ௦௔௟௔௥௬ଶ మబభర ൌ  െ0.55, 𝑝 ൌ
0.02; 𝑟஼ாை ௧௢௧௔௟ ௥௘௠௨௡௘௥௔௧௜௢௡ଶ଴ଵସ ൌ െ0.55, 𝑝 ൌ 0.02ሻ.  Throughout the nine years, there 
were differing degrees of correlation.  In some cases, the correlation was stronger, 
and in other cases there was almost no or a negligible relationship.  This means 
that poor AOs were associated with low Fixed pay and Total remuneration.  The 
results indicated no statistically significant relationship between STIs and AO over 
the study period.  Figure 32 shows the strength of the relationship between CEO 
remuneration components and AO for the period 2006 to 2014. 
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Figure 32 Correlation between CEO remuneration components and AO 
 
Figure 32 shows an unstable linear relationship between the components of CEO 
remuneration and AO.  The figure further shows that there is no consistent positive 
trend across the nine-year period. This result may suggest that the CEOs’ 
remuneration is determined without considering the AO.  It is further clear that the 
relationships of Fixed pay and Total remuneration with AO declined from 2011, 
although the relationship of Total remuneration showed an improvement during the 
2012/2013 financial year. 
 
5.8   RESULTS OF RESEARCH QUESTION 3 
The third research question aimed to determine the relationship between the 
components of CEO remuneration — Fixed pay, STIs, and Total remuneration — 
and components of Organisational performance for the periods 2006 to 2010 and 
2011 to 2014.  This was done to determine the potential effect of the financial crisis 
on CEO remuneration, and whether an increase in any of the CEO remuneration 
components, if any, was related to any of the components of Company 
performance.  The years 2006 to 2007 were prior to the financial crisis.  The years 
2008 to 2009 can be considered the height of the financial crisis years, and the 
period 2010 to 2014 can be considered the aftermath (although, in 2011, the global 
economy felt the effects of the stock market fall). 
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According to Van Veen (2014), the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission of the 
United States government, in their report, stated that the biggest turmoil in the 
financial markets started mid-2007 and ended at the beginning of 2009.  However, 
the effects of the crisis took a few months to spread to South Africa.  The effects of 
the financial crisis hit South Africa around June or July 2008, when the JSE 
devalued almost 20% in three months and, in the same period, the rand depreciated 
by 37% against the US dollar (Viegi 2008).  Although the effects of the crisis eased 
in the following two years, 2009 and 2010, the consequences of the global financial 
collapse were still noticeable. 
 
Once again, OLS multiple regression models were conducted on the relationship of 
the components of Company performance with Fixed pay and Total remuneration 
respectively.  In all the models, the panel data analysis was run with Fixed pay and 
Total remuneration as the dependent variables, and the components of Company 
performance as the independent variables.  Pearson’s product-moment correlation 
coefficient analysis was performed to test whether there was a statistically 
significant correlation between STIs and the components of Company performance.  
As previously indicated, because a third of the SOEs had declared zero bonuses, it 
was not possible to make use of regression analysis in respect of STIs.  
 
5.8.1 Relationship between Fixed pay and Company performance 
components for the periods 2006 to 2010 and 2011 to 2014 
The regression model included 72 balanced panel observations and 18 cross-
sectional units over a period of five years, due to the inclusion of the AR(1) term.  
All the Company performance components were used in Regression 1, the baseline 
model.  Various iterations were run to determine the optimum final regression model 
for the period 2006 to 2010 (refer to Annexure E.3 for the different iterations).  Model 
8 was regarded as the optimum model, as will be discussed in subsequent 
paragraphs.  The results of each individual regression model are presented in Table 
33 (with the t-statistics in parentheses). 
 
The DW test was used to detect autocorrelation.  As can be seen in Table 33, the 
DW was 2.6, indicating no serious autocorrelation. The last regression, Model 8, 
was regarded as the optimum model, as the F-test statistic increased to 46.68, 
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indicating an optimal fit for the model.  Further reduction of independent variables 
resulted in a decrease in the F-statistic and adjusted R2 value. The optimum model 
explained 57% (adjusted R2 = 0.57) of the variance in Fixed pay. The adjusted R2 
was higher than that of Model 1 (0.53), and the increase in the adjusted R2 showed 
that this variable was the only independent variable included among the variables 
considered, and that it is statistically significant in predicting Fixed pay for the period 
2006 to 2010.  The increase in the adjusted R2 showed that the model that included 
Turnover explained a higher amount of variation than the model that included all the 
components of Company performance.  
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Table 33 Regression — Fixed pay and Company performance components (2006 to 2010) 
                                                        Dependent variable: Fixed pay  
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Constant 2 478 817.00 
(6.88) 
2 476 152.00 
(7.02)
2 476 627.00 
(7.04)
2 490 376.00
(7.31)
2 496 220.00 
(7.41) 
2 501 185.00 
(7.40)
2 416 219.00 
(9.38)
2 454 341.00
(8.90)
AR(1) 0.54 
(5.07) 
0.54 
(5.13)
0.54 
(5.24)
0.54
(5.30)
0.54 
(5.32) 
0.54 
(5.40)
0.55 
(5.54)
0.58
(6.11)
Turnover 353 000.00* 
(2.65) 
353 000.00*
(2.67)
353 000.00*
(2.70)
352 000.00*
(2.72)
359 000.00* 
(2.87) 
318 000.00*
(3.48))
379 000.00*
(3.46)
361 000.00*
(3.19)
OP 301 000.00 
(0.40) 
 
306 000.00 
(0.41)
290 000.00 
(0.40)
295 000.00
(0.41)
166 000.00 
(0.38) 
NP -8 880 000.00 
(-0.22) 
-9 150 000.00 
(-0.23)
-8 700 000.00 
(-0.22)
-8 900 000.00
(-0.23)
 
LR -4 755.16.00 
(-0.22) 
 
SR -38 462.60 
(-0.32) 
-29 531.79 
(-0.40)
-41 288.12 
(-0.40)
-43 042.58
(-0.43)
-44 364.28 
(-0.44) 
-40 497.54 
(-0.41)
ROCE -30 123.22 
(-0.10) 
-29 531.79 
(-0.10)
 
ROE -227 824.40 
(-0.79) 
-226 683.70 
(-0.79)
-226 046.00 
(-0.80)
-225 606.10
(-0.80)
-243 348.00 
(-0.81) 
-209 075.00 
(-0.83)
-205 925.40 
(-0.82)
IFWE 0.00 
(0.18) 
0.00 
(0.18)
0.00 
(0.17)
 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
9.98 
(0.00) 
11.41
(0.00)
13.25
(0.00)
15.68
(0.00)
19.08 
(0.00) 
24.13
(0.00)
32.51 
(0.00)
48.68
(0.00)
DW stat 2.61 2.61 2.62 2.63 2.64 2.62 2.63 2.64
R2 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57
Inverted AR 
roots 
0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.58
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Table 34, below, provides a summary of the results of the regression analysis of the 
relationship between Fixed pay and the components of Company performance for 
the period 2011 to 2014. The regression model included 70 balanced panel 
observations and 18 cross-sectional units over a period of four years.  Once again, 
all the components of Company performance were included in the first regression 
model. Six various regression iterations were run to determine the optimum final 
regression model. Refer to Annexure E.4 for the different regression iterations.  
Model 6 was regarded as the optimum model, as will be discussed in subsequent 
paragraphs.  As can be seen from Table 34, the DW was 3, still indicating no serious 
autocorrelation. 
 
Table 34 Regression — Fixed pay and Company performance components (2011 
to 2014) 
Dependent variable: Fixed pay 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 2 
539 841.00 
(4.53) 
2 
549 470.00 
(4.66)
2 447 136.00 
(5.05) 
2 511 930.00 
(5.25) 
2 
520 434.00 
(5.32) 
2 
557 187.00 
(5.47)
AR (1) 0.64 
(2.98) 
0.64 
(6.06) 
0.65 
(6.26) 
0.66 
(6.69) 
0.67 
(6.85) 
0.67 
(6.85) 
Turnover 320 000.00* 
(3.08) 
319 000.00* 
(3.11) 
323 000.00* 
(3.16) 
351 000.00* 
(3.75) 
345 000.00* 
(3.81) 
346 000.00* 
(3.85) 
OP 981 000.00 
(0.68) 
976 000.00 
(0.68) 
928 000.00 
(0.66) 
   
NP -0.000123 
(-0.72) 
-0.000123 
(-0.72) 
-0.000120 
(-0.71) 
-1.24 
(-0.29) 
  
LR 21 575.90 
(1.55) 
215 090.90 
(1.56) 
188 999.70 
(1.64) 
178 166.90 
(1.59) 
176 583.90 
(1.60) 
17 3260.10 
(1.57) 
SR -67 223.29 
(-0.36) 
-68 709.25 
(-0.38) 
    
ROCE 118 507.70 
(0.69) 
117 255.30 
(0.69) 
119 753.00 
(0.72) 
113 021.70 
(0.68) 
112 537.30 
(0.69) 
 
ROE -18 732.71 
(-0.12) 
     
IFWE -0.000138 
(-1.08) 
-0.000139 
(-1.10) 
-0.000147 
(-1.21) 
-0.000167 
(-1.46) 
-0.000165 
(-1.45) 
-0.000171 
(-1.51) 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
12.38 
(0.00) 
14.25 
(0.00) 
16.59 
(0.00) 
19.52 
(0.00) 
23.87 
(0.00) 
30.06 
(0.00) 
DW stat 2.91 2.92 2.93 2.99 3.03 3.00 
R2 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.71 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.66 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 
  Note: (i) Coefficients reported with t-statistics in parenthesis; and (ii) Unstandardized beta coefficients are       
presented     * indicates significance at the 5% level.  
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Model 6, shown in Table 34, above, was regarded as the optimum model, due do 
the increase in the F-statistic to 30.06, in conjunction with an improvement of the 
adjusted R2 value (0.69).  Further reduction of the independent variables resulted in 
a decrease in the F-statistic and the adjusted R2 value. The optimum model 
indicated that 69% of the variance in Fixed pay for the period 2011 to 2014 was 
explained by Turnover, LR, and IFWE.  The increase in the adjusted R2 indicated 
that these variables were the optimal set of independent variables in predicting 
Fixed pay for the period 2011 to 2014.  
 
5.8.2 Relationship between STIs and Company performance components 
for the periods 2006 to 2010 and 2011 to 2014 
The correlations of STIs with the components of Company performance for the 
entire period were provided in Table 30, Section 5.5.2. The researcher used the 
same correlations to discuss Research Sub-question 3.2, which refers to the 
periods 2006 to 2010 and 2011 to 2014 (before and after the financial crisis). From 
Table 30, it is clear that there was a moderate to strong statistically significant 
positive relationship between STIs and Turnover ሺ𝑟 ௨௥௡௢௩௘௥మబబల ൌ 0.63, 𝑝 ൌ
0.02; 𝑟 ௨௥௡௢௩௘௥మబబళ ൌ 0.77, 𝑝 ൌ 0.01. Further, it is clear that there was a moderate, 
statistically negative relationship between STIs and LR, ROE, and ROCE 
(𝑟௅௜௤௨௜ௗ௜௧௬మబబల ൌ െ0.62, 𝑝 ൌ 0.02;  𝑟ோைாమబబళ ൌ െ0.64, 𝑝 ൌ 0.01; 𝑟ோை஼ாమబబవ ൌ െ0.59, 𝑝 ൌ
0.01; 𝑟ோைாమబబవ ൌ െ0.64; 𝑝 ൌ 0.02 for the period 2006 to 2010. 
 
For the period 2011 to 2014, there were strong to very strong statistically significant 
positive relationships between STIs and the Company performance components 
Turnover, OP, and NP ൫𝑟 ௨௥௡௢௩௘௥మబభర ൌ 0.79, 𝑝 ൌ 0.01; 𝑟ை௣௘௥௔௧௜௡௚ ௉௥௢௙௜௧మబభమ ൌ
0.71, 𝑝 ൌ 0.01;   𝑟ை௣௘௥௔௧௜௡௚ ௉௥௢௙௜௧మబభర ൌ 0.82, 𝑝 ൌ 0.00; 𝑟ே௘௧ ௉௥௢௙௜௧మబభర ൌ 0.86, 𝑝 ൌ 0.00൯.  
During the same period, there was a very strong, statistically negative relationship 
between STIs and ROCE (𝑟ோை஼ா మబభయ ൌ െ0.70, 𝑝 ൌ 0.03ሻ.   Interestingly, there was 
no statistically significant relationship between STIs and any of the components of 
Company performance in the period 2010 to 2011. 
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5.8.3 Relationship between Total remuneration and Company performance 
components for the periods 2006 to 2010 and 2011 to 2014 
The regression model included 70 balanced panel observations and 18 cross-
sectional units over a period of five years.  Six iterations were run to determine the 
optimum final regression model for Total remuneration. Refer to Annexure E.5 for 
the different iterations. The results of each individual regression model for the period 
2006 to 2010 are summarised and presented in Table 35, below, (with the t-statistics 
in parentheses).  All the company performance measures were used in Regression 
1, the baseline model.  
Table 35 Regression — Total remuneration and Company performance 
components (2006 to 2010) 
        Dependent variable: Total remuneration 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 4 537 979.00 
(3.96) 
4 357 463.00 
(4.59)
4 245 834.00 
(4.75)
4 213 653.00
(4.89)
3 954 614.00 
(5.60) 
4 247 169.00 
(6.99)
AR (1) 0.73 
(7.63) 
0.73 
(8.27)
0.73 
(8.22)
0.72
(8.04)
0.69 
(7.90) 
0.68 
(7.71)
Turnover -250 000.00 
(-0.75) 
-249 000.00 
(-0.76)
-226 000.00 
(-0.71)
-221 000.00
(-0.70)
 
OP 0.000414* 
(2.56) 
0.000409*
(2.61)
0.000405*
(2.60)
0.000421*
(2.80)
0.000383* 
(2.73) 
0.000361*
(2.62)
NP -0.000205* 
(-2.33) 
-0.000204*
(-2.55)
-0.000201*
(-2.53)
-0.000204*
(-2.59)
-0.000188* 
(-2.47) 
-0.000175*
(-2.33)
LR 171 366.60 
(0.96) 
149 619.70 
(0.92)
149 407.10 
(0.93)
148 583.40 
(0.93)
143 712.50 
(0.92) 
SR -96 199.69 
(-0.35) 
 
ROCE 299 364.00 
(0.56) 
310 308.00 
(0.59)
273 949 
(0.53)
 
ROE -13 464.73 
(-0.03) 
 
IFWE -0.001082 
(-0.54) 
-0.001953 
(-0.52)
 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
10.48 
(0.00) 
13.87
(0.00)
16.33
(0.00)
19.76
(0.00)
24.80 
(0.00) 
32.87
(0.00)
DW stat 2.51 2.50 2.46 2.46 2.47 2.46
R2 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60
Adjusted 
R2 
0.55 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.58
Inverted AR 
roots 
0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.69 0.68
Note: (i) Coefficients reported with t-statistics in parenthesis; and (ii) Unstandardized beta coefficients are 
presented 
* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
The last regression model (Model 6), shown in Table 35, was regarded as the 
optimum model, as the F-statistic increased to 32.87, in conjunction with an 
improvement of the adjusted R2 value. Further reduction of the independent 
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variables resulted in a decrease in the F-statistic and the adjusted R2 value. The 
optimum model indicated that 58% (adjusted R2 = 0.58) of the variance in Total 
remuneration was explained by OP and NP.  The results clearly showed that there 
is a strong positive relationship between Total remuneration and OP, and a strong 
negative relationship between Total remuneration and NP for the period 2006 to 
2010. Both these Company performance components showed a statistically 
significant relationship.  
 
Table 36 provides the results of the regression analysis for the period 2011 to 2014.  
The regression model included 53 unbalanced panel observations and 18 cross-
sectional units over a period of four years.  Various iterations were run to determine 
the optimum final regression model. Refer to Annexure E.6 for the different 
iterations. The results of each individual regression model for the period 2006 to 
2010 are summarised and presented in Table 36, below (with the t-statistics in 
parentheses). All the Company performance components were used in Regression 
1, the baseline model.  As can be seen in Table 36, the DW test statistic was 
relatively far above the threshold of 2.5, i.e. between 3.39 and 3.41, indicating 
negative serial correlation. 
Table 36 Regression — Total remuneration and Company performance 
components (2011 to 2014) 
Dependable variable: Total remuneration 
Models 1 2 3 4 
Constant 5 615 339.00 
(3.45)
5 533 097.00 
(3.57)
5 366 363.00 
(3.82) 
6 068 994.00
(5.60)
AR(1) 0.76 
(7.52)
0.76 
(7.58)
0.76 
(8.00) 
0.77
(9.04)
Turnover 112 000.00 
(0.40)
154 000.00 
(0.58)
153 000.00 
(0.58) 
OP 490 000.00 
(0.15)
 
NP 662 000.00 
(0.02)
 
LR 195 518.40 
(0.67)
180 448.90 
(0.64)
141 505.10 
(0.59) 
SR -152 083.70 
(-0.36)
-108 479.40 
(-0.26)
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Dependable variable: Total remuneration 
Models 1 2 3 4 
ROCE -625 030.20 
(-1.68)
-619 048.30 
(-1.69)
-614 510.10 
(-1.71) 
-616 921.10
(-1.74)
ROE 289 099.10 
(0.94)
323 082.40 
(1.08)
316 546.90 
(1.07) 
333 883.70
(1.17)
IFWE -0.000426*
(-1.66)
-0.000449*
(-1.83)
-0.000460* 
(-1.93) 
-0.000478*
(-2.06)
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
9.97
(0.00)
13.21
(0.00)
15.71 
(0.00) 
24.13
(0.00)
DW stat 3.39 3.38 3.34 3.41
R2 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64
Inverted AR roots 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.77
           Note: (i) Coefficients reported with t-statistics in parenthesis; and (ii) Unstandardized beta coefficients are presented 
           * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
The last regression model, Model 4, shown in Table 36, was regarded as the 
optimum model, as the F-statistic increased to 24.13, in conjunction with an 
improvement of the adjusted R2 value. Further reduction of the independent 
variables resulted in a decrease in the F-statistic and the adjusted R2 value. The 
optimum model indicated that 64% of the variance in Total remuneration for the 
period 2011 to 2014 was explained by ROCE, ROE, and IFWE.  This suggests that 
ROCE, ROE, and IFWE constituted the best set of independent variables for 
predicting Total remuneration for the period 2011 to 2014.  However, only the p-
value of IFWE was statistically significant (p < 0.05), and was negative, suggesting 
a stronger relationship between Total remuneration and this variable for the period 
2011 to 2014.  
 
5.9   RESULTS OF RESEARCH QUESTION 4 
Research Question 4 aimed to determine whether the relationship between the 
components of CEO remuneration and the components of Company performance 
in the optimal model would change if the demographic variables of the CEOs were 
included. The demographic variables investigated were: Age, Education, Race, 
Tenure, and Gender.  To answer the research question, the analysis of the data for 
Fixed pay and Total remuneration was conducted, using pooled OLS regression.  
 
The following applied to all the regressions: Firstly, the actual age of the CEO was 
used.  Secondly, dummy variables were introduced for Race and Education.  As 
Chapter 5: Research results 
 
231 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
there were four categories of Race and of Education (k = 4), Race and Education 
had to be represented with three dummy variables (k-1 = 3).  White was used as a 
reference category.  The following therefore applied in terms of race: 
 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒1 ൌ 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒2 ൌ 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒3 ൌ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 
 
With regard to education, Bachelor’s degree was used as a reference category.  The 
following applied in terms of education: 
 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙2஽௨௠ ൌ 𝐻𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙3஽௨௠ ൌ 𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟ᇱ𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙4஽௨௠ ൌ 𝐷𝑜𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 
In order to determine the relationship between STIs and CEO demographic 
variables, the mean of STIs per demographic category was used for the nine-year 
period. 
 
5.9.1 Relationship between Fixed pay and CEO demographic variables 
The first multiple regression performed (baseline model) was run with the Company 
performance components that were found to have an effect on Fixed pay.  Thus, 
the optimum model, presented in Table 25, where Turnover, NP, and IFWE (as 
independent variables) had an influence on Fixed pay was used as a baseline 
model.  The regression model included 144 balanced panel observations and 18 
cross-sectional units over a period of nine years, due to the inclusion of the AR(1) 
term.  Three different iterations were run to determine the optimum final regression 
model.  Refer to Annexure E.7 for the different iterations. The results of each 
individual regression model are summarised and presented in Table 37, below.  As 
can be seen from Table 37, the DW test statistic was 2.6, indicating no serious serial 
correlation.  
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Table 37 Regression — Fixed pay and CEO demographic variables 
Dependable variable: Fixed pay 
Models 1 2 3
Constant 4 031 843.00
(2.30)
4 265 769.00 
(2.54)
4 446 008.00
(2.66)
AR (1) 0.87
(16.38)
0.87 
(17.19)
0.88
(18.18)
Turnover 142 000.00
(1.46)
131 000.00 
(1.42)
121 000.00
(1.31)
NP -534 000.00
(-4.25)
-537 000.00 
(-4.34)
-535 000.00
(-4.36)
IFWE -207 000.00
(-0.31)
Gender  -830 136.50*
(-3.70)
-824 878.40*
(-3.77)
-826 086.40*
(-3.79)
Age -12 215.48*
(-0.43)
-18 531.44*
(-0.78)
-18 614.95*
(-0.78)
Dummy race_Black African 1 049 664
(1.81)
113 0413 
(2.06)
109 2078
(2.03)
Dummy race_Coloured 1 582 107.00*
(2.21)
1 672 238.00*
(2.45)
1 638 475.00*
(2.43)
Dummy race_Indian 985 706.10
(0.39)
1 196 152 
(0.48)
Tenure  188 522.60*
(4.61)
189 360.30*
(4.81)
189 213.80*
(4.84)
Dummy education_Honours 
degree 
-940 228.40*
(-1.89)
-838 771.50*
(-2.38)
-869 831.60*
(-2.52)
Dummy-education_Master’s 
degree 
-361 900.60
(-1.42)
-329 068.20 
(-1.40)
-332 891.10
(-1.43)
Dummy education_Doctorate -291 791.30
(-0.37)
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
31.95
(0.00)
38.38
(0.00)
42.52
(0.00)
DW stat 2.64 2.63 2.65
R2 0.80 0.80 0.80
Adjusted R2 0.773 0.777 0.778
   Note: (i) Coefficients reported with t-statistics in parenthesis; and (ii) Unstandardized beta coefficients 
are      presented 
              * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
The last regression model, Model 3, presented in Table 37, was regarded as the 
optimum model, as the F-statistic increased to 42.52, in conjunction with an 
improvement of the adjusted R2 value. Further reduction of the independent 
variables resulted in a decrease in the F-statistic and the adjusted R2 value. The 
optimum model indicated that 78% (adjusted R2 = 0.78) of the variance in Fixed 
pay, over and above the Company performance components Turnover and NP, is 
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explained by Gender, Race (in terms of Coloured CEO), Tenure, Age, and 
Education (in terms of  Honours degree). The increase in the adjusted R2 value 
indicated that these variables were the optimal set of independent variables among 
the variables considered in predicting Fixed pay. Interestingly, including CEO 
demographic variables in the regression model led to IFWE no longer having an 
effect on Fixed pay. 
 
From these findings, it is clear there are relationships between Fixed pay and CEO 
demographic variables, i.e. Gender, Race, Tenure, Age, and Education.  The results 
imply that:  
 There is a statistically significant negative relationship between Fixed pay and 
Gender, at the 5% level of significance. This result suggests that male CEOs 
earn more than female CEOs. 
 There is a statistically significant negative relationship between Fixed pay and 
Education (with reference to CEOs with a bachelors’ degree), at the 5% level 
of significance. This suggests that CEOs with an honours degree earn less 
than CEOs with a bachelor’s degree.  
 There is a statistically significant negative relationship between Fixed pay and 
Age, at the 5% level of significance. This suggests that as CEOs gets older, 
the lower the fixed pay becomes. 
 There is statistically significant positive relationship between Fixed pay and 
Tenure. This suggests that as a CEO’s tenure increases, his or her fixed pay 
will increase accordingly. 
 There is a statistically significant positive relationship between Fixed pay and 
Race (with reference to Coloured CEOs).  The result suggests that Coloured 
CEOs earn more than white CEOs.  Although not statistically significant, the 
results also suggest that black African CEOs earn more than white CEOs. 
 
The results further suggest that the variables that have statistical significance (p < 
0.05) have a stronger relationship with Fixed pay than the other variables. 
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5.9.2 Relationship between STIs and CEO demographic variables 
The relationship between STIs and CEO demographic variables are discussed in 
the following paragraphs. 
5.9.2.1 Gender  
To answer the question whether there is relationship between STIs and Gender, a 
Mann-Whitney test (non-parametric method) to test for significant differences was 
used.  This method is appropriate when the sample is small, or if the data type is 
ordinal (Coast, Field, Cobb, & Scarborough 2016).  Table 38 shows the results for 
Gender. 
Table 38 Relationship between STIs and Gender 
           STIs 
Mann-Whitney U 171.50 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.82 
 
The Mann-Whitney test revealed no statistically significant difference between male 
and female CEOs with regard to STIs. 
 
5.9.2.2 Education 
To answer the question whether there is a relationship between STIs and Education, 
the Spearman rank order correlation test (non-parametric) was used.  Table 39 
shows the results. 
Table 39 Correlation — STIs and Education (n = 162) 
  Education STIs 
STIs Correlation coefficient 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
-0.16
0.40
1.00
             *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Based on the results, there was no statistically significant correlation between STIs 
and Education (𝑟௦ = -0.16, n = 162, p = 0.40).  This suggests that a change in the 
CEO’s education would not lead to an increase or decrease in his or her STIs. 
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5.9.2.3 Age and Tenure 
To answer the question whether STIs has a relationship with Age and Tenure 
respectively, a Pearson product moment correlation test (parametric test) was used.  
Table 40 shows the results.  
Table 40 Correlation — STIs, Age, and Tenure  
   STIs 
 
 
Age 
 
Tenure  
STIs Pearson correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
1 
 
162 
-0.01 
0.90 
139 
0.10* 
0.23 
162 
  *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
The results showed a weak positive correlation between STIs and Tenure (r = 0.10, 
n = 162, p < 0.23).  The results further indicated that there was almost no linear 
relationship between STIs and Age. 
 
5.9.2.4 Race 
To answer the question whether there is a relationship between STIs and Race an 
independent sample t-test was used to compare the mean scores of black African 
and white CEOs. There was not enough data on Indian (3.8%) and Coloured (8%) 
CEOs to perform the t-test. Table 41 shows the results. 
 
From the results of the independent-sample t-test it is clear that there was no 
significant difference in scores for black African (M = 1059062.51, SD = 1288167, 
24) and white CEOs (M = 1183810.35, SD = 1564098.66). There is therefore not a 
statistically difference in the mean STI scores for black African and white CEOs. 
Chapter 5: Research results 
 
236 
 
Table 41 Independent Sample t-test — STIs and Race 
 Levene’s 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variance 
  
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CEO STI Equal variance 
assumed 
3.81 0.53 -0.46 142 0.65 -124747.87 271246.46 -660950.86 411455.13
Equal variance 
not assumed 
 -0.41 43.72 0.68 -124747.87 302102.62 -733705.39 484209.65
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5.9.3 Relationship between Total remuneration and CEO demographic 
variables 
The baseline model was run with the Company performance components that were 
found to have an effect on Total remuneration, presented in Table 26, namely OP, 
NP, LR, ROCE, and IFWE (as independent variables).  Race and Education were 
introduced by means of dummy variables, where White and Bachelor’s degree were 
used as reference categories. The regression model included 142 unbalanced 
panel observations and 18 cross-sectional units over a period of nine years.  Three 
various iterations were run to determine the optimum final regression model.  Refer 
to Annexure E.8 for the different iterations.  The results of each individual regression 
model are summarised and presented in Table 42.  As can be seen from Table 42, 
the DW test statistic was 2.8, indicating no serious serial correlation. 
Table 42 Regression — Total remuneration and CEO demographic variables 
Dependable variable: Total remuneration 
Models 1 2 3 
Constant 3 989 296.00 
(1.02)
3 730 910.00
(3.38)
4 203 129.00 
(4.91)
AR (1) 0.79 
(13.03)
0.78
(14.60)
0.77 
(15.02)
OP 0.000303 
(3.40)
0.000303
(3.77)
0.000319 
(4.09)
NP -0.000197 
(-3.62)
-0.000198
(-3.91)
-0.000203 
(-4.07)
LR 168 311.70 
(1.10)
143 818.30
(1.34)
144 143.40 
(1.36)
IFWE -0.000134 
(-0.85)
-0.000158
(-1.17)
-0.000164 
(-1.22)
Age -24 293.21 
(-0.36)
Dummy race_Black 1 993 107.00 
(1.52)
819 211.10
(1.31)
565 025.30 
(1.10)
Dummy race_Coloured 1 921 269.00 
(1.16)
713 627.0
(0.72)
Dummy_Indian 1 975 257.00 
(0.53)
-364 665.30
(-0.25)
 
Dummy_education_Honours 
degree 
-525 595.90 
(-0.47)
-656 805.10
(-1.08)
-765 780.50 
(-1.39)
Dummy_education_Master’s 
degree 
-1 524 025.00*
(-2.41)
-1 003 480.00*
(-2.19)
-1 015 987.00*
(-2.24)
Dummy_education_Doctorate 164 361.20 
 (0.09)
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Dependable variable: Total remuneration 
Models 1 2 3 
Gender 256 702.70
(-0.36)
270 503.40
(0.57)
Tenure  224 415.10*
(2.41)
192 484.10*
(2.97)
182 116.60*
(2.95)
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
16.84
(0.00)
24.40
(0.00)
33.00
(0.00)
DW stat 2.86 2.79 2.79
R2 0.70 0.69 0.69
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.67 0.67
 Note: (i) Coefficients reported with t-statistics in parenthesis; and (ii) Unstandardized beta coefficients are 
presented      * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
Model 3, shown in Table 42, was regarded as the optimum model, as the F-statistic 
increased to 33.00, in conjunction with and improvement of the adjusted R2 value.  
The optimum model indicated that 67% (adjusted R2 = 0.67) of the variance in Total 
remuneration, in addition to OP, NP, LR, and IFWE, was explained by the CEO 
demographic variables Race, Education, and Tenure.  The increase in the adjusted 
R2 value indicated that these constituted the optimal set of independent variables 
among the variables considered in predicting Total remuneration.   
 
From these findings, it is clear that, in addition to the relationship between Total 
remuneration and OP, NP, LR, and IFWE, respectively, there is also a relationship 
between each of the variables Race, Tenure, and Education (respectively) and Total 
remuneration.  
 
With regard to the research question whether total remuneration is influenced by 
variables such as age, education, tenure, and race of the CEO, the results in Table 
42 indicate the following:  
 
 There is a statistically significant negative relationship between Total 
remuneration and Education (specifically with regard to a Master’s degree), at 
the 5% significance level.  There can be various explanations for this, which 
will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
 There is a statistically significant positive relationship between Total 
remuneration and Tenure, at the 5% significance level.  
Chapter 5: Research results 
 
239 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
 Although not statistically significant, black African CEOs earn more than white 
CEOs. 
 
The results further suggest that the variables that showed a statistical significance 
(p < 0.05) had a stronger relationship with Total remuneration than the other 
variables. 
 
5.10   RESULTS OF RESEARCH QUESTION 5 
Research Question 5 aimed to determine whether there is a relationship between 
CEO remuneration components and Company size.  
 
Company size was included as a dummy variable in the regression analysis, with 
Medium company used as reference category, as none of the entities fell into the 
classification of Small company. The researcher applied the following 
categorisation: 
 
3 ൌ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 
4 ൌ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 
 
5.10.1 Relationship between Fixed pay and Company size 
Because company size could have an impact on fixed pay, the researcher added 
Company size to the pooled regression model.  The regression model included 119 
unbalanced panel observations and 17 cross-sectional units over a period of nine 
years, due to the inclusion of the AR(1) term. The regression model was run with 
the optimum model, presented in Table 37, and included Company size as dummy 
variable.  Company size had four classifications: Small, Medium, Large, and Very 
large company.  As there were four organisational sizes (k = 4), the study made use 
of three dummy variables (k − 1 = 3).  As none of the SOEs fell in the Small category 
(based on the guideline provided in Table 11), Company size 2 (Medium) was used 
as reference category.  Dum_Size3 represented Large company and dum-Size4 
represented Very large company. The results of the optimum model of the pooled 
multiple regression analysis are presented in Table 43, below.  
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Table 43 Regression analysis — Fixed pay and Company size 
Dependent variable: Fixed pay 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 – 2014 
Periods included: 8 
Cross-sections included: 17 
Total unbalanced panel observations: 119 
Variable Beta 
coefficient 
Std. error t-statistic p-
value 
Constant 3 042 350.00 2 945 625.00 1.03 0.30
AR (1) 0.88 0.05 17.68 0.00
Turnover 117 000.00 933 000.00 1.25 0.21
NP -534 000.00 124 000.00 -4.31 0.00
Gender -812 027.30 226 824.40 -3.58 0.00
Age -17 754.29 24 006.44 -0.74 0.46
Dummy race_Black 
African 
1 108 575.00 544 624.00 2.04 0.04
Dummy race_Coloured 1 707 985.00 690 058.10 2.48 0.01
Tenure  189 376.20 39 395.50 4.81 0.00
Dummy 
education_Honours 
degree 
-884 876.80 349 286.10 -2.53 0.01
Dummy 
education_Master’s 
degree 
-349 589.90 240 623.70 -1.45 0.15
Dummy size_Large 
company 
1 413 989.00 2 452 275.00 0.58 0.57
Dummy size_Very large 
company 
1 368 887.00 2 434 449.00 0.56 0.58
Weighted statistics 
R-squared 0.79
Adjusted R-squared 0.775
F-statistic 34.91
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00
DW stat 2.64
   * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
The results in Table 43 indicate that 77% (adjusted R2 = 0.77) of the variance in 
Fixed pay can, in addition to NP, be attributed to some CEO demographic variables.  
Similar to the results in Table 42, the CEO demographic variables that have an 
effect on Fixed pay are Gender, Race (in terms of Coloured CEOs), Tenure, and 
Education (in terms of an Honours degree).  The adjusted R2 was slightly lower than 
that of the optimum model presented in Table 37.  This indicated that the variable 
added to the model, namely Company size, did not contribute to explaining the 
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variance in Fixed pay, given the other independent variables.  This model therefore 
indicated that Company size is not a statistically significant predictor of Fixed pay.  
Interestingly, when adding Company size to the analysis, Turnover did not 
contribute significantly to Fixed pay. 
 
5.10.2 Relationship between Company size and STIs 
A nonparametric Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was used to test whether 
there was a correlation between Company size and STIs. Table 44 lists the 
correlations between STIs and Company size for the period 2006 to 2014. 
Table 44 Correlation — STIs and Company size 
  Company size 
STIs Spearman’s rho 0.46** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 
N 108 
            ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Based on the results, there was a strong positive correlation between STIs and 
Company size (r = 0.46, n = 108, p < 0.00) during the period under study.   
 
5.10.3 Relationship between Total remuneration and Company size 
A regression analysis was performed with the optimum model presented in Table 
41, with Company size included as a dummy variable.  The Company size variables 
were four classifications of SOEs: Small, Medium, Large, and Very large.  Because 
there were four sizes (k=4), the researcher had to make use of three dummy 
variables (k − 1=3).  None of the SOEs fell in the Small category; therefore, 
Company size 2 (Medium) was used as a reference category. Dum_Size3 
represented Large company, and Dum_size4 represented Very large company.  
The results of the pooled multiple regression analysis are presented in Table 45, 
below. 
 
The regression model included 142 unbalanced panel observations across 18 
cross-sectional units over a period of nine years, due to the inclusion of the AR(1) 
term.  Two different iterations were run with Company size as a dummy variable, in 
order to determine the optimum final regression model.  Refer to Annexure E.9 for 
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the different iterations.  The results of each individual regression model are 
summarised and presented in Table 45.  As can be seen from Table 45, the DW 
test statistic was 2.7, indicating no serious serial correlation. 
Table 45 Regression analysis — Total remuneration and Company size 
Dependent variable: Total remuneration 
Models 1 2 
Constant 2 307 917.00
(1.26)
3 781 641.00 
(5.50) 
AR(1) 0.70
(12.10)
0.71 
(12.40) 
OP 0.000285*
(3.32)
0.000286* 
(3.64) 
NP -0.000185*
(-3.54)
-0.000186* 
(-3.57) 
LR 123 038.30
(1.13)
132 127.40 
(1.22) 
ROCE -292 645.30
(-1.09)
-286 912.00 
(-1.07) 
IFWE -0.000156
(-1.12)
-0.000154 
(-1.11) 
Dum_Large company 1 649 044.00
(0.85)
 
Dum_Very large company 2 796 956.00
(1.48)
1 263 352.00 
(1.81) 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
33.32
(0.00)
38.06 
(0.00) 
DW stat 2.73 2.74 
R2 0.68 0.67 
Adjusted R2 0.6471 0.6478 
Note: (i) Coefficients reported with t-statistics in parenthesis; and (ii) Unstandardized beta 
coefficient are   presented     
* Significance at the 5% level 
 
The last regression model, Model 2, was regarded as the optimum model, as the F-
statistic increased to 38.06.  The optimum model indicated that 65% (adjusted R2 = 
0.65) of the variance in Total remuneration, over and above the components of 
Company performance, was explained by Company size.  One may therefore infer 
that company size affects CEOs’ total remuneration, with reference to very large 
South African SOEs.  However, the p-value of Company size (Very large company) 
was not statistically significant at the 5% level (p > 0.05), suggesting a weaker 
relationship between Total remuneration and Company size in very large SOEs. 
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5.11   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the research results. The descriptive statistics for the 
components of CEO remuneration revealed that CEOs’ fixed salaries increased by 
a total of 82% during the study period, with the lowest increase (3%) during the 
2009/2010 financial year.  The negative growth in fixed pay during some years 
seems to reflect the trend in some of the components of Company performance.  
On the other hand, Total remuneration increased by 93% over the study period, with 
the largest increase (35%) during the 2006/2007 financial year. The results 
indicated that Total remuneration fluctuated during the study period.  Conversely, 
STIs declined by 29% over the nine-year period, with an average year-on-year 
decline of 4%.  Further, a decline was found in STIs from 2010, indicating that STIs 
were not guaranteed for the sampled CEOs.  The decline in STIs, accompanied by 
the decline in Fixed pay over the study period is a cause for concern, and will be 
discussed further in Chapter 6. 
 
The descriptive statistics for the components of Company performance indicated 
that the results of the performance-based measures were volatile in the period 
under study, except for Turnover.  Further, analysis revealed a downward trend in 
NP, OP, SR, and ROE means from 2007 to 2010, indicating the effects of the 
economic recession on performance of SOEs, and, therefore, shareholders’ returns. 
 
In answering Research Question 1, the results of the regression analysis revealed 
that Fixed pay had a relationship with Turnover, NP, and IFWE.  As expected, there 
was a negative relationship with NP and IFWE.  However, only the p-values of NP 
and Turnover were statistically significant, suggesting a stronger relationship.  
Correlational analysis indicated a statistically weak negative relationship between 
STIs and Turnover, a weak to strong positive relationship between STIs and OP, 
and a weak to strong negative relationship between STIs and NP. 
 
The results further revealed a relationship between Total remuneration and OP, NP, 
LR, ROCE, and IFWE respectively.  However, only OP and NP had a statistically 
significant relationship with Total remuneration.  As expected, there was a negative 
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relationship between Total remuneration and NP, ROCE, and IFWE respectively.  
Results from the Spearman rank correlation test revealed a statistically negative 
relationship between Fixed pay and AO, and between Total remuneration and AO 
for the period under study.   
 
The results of Research Question 2 indicated that Turnover seemed to have the 
most stable relationship with Fixed pay. The results further indicated that the 
relationship between Fixed pay and the components of Company performance did 
not strengthen over the study period, but did fluctuate. This trend was mirrored in 
the analysis of Total remuneration, where Turnover, once again, provided the most 
stable linear relationship.  Further, there was no definite pattern of improvement in 
the strength of the linear relationship between Total remuneration and the 
components of Company performance in the period under study.  The results 
indicated that STIs showed an unstable trend in the strength of the linear 
relationship with all the components of Company performance throughout the period 
under study. Contrary to expectations, STIs showed a direct and strong to very 
strong positive relationship with Turnover, OP, and NP for the years under study.  
 
The results further revealed that different performance measures were important 
before, during, and after the financial crisis with regard to the components of CEO 
remuneration. The regression analysis results reveal that Fixed pay can be 
explained by Gender, Age, Race, Education, and Tenure. This could possibly 
suggest that fixed pay within South African SOEs is determined by subjectively 
employed criteria, such as race and gender. 
 
The results further indicated that gender, education, race and age do not have an 
effect on STIs. However, the research indicates a weak positive relationship 
between Tenure and STIs, suggesting that the longer a CEO is employed, the more 
STIs he or she will receive.  Total remuneration can be explained by Race, Tenure, 
and Education.  This suggests that CEOs’ remuneration in SOEs is not affected by 
gender, and that their total remuneration is determined by job evaluation and 
benchmarking. 
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Contrary to previous findings, the size of the SOE does not play a role in the CEO’s 
remuneration.  The results confirm that Company size is not a statistically significant 
predictor of Fixed pay.  However, with regard to Total remuneration, Company size, 
in terms of Very large company, was found to be a predictor, though not statistically 
significant.  This suggests a weaker relationship between Total remuneration and 
Company size.  
 
The results indicate that there was a strong positive relationship between STIs and 
Company size, but that Company size did not affect Fixed pay.  Although Company 
size, in the case of Very large company, had an effect on Total remuneration, the 
relationship was not significant.  
 
The next chapter will discuss the results against the background of the literature 
review. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
6.1   INTRODUCTION  
The main objective of this research was to determine whether there is a link between 
CEO remuneration and company performance in South African Schedule 2 SOEs.  
The previous chapter presented the results of the study, which focused on the 
relationships between the variables, based on descriptive, correlation, and 
regression statistics.  
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive discussion of the research results within the 
context of the literature review.  The main objective of this chapter is to examine the 
alignment between the results presented in Chapter 5 against the results of prior 
studies on related topics.  The comparison of this study’s results with those of other 
studies will outline key similarities and differences, for the purpose of contributing to 
the literature.  
 
The chapter starts with a discussion of the results of the correlation and regression 
analysis in addressing the research questions and sub-questions.  It concludes with 
a summary of the chapter. 
 
6.2   DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS — WHETHER THERE IS A 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CEO REMUNERATION 
COMPONENTS AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
Research Question 1 aimed to analyse the relationship between CEO remuneration 
components (fixed pay, STIs, and total remuneration) and the SOE’s performance.  
The researcher used OLS multiple regression for panel data to test the relationship 
of the components of Company performance with Fixed pay and Total 
remuneration.  Because a third of the sample declared zero bonuses, regression 
analysis could not be run on the STIs component.  Therefore, the Spearman rank 
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correlation coefficient analysis was used to test for correlation between components 
of Company performance and STIs. 
 
6.2.1 Relationship between fixed pay and company performance 
The findings of this research, that fixed pay has a relationship with turnover, NP, 
and IFWE respectively, support the findings of Ndofirepi (2015), Modau (2013), and 
Barber et al. (2006).  Ndofirepi (2015) found a statistically significant relationship 
between fixed pay and accounting-based performance measures (ROA and ROE).  
In his study, Modau (2013) found an inverse relationship between fixed pay and 
ROE, whereas Barber et al. (2006) found a strong relationship between CEO salary 
and net income in restaurant companies. The findings of the present study are 
contrary to that of Osei-Bonsu and Lutta (2016), who found that CEOs’ salaries are 
not linked to company performance. 
 
Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) posit that listed SOEs normally have close political 
connections with government.  It may be the case that an increase in IFWE signals 
an inept board or management that could result in a loss of crucial political 
connections for these SOEs (Conyon & He 2016). Therefore, the negative 
relationship between fixed pay and IFWE could suggest that boards and 
shareholders reduce fixed salaries of executives to penalise them for such losses.  
 
The results of the present study further show that the higher an SOE’s turnover and 
NP are, the more fixed pay the CEOs will earn.  Based on the finding of a statistically 
strong positive relationship between Fixed pay and Turnover, it could be argued that 
a CEO that generates a higher income for the SOE is considered to perform well, 
for which he or she is rewarded. This could explain the connection between CEO 
remuneration and company performance posited by Andersson and Andersson 
(2006). 
 
6.2.2 Relationship between STIs and company performance 
The payment of bonuses has several purposes; for example, it can be used to 
attract or to retain skilled and experienced talent, or it can serve a means to monitor 
and motivate CEO.  Beer and Katz (2003) posit that both the expectancy theory and 
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agency theory treat remuneration as a tool that can help to maximise motivation and 
performance.  The main reason for paying STIs is to tie payment to results.  From 
an agency approach, individual efforts and objectives may be more accurately 
aligned with firm objectives.  This should indicate that CEOs receive STIs in good 
times, along with their fixed pay (Nellkrans & Dogan 2015).  However, this has not 
always been the case. Even though 2009 was an abysmal year for many 
companies, including the SOEs under study, the CEOs managed to extract STIs to 
the amount of R1 156 762 50.00, an increase of 52% from the previous year.  This 
raises questions. 
 
While STIs have been the topic of many studies, previous research has struggled 
to explain the significance level of bonus remuneration in relation to company 
performance (Nellkrans & Dogan 2015).  In fact, Beer and Katz (2003) found that 
executive bonuses are more likely to be seen as having a negative impact on 
executive behaviour and decision-making when the bonuses are based on unit 
performance, rather than company performance. 
 
The results of the present study revealed a significant positive correlation between 
the STIs component of CEO remuneration and three of the eight components of 
Company performance used in this study.  Despite the positive relationship of STIs 
with OP, NP, and Turnover being contrary to expectations, due to the poor 
performance of the SOEs, it suggests that the implementation of the Companies Act 
(2008) and King III (2009) was successful as it is required that CEO remuneration 
be linked to some form of company performance (Modau 2013).  
 
Findings from the present research are contrary to those of Andersson and 
Andersson (2006), Weinberg (1995), Nel (2012), and Osei-Bonsu and Lutta (2016), 
who found no significant relationship between company performance and STIs.  The 
significant relationship between Company performance and STIs found in the 
present study supports the findings of Jeppson (2009), Modau (2013), Shaw (2012), 
Barret (2014), and Ndofirepi (2015).  It must, however, be noted that, although these 
authors did find significant relationships, these were in opposing directions. It 
therefore appears that the effect of STIs on company performance is not clear, and 
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requires further research.  Michaud and Gai (2009) found that, after controlling for 
fixed effects such as macroeconomics and specific industry conditions, only 
bonuses (STIs) had a significant positive effect on company performance.  
 
Beer and Katz (2003) argue that researchers have been unable to establish that 
STIs are causally correlated to company performance.  These authors further argue 
that an implicit assumption embedded in prior research is that bonuses shape 
executive behaviour and decision-making, which, in turn, influence organisational 
performance. 
 
6.2.3 Relationship between total remuneration and company performance 
The results of the present study revealed that there is a relationship between Total 
remuneration of CEOs and five of the eight components of Company performance.  
The negative relationship of Total remuneration with IFWE could suggest that 
boards and stakeholders reduce total remuneration to penalise SOEs for loss of 
crucial political connections as posited by Fan et al. 2007. A company’s political 
connections may have both direct and indirect effects on changes in executive 
remuneration (Conyon & He 2016: 689) 
 
The findings of the present research add support to previous studies of executive 
remuneration that found a relationship between total remuneration and company 
performance (although those authors conducted these studies in the private sector 
or in different sectors to that of the present study).  For example, Barber et al. (2006) 
found a weak statistical relationship between total remuneration and net income.  
Jeppson et al. (2009) found that company revenue was the only statistically 
significant variable that predicted total remuneration (with an r2 of only 0.10).  In his 
study, Modau (2013) found a positive relationship between total remuneration and 
ROE. Scholtz and Smit (2012) found a strong relationship between total 
remuneration and, amongst others, turnover.  The finding of the present research 
that there is a positive relationship with OP support the findings of Sigler (2011), Nel 
(2012), Van Blerck (2012), and Modau (2013).  Interestingly, McGuire, Chiu, and 
Elbing (1962) did not find a significant relationship between executive remuneration 
and company profit. 
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In the present study, the results regarding the relationship between Total 
remuneration and some of the components of Company performance are worrying, 
due to their inverse nature, especially the relationship between NP and ROCE.  This 
may suggest that the relationship between total remuneration and the SOEs’ 
performance is not strong enough (Ozkan 2011).  This implies that CEOs receive 
their remuneration regardless of their organisations’ performance (Bussin 2014).  
 
6.2.4 Relationship between CEO remuneration components and AO 
The results of the present study reveal that AO had a strong negative relationship 
(for different years) with Fixed pay and with Total remuneration. However, the 
results revealed no statistically significant relationship between AO and STIs.  This 
suggests that poor AOs were associated with lower levels of fixed pay and total 
remuneration.  Findings from correlational analysis of this study support the findings 
of Lennox (1998), who found a negative relationship between CEO remuneration 
(after correcting for performance) and modified audit reports. This suggests that 
modified audit reports have a statistically significant effect on executive 
remuneration.  His findings further indicate that negative audit reports have a 
negative impact on managerial remuneration.   
 
Zhang and Xian (2014) investigated the impact of audit opinions and audit fees on 
CEO remuneration.  They specifically examined the changes in CEO remuneration 
according to different AOs and audit- or total fees. They found that the presence of 
modified opinions is linked with lower CEO fixed pay and total remuneration. The 
justification for this is that modified opinions are indicators of poor firm performance 
or financial distress. Their analysis of adverse opinions implies that, after the 
issuance of adverse opinions, CEOs are offered more STIs, compared to total 
remuneration. This indicates that CEOs prefer short-term remuneration to long-term 
remuneration after the issuance of adverse opinions that contain information about 
potential bankruptcy.  
 
The present study’s results of the OLS regression analysis, where the relationship 
was tested over the entire study period, however, revealed that AO did not have a 
relationship with the CEO remuneration components Fixed pay and Total 
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remuneration.  The reason for this was that the dummy variable AO did not feature 
in the final regression model.  
 
6.3   DISCUSSION OF RESULTS: WHETHER THE STRENGTH OF 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CEO REMUNERATION AND 
COMPANY PERFORMANCE STRENGTHEND OVER THE 
NINE-YEAR PERIOD 
Research Questions 2 was aimed to analyse, by means of Spearman’s rank 
correlation test, the trend in the relationship between the three CEO remuneration 
components and the components of Company performance. In order to analyse the 
trend, the correlation coefficient with reference to the three CEO remuneration 
components were used, tracked over the nine-year period under study. The 
expectation was that the relationship would strengthen over the nine-year period.  
This expectation was based on the effects of improved monitoring and regulation 
(Bussin 2014). 
 
6.3.1 Fixed pay 
The findings reported in Chapter 5 indicated that the trend in the relationship 
between Fixed pay and the components of Company performance was 
characterised by a fluctuation over the nine-year period under study.  From the 
results, it is clear that Turnover had a stronger influence on Fixed pay than the other 
components of Company performance did.  Throughout the nine-year period, there 
was mostly a positive relationship between Fixed pay and Turnover, whereas the 
other components of Company performance seemed to move in and out of the 
different relationship boundaries, and changing direction in other years. The 
relationship between Fixed pay and almost all the components of Company 
performance between positive and negative throughout the nine-year period.  A 
sharp decline was evident in the strength of the linear relationship during the 
2012/2013 financial year, with the results for all the components of Company 
performance (except Turnover) suggesting that the linear relationship was at its 
weakest during this period.  A possible explanation for the decline could be the 
fragility of the global economy or political uncertainty in South Africa at the time.  A 
total of 99 strikes were recorded during 2012, with this trend continuing into 2013.  
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Many of these strikes was characterised by violence (Davies 2013).  At the same 
time, the descriptive statistics indicated that the median of Fixed pay showed a 
steady growth over the nine-year period. 
 
A deeper analysis of the Fixed pay median data points indicated that the median 
increased by 11% year on year from 2006 to 2010, with a mere 3% year-on-year 
increase from 2011 to 2014.  Fixed pay increased by 83% over the nine-year period.  
The impact of the lower increase in Fixed pay through the latter half of the nine-year 
period appears to have played a role in weakening the relationship between Fixed 
pay and the components of Company performance (except Turnover). A further 
implication of the results is that CEOs’ increases were more evident during the 
economic crisis than afterwards.  
 
If this observation is combined with that of declining STIs for the period 2011 to 
2014, it could be assumed that the structure of CEO remuneration had changed to 
include less variable pay and more fixed pay over the latter part of the nine-year 
period. The finding of this structural change supports the research findings of Valenti 
(2012), Bussin, et al. (2013), and Modau (2013).  
 
Interestingly, findings by Osei-Bonsu and Lutta (2016) suggest that fixed pay total 
does not seem to provide a better incentive to CEOs. Thus, higher fixed 
remuneration alone would not have an impact on company performance. These 
authors argue that this could be because CEOs’ fixed remuneration is generally 
determined by considerations that are not related to the interests of the 
shareholders. 
 
6.3.2 STIs 
In the present study, the trend in STIs indicated an unstable and inconsistent linear 
relationship with the components of Company performance throughout the nine-
year period. This inconsistent relationship casts doubt on whether SOEs use a 
range of performance targets to determine CEOs’ STIs.  It could also suggest that 
SOEs do not follow remuneration policy and guidelines when awarding bonuses, 
and that the contracted performance measures differ between SOEs.  An upward 
Chapter 6: Discussion of results 
 
253 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
trend in the strength of the linear relationship between STIs and the components of 
Company performance occurred during 2014, with the exception of ROCE, which 
declined from 2012.  A deeper analysis of the median STIs data points indicated 
that the median increased by 21% year on year from 2006 to 2010, but decreased 
by 29% over the nine-year period.  This was the result of a 26% year-on-year 
decrease over the period 2011 to 2014.  
 
This suggests that the reason why the relationship between STIs and the 
components of Company performance was unstable during the nine-year period, 
especially from 2006 to 2011, was that, while STIs did decline, the decline was not 
aligned with the decline in the results for the components of Company performance. 
 
The decline in STIs, in conjunction with the increase in Fixed pay over the nine-year 
period, suggests that the focus was more on fixed pay, in order to compensate 
CEOs for declining STIs.  Ellig (2007) claims that, should STIs be difficult to achieve, 
due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the CEO, the structure of 
the remuneration would lean towards a guaranteed cost-to-company or fixed pay.  
Bussin and Modau (2015) posit that the global trend in such times is to reduce or 
defer, inter alia, STIs and incentive bonuses. 
 
However, focusing less on STIs or variable pay may not necessarily be as 
unscrupulous as it appears at first glance.  According to Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006), cash bonuses linked to accounting figures encourage executives to 
manipulate the scheduling of revenues and expenses, to increase their 
remuneration.  In addition, in some instances, it motivates executives to focus on 
short-term performance that may adversely affect the long-term survival of the 
company. The challenge therefore lies in developing and implementing strategies 
that provide sustainable long-term results to the benefits of shareholders (Nellkrans 
& Dogan 2015). 
 
6.3.3 Total remuneration 
The results of the present study point to a trend of fluctuation in the strength of the 
linear relationship between Total remuneration and the components of Company 
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performance.  Moreover, when examining the results of the correlation between 
Total remuneration and the components of Company performance, it appears that 
there was no definite pattern of improvement in the strength of the linear relationship 
from 2006 to 2014.  
 
As with Fixed pay, Turnover showed a growing significant correlation with Total 
remuneration (except for 2010). Most of the other components of Company 
performance showed different levels of correlation over time. This was contradictory 
to the findings of Van Blerck (2012), who found that the relationship between 
executive remuneration and EVA strengthened after the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
The most noticeable finding with regard to the strength of the relationship between 
Total remuneration and the components of Company performance was that they 
are generally moving in and out of the different relationship boundaries, and 
changed direction in some years.  When the data were examined in conjunction with 
the components of Company performance, it was clear that there was a difference 
in trend lines over the period researched.  It seems the Total remuneration was not 
sensitive to the components of Company performance during the nine-year period.  
 
The descriptive statistics indicated that the median of Total remuneration increased 
by 14% year on year from 2006 to 2010, and increased by only 3% year-on-year 
over the period 2011 to 2014.  However, the growth was unstable, and fluctuated 
during the study period. This finding was contradictory to that of Kuboya (2014), 
who found that total remuneration increased steadily during a five-year period.  This 
suggests that the reason why the relationship between Total remuneration and the 
components of Company performance was unstable was the fact that the initial 
Total remuneration increases were not aligned with the decline in the components 
of Company performance from 2006 to 2010. 
It appears that the rate of change in total remuneration was high, with a 93% 
increase over the nine-year period, and may have been as high as reported in the 
media.  Further, the increase in CEO remuneration was higher than that of the rest 
of the workforce in South Africa, which spurred the strikes in 2014.  This is contrary 
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to the analysis of Larcker and Tayan (2011) that the average CEO is not overpaid 
considering the responsibilities and risk associated to the position.  
During 2015, government budgeted for a cost-of-living wage increase of only 6% for 
workers (Paton 2015). The growth rates of the components of Company 
performance were not consistent for the nine-year period, showing both negative 
and positive growth. Therefore, no consistent positive trend in the components of 
Company performance could be established, except for Turnover, which had a 
greater effect on Total remuneration.  
 
As an overall observation, the unstable relationships bring into focus the role of 
labour market forces (as indicated by Chalmers et al. 2006) as being a contributing 
factor in CEO remuneration, especially during periods of economic upset.  This 
supports the findings of Shaw (2011). 
 
6.4  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS — RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
CEO REMUNERATION COMPONENTS AND COMPANY 
PERFORMANCE COMPONENTS FOR THE PERIODS 2006 
TO 2010 AND 2011 TO 2014
The global recession of 2009 started in December 2007, and intensified in 
September 2008 (Colander 2010).  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines 
a global recession as a decline in annual per capita world GDP (Modau 2013). 
 
Based on what happened leading to the 2008 to 2009 global financial crisis, 
Research Question 3 focused on analysing the relationship between the 
components of CEO remuneration and the components of company performance 
for the period 2006 to 2010 and again 2011 to 2014.  
 
The question therefore attempted to analyse the effect of substantial economic 
changes on the remuneration of the CEOs in SOEs.  The reasoning behind this was 
to determine whether the global financial crisis and the stock market fall of 2011 had 
had an impact on the relationship between the components of CEO remuneration 
and those of Company performance.  According to Nellkrans and Dogan (2015), 
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times of economic decline seem to have little effect on CEOs’ remuneration, both in 
terms of total remuneration and bonuses. 
 
6.4.1 Fixed pay 
The findings of the present study revealed that, for the period 2006 to 2010, there 
was a statistically strong positive relationship between Fixed pay and Turnover.  
Estimations of the regression models revealed that Fixed pay and Turnover 
appeared to be positively related, even during the financial crisis (2006 to 2010).  
This finding supports those of Otieno (2011), who found a statistically significant 
positive correlation between company performance measured by turnover 
(revenue), NP, and CEO remuneration during the 2008/2009 period.  
 
In the present study, a closer inspection of the Fixed pay median data points 
indicated that the highest increase (23%) in the median occurred in the 2006/2007 
financial year.  As expected, the increase in fixed pay during the 2008/2009 financial 
year was relatively high — CEOs received a 21% increase.  This was in contrast to 
the decline in six of the eight measures of Company performance during the same 
period.  This finding supports the notion proposed by Kuboya (2014), that the fixed 
proportion of executives’ pay, in most cases, will not decline during periods of poor 
financial performance.  This finding could suggest that the remuneration committees 
of SOEs did not consider the impact of the economic crisis in determining of fixed 
salaries.  
 
The negative company performance (as measured by OP, LR, SR, ROCE, and 
ROE) during the 2007/2008 financial year was not followed by recovery with positive 
returns during the 2009/2010 financial year.  
 
An implication of the results is that CEOs in South African SOEs received noticeable 
fixed pay increases, despite the global financial crisis and the decline in their 
performance.  This is in line with findings of Otieno (2011), who observed that the 
financial performance of SOEs (due to the declining average in NP) deteriorated in 
the period 2007 to 2009.  The concurrent decline in the performance of SOEs (as 
seen in the negative growth in OP, NP, SR, ROCE, and ROE) signals that 
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remuneration measures did not to reflect the poor performance of the SOEs.  This 
would suggest that, as tough economic conditions became a reality, CEOs in South 
African SOEs received higher fixed salaries, not compensating for the decline in 
certain measures of their performance.   
 
This supports findings of Shaw (2011), who found that CEOs in the financial 
services industry received fixed pay increases that were more noticeable during an 
economic downturn.  On average, fixed pay was high, despite a decline in company 
performance. In fact, in the present study, the median Fixed pay data points 
increased by 11% year on year from 2006 to 2011, while most of the components 
of Company performance declined during the same period.  This suggests that the 
CEOs’ fixed salaries were not aligned to the performance of SOEs during the period 
2006 to 2011.  
 
Even after the financial crisis (the period 2011 to 2014), Fixed pay was positively 
related to Turnover and LR, although the relationship with LR was not statistically 
significant. The positive relationship was contrary to expectations. This is consistent 
with findings from for example Mbo and Adjasi (2013) who found that liquidity have 
a positive influence on company performance. 
 
As expected, results revealed a negative relationship between Fixed pay and IFWE.  
During the 2011/2012 financial year, Fixed pay increased by 18%, suggesting that 
the August 2011 stock market fall did not have an effect on the fixed salaries of 
SOEs’ CEOs. This finding, in conjunction with the finding that components of 
Company performance, such as OP and SR, decreased during the same period, 
suggests that remuneration committees did not consider the SOEs’ poor 
performance in determining the CEOs’ fixed salaries at the time.  However, the 
Fixed pay median data points indicated that the median increased by only 3% during 
the period 2011 to 2014. This could suggest that the CEOs’ fixed salaries had 
increased in previous years, and were not moving in the same direction and at the 
same rate as the SOEs’ performance during this period. 
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6.4.2 STIs 
The results of the present study indicate that there was a moderate to strong 
statistically positive relationship between STIs and Turnover for the period 2006 to 
2010. However, the observation of a strong statistically significant negative 
relationship between STIs and the components of Company performance, such as 
LR, ROE, and ROCE, during the same period is a concern.  
 
The findings of the present research support the findings of Nellkrans and Dogan 
(2015), who found a statistically positive relationship between company 
performance measured through relative bonus and stock performance during the 
period 2007 to 2010.  However, the findings of the present research are contrary to 
those of Azim, Mei, and Rahman (2011), who found no statistically significant 
relationship between executives’ bonuses and company performance as measured 
through ROE, ROA, and ROI, from 2007 to 2008. 
 
A deeper analysis of the descriptive statistics of the median of STIs indicated a 52% 
increase in STIs during the 2008/2009 financial year, suggesting that the global 
economic downturn did not have an effect on the payment of STIs in SOEs.  This 
finding is contrary to the postulation of Nellkrans and Dogan (2015) that bonus 
payments are left unchanged in times of poor financial performance, whereas fixed 
salaries are increased.  The reasoning behind this is to motivate more experienced 
CEOs to keep the company afloat during a financial crisis (Nellkrans & Dogan 2015).  
In the present study, it was found that both the CEOs’ STIs and their fixed salaries 
increased during the 2008/2009 financial year. This finding is in line with that of 
Valenti (2012), who found that CEOs’ bonuses did not decline as expected in the 
recession years 2007 to 2009. The finding of the present research is, however, 
contrary to the finding of Kuboya (2014), who found that performance bonuses 
(STIs) experienced a slight decline during the economic recession of 2007 to 2008.  
An inspection of the median data points of STIs indicated that the median increased 
by 21% year on year from 2006 to 2010.   
 
Even though STIs reward CEOs for past performance, the increase in STIs during 
the 2008/2009 financial year is still a concerning result, considering that the global 
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financial crisis started in August 2007.  This, in conjunction with the decline in five 
of the nine measures of Company performance, namely OP, NP, SR, ROCE, and 
ROE during the global financial crisis, suggests that the relationship between STIs 
and SOEs’ performance could be problematic. This finding raises questions about 
the remuneration schemes of CEOs in SOEs, as well as about how the bonuses 
relate to the performance of the SOE.  It could reasonably have been expected that 
SOEs would implement a downward discretion in awarding STIs, due to the 
probability of poor performance of SOEs.  However, as seen from the results, this 
clearly did not happen.  
 
The results suggest that there was no connection between the payment of STIs and 
the decline in SOEs’ performance during the financial crisis. Although Nellkrans and 
Dogan (2015) found a slight reduction in bonuses paid to CEOs, this reduction was 
not as notable as had been expected. These authors, however, found that many 
CEOs in their sample continued to extract bonuses, even during the worst year of 
the financial crisis.  This is consistent with findings of the present research. 
 
The results of the present study further revealed that STIs had a strong to very 
strong statistically significant positive relationship with Turnover, OP, and NP for the 
period 2011 to 2014.  Of particular interest is the finding that STIs had a very strong 
statistically negative relationship with ROCE. Maug, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Zhivotova 
(2014) argue that there are other variables that can influence a CEO’s remuneration 
besides company performance.  
 
The analysis of median STIs points indicated that the median declined by 26% year 
on year from 2011 to 2014. During the same time, the median of both Fixed pay and 
Total remuneration increased by 3% year on year. 
 
Interestingly, Gaver and Gaver (1998) point out that companies are reluctant to 
reprimand their executives for losses (Nellkrans & Dogan 2015), especially when 
macroeconomic effects explain the losses. 
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6.4.3 Total remuneration 
The results of the present study reveal that Total remuneration had a statistically 
strong positive relationship with OP and a strong negative relationship with NP for 
the period 2006 to 2010. The finding of a statistically significant relationship between 
Total remuneration and OP confirms previous findings of, for example, Otieno 
(2011) and Keller (2013). Otieno (2011) found a statistically strong correlation 
between CEO remuneration and net profit for 2007 and 2008.  In his study, Keller 
(2013), found a statistically significant correlation between the remuneration of 
CEOs and the net income of their companies during 2010. Vemala et al.  (2014) 
found that the financial crisis had had a positive impact on total remuneration. This 
suggests that CEOs were highly paid despite the crisis. This was also found in the 
present research, where it was observed that median of Total remuneration grew 
by 70% for the period 2006 to 2010.  
 
Furthermore, results from the regression analysis of the post-crisis (2011 to 2014) 
data indicated that Total remuneration had a negative relationship with ROCE and 
IFWE respectively, and a positive relationship with ROE. However, although an 
inverse relationship, only the relationship between Total remuneration and IFWE 
was statistically significant, suggesting a stronger relationship. The opposite 
direction of the relationship during 2011 to 2014 is interesting from an agency 
perspective, with reference to how companies tend to evaluate and set pay levels 
in a period of great market volatility. Although the SOEs did not perform well, the 
CEOs’ remuneration levels increased. This could be due to the factors that CEO 
remuneration have previously increased during years of poor performance, and the 
post-crisis market reactions had already been discounted in the CEOs’ 
remuneration in previous years (Nellkrans & Dogan 2015).  From the results of the 
descriptive statistics of the medians of Total remuneration, it was observed that the 
median grew by 9% during the period 2011 to 2014. 
 
The results indicate the serious consequences of the economic downturn for SOEs 
in South Africa.  The only component of Company performance that did not decline 
during the study period was IFWE. In fact, it increased substantially from 2011 
onwards.  Interestingly, according to a draft audit report for the financial year ending 
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31 May 2014 by one of the leading auditing firms in South Africa, the South African 
Post Office (SAPO) spent R2.1 billion in IFWE during the 2013/2014 financial year; 
this despite the fact that SAPO had an overdraft of R250 million during the same 
period (BusinessTech 2014).  
 
An important characteristic of SOEs is that their CEOs and executives have strong 
political connections with the government, which enables government to exercise 
substantial influence on the operations of SOEs (Cao et al. 2014; Fan et al. 2007).  
Chen et al. (2011) postulate that SOEs’ executives face delayed and less stern 
punishment when committing fraud.  This is because government shields them from 
enforcement actions by regulatory bodies (Conyon & He 2016).  Hou and Moore 
(2011) also found that larger state ownership in SOEs is linked to a smaller 
likelihood of enforcement actions.  If this is the case, the impact of IFWE on CEOs’ 
remuneration may be weaker in SOEs.  This lack of enforcement perhaps explains 
the increase in IFWE of the SOEs under study.  
 
Nellkrans and Dogan (2015) claim that CEOs can be remunerated particularly well 
for managing a company during economic turmoil.  This means that the negative 
relationship between Total remuneration and Company performance could be an 
exogenous factor for which individual CEOs cannot be held accountable during the 
global financial crisis.  
 
6.5   DISCUSSION OF RESULTS — THE EXTENT OF THE EFFECT 
OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES ON THE COMPONENTS OF 
CEO REMUNERATIONDEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
Research Question 4 analysed the relationship between CEO demographic 
variables and the components of CEO remuneration in South African SOEs.  CEO 
demographic variables consisted of Age (in years), Gender, Race, Tenure (in years) 
and Education.  
 
The purpose of using the variables Age, Education, and Tenure was, in part, to 
check for a relation to experience and not the actual change in the number of years 
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(Andersson & Andersson, 2006).  This subsection presents a discussion of the key 
findings pertaining to Research Question 4. 
 
6.5.1 Fixed pay and CEO demographic variables 
The results of the present study revealed that Fixed pay had a relationship with Age, 
Tenure, Gender, Race, and Education.   
 
Age 
The finding of a statistically significant negative relationship between Fixed pay and 
Age is contrary to findings of McKnight et al. (2000) that CEO pay is positively 
related to age. Mäkinen (2008) also found a positive relationship with age. Findings 
of this research is in line with that of Deckop (1998) who argued that the CEO’s age 
does not have an effect on CEO cash remuneration. Beyond which real fixed pay 
decreased.  This is consistent with the belief that the need for cash will weaken as 
one gets older because of a decrease in human life-cycle related obligations and 
dependencies (McKnight et al. 2000).  
 
Tenure 
Previous research on the effect of CEOs’ tenure on the relationship between CEOs’ 
remuneration and company performance suggests that the relationship weakens as 
the CEOs’ tenure increases, because the board of directors learns more about the 
CEO, and does not need to use company performance measures as a proxy for 
CEO performance (Murphy 1996). The finding of a statistically significant positive 
relationship between Fixed pay and Tenure in the present study could suggest that, 
as CEOs’ experience increases, their worth to the company increases, which results 
in them demanding higher salaries.  This finding is in line with that of Bradley (2013), 
Nel (2012), and Ndofirepi (2015).  
 
Baptista (2010) posits that CEOs with longer tenure could be paid more, due to the 
increase in their knowledge of the company, or due to entrenchment, or both. The 
finding of the present study, that there is a relationship between Fixed pay and 
Tenure, further supports the notion that, over time, the abilities of the CEOs improve, 
together with their influence on the board of directors, which could lead to increases 
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in their fixed pay (Sigler 2011).  Through tenure, CEOs may gain control over the 
process of setting pay, and, in turn, design remuneration schemes to suit their 
preferences (McKnight & Tomkins 2004).  
 
Bouvier (2010) found that tenure became insignificant once industry controls were 
added, suggesting that age is sufficient to describe the variation in CEOs’ fixed pay.  
Further, Aaron et al. (2015) suggest that CEOs with a longer tenure, who prefer a 
higher fixed pay.   
 
Gender 
The finding of the present research that male CEOs earned more than female CEOs 
supports the findings of Bertrand and Hallock (2001), Mohan and Ruggiero (2003), 
Gius (2007), and Cole and Mehran (2008). The findings of the present study support 
those of a 2013 PwC study, where it was found that women, overall, earned 28.1% 
less than men, as measured by taxable income (BusinessTech 2013). 
 
Race 
The finding of the present research that there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between Fixed pay and Race is contrary to finding of Barret (2014), who 
found no variance in fixed pay between black African and white CEOs. 
 
Education 
The present study found a negative relationship between Fixed pay and Education, 
which is contrary to the findings of, for example, Andersson and Andersson (2006) 
and Michiels (2012).  Banghøj et al. (2010) found that educational level contributes 
greatly to variations in executive remuneration. In the present study, the result 
indicated that, specifically, CEOs with a bachelor’s degree earned more than CEOs 
with an honours degree. Andersson and Andersson (2006) revealed that, CEOs 
with a higher level of education received a higher total remuneration.  Michiels 
(2012), in a study conducted on privately held companies, also found that CEOs 
with a higher level of education earn more.  Andersson and Andersson (2006) posit 
that, if a CEO has a high level of education, the CEO would have knowledge that 
Chapter 6: Discussion of results 
 
264 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
will probably make it easier to solve problems and identify new ways to increase a 
company’s performance than what it would be for a CEO less education. 
 
Findings from the present research support the findings of Ayaba (2012), who found 
that CEOs’ education had a limited effect on the results of accounting-based 
measures of company performance.  The results of Ayaba (2012) show that, while 
the CEO may bring skills that were acquired through education, these skills may be 
progressively redefined to meet the challenges of the environment.  Interestingly, 
Aron and Matthew (2010) found that the educational background of the CEO is not 
related to the financial performance of the company. 
 
The results of the present study therefore suggest that the fixed pay of CEOs of 
South African SOEs is influenced by the CEOs’ age, tenure, race, gender, and level 
of education. 
 
6.5.2 STIs and CEO demographic variables 
Age 
The present study found a negligible relationship between STIs and Age.  This 
finding is contrary to that of Nel (2012) and Bradley (2013), who found that age is 
positively correlated with CEOs’ bonuses. Similar to the finding of the present 
research, Andersson and Andersson (2006) found that age is not an important 
variable in CEOs’ remuneration. Bouvier (2010) found STI to be significant at the 
1% level. Suggesting that for every year increase in age, STI would increase. 
 
Tenure 
The present study found a weak statistically significant positive relationship between 
STIs and Tenure, which is in line with the finding of Baptista (2010) and Sigler 
(2011). The finding is, however, contrary to that of Bebchuk et al. (2002), Nel (2012), 
and Bradley (2013), who found that tenure is negatively correlated with STIs.  The 
results of the present study suggest that, the longer a CEO remains with a company, 
the higher his or her STIs will be. This is contrary to finding of Rankin (2006) and 
Ndofirepi (2015), who found no relationship between tenure and STIs.   
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Further, Aaron et al. (2015) hypothesise that companies with CEOs with longer 
tenure will perform better when offered a greater proportion of fixed remuneration 
relative to performance-based remuneration. Findings from the present study is 
consistent with the literature because CEOs with a longer tenure is rewarded with 
higher pay for possessing more valuable human capital (Brick, Palmon & Wald 
2006). 
 
Gender 
The present study found no relationship between STIs and Gender. This suggests 
that there is no difference between male and female CEOs with regard to STIs. This 
points towards equity when paying STIs. This finding is contrary to the findings of 
Kulich, Trojanowski, Ryan, Alexander Haslam and Renneboog (2010) who found 
that bonuses (STIs) awarded to men are larger than those allocated to female 
executives. Albanesi, Olivetti and Prados (2015) also found that female executive 
receive lower levels of STIs relative to males. 
 
Race 
This study found no statistical difference in mean scores between STIs and Race. 
This suggests that there is no difference between African black and white CEO with 
regard to STIs, pointing towards remuneration equity (with regard to the payment of 
STIs) between black African and white CEOs. This is contrary to the findings of 
Barret (2014) who found a variance in STI between these two race groups. He 
observed that the variance in STIs of black African CEOs are higher than that of the 
white CEOs. 
 
Education 
The present study found no statistically significant correlation between STIs and 
Education. This finding is in line with the finding of Bhagat et al. (2010) who found 
that education may be an insufficient proxy for STIs. 
 
6.5.3 Total remuneration and CEO demographic variables 
In the present study, it was found that Total remuneration had a relationship with 
Tenure, Race, and Education respectively.   
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Age 
Contrary to findings of Abraham, Harris and Auerbach (2014), this study found no 
relationship between Total remuneration and Age.  Abraham et al. (2014) found that 
an increase in a CEO’s age led to an increase in the CEO’s remuneration, which 
underscores the importance of age in determining CEOs’ remuneration.   
 
Tenure 
The present study found a statistically significant positive relationship between Total 
remuneration and Tenure.  This finding suggests that CEOs with longer tenure may 
have more power to influence their remuneration (Ndofirepi 2015).  Further, this 
finding supports that of Andersson and Andersson (2006), who found that a CEO’s 
total remuneration will increase for every year that a CEO remains in his or her 
position. These authors explain this phenomenon it by indicating that, if the CEO 
works for one more year, he or she will have more experience, thereby making a 
greater contribution to the success of the company, resulting in higher 
remuneration. 
 
The finding of the present study further supports that of Jaiswall and Bhattacharyya 
(2016), who found that total remuneration in public companies was positively related 
to CEOs’ tenure.  Abraham, Harris, and Auerbach (2014) also found a relationship 
between CEOs’ tenure and their remuneration. 
 
Gender 
It is well documented that the overall remuneration levels of females is lower than 
males (see Rekker, Benson & Faff 2014). However, the present study found no 
relationship between Total remuneration and Gender. This finding is contrary to the 
findings of Muñoz-Bullõn (2010) who found that a large percentage of the gender 
pay gap in total remuneration was attributable to differences in variable pay between 
the genders.   
 
Race 
The finding of the present study that black African CEOs earned more than white 
CEOs supports the finding of Barret (2014).   
Chapter 6: Discussion of results 
 
267 
@University of South Africa 2016 
 
 
Education 
From the data set of the present study, it was found that CEOs with a Master’s 
degree earned less than those with a bachelor’s degree. This finding could possibly 
correlate with the finding that tenure is important, suggesting that the CEOs were 
remunerated for their years of experience, and not according to their qualifications.  
Thus, a CEO with a longer tenure would earn more than a CEO with a higher level 
of education.  
 
The findings of the present research are contrary to those of the study of Cole 
(2009), who found that executive pay increases with educational attainment. The 
author found that, compared to CEOs who did not have a college degree, CEOs 
with a college degree earned 4% to 6% more, while CEOs with a graduate degree 
earned 8% to 25% more. Andersson and Andersson (2006) found that CEOs’ 
remuneration is linked to their level of education.  These authors posit that CEOs 
with a higher level of education will be better able to solve problems and increase a 
company’s profit, resulting in higher remuneration.  
 
It stands to reason that a person without an education would not be appointed as 
the CEO of a SOEs.  However, it seems as if a higher level of education does not 
necessarily imply that the CEO will earn more. Sampson-Akpuru (2008) examined 
whether CEOs holding a degree from an Ivy League institution of higher education 
was associated with higher remuneration.  After controlling for other factors, the 
author found that an Ivy League education is not associated with higher total 
remuneration.  This finding is supported by the present research.  
 
6.6   DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS — WHETHER THERE IS A 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CEO REMUNERATION AND 
COMPANY SIZE 
Research Question 5 was aimed at determining whether there was a relationship 
between the components of CEO remuneration and the size of SOEs.  Executive 
remuneration has attracted considerable public attention and academic interest, 
due to both the magnitude of CEOs’ pay in relation to company performance (Zhou 
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2010).  In line with the allocation theory of control, “in a market equilibrium, the most 
talented executives occupy top positions in the largest firms, where the marginal 
productivity of their actions is greatly magnified over the many people below them 
to whom they are linked” (Rosen 1992: 182).  This reasoning provides a theoretical 
basis for a positive relationship between CEO remuneration and company size 
(Zhou 2010).  Deysel (2013) posits that company size is believed to be an important 
variable, and that it is often mentioned by remuneration committees as a reason for 
above-average CEO remuneration packages.  
 
The present study revealed that Company size is not a statistically significant 
predictor of Fixed pay, but that there is a strong positive relationship between STIs 
and Company size. The results further show that Company size positively affects 
Total remuneration. The results specifically show that the category Very large 
company in terms of revenue (R2.54 billion to R27.6 billion) and assets (R3.3 billion 
to R78.8 billion) positively affects Total remuneration.  
 
The findings of the present study are contrary to those of Valenti (2012), Deysel and 
Kruger (2015), and Hill, Lopez, and Reitenga (2016), who found that a company’s 
size does not have an effect on the CEO’s remuneration.  Fabbri and Marin (2012) 
found that the CEO’s remuneration declines as company size increases. One 
possible interpretation that these authors provide is that German companies 
increase their quest for management talent when the economy declines, rather than 
when it grows. Skilled and experienced CEOs are more in demand when companies 
go through difficult times and have to find ways to mitigate losses and to recover 
rapidly (Fabbri & Marin 2012). 
 
The finding of the present study that organisation size affects total remuneration 
confirms previous findings in a substantial body of work that shows that company 
size has an effect on CEOs’ remuneration, for example, Lau and Vos (2004), 
Jeppson et al. (2009), Sigler (2011), Nulla (2013), Abed, Suwaidan, and Slimani 
(2014), Abraham et al. (2014), Barret (2014), and Oberholtzer (2014).  Abraham et 
al. (2014), for example, found a company’s size to be the most powerful determinant 
of the CEO’s remuneration, explaining up to 30% of his or her remuneration, in both 
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publicly held and privately owned companies.  Oberholtzer (2014) found company 
size to be the only factor that has a constant and positive correlation with CEOs’ 
remuneration.  Jeppson et al. (2009) found that the remuneration of CEOs’ of larger 
firms is higher.  One of the reasons for this is that larger companies have more 
operations, subsidiaries, and layers of management that the CEO has to manage 
(Lippert & Moore 1994). Further, larger companies require a higher level of 
responsibility of CEOs; their tasks are more complex, and a greater value is 
therefore placed on CEOs making the right decisions (Janssen-Plas 2009).  
 
6.7   SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
The findings relating to the goals of the research study are summarised in Table 46. 
Table 46 Summary of key findings 
Main question: Is there relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and the performance 
of South African Schedule 2 SOEs?
Research question Remuneration 
component
Finding 
RQ1 
 
 
Is there a relationship 
between CEOs’ 
remuneration and the 
performance of South 
African SOEs for the 
period 2006 to 2014? 
 
Fixed pay 
Statistically significant: 
Turnover (+) 
NP (-) 
Non-statistically significant: 
IFWE (-) 
 
 
STIs 
Statistically weak to strong: 
OP (+) 
NP (+) 
Statistically strong: 
Turnover (+) 
 
 
Total remuneration 
Statistically significant: 
OP (+) 
Net Profit (-) 
Non-statistically significant: 
LR (+) 
ROCE (-) 
IFWE (-) 
 
RQ2 
 
 
Did the relationship 
between CEOs’ 
remuneration and 
SOEs’ performance 
strengthen over the 
period 2006 to 2014? 
 
Fixed pay 
No 
Relationship fluctuated 
Strong to very strong 
statistically significant positive 
relationship with Turnover 
 
 
 
STIs 
No 
Unstable relationship 
Statistically significant strong to 
very strong positive relationship 
with Turnover, OP, and NP 
Statistically significant strong 
negative relationship with LR, 
ROCE, and ROE 
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Research 
question 
Remuneration 
component 
Finding Research question 
 
RQ2 
Did the relationship 
between CEOs’ 
remuneration SOEs’ 
performance 
strengthen over the 
period 2006 to 2014?
 
 
Total remuneration 
No 
Relationship fluctuated 
No consistent positive trend 
Very strong statistically 
significant positive relationship 
with Turnover 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RQ3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the nature of 
the relationship 
between CEOs’ 
remuneration and the 
performance of SOEs 
before and during the 
financial crisis (2006 
to 2010) and 
afterwards (2011 to 
2014)? 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed pay 
Period 2006 – 2010, 
statistically significant: 
Turnover (+) 
 
Period 2011 – 2014, 
statistically significant: 
Turnover (+) 
 
Non-statistically significant: 
LR (+) 
IFWE (-) 
STIs 
Period 2006 – 2010 
Statistically moderate to 
strong: 
Turnover (+) 
 
Statistically moderate: 
LR (-) 
ROE (-) 
ROCE (-) 
 
Period 2011 – 2014: 
Statistically strong to very 
strong: 
Turnover (+) 
OP (+) 
NP (+) 
 
Statistically very strong: 
ROCE (-) 
  
Total remuneration 
Period 2006 – 2010: 
Statistically significant: 
OP (+) 
NP (-) 
 
Period 2011 ‒ 2014: 
Statistically significant: 
IFWE (-) 
 
Non-statistically significant: 
ROCE (-) 
ROE (+) 
RQ4 
 
Is the remuneration of 
CEOs affected by 
demographic 
variables age, tenure, 
gender, race, and 
education? 
Fixed pay 
Statistically significant: 
Gender (-) 
Age (-) 
Race (Coloured) (+) 
Tenure (+) 
Education (Honours degree) (-) 
 
Non-statistically significant: 
Race (Black African) (+)
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Research 
question 
Remuneration 
component 
Finding Research question 
 
 
 
 
RQ4 
 
 
Is the remuneration of 
CEOs affected by 
demographic 
variables age, tenure, 
gender, race, and 
education? 
STIs Statistically weak correlation: 
Tenure (+) 
Total remuneration 
Statistically significant: 
Education (Master’s degree) (-) 
Tenure (+) 
 
Non-statistically significant: 
Race (Black African) (+) 
Education (Honours degree) (-) 
 
RQ5 
Is there a relationship 
between CEOs’ 
remuneration and the 
size of South African 
SOE? 
Fixed pay No 
STIs Statistically significant 
relationship (+) 
Total remuneration Yes 
Non-statistically significant: 
Very large SOE (+) 
 
6.8   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a discussion of the research results, providing in-depth insight 
into each of the results, and relating these to the research questions and 
observations from pertinent literature. 
 
The findings appear to suggest that there is a relationship (either positive or 
negative) between the components of CEO remuneration and the results of various 
measures of Company performance.  While some of the components of Company 
performance showed no relationship with the components of CEO remuneration, 
others were found to have a significant negative relationship.  It can therefore be 
assumed that there is a basis to claim an inverse correlated relationship between 
the SOEs’ performance and their CEOs’ remuneration.  This is opposed to Theku’s 
(2014) finding in this regard. 
 
Interestingly, the Company performance component IFWE, which has not used in 
previous studies, was found to play key role in determining the fixed pay and total 
remuneration of the CEOs, although an inverse relationship was found.  Although 
the results of the Spearman rank correlation coefficient showed that AO had a 
relationship with Fixed pay and Total remuneration, the results from the OLS 
regression analysis show no relationship.  The AO was therefore found to have had 
no impact on the CEOs’ remuneration. 
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The discussion in the previous chapter further provided a deeper insight into the 
relationship between the CEOs’ remuneration and the results of the measures of 
company performance, in answering Research Question 2.  The results indicate 
that there was an unstable and fluctuating relationship between the components of 
Company performance and those of CEO remuneration for the period 2006 to 2014.  
 
Chapter 7 will restate the main findings of the research, based on the discussion 
presented in this chapter, and will outline recommendations for business 
deliberation and future studies on the subject. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
“We shall not cease from exploration, and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive 
at where we started and know the place for the first time.” 
Elliot 1974: 209 
 
7.1   INTRODUCTION  
The relationship between CEO remuneration and company performance has 
become a much-debated topic in academic and public spheres.  Critics claim that 
CEOs are overpaid in relation to the performance of the companies they manage.  
Therefore, if there is no meaningful relationship between a CEO’s remuneration and 
the company’s performance, this claim is founded. Furthermore, it is then 
debateable whether the millions of rands of assets of SOEs are being managed 
cost-effectively.  
 
The preceding chapters introduced the research problem, reviewed the theoretical 
underpinnings of the relationship between CEO remuneration to company 
performance, and discussed the findings of previous research. The SOE 
environment in South Africa was described, the research methodology of this study 
was explained, and the results of the present study were discussed. 
 
This chapter briefly reiterates the reasons for undertaking the research, together 
with an outline of the research methodology.  This is followed by a summary of the 
key findings of the research.  The researcher then presents a conceptual framework 
based on the findings of this research. This is followed by recommendations to 
relevant stakeholders, whereafter areas for suggested further research are 
discussed.  Finally, the researcher provides the conclusions drawn from the results 
of the study. 
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7.2   REASONS FOR UNDERTAKING THE RESEARCH 
The primary goal of this research was to determine whether there is a link between 
CEO remuneration and the performance of South African SOEs.  As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the main research question stemmed from the fact that remuneration 
packages of CEOs in SOEs have increased over the past few years, despite the 
poor performance of some of these SOEs.  Further, pervious research has largely 
been focused on public companies, with little research being available on SOEs.  
This study therefore focused on Schedule 2 SOEs in South Africa, in order to 
remedy the limited understanding of the relationship between SOEs’ performance 
and their CEOs’ remuneration.  Schedule 2 SOEs are deemed key entities. They 
have the most autonomy compared to other SOEs, operate in a competitive 
marketplace, and are managed according to good governance principles.  
 
This study aimed to determine the existence of the following:   
 whether there was a relationship between CEO remuneration and SOEs’ 
performance for the period 2006 to 2014; 
 whether the relationship between CEO remuneration and SOE performance 
had strengthened during the period 2006 to 2014; 
 the relationship between the components of CEO remuneration components 
and the components of Company performance for the periods 2006 to 2010 
and 2011 to 2014;  
 whether the CEO demographic variables — age, tenure, gender, race, and 
education affected the remuneration of the CEOs of the SOEs; and 
 Whether there was a relationship between the CEO’s remuneration and the 
size of the SOE. 
 
7.3   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
The researcher applied a positivistic, deductive approach in this study. The study 
was, further, mainly exploratory and archival in nature, while the time horizon was 
longitudinal.  The researcher collected secondary data from the annual reports of 
SOEs, and applied a quantitative methodology in analysing the data.  
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The researcher applied no sampling methodology, due to the small target 
population.  All 21 South African Schedule 2 SOEs were included in the study.  After 
applying the population selection criteria shown in Figure 14, the realised sample 
consisted of 18 companies.  The three SOE eliminated from the process either did 
not operate for the entire nine-year period, or not all the annual reports for the nine-
year period were available.  The researcher did not perform research on human 
subjects, which reduced associated ethical considerations.  
 
The researcher used accounting-based measures of company performance, 
namely turnover, OP, NP, ROCE, ROE, SR, LR, IFWE, and AO. These were the 
independent variables.  The second group of independent variables was the CEOs’ 
demographic variables and Company size.  The components of CEO remuneration, 
the dependent variables, were Fixed pay, STIs, and Total remuneration.  
 
The statistical package SPSS 22 was used for the descriptive analysis of the data, 
and EViews 8 was used to run multiple regression models on the pooled dataset.  
For the purposes of this study, correlations were accepted as statistically significant 
if the correlation exhibited a p-value of 5%.  
 
Chapter 5 provided the results of the analyses of the data collected for the different 
variables for each of the nine years 2006 to 2014 for 18 SOEs.  The descriptive 
statistics for the variables were discussed. Correlational and multiple regression 
analyses were performed for each of the nine years, using the components of CEO 
remuneration as the dependent variables, and the components of Company 
performance as the independent variables. 
 
7.4   RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Due to its exploratory nature, this research provides valuable insights into the 
relationship between CEO remuneration and the selected variables in South African 
Schedule 2 SOEs.  This section discusses, first, the primary findings of this research 
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— the findings related to the research questions, and, secondly, the secondary 
findings of this research. 
 
7.4.1 Primary research findings 
Contrary to the widely held opinion that there is no link between company 
performance and CEO remuneration, the situation in South African SOEs has 
proved this sentiment untrue. From this research, all three CEO remuneration 
components were shown to have either a positive or a negative relationship with 
Company performance.  
 There is a relationship between the CEOs’ fixed pay and three of the measures 
of the SOEs’ performance — turnover, NP, and IFWE. Due to the poor 
performance of the SOEs, a negative relationship was expected.  However, a 
positive relationship was found between the CEOs’ fixed pay, turnover, and 
NP respectively.  
 A significant positive correlation was found between the STIs component of 
the CEOs’ remuneration and three of the company performance measures.  
The company performance measures that displayed a statistically significant 
relationship with STIs were OP, NP, and turnover.  However, the relationships 
with OP and NP were weak, compared to the strong relationship between 
CEOs’ STIs and turnover.  
 There was a relationship between the CEOs’ total remuneration and five 
measures of company performance: OP, NP, LR, ROCE, and IFWE.  OP and 
LR were the only measures that had a positive relationship with the CEOs’ 
total remuneration.  
Hence, in answering Research Question 1, the researcher found a relationship 
between the components of CEO remuneration and those of company performance, 
with the individual relationships generally moving in and out of the different 
relationship boundaries. The positive relationship between the components of the 
CEOs’ remuneration and some of the measures of the SOEs’ performance could 
possibly provide justification for the high levels of the CEOs’ remuneration.  
However, the majority of the measures of company performance revealed a 
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negative relationship, which is a cause for concern.  This could suggest that CEOs 
are paid for poor performance, suggesting that the relationship is not strong enough.  
In answering Research Question 2, the results indicated the following: 
 
 In the case of the CEOs’ fixed pay, the analysis indicated no consistent trend 
in its relationship with the SOEs’ performance. Turnover demonstrated a 
strong to very strong statistically positive relationship with the CEOs’ fixed 
salaries throughout the study period.  It was further noted that there was a 
downward trend the relationship between the CEO’s salaries and the 
performance of the SOEs in the 2012/2013 financial year, with the exception 
of turnover. 
 In the case of STIs, there was an unstable trend throughout the study period.  
This could suggest that SOEs do not use a range of performance targets to 
determine the CEOs’ STIs.  An upward trend was noted in the strength of the 
linear relationship for the 2013/2014 financial year.  
 In the case of the relationship between the CEO’s total remuneration and the 
measures of the SOEs’ performance, the trend seemed to mirror that of the 
CEOs’ fixed salaries, where the researcher did not note a consistent trend over 
the study period. Further, no definite pattern of improvement in the strength of 
the linear relationship was noted. A downward trend was noted for 2013, with 
the exception of turnover. 
 
In summary, in answering Research Question 2, the results indicate no consistent 
trend in the relationship between the components of the CEOs’ remuneration and 
the performance of SOEs. Turnover (having a positive relationship throughout the 
period) was the only exception, and played a stronger role in both the fixed salaries 
and total remuneration of the CEOs.  The initial expectation was that the relationship 
between the CEOs’ remuneration and the SOEs’ performance would strengthen 
over the nine-year period, due to the effects of increased monitoring and regulation.  
However, the fluctuations seen appear to relate more to the macroeconomic 
environment than improved corporate governance (Bussin 2014).  
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Research Question 3 focused on analysing the relationship between the 
components of CEO remuneration and the measures of the SOEs’ performance for 
the periods 2006 to 2010 and 2011 to 2014.  For the period 2006 to 2010, the results 
indicate that:  
 
 There is a positive relationship between the CEOs’ fixed salaries and one 
measure of the SOEs’ performance, namely turnover. 
 There is a moderate to strong statistically significant positive relationship 
between the CEOs’ remuneration and the SOEs’ turnover, and a strong 
statistically negative relationship between the CEOs’ remuneration and the 
SOEs’ LR, ROE, and ROCE.   
 There is a positive relationship between the CEOs’ total remuneration and the 
SOEs’ OP, and a negative relationship between the CEOs’ total remuneration 
and the SOEs’ NP. 
 
The positive relationship between the CEOs’ remuneration and the SOEs’ 
performance was contrary to expectation, due to the poor performance of the SOEs.  
In fact, six of the eight measures of their performance declined during the period 
2006 to 2011, while all the components of the CEOs’ remuneration increased. 
 
For the period 2011 to 2014, classified in this study as the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, a relationship was found between the CEOs’ remuneration and the 
performance of the SOEs. However, the performance measures with which the 
components of the CEOs’ remuneration had a relationship were, in some instances, 
different for the two periods (before and during, and after the financial crisis).  
 
 The CEOs’ fixed salaries showed a positive relationship with the SOEs 
turnover and LRs, and a negative relationship with their IFWE.  
 The measures of the SOEs’ performance that displayed a strong to very strong 
statistically significant positive relationship with the CEOs’ STIs are turnover, 
OP, and NP.  Further, a very strong statistically negative relationship was 
found between the STIs and the SOE’s ROCE.  
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 A positive relationship was found between the CEOs’ total remuneration and 
the SOEs’ ROE, and a negative relationship was found between the CEO’s 
total remuneration and the SOEs’ ROCE and IFWE.  
 
SOEs typically have close political connections with the government.  The literature 
suggests that IFWE signals poor management or board oversight, which could 
result in a loss of crucial political connections for these SOEs.  As a result, the board 
and shareholders could reduce executive remuneration to penalise them for such a 
loss. From the negative relationship between the components of the CEOs’ 
remuneration and the SOEs’ IFWE, it could be inferred that CEOs are penalised for 
IFWE by receiving lower remuneration. 
 
Research Question 4 aimed to establish to what extent the CEOs’ demographic 
variables affected their remuneration.  The results indicate the following: 
 
 In the case of fixed pay, there is a relationship with the CEO’s age in years, 
gender, tenure, and level of education.  It is evident that male CEOs of SOEs 
earn more than their female counterparts. However, this finding should be 
interpreted with caution, as the sample contained only 19.2% female CEOs.  
Surprisingly, the results revealed that the CEOs with a bachelor’s degree 
earned more than those with an honours degree.  The expectation, based on 
previous research, was that CEOs with a higher level of education would earn 
more. The positive relationship with tenure suggests that, as CEOs’ 
experience increases, their worth to the company increases, resulting in a 
higher fixed pay.  It was further noted that Coloured CEOs earned more fixed 
pay than white CEOs did.  This suggests that race has an effect on the fixed 
salaries of CEOs in South African SOEs.  
 In the case of STIs, a weak positive relationship existed with tenure, 
suggesting that STIs will show a weak increase as a CEO’s tenure increases. 
 In the case of total remuneration, there was a negative relationship with race 
and education, and a positive relationship with tenure. The analysis of this 
dataset showed that a CEO with a Master’s degree would earn less than a 
CEO with a bachelor’s degree, while the positive relationship with tenure 
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suggests that the longer a CEO remains with an SOE, the higher his or her 
total remuneration would be.  This suggests that the CEOs are remunerated 
for years of experience, and not according to their level of education.  The 
results further reveal that black African CEOs earn more than white CEOs. 
 
Based on the findings for Research Question 4, it could be argued that an SOE’s 
performance may improve when the CEO is remuneration in line with his or her 
preferences, which may be related to personal circumstances. These 
circumstances are likely to change over time, suggesting that reward strategies 
should be flexible, in order to accommodate these circumstances. 
 
The aim of Research Question 5 was to determine whether there is a relationship 
between the components of the CEO’s remuneration and the size of the SOE.  The 
results showed the following: 
 
 The size of the SOE is not a statistical predictor of the CEO’s fixed pay. 
 There is a strong positive relationship between the CEO’s STIs and the size 
of the SOE. 
 An SOE being classified as very large in terms of revenue (R2.54bn to 
R27.6bn) and assets (R3bn3 to R78.8bn) has an effect on the CEO’s total 
remuneration.  
 
7.4.2 Secondary research findings 
The secondary research findings provide additional context to the relationship 
between CEOs’ remuneration and the performance of South African SOEs. 
 
 The growth in the medians of the components of CEO remuneration showed 
fluctuation over the study period.  However, STIs’ movement was more volatile 
during the study period than that of the other two remuneration components.  
A worrying observation was the weakening of the relationship between the 
STIs component of CEO remuneration and the SOEs’ performance. In 
conjunction with the weakening relationship between the STIs and company 
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performance, the descriptive statistics indicated an increase in the CEOs’ fixed 
pay during the study period.  
 
 The decline of STIs, coupled with the increase in fixed pay during the nine-
year period, suggests that CEOs have moved away from STIs, preferring a 
fixed pay, possibly to avoid performance-related considerations in the 
determination of their remuneration.  This has created a misalignment between 
what the CEOs are being paid and the performance of the SOEs — an inverse 
relationship between some measures of SOE performance and the CEOs’ 
remuneration.   
 
 The results of the present study revealed that the CEOs received high STIs 
during the worst period of the financial crisis, even when the SOEs’ 
performance was poor.  Public anger over the amounts top executives are 
paid, including bonuses irrespective of company performance, might be 
harmful to SOEs’ reputation. This has a ripple effect — people lose trust in the 
company, and the company becomes hesitant to pay bonuses.  This is 
especially true for companies under continuous public scrutiny (such as SOEs) 
and in times when high unemployment rates prevail (Nellkrans & Dogan 2015), 
such as in South Africa.  
 
 An important observation from the descriptive statistics was the decline in the 
performance of the SOEs in the period 2006 to 2011, as evidenced by the 
decline in the results of six of the eight measures of the SOEs’ performance.  
As found by Otieno (2014), the deterioration in the performance of the SOEs 
was most evident in 2009. However, the components of the CEOs’ 
remuneration did not show a similar decline during the same period.  In fact, 
their fixed salaries increased by 11% year on year, STIs increased by 21% 
year on year, and their total remuneration increased by 14% year on year for 
the period 2006 to 2011.  This disconnect signals that the SOEs’ remuneration 
committees did not adjust the CEOs’ remuneration to reflect the poor 
performance of the SOEs.  However, it could also suggest that the CEOs were 
compensated for the difficult task of managing the SOEs during a period of 
economic turmoil. This would indicate that the decline in the SOEs’ 
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performance is considered an exogenous factor for which the CEOs are not 
held accountable (Nellkrans & Dogan 2015). 
 
 Furthermore, the above constituted a value-deteriorating step for government 
as a shareholder, as the CEOs’ remuneration increased despite the poor 
performance of the SOEs. The CEOs therefore received remuneration that 
was not aligned to the performance of their SOEs. This is contrary to the 
proposition by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that shareholders appoint 
executives to act in their best interests.  Thus, although CEO remuneration in 
South African SOEs does not necessarily seem excessive, there are concerns 
about the separation of SOEs’ company performance from the CEOs’ 
remuneration.  However, considering the responsibilities and risk associated 
to the position, CEOs may not be overpaid although their remuneration is not 
aligned to SOE performance.  
 
 Further, the misalignment between SOEs’ performance and the CEOs’ 
remuneration could be evidence of inappropriately designed remuneration 
packages that promote self-interested behaviour by management (Kang, 
Kumar, & Lee 2006). This corroborates the discussion on self-interested 
behaviour of executives in Chapter 2. It also supports the postulation of 
Fontrodona and Sison (2006) that individuals motivated by economic benefits 
will attempt to maximise their own benefits.  This self-interested behaviour is 
contrary to the tenet of the stewardship theory, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
However, it supports the notion of the public choice theory, where the primary 
consideration in the political sphere is self-interest (Shaw 2008; Mbo & Adjasi 
2013). It would have been expected that, due to the high level of scrutiny and 
regulation of SOEs, remuneration would be controlled and appropriate 
(Mengistae & Xu 2004).  However, this does not seem to be the case in South 
African SOEs.  
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7.3   CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Figure 2 in Chapter 1 presented the theoretical framework on which this study was 
based.  From the results of the empirical investigation, discussed in Chapter 5, the 
conceptual framework for this study is presented in Figures 33 to 35. 
 
Figure 33 Conceptual framework: Fixed pay 
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Figure 34 Conceptual framework: STIs 
 
Figure 35 Conceptual framework: Total remuneration 
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During the study, the attention moved from the key concepts and theoretical 
frameworks underpinning the context of the study (Figure 2) to the conceptual and 
practical outcomes of the study (Figures 33 to 35). Robson (2011) defines a 
conceptual framework as a structure of beliefs, suppositions, theories, and concepts 
that support and inform a research study. Figures 33 to 35 therefore visually 
illustrate the researcher’s understanding of the relationships between the 
components of CEO remuneration and the dependent variables (the components of 
Company performance and CEO demographic variables). 
 
7.4   RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study provides an original contribution with regard to the relationship between 
CEOs’ remuneration and the performance of Schedule 2 SOEs in South Africa.  This 
will be of particular interest to investors and other stakeholders, such as unions and 
regulators, who expect CEOs’ remuneration to be aligned with the SOEs’ 
performance.  
 
7.4.1 Recommendations to stakeholders 
In managing the relationship between SOEs’ performance and their CEOs’ 
remuneration, it is recommended that the relevant stakeholders consider the 
following: 
 
 Regarding the effect of the CEO’s preferences in determining his or her 
remuneration, it is recommended that SOEs develop a formal, standardised 
policy that deals specifically with discretion with regard to the strategy for the 
CEO’s rewards; 
 Regarding the alignment of CEO’s remuneration with SOEs’ performance, the 
current notable misalignment could be evidence of inappropriately designed 
remuneration frameworks that promote self-interested behaviour by CEOs.  It 
is therefore recommended that SOEs develop a remuneration framework that 
ensures alignment between SOEs’ performance and the CEOs’ remuneration; 
 Regarding company performance measures that are important when 
determining CEOs’ remuneration, it is recommended that SOEs’ boards and 
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remuneration committees meticulously consider the following measures to 
determine remuneration: turnover, operating profit, net profit liquidity and 
IFWE. This should ensure that the right measures are used to determine the 
right components.  Further, more attention needs to be paid to different 
accounting- and market-based measures in measuring CEOs’ performance; 
 Jensen et al. (2004) maintain that inappropriate measurement of performance 
leads to inappropriate incentives. SOEs need to communicate measures of 
CEO performance to CEOs, stakeholders and employees within the company, 
with the remuneration of CEOs clearly linked to these measures, to ensure 
high performance of SOEs; 
 Once SOEs have identified the suitable and relevant measures of their 
performance, these need to be linked to realistic and achievable targets for 
CEOs, in alignment with stakeholders’ expectations; 
 SOEs need to develop well-defined, all-inclusive, and contemporary 
guidelines for setting CEOs’ remuneration. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
DPE provided remuneration guidelines in 2007.  However, not all SOEs follow 
these guidelines, and of the application of these guidelines occurs primarily in 
SOEs that report to the DPE.  Furthermore, these guidelines are not linked to 
the components of SOEs’ performance.  The current guidelines are therefore 
obsolete, and need to be appropriate for the markets in which SOEs operate, 
with specific regard for the skills and talent that SOEs need to attract; 
 As noted in Chapter 6, the inconsistent relationship between CEOs’ STIs and 
SOEs’ performance may suggest that SOEs do not follow a standard policy 
when awarding bonuses. Moreover, the present research indicates 
inconsistencies within SOEs regarding remuneration of their CEOs.  The 
development of an overarching framework for remuneration for Schedule 2 
SOEs is recommended, in line with recommendations by the Presidential 
Review Committee on State-Owned Entities (2013); 
 SOE boards should hold CEOs liable for the performance of the SOE.  This 
ought to ensure that CEOs do not act purely out of self-interest, but that the 
interests of the shareholder are also taken into consideration;  
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 SOEs’ remuneration committees should ensure that non-performing CEOs do 
not receive enormous salary increases or STIs. Therefore, CEOs should be 
rewarded or penalised, depending on the performance of their SOEs;  
 SOE management need to disclose executive remuneration in a clear and 
understandable manner. SOEs should state “one figure” for remuneration that 
includes the value of all remuneration paid during the year, including salary, 
bonus, pension, benefits, and the value of any incentives granted. 
 
7.4.2 Recommendations to remuneration- and HR practitioners 
In designing any HR programme, remuneration specialists and HR practitioners 
have the opportunity to ensure that the design principles and features of the 
programme are aligned with market practices and the organisation’s objectives.  
Based on the results of the present study, it is recommended that remuneration 
specialists and HR practitioners ensure that: 
 SOEs’ remuneration committees set remuneration in an equitable and fair 
manner, and are aware of social out-group bias (the tendency to have negative 
views about people who are not members of one's own group);  
 As per findings of Maloa (2015), inconsistencies and absence of checks and 
balances exist in terms of the implementation of transformation in executive 
remuneration. Remuneration specialists and HR practitioners therefore need 
to ensure that the Employment Equity Act (EEA) 55 of 1998 is adhered to in 
setting CEOs’ remuneration. The EEA requires employers to take measures 
to progressively reduce a disproportionate income differential and to institute 
an equal pay for equal work philosophy; 
 STI payments are aligned with agreed-upon performance objectives. These 
objectives should not be repeated across incentives and if the performance 
criteria are not met, they should not be re-tested in a subsequent year; 
 SOEs’ remuneration committees calculate CEOs’ remuneration according to 
a prescribed and rational method and in a transparent way, which will ensure 
that the shareholders’ and the taxpayers’ interests are protected; 
 A remuneration framework and policy for CEOs of SOEs is developed that is 
fair and responsible with reference to all employees;  
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 The development of a tool that sets out greater clarity in terms of the 
breakdown and the necessary EEA targets, in setting CEO remuneration. The 
purpose of this tool would be to establish equity in CEO remuneration pay 
levels in order to assist South African SOEs in the process of implementing 
transformation; 
 Benchmarking of CEOs’ remuneration is appropriate and not just an alignment 
of their remuneration to private sector salaries.   
 
7.5   CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
The primary contribution of this research is its extension of the literature on CEO 
remuneration practices in South Africa. This research examined the popular belief 
that CEOs’ pay should reflect the performance of the company. The main aim was 
to examine whether there is a relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and the 
performance of South African Schedule 2 SOEs. This study opened up new and 
potentially fruitful avenues for future research. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, this study provides a mini meta-analysis of studies 
that found either a negative relationship or no relationship between CEOs’ 
remuneration and companies’ performance. Past research on executive 
remuneration and company performance concentrated mainly on public companies.  
This study therefore contributes new knowledge to the scarce research on SOEs’ 
performance and CEOs’ remuneration, particular with regard to the relationship 
between the constructs in the South Africa context. 
 
The present study found that there is a relationship (either negative or positive) 
between the components of CEOs’ remuneration and the performance of South 
African Schedule 2 SOEs.  Further, as with Otieno’s (2011) study, public companies 
could use the results of this study to compare how their alignment of executive 
remuneration to company performance measures up to that of the SOEs, in the 
context of the debate around excessive executive remuneration in both SOEs and 
public companies. 
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This research is one of few studies that assessed the relationship between CEO 
remuneration and company performance before and during, as well as after the 
financial crisis (2006 to 2014).  The study contributes to the literature on the effects 
of CEO remuneration on company performance in the pre- and post-crisis periods.  
The aim was to test how the financial crisis had impacted the relationship between 
the constructs. In this respect, criticisms and concerns regarding excessive 
executive remuneration seem valid, especially given the negative impact of the 
financial crisis on South Africa’s and the global economy. 
 
This research focused on different components of executive remuneration, to 
determine the relationship of these components with components of company 
performance, as suggested by Otieno (2011) and Farmer et al. (2010).  The present 
researcher included three components of executive remuneration, namely fixed 
pay, STIs, and total remuneration, and tested the relationship of each with the 
components of company performance.  In doing so, this study shed more light on 
the relationship between executive remuneration and company performance.  
 
Otieno further recommended that future research extend the period of such a study, 
to ascertain whether the results obtained were applicable only to the short term, or 
if there is a long-term association between executive remuneration and company 
performance.  Furthermore, in their study, Deysel and Kruger (2015) propose that 
researchers concentrating on a short-term horizon of less than seven years may 
produce skewed research findings, thereby impeding the ability to reach 
conclusions.  The period of the current study was nine years (2006 to 2014).  This 
study therefore addressed the concerns of Otieno (2011) and Deysel and Kruger 
(2015).  The present researcher selected a period of nine years to ensure a long-
term view, as investors deem this a sufficient period to account for possible short-
term recessions or fluctuations (Deysel 2013). 
 
Ochien’elly (2012) posits that one category of variables distinctly lacking from the 
majority of empirical models explaining the pay‒performance relationship is CEOs’ 
demographic information. The present study included the demographic variables of 
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age, tenure, gender, race, and education, thereby contributing to the knowledge of 
the effect of these variables on CEOs’ remuneration. 
 
Lastly, with the focus on the inequalities of remuneration between executives and 
employees, it has become important that all remuneration practices and strategies 
are beyond criticism, and reflect justifiable and realistic reasoning.  
 
Literature, theories, and industry surveys brought forward by researchers, 
consultants, and scholars have not sufficiently investigated the relationship between 
CEO remuneration, remuneration strategies, and organisational performance, 
especially within the South African context. Had these contributions provided 
conclusive proof of the relationship between pay and performance, there would be 
no debate around equitable remuneration in South Africa or abroad.  This study may 
serve as a useful source of information for labour representatives, organisations, 
human resources practitioners, and remuneration committees in setting strategies 
for CEOs’ remuneration in such a way as to increase the likely impact thereof on 
company performance.  
7.6   SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Despite the fact that this study provides meaningful insights into the relationship 
between CEOs’ remuneration and various variables, the researcher highlighted 
several limitations of the study in Chapter 4.  These, in conjunction with additional 
observations made during the research project, suggest that further research is 
necessary to address these limitations.  The following areas for future research are 
suggested: 
 
 In this research, the researcher did not consider the different industries/sectors 
within which the SOEs under study operated.  Duffhues and Kabir (2008), and 
Goh and Gupta (2010), among others, postulate that the type of industry within 
which a company operates significantly influences the CEO’s remuneration.  
Further, considering that Henderson et al. (2006) found that the influence of 
tenure is industry-specific, future studies could focus on the specific industries 
within which SOEs operate. 
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 The focus of this study was South African SOEs, and it may be meaningful to 
undertake a study of SOEs in other countries, in order to compare the results.  
This will clarify whether the association between company performance and 
CEO remuneration found in the present study is only applicable to South 
African SOEs, or if a similar alignment can be observed in SOEs in other 
countries. 
 The relevance of IFWE in relation to the components of CEO remuneration in 
SOEs was noted.  However, there is a paucity of literature that either supports 
or disagrees with this finding.  It is therefore recommended that future studies 
explore this relationship in more depth. 
 This study investigated the relationship between STIs and long-term company 
performance, with LTIs excluded, because, as mentioned in Chapter 1, few 
SOEs offer LTIs.  Future studies could include LTIs, as the exclusion of LTIs 
as a component of CEO remuneration may have led to a significant aspect 
CEOs’ remuneration and its effect on company performance not being 
considered.  Further, the exclusion of LTIs might create prejudice against the 
pay‒performance relationship. 
 As put forward in this research, the “political” objectives of SOEs could play a 
role in the setting of CEO remuneration as well as company performance. 
Therefore, reporting to a political functionary with a stronger political focus can 
even outweigh the financial results when it comes to recognition and reward 
of the CEOs. It is therefore recommended that future studies include a political 
dimension as a variable. 
 Attaway (2000) suggests that, in order for a study to be able to determine 
whether CEO remuneration is linked to company performance, the same CEO 
should be in place for the period under study.  Ngwenya and Khumalo (2012) 
applied this criterion in their study. The present study, however, did not meet 
this criterion, and it is therefore recommended that future studies replicate this 
study using data for a period when the same CEO managed an organisation, 
to determine whether and how the results differ from those of the current study. 
 Considering that employee strikes are an ongoing phenomenon in South 
Africa, further studies on CEOs’ remuneration in relation to that of employees 
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could add quantifiable data for use in annual wage negotiations between 
organised labour and business. 
 Although an investigation into the culture of teamwork did not form part of this 
research, Beer and Katz (2003) found that neither executive bonuses nor any 
other aspect of remuneration predicted organisational performance. These 
authors found that the only variable that significantly predicted company 
performance was the extent to which the organisational culture is 
characterised by teamwork. It would therefore be interesting for future 
researchers to assess whether this holds true for South African SOEs. 
 It is recommended that future research focus on the self-interested behaviour 
of CEOs to determine whether it plays in role in setting CEO remuneration and 
what influence, if any, it has on the relationship between CEO remuneration 
and company performance. 
 As Conyon (2006) suggests, financial incentives are only one factor motivating 
executives. Executives are as likely to be motivated by other factors such as 
intrinsic factors of the job, career concerns, social norms, and the like. It is 
therefore recommended that future studies include these factors in their study. 
 
7.7   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this study, the researcher sought to contribute to the understanding of the 
relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and the performance of South African 
SOEs. The results of abundant empirical research examining the relationship are 
surprisingly inconsistent and, at times, even contradictory.  In addition, the role of 
executive remuneration in skewing income equality is cause for concern. 
 
The statistics on CEO remuneration provided in Chapter 2 show the rapid increase 
in CEO remuneration over the last decades.  A great deal of the public debate on 
CEO remuneration has highlighted the steady eroding of income equality (and the 
growing wage gap) accelerating in recent years. The discussion provided in Chapter 
2 emphasised the increasing gap between CEO remuneration and salary received 
by ordinary employees. The increase in CEO remuneration, as well as the 
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accompanying misalignment between remuneration and performance of the SOEs, 
was discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Although the present researcher expected to find a negative relationship between 
the CEOs’ remuneration and the SOEs’ performance, this was not the case in all 
instances. Some positive relationships were found in this study.  The results suggest 
that there is indeed a relationship between the components of CEO remuneration 
and some of the measures of the performance of South African SOEs. Turnover 
seemed to be the most stable measure of SOE’s performance, as could be seen 
from the discussion of the trend analysis.  This could suggest that turnover is the 
primary measure used in determining the remuneration of the CEOs of South 
African SOEs.  This could suggest that SOEs generate sufficient turnover to sustain 
their operations, without being overly dependent on government grants and 
subsidies (Ngwenya & Khumalo 2012).  
 
While the results of the present study suggest that there is a relationship between 
CEOs’ remuneration and SOEs’ performance, the declining performance of SOEs 
during the study period, despite high CEO remuneration, is a concern.  Moreover, 
the evidence of a negative relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and some of 
the measures of the SOEs’ performance suggests that the CEOs’ remuneration is 
not aligned with all of the measures of the SOEs’ performance, which may be a 
contributing factor with regard to poor performance of South African SOEs.   It also 
suggests that the dissatisfaction with the CEOs’ remuneration may be justified.  This 
indicates that challenges still exist in maintaining a link between company 
performance and CEO remuneration.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the CEOs’ fixed pay and total remuneration increased 
during the study period, these components did not show the runaway growth 
suggested in the media by social commentators. It is questionable whether the 
average year-on-year increase of between 8% and 9% over the nine-year period 
was larger than the increases received by employees.  However, the results from 
this study revealed that the CEOs’ fixed pay and total remuneration were not 
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dependent on the performance of their SOEs.  These remuneration components 
continued to increase, even when the SOEs were performing poorly.   
 
The findings of this research support the notion that successfully linking pay to 
performance is dependent on appropriate performance targets and measures of 
both the CEO’s performance and that of the organisation.  Because there is no 
regulation of performance targets and measures used by SOEs, SOEs use diverse 
performance targets and performance measures.  All performance measures have 
their limitations, but some take a longer-term view.  To ensure the long-term success 
of SOEs, more long-term performance measures should be incorporated in SOEs’ 
remuneration strategies.  
 
The results of this study indicate that there is a need in South Africa to complement 
the relationship between company performance and CEOs’ and executives’ pay 
through adherence to the recommendations of King III (or King IV, to be 
implemented with effect from 1 April 2017).  
 
Never in the history of South Africa has it been more important to ensure that 
executive remuneration is aligned to company performance.  This is due to the 
prevailing economic climate, as well as the high levels of unemployment and social 
unrest. High executive remuneration that is not linked to company performance 
poses a long-term risk, not only the continued existence of SOEs, but also to the 
broader society. Until executive remuneration is perceived to be fair and aligned 
with company performance, it will continue to receive intense criticism from unions, 
regulators, shareholders, and the public. 
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ANNEXURE A 
                               EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION THEORIES 
Theory Proponent (s) Explanation 
Agency theory Bearl and 
Means 1932 
Separation of ownership and control 
causes agency costs 
Class hegemony 
theory 
Gomez-Mejia 
1994 
Fellow CEOs as board numbers 
follow own interests 
Efficiency wage 
theory 
Prendergast 
1999 
Premiums paid to CEOs to 
incentivise extra efforts 
Figurehead theory Ungston and 
Steers 1984 
CEOs are paid as leaders and 
figureheads, rather than for results 
Human capital theory Agarwal 1981 Executive remuneration based 
knowledge and skills 
Managerialism 
theory 
Gomez-Mejia 
1994 
Managers have absolute power and 
control to pursue own interests 
Marginal productivity 
theory 
Gomez-Mejia 
1994 
CEOs should receive compensation 
based on value added 
Prospect theory Wiseman and 
Gomez-Mejia 
1998 
CEOs paid for risk aversion 
Social comparison 
theory 
O’Reilly, Main, 
and Crystal 
1998 
Board members’ pay informs top 
management’s pay 
Tournament theory Lazear and 
Rosen 1981 
Executive remuneration sets 
incentives for direct subordinates 
The pay 
compression 
hypothesis 
Lazear 1989 
1991 
The pay difference between 
managers may be smaller than the 
productivity difference, because pay 
compression will lead to high 
performance 
Source: Ulrich (2010: 408), Otten (2008: 28) and Kubo (2010: 85-86) 
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ANNEXURE B 
Extreme values — CEO remuneration variables 
 Case Number Value 
CEO salary Highest 1 15 8416000 
2 100 7931000 
3 28 6500000 
4 29 6402150 
5 127 5769000 
Lowest 1 71 870000 
2 144 887158 
3 45 968714 
4 70 974000 
5 90 985855 
CEO total benefits Highest 1 34 13218772 
2 33 7430452 
3 100 5508000 
4 30 4692588 
5 124 4324231 
Lowest 1 162 0 
2 161 0 
3 159 0 
4 158 0 
5 157 0a 
CEO bonus Highest 1 129 6473000 
2 133 5790000 
3 28 5200000 
4 51 4392000 
5 147 4385000 
Lowest 1 162 0 
2 161 0 
3 160 0 
4 159 0 
5 157 0a 
TCEO total remuneration Highest 1 34 19108837 
2 100 13439000 
3 33 12827648 
4 129 12473000 
5 30 12067321 
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Lowest 1 90 1077074 
2 119 1150518 
3 89 1171937 
4 88 1184692 
5 71 1360000 
TCEO total remuneration adjusted for Job 
tenure (1% per year) 
Highest 1 34 18933609 
2 100 12901440 
3 33 12699372 
4 129 12348270 
5 30 11946648 
Lowest 1 90 1068996 
2 119 1139013 
3 89 1152366 
4 88 1160998 
5 71 1346400 
 
a. Only a partial list of cases with the value 0 are shown in the table of lower extremes. 
 
Extreme values — Company performance variables
 Case Number Value 
Turnover/Revenue (R'000) Highest 1 100 139506000000 
2 101 128869000000 
3 102 114760000000 
4 103 91447000000 
5 104 71209000000 
Lowest 1 83 93908207 
2 84 113460341 
3 87 127517726 
4 89 133657847 
5 88 139824507 
(EBIT) Operating profit_income/loss (R'000) Highest 1 102 22329000000 
2 32 17138000000 
3 36 14677000000 
4 103 14515000000 
5 34 14482000000 
Lowest 1 29 -11047000000 
2 105 -3195000000 
3 109 -2307000000 
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4 59 -1429210000 
5 55 -1414991000 
Net Profit/Loss for the year (R'000) Highest 1 32 37585000000 
2 102 13248000000 
3 36 9321000000 
4 35 8849000000 
5 103 8356000000 
Lowest 1 29 -11499000000 
2 105 -9181000000 
3 109 -2554000000 
4 154 -1977000000 
5 55 -1432145000 
Liquidity ratio Highest 1 63 10.487668 
2 58 10.409452 
3 57 9.471043 
4 60 9.350079 
5 122 8.779604 
Lowest 1 161 .044289 
2 73 .056116 
3 160 .060898 
4 80 .070007 
5 74 .086905 
Solvency ratio Highest 1 50 9.765425 
2 51 8.817231 
3 136 7.860097 
4 49 7.774494 
5 52 6.200411 
Lowest 1 109 .820276 
2 162 .833010 
3 87 .834044 
4 161 .850073 
5 160 .855085 
ROCE Highest 1 109 4.462282 
2 42 2.866288 
3 45 .864518 
4 44 .827029 
5 43 .822581 
Lowest 1 99 -.477744 
2 110 -.410182 
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3 29 -.387655 
4 15 -.362349 
5 96 -.304511 
ROE Highest 1 85 4.987218 
2 99 2.269941 
3 110 1.375736 
4 32 1.241905 
5 69 .775487 
Lowest 1 111 -1.902935 
2 90 -.915019 
3 98 -.867868 
4 84 -.829881 
5 96 -.640636 
Total Irregular, fruitless 
 and wasteful expenditure 
Highest 1 130 8264500000 
2 10 3418809000 
3 55 2531011000 
4 38 2231756411 
5 56 1009422000 
Lowest 1 162 0 
2 161 0 
3 160 0 
4 159 0 
5 158 0a 
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ANNEXURE C
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ANNEXURE D 
Correlation coefficient — Fixed pay and Company performance  
(n = 18) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Turnover 0.63** 0.51* 0.51* 0.77** 0.71** 0.51* 0.64** 0.65** 0.74** 
Operating 
profit 
0.43 0.45 0.28 0.28 0.55* 0.44 0.58* 0.10 0.72** 
Net profit 0.41 0.37 0.17 -0.19 0.29 0.34 0.49* -0.23 0.66** 
Liquidity -0.26 -0.34 -0.17 -0.14 -0.23 -0.16 0.09 -0.55* -0.41 
Solvency -0.22 -0.26 -0.15 -0.11 -0.07 -0.04 -0.00 -0.38 -0.23 
ROCE -0.26 -0.01 -0.35 -0.27 -0.17 0.04 -0.34 -0.50* 0.19 
ROE 0.36 -0.43 -0.34 -0.20 0.12 -0.12 -0.00 -0.20 0.14 
IFWE 0.53* -0.02 -0.00 -0.18 0.07 0.14 0.17 -0.23 -0.18 
** p < .01 (2-tailed) 
* p < 0.05 (2 tailed) 
 
Correlation coefficient — STIs and Company performance 
2006 
(n=13) 
2007 
(n=15) 
2008 
(n=12) 
2009 
(n=12) 
2010 
(n=13) 
2011 
(n=12) 
2012 
(n=11) 
2013 
(n=10)
2014 
(n=10) 
Turnover 0.63* 0.77** 0.55 0.31 0.40 0.07 0.38 0.35 0.76* 
Operating 
profit 
0.43 0.44 0.34 0.15 0.48 0.57 0.71* -0.30 0.82** 
Net profit 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.05 0.43 0.48 0.58 -0.30 0.86** 
Liquidity -0.62* -0.09 -0.18 0.04 -0.45 0.01 0.11 -0.19 -0.50 
Solvency -0.39 0.09 0.18 0.15 -0.48 0.34 0.36 -0.37 -0.02 
ROCE -0.01 0.39 0.40 -0.59* -0.14 0.42 -0.19 -0.69* 0.38 
ROE 0.34 0.64* -0.47 0.64* 0.32 0.25 -0.13 -0.30 0.44 
IFWE -0.21 0.15 -0.41 -0.27 0.05 -0.39 0.14 0.44 0.18 
** p < .01 (2-tailed) 
* p < 0.05 (2 tailed) 
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Correlation coefficient — Total remuneration and Company performance  2006 
(n=13) 
2007 
(n=15) 
2008 
(n=12)
2009 
(n=12) 
2010 
(n=13) 
2011 
(n=12) 
2012 
(n=11) 
2013 
(n=10)
2014 
(n=10) 
Turnover 0.72** 0.70** 0.79** 0.74** 0.50* 0.71** 0.73** 0.76** 0.74** 
Operating 
profit 
0.46 0.36 0.21 0.20 0.66** 0.66** 0.75** 0.26 0.79** 
Net profit 0.53* 0.29 0.32 0.24 0.59** 0.58** 0.53* 0.14 0.69** 
Liquidity -0.52* -0.17 0.05 0.03 -0.39 -0.33 -0.28 -
0.63** 
-0.11 
Solvency -0.22 -0.03 0.25 0.34 0.06 0.10 0.29 -0.30 -0.11 
ROCE 0.01 -0.10 -0.32 -0.44 -0.13 -0.00 0.21 -0.11 0.39 
ROE 0.31 -0.53* -0.31 -0.31 0.29 -0.06 0.07 -0.24 0.07 
IFWE 0.01 -0.20 -0.19 -0.21 -0.14 -0.23 0.20 -0.13 -0.12 
** p < .01 (2-tailed) 
* p < 0.05 (2 tailed) 
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ANNEXURE E 
E.1: FIXED PAY AND COMPANY PEFORMANCE 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary  
Series: CEOSALARY   
Date: 08/04/15   Time: 15:42 
Sample: 2006 2014   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
Balanced observations for each test  
  Cross-
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin, & Chu t* -1.27133  0.1018  18  126 
  
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran, and Shin W-stat   0.67222  0.7493  18  126 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  28.5664 0.8064 18 126
PP - Fisher Chi-square  55.3714  0.0205  18  144 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-
        square distribution.  All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/04/15   Time: 15:47  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014 
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 144 
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.02E-05 7.80E-06 3.872878 0.0002
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 4.41E-05 4.62E-05 0.955059 0.3413
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -7.34E-05 2.98E-05 -2.460348 0.0152
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 65696.59 65255.70 1.006756 0.3159
SOLVENCYRATIO -8801.988 106403.7 -0.082723 0.9342
ROCE 104220.5 148395.3 0.702317 0.4837
ROE -18989.40 100384.3 -0.189167 0.8503
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -9.87E-05 7.82E-05 -1.261953 0.2092
DUM_AUDIT1 -20617.58 369254.5 -0.055836 0.9556
DUM_AUDIT2 -28699.62 211250.6 -0.135856 0.8921
DUM_AUDIT4 -356500.1 797353.6 -0.447104 0.6555
C 2774276. 349439.6 7.939214 0.0000
AR(1) 0.664009 0.066315 10.01299 0.0000
R-squared 0.650092    Mean dependent var 2971893.
Adjusted R-squared 0.618039    S.D. dependent var 1344702.
S.E. of regression 831066.1     Akaike info criterion 30.18475
Sum squared resid 9.05E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.45285
Log likelihood -2160.302    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.29369
F-statistic 20.28199    Durbin-Watson stat 2.535566
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .66
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Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/04/15   Time: 15:49  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014 (Baseline model)
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 144 
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.02E-05 7.70E-06 3.929788 0.0001
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 4.45E-05 4.50E-05 0.988874 0.3245
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -7.44E-05 2.91E-05 -2.559952 0.0116
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 64197.29 58112.63 1.104705 0.2713
ROCE 104960.1 145481.6 0.721466 0.4719
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -9.97E-05 7.65E-05 -1.302527 0.1950
DUM_AUDIT4 -354703.1 785459.7 -0.451587 0.6523
C 2750492. 287427.7 9.569337 0.0000
AR(1) 0.667616 0.064329 10.37812 0.0000
R-squared 0.649934    Mean dependent var 2971893.
Adjusted R-squared 0.629189    S.D. dependent var 1344702.
S.E. of regression 818846.3    Akaike info criterion 30.12964
Sum squared resid 9.05E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.31526
Log likelihood -2160.334    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.20506
F-statistic 31.33017    Durbin-Watson stat 2.536752
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .67   
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 08/04/15   Time: 15:50 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014  
Periods included: 8 
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 144
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.04E-05 7.64E-06 3.977453 0.0001
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 4.48E-05 4.49E-05 0.998495 0.3198
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -7.45E-05 2.90E-05 -2.570868 0.0112
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 63404.60 57885.91 1.095337 0.2753
ROCE 104575.7 145114.5 0.720642 0.4724
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000102 7.62E-05 -1.344226 0.1811
C 2736442. 282510.3 9.686167 0.0000
AR(1) 0.664768 0.064092 10.37213 0.0000
R-squared 0.649408    Mean dependent var 2971893.
Adjusted R-squared 0.631363    S.D. dependent var 1344702.
S.E. of regression 816442.8     Akaike info criterion 30.11725
Sum squared resid 9.07E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.28224
Log likelihood -2160.442    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.18430
F-statistic 35.98788    Durbin-Watson stat 2.537441
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .66
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Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY 
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 08/04/15   Time: 15:52 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014  
Periods included: 8 
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 144
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.40E-05 6.88E-06 4.936018 0.0000
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -5.03E-05 1.69E-05 -2.983139 0.0034
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 58383.31 57681.39 1.012169 0.3132
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000111 7.58E-05 -1.465899 0.1450
C 2765884. 278297.0 9.938605 0.0000
AR(1) 0.661874 0.064540 10.25520 0.0000
R-squared 0.645335    Mean dependent var 2971893.
Adjusted R-squared 0.632485    S.D. dependent var 1344702.
S.E. of regression 815199.2     Akaike info criterion 30.10103
Sum squared resid 9.17E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.22477
Log likelihood -2161.274    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.15131
F-statistic 50.21993    Durbin-Watson stat 2.547718
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .66
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 08/04/15   Time: 15:54  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014 
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 144 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.35E-05 6.65E-06 5.041276 0.0000
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -4.91E-05 1.70E-05 -2.892115 0.0044
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000112 7.62E-05 -1.471394 0.1434
C 2877548. 235542.6 12.21668 0.0000
AR(1) 0.644687 0.065295 9.873402 0.0000
R-squared 0.642838    Mean dependent var 2971893.
Adjusted R-squared 0.632560    S.D. dependent var 1344702.
S.E. of regression 815116.3     Akaike info criterion 30.09415
Sum squared resid 9.24E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.19727
Log likelihood -2161.779    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.13606
F-statistic 62.54470    Durbin-Watson stat 2.518909
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .64
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E.2: TOTAL REMUNERATION AND COMPANY PEFORMANCE 
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
 
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 06/11/15   Time: 15:15 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014  
Periods included: 8 
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 142
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 1.13E-05 1.68E-05 0.670977 0.5034
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 0.000270 8.67E-05 3.113969 0.0023
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000184 5.46E-05 -3.376617 0.0010
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 167115.5 121760.8 1.372489 0.1723
SOLVENCYRATIO -93446.08 211979.2 -0.440827 0.6601
ROCE -305089.1 274814.1 -1.110165 0.2690
ROE 82217.63 180144.9 0.456397 0.6489
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000163 0.000143 -1.142685 0.2553
DUM_AUDIT1 -457843.3 672983.6 -0.680319 0.4975
DUM_AUDIT2 -302816.0 394310.1 -0.767964 0.4439
DUM_AUDIT4 -212477.0 1517721. -0.139997 0.8889
C 4734563. 792377.1 5.975139 0.0000
AR(1) 0.740126 0.058285 12.69832 0.0000
R-squared 0.662868    Mean dependent var 4672678.
Adjusted R-squared 0.631507    S.D. dependent var 2561919.
S.E. of regression 1555178.     Akaike info criterion 31.43916
Sum squared resid 3.12E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.70977
Log likelihood -2219.181    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.54913
F-statistic 21.13660    Durbin-Watson stat 2.711734
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .74   
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 06/11/15   Time: 15:19  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014 
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 142 
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 1.21E-05 1.65E-05 0.735385 0.4634
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 0.000267 8.60E-05 3.103818 0.0023
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000181 5.40E-05 -3.346787 0.0011
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 145303.3 111932.5 1.298134 0.1965
ROCE -294257.7 272730.3 -1.078933 0.2826
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000169 0.000141 -1.196021 0.2338
DUM_AUDIT1 -464156.3 670105.2 -0.692662 0.4897
DUM_AUDIT2 -300267.4 391884.3 -0.766214 0.4449
DUM_AUDIT4 -183179.9 1506341. -0.121606 0.9034
C 4545667. 662437.1 6.862035 0.0000
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AR(1) 0.734400 0.058274 12.60261 0.0000
R-squared 0.661842    Mean dependent var 4672678.
Adjusted R-squared 0.636029    S.D. dependent var 2561919.
S.E. of regression 1545607.    Akaike info criterion 31.41403
Sum squared resid 3.13E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.64300
Log likelihood -2219.396    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.50708
F-statistic 25.63931    Durbin-Watson stat 2.700525
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .73   
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 06/11/15   Time: 15:21  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014 
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 142 
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 1.22E-05 1.64E-05 0.745815 0.4571
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 0.000267 8.57E-05 3.116707 0.0022
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000181 5.38E-05 -3.359445 0.0010
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 144970.8 111496.0 1.300233 0.1958
ROCE -294233.8 271738.2 -1.082784 0.2809
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000170 0.000141 -1.209012 0.2288
DUM_AUDIT1 -463094.1 667657.9 -0.693610 0.4891
DUM_AUDIT2 -299320.4 390208.8 -0.767078 0.4444
C 4536532. 655034.0 6.925643 0.0000
AR(1) 0.733663 0.058055 12.63737 0.0000
R-squared 0.661804    Mean dependent var 4672678.
Adjusted R-squared 0.638746    S.D. dependent var 2561919.
S.E. of regression 1539827.     Akaike info criterion 31.40006
Sum squared resid 3.13E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.60822
Log likelihood -2219.404    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.48464
F-statistic 28.70074    Durbin-Watson stat 2.702584
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .73   
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 06/11/15   Time: 15:22  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014 
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 142 
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 1.21E-05 1.65E-05 0.732768 0.4650
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 0.000273 8.47E-05 3.224874 0.0016
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000184 5.32E-05 -3.452491 0.0007
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 140075.5 110211.9 1.270965 0.2059
ROCE -285637.6 269357.8 -1.060440 0.2909
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000170 0.000140 -1.219533 0.2248
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C 4436095. 645487.4 6.872474 0.0000
AR(1) 0.739692 0.056949 12.98858 0.0000
R-squared 0.659926    Mean dependent var 4672678.
Adjusted R-squared 0.642161    S.D. dependent var 2561919.
S.E. of regression 1532532.     Akaike info criterion 31.37743
Sum squared resid 3.15E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.54395
Log likelihood -2219.797    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.44510
F-statistic 37.14737    Durbin-Watson stat 2.724027
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .74
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 06/11/15   Time: 15:24 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014  
Periods included: 8 
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 142
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 0.000293 7.98E-05 3.675828 0.0003
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000191 5.20E-05 -3.680973 0.0003
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 137633.1 109952.1 1.251755 0.2128
ROCE -280666.9 268202.7 -1.046473 0.2972
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000156 0.000136 -1.139881 0.2564
C 4647930. 615260.2 7.554415 0.0000
AR(1) 0.754297 0.053274 14.15876 0.0000
R-squared 0.658649    Mean dependent var 4672678.
Adjusted R-squared 0.643478    S.D. dependent var 2561919.
S.E. of regression 1529709.    Akaike info criterion 31.36709
Sum squared resid 3.16E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.51280
Log likelihood -2220.064    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.42630
F-statistic 43.41453    Durbin-Watson stat 2.740114
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .75   
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 06/11/15   Time: 15:35 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014  
Periods included: 8 
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 142
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 5.66E-05 8.43E-05 0.671391 0.5033
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -7.53E-05 6.01E-05 -1.252919 0.2127
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 170716.0 117210.1 1.456495 0.1479
ROCE -215080.5 269908.0 -0.796866 0.4271
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -5.02E-05 0.000152 -0.329412 0.7424
C 4360112. 319488.2 13.64718 0.0000
AR(1) 0.187824 0.092291 2.035138 0.0441
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 Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.755933    Mean dependent var 4672678.
Adjusted R-squared 0.708361    S.D. dependent var 2561919.
S.E. of regression 1383529.     Akaike info criterion 31.27106
Sum squared resid 2.26E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.77064
Log likelihood -2196.245    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.47407
F-statistic 15.89018    Durbin-Watson stat 2.186303
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .19
 
E.3: FIXED PAY AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE (2006 – 2010) 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 19:44  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010 
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 72
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.53E-05 1.33E-05 2.652116 0.0101
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 3.01E-05 7.55E-05 0.398771 0.6914
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -8.88E-06 4.06E-05 -0.218735 0.8276
LIQUIDITYRATIOS -4755.164 89236.17 -0.053287 0.9577
SOLVENCYRATIO -38462.60 118768.4 -0.323845 0.7471
ROCE -30123.22 297476.0 -0.101263 0.9197
ROE -227824.4 289136.1 -0.787949 0.4337
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R 0.000189 0.001065 0.177557 0.8596
C 2478817. 360437.2 6.877251 0.0000
AR(1) 0.535009 0.105596 5.066581 0.0000
R-squared 0.591715    Mean dependent var 2580099.
Adjusted R-squared 0.532448    S.D. dependent var 1190284.
S.E. of regression 813890.4     Akaike info criterion 30.18529
Sum squared resid 4.11E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.50149
Log likelihood -1076.670    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.31117
F-statistic 9.983845    Durbin-Watson stat 2.612094
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .54
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY 
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 19:46 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010  
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 72
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
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TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.53E-05 1.32E-05 2.671640 0.0096
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 3.06E-05 7.41E-05 0.413642 0.6805
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -9.15E-06 3.99E-05 -0.229166 0.8195
SOLVENCYRATIO -41530.09 102583.9 -0.404840 0.6870
ROCE -29531.79 295065.4 -0.100086 0.9206
ROE -226683.7 286562.5 -0.791045 0.4319
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R 0.000187 0.001057 0.177406 0.8598
C 2476152. 352643.9 7.021678 0.0000
AR(1) 0.535972 0.104543 5.126824 0.0000
R-squared 0.591696    Mean dependent var 2580099.
Adjusted R-squared 0.539848    S.D. dependent var 1190284.
S.E. of regression 807423.2    Akaike info criterion 30.15755
Sum squared resid 4.11E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.44214
Log likelihood -1076.672    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.27085
F-statistic 11.41212    Durbin-Watson stat 2.613094
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .54   
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 19:52 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010  
Periods included: 4 
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 72
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.53E-05 1.31E-05 2.706340 0.0087
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 2.90E-05 7.20E-05 0.402889 0.6884
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -8.70E-06 3.94E-05 -0.220790 0.8260
SOLVENCYRATIO -41288.12 102200.0 -0.403993 0.6876
ROE -226046.0 283341.9 -0.797786 0.4279
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R 0.000177 0.001044 0.169082 0.8663
C 2476627. 351582.2 7.044232 0.0000
AR(1) 0.539004 0.102884 5.238928 0.0000
R-squared 0.591636    Mean dependent var 2580099.
Adjusted R-squared 0.546971    S.D. dependent var 1190284.
S.E. of regression 801150.1     Akaike info criterion 30.12992
Sum squared resid 4.11E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.38289
Log likelihood -1076.677    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.23063
F-statistic 13.24611    Durbin-Watson stat 2.616974
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .54
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 19:53  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010 
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 72  
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.52E-05 1.29E-05 2.717238 0.0084
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INC
O 2.95E-05 7.14E-05 0.412838 0.6811
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -8.90E-06 3.91E-05 -0.227635 0.8206
SOLVENCYRATIO -43042.58 101024.7 -0.426060 0.6715
ROE -225606.1 281042.2 -0.802748 0.4250
C 2490376. 340886.5 7.305586 0.0000
AR(1) 0.540044 0.101945 5.297388 0.0000
R-squared 0.591453    Mean dependent var 2580099.
Adjusted R-squared 0.553741    S.D. dependent var 1190284.
S.E. of regression 795141.2    Akaike info criterion 30.10259
Sum squared resid 4.11E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.32394
Log likelihood -1076.693    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.19071
F-statistic 15.68340    Durbin-Watson stat 2.631750
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .54   
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 19:54 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010  
Periods included: 4 
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 72
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.59E-05 1.25E-05 2.868961 0.0055
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INC
O 1.66E-05 4.31E-05 0.384411 0.7019
SOLVENCYRATIO -44364.28 100037.5 -0.443477 0.6589
ROE -243348.0 267929.2 -0.908255 0.3670
C 2496220. 337087.5 7.405259 0.0000
AR(1) 0.539348 0.101380 5.320045 0.0000
R-squared 0.591126    Mean dependent var 2580099.
Adjusted R-squared 0.560151    S.D. dependent var 1190284.
S.E. of regression 789410.1    Akaike info criterion 30.07561
Sum squared resid 4.11E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.26534
Log likelihood -1076.722    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.15114
F-statistic 19.08379    Durbin-Watson stat 2.635208
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .54
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 19:59  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010  
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 72  
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
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TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.81E-05 1.09E-05 3.476797 0.0009
SOLVENCYRATIO -40497.57 99619.87 -0.406521 0.6857
ROE -209075.0 252218.2 -0.828945 0.4101
C 2501185. 338300.2 7.393389 0.0000
AR(1) 0.544359 0.100922 5.393881 0.0000
R-squared 0.590221    Mean dependent var 2580099.
Adjusted R-squared 0.565757    S.D. dependent var 1190284.
S.E. of regression 784363.2    Akaike info criterion 30.05005
Sum squared resid 4.12E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.20815
Log likelihood -1076.802    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.11299
F-statistic 24.12572    Durbin-Watson stat 2.620786
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .54   
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY 
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 20:00 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010  
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 72
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.79E-05 1.10E-05 3.456013 0.0009
ROE -205925.4 249649.3 -0.824859 0.4123
C 2416219. 257556.2 9.381326 0.0000
AR(1) 0.550302 0.099281 5.542851 0.0000
R-squared 0.589227    Mean dependent var 2580099.
Adjusted R-squared 0.571104    S.D. dependent var 1190284.
S.E. of regression 779518.7    Akaike info criterion 30.02469
Sum squared resid 4.13E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.15118
Log likelihood -1076.889    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.07505
F-statistic 32.51382    Durbin-Watson stat 2.632630
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .55   
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY 
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 20:02 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010  
Periods included: 4 
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 72
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.61E-05 1.13E-05 3.189935 0.0021
C 2454341. 275529.6 8.907721 0.0000
AR(1) 0.578090 0.094626 6.109207 0.0000
R-squared 0.585246    Mean dependent var 2580099.
Adjusted R-squared 0.573224    S.D. dependent var 1190284.
S.E. of regression 777590.3     Akaike info criterion 30.00656
Sum squared resid 4.17E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.10142
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Log likelihood -1077.236    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.04433
F-statistic 48.68177    Durbin-Watson stat 2.637842
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .58 
 
 
E.4: FIXED PAY AND COMPANY PEFORMANCE (2011‒2014) 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 20:09  
Sample (adjusted): 2012 2014 
Periods included: 3   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 53 
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.20E-05 1.04E-05 3.075310 0.0036
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 9.81E-05 0.000144 0.679233 0.5006
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000123 0.000171 -0.718432 0.4764
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 215725.9 139410.7 1.547413 0.1291
SOLVENCYRATIO -67223.29 184279.0 -0.364791 0.7171
ROCE 118507.7 171561.7 0.690758 0.4934
ROE -18732.71 153570.8 -0.121981 0.9035
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000138 0.000127 -1.082406 0.2851
C 2539841. 559739.1 4.537545 0.0000
AR(1) 0.643311 0.107571 5.980319 0.0000
R-squared 0.721641    Mean dependent var 3433612.
Adjusted R-squared 0.663380    S.D. dependent var 1399247.
S.E. of regression 811828.7    Akaike info criterion 30.22023
Sum squared resid 2.83E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.59199
Log likelihood -790.8362    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.36319
F-statistic 12.38630    Durbin-Watson stat 2.913668
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .64   
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 20:10  
Sample (adjusted): 2012 2014 
Periods included: 3   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 53 
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.19E-05 1.03E-05 3.114592 0.0032
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 9.76E-05 0.000143 0.684044 0.4975
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000123 0.000169 -0.728713 0.4700
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 215090.9 137749.8 1.561461 0.1256
SOLVENCYRATIO -68709.25 181719.1 -0.378107 0.7072
ROCE 117255.3 169336.8 0.692438 0.4923
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TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000139 0.000126 -1.103686 0.2757
C 2549470. 546573.9 4.664457 0.0000
AR(1) 0.642609 0.106070 6.058375 0.0000
R-squared 0.721544    Mean dependent var 3433612.
Adjusted R-squared 0.670916    S.D. dependent var 1399247.
S.E. of regression 802689.4     Akaike info criterion 30.18284
Sum squared resid 2.83E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.51742
Log likelihood -790.8454    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.31151
F-statistic 14.25181    Durbin-Watson stat 2.923349
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .64
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 20:12  
Sample (adjusted): 2012 2014 
Periods included: 3   
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 53 
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.23E-05 1.02E-05 3.160492 0.0028
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 9.28E-05 0.000142 0.655596 0.5154
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000120 0.000168 -0.712167 0.4800
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 188999.7 115433.8 1.637299 0.1085
ROCE 119753.0 167432.7 0.715231 0.4782
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000147 0.000121 -1.207034 0.2337
C 2447136. 484895.5 5.046728 0.0000
AR(1) 0.651544 0.104064 6.261016 0.0000
R-squared 0.720669    Mean dependent var 3433612.
Adjusted R-squared 0.677217    S.D. dependent var 1399247.
S.E. of regression 794967.8     Akaike info criterion 30.14825
Sum squared resid 2.84E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.44565
Log likelihood -790.9286    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.26261
F-statistic 16.58557    Durbin-Watson stat 2.927775
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .65   
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY 
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 20:13 
Sample (adjusted): 2012 2014  
Periods included: 3 
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 53 
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.51E-05 9.35E-06 3.752875 0.0005
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -1.24E-05 4.19E-05 -0.296499 0.7682
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 178166.9 112356.6 1.585727 0.1197
ROCE 113021.7 165688.3 0.682134 0.4986
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TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000167 0.000116 -1.445160 0.1552
C 2511930. 478249.4 5.252343 0.0000
AR(1) 0.663216 0.099102 6.692277 0.0000
R-squared 0.718046    Mean dependent var 3433612.
Adjusted R-squared 0.681269    S.D. dependent var 1399247.
S.E. of regression 789962.3     Akaike info criterion 30.11986
Sum squared resid 2.87E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.38009
Log likelihood -791.1763    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.21993
F-statistic 19.52450    Durbin-Watson stat 2.991106
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .66
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 20:14  
Sample (adjusted): 2012 2014 
Periods included: 3   
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 53 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.45E-05 9.05E-06 3.812858 0.0004
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 176581.9 110699.1 1.595151 0.1174
ROCE 112537.3 164048.5 0.686000 0.4961
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000165 0.000114 -1.448016 0.1543
C 2520434. 473891.1 5.318594 0.0000
AR(1) 0.665815 0.097207 6.849451 0.0000
R-squared 0.717510    Mean dependent var 3433612.
Adjusted R-squared 0.687458    S.D. dependent var 1399247.
S.E. of regression 782255.2     Akaike info criterion 30.08402
Sum squared resid 2.88E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.30707
Log likelihood -791.2265    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.16980
F-statistic 23.87553    Durbin-Watson stat 3.036955
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .67   
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY 
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 08/17/15   Time: 20:15 
Sample (adjusted): 2012 2014  
Periods included: 3 
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 53
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 3.46E-05 9.01E-06 3.845827 0.0004
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 173260.1 110021.8 1.574780 0.1219
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000171 0.000113 -1.510123 0.1376
C 2557187. 467634.2 5.468349 0.0000
AR(1) 0.666083 0.097147 6.856423 0.0000
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R-squared 0.714678    Mean dependent var 3433612.
Adjusted R-squared 0.690901    S.D. dependent var 1399247.
S.E. of regression 777934.8     Akaike info criterion 30.05626
Sum squared resid 2.90E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.24214
Log likelihood -791.4909    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.12774
F-statistic 30.05770    Durbin-Watson stat 3.007931
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .67
 
 
E.5: TOTAL REMUNERATION AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE (2006‒2010) 
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/11/15   Time: 22:25  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010 
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 70 
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 -2.50E-05 3.35E-05 -0.745542 0.4589
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 0.000414 0.000162 2.561725 0.0129
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000205 8.77E-05 -2.336088 0.0228
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 171366.6 177512.8 0.965376 0.3382
SOLVENCYRATIO -96199.69 274420.7 -0.350555 0.7271
ROCE 299364.0 532036.6 0.562675 0.5758
ROE -13464.73 478114.4 -0.028162 0.9776
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.001082 0.001996 -0.542418 0.5895
C 4537979. 1144915. 3.963596 0.0002
AR(1) 0.731772 0.095923 7.628704 0.0000
R-squared 0.611111    Mean dependent var 4225210.
Adjusted R-squared 0.552778    S.D. dependent var 2253156.
S.E. of regression 1506790.    Akaike info criterion 31.42043
Sum squared resid 1.36E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.74164
Log likelihood -1089.715    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.54802
F-statistic 10.47620    Durbin-Watson stat 2.514105
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .73   
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/11/15   Time: 22:28  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010 
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 70 
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 -2.49E-05 3.26E-05 -0.763555 0.4480
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 0.000409 0.000157 2.607735 0.0114
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000204 8.00E-05 -2.551257 0.0132
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LIQUIDITYRATIOS 149619.7 162588.0 0.920238 0.3610
ROCE 310308.0 523319.5 0.592961 0.5554
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.001010 0.001953 -0.516932 0.6070
C 4357463. 949146.7 4.590926 0.0000
AR(1) 0.730898 0.088340 8.273692 0.0000
R-squared 0.610292    Mean dependent var 4225210.
Adjusted R-squared 0.566293    S.D. dependent var 2253156.
S.E. of regression 1483848.    Akaike info criterion 31.36539
Sum squared resid 1.37E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.62236
Log likelihood -1089.789    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.46746
F-statistic 13.87051    Durbin-Watson stat 2.497102
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .73
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/11/15   Time: 22:29  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010 
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 70 
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 -2.26E-05 3.20E-05 -0.706356 0.4826
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INC
O 0.000405 0.000156 2.601476 0.0116
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000201 7.94E-05 -2.533930 0.0138
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 149407.1 161262.1 0.926486 0.3577
ROCE 273949.0 517089.1 0.529791 0.5981
C 4245834. 894206.4 4.748159 0.0000
AR(1) 0.725419 0.088211 8.223678 0.0000
R-squared 0.608623    Mean dependent var 4225210.
Adjusted R-squared 0.571348    S.D. dependent var 2253156.
S.E. of regression 1475174.    Akaike info criterion 31.34109
Sum squared resid 1.37E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.56594
Log likelihood -1089.938    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.43040
F-statistic 16.32832    Durbin-Watson stat 2.455631
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .73
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/11/15   Time: 22:30  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010 
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 70 
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 -2.21E-05 3.15E-05 -0.701893 0.4853
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INC
O 0.000421 0.000150 2.803490 0.0067
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000204 7.86E-05 -2.597130 0.0117
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 148583.4 159721.6 0.930265 0.3557
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C 4213653. 860720.7 4.895494 0.0000
AR(1) 0.715875 0.089031 8.040705 0.0000
R-squared 0.606921    Mean dependent var 4225210.
Adjusted R-squared 0.576212    S.D. dependent var 2253156.
S.E. of regression 1466782.     Akaike info criterion 31.31686
Sum squared resid 1.38E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.50958
Log likelihood -1090.090    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.39341
F-statistic 19.76344    Durbin-Watson stat 2.457810
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .72
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/11/15   Time: 22:31  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010 
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 70 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INC
O 0.000383 0.000140 2.726314 0.0082
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000188 7.63E-05 -2.467968 0.0162
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 143712.5 156590.4 0.917761 0.3621
C 3954614. 706591.2 5.596749 0.0000
AR(1) 0.685680 0.086734 7.905522 0.0000
R-squared 0.604127    Mean dependent var 4225210.
Adjusted R-squared 0.579765    S.D. dependent var 2253156.
S.E. of regression 1460620.     Akaike info criterion 31.29537
Sum squared resid 1.39E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.45598
Log likelihood -1090.338    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.35916
F-statistic 24.79847    Durbin-Watson stat 2.474086
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .69
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/11/15   Time: 22:32  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2010 
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 70 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INC
O 0.000361 0.000138 2.619639 0.0109
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000175 7.49E-05 -2.331553 0.0228
C 4247169. 607315.3 6.993351 0.0000
AR(1) 0.675645 0.087622 7.710930 0.0000
R-squared 0.599025    Mean dependent var 4225210.
Adjusted R-squared 0.580799    S.D. dependent var 2253156.
S.E. of regression 1458823.     Akaike info criterion 31.27960
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Sum squared resid 1.40E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.40809
Log likelihood -1090.786    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.33064
F-statistic 32.86622    Durbin-Watson stat 2.463284
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .68   
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.6: TOTAL REMUNERATION AND COMPANY PEFORMANCE (2006‒2010) 
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 08/11/15   Time: 22:39 
Sample (adjusted): 2012 2014  
Periods included: 3 
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 53
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 1.12E-05 2.80E-05 0.400130 0.6910
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 4.90E-05 0.000334 0.146791 0.8840
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 6.26E-06 0.000391 0.016011 0.9873
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 195518.4 293829.3 0.665415 0.5093
SOLVENCYRATIO -152083.7 422285.7 -0.360144 0.7205
ROCE -625030.2 371311.0 -1.683306 0.0996
ROE 289099.1 306074.4 0.944539 0.3502
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000426 0.000256 -1.664655 0.1033
C 5615339. 1628627. 3.447899 0.0013
AR(1) 0.763239 0.101465 7.522153 0.0000
R-squared 0.676163    Mean dependent var 5214295.
Adjusted R-squared 0.608383    S.D. dependent var 2852641.
S.E. of regression 1785163.    Akaike info criterion 31.79618
Sum squared resid 1.37E+14    Schwarz criterion 32.16794
Log likelihood -832.5989    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.93914
F-statistic 9.975858    Durbin-Watson stat 3.397837
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .76
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 08/11/15   Time: 22:40 
Sample (adjusted): 2012 2014  
Periods included: 3 
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 53
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations  
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 1.54E-05 2.66E-05 0.579881 0.5649
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 180448.9 282566.6 0.638606 0.5263
SOLVENCYRATIO -108479.4 409557.1 -0.264870 0.7923
ROCE -619048.3 364403.6 -1.698799 0.0963
ROE 323082.4 298270.7 1.083185 0.2845
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000449 0.000245 -1.832049 0.0736
C 5533097. 1549321. 3.571304 0.0009
AR(1) 0.760332 0.100246 7.584647 0.0000
R-squared 0.672650    Mean dependent var 5214295.
Adjusted R-squared 0.621729    S.D. dependent var 2852641.
S.E. of regression 1754481.     Akaike info criterion 31.73150
Sum squared resid 1.39E+14    Schwarz criterion 32.02890
Log likelihood -832.8848    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.84587
F-statistic 13.20965    Durbin-Watson stat 3.378435
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .76
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 08/11/15   Time: 22:41  
Sample (adjusted): 2012 2014 
Periods included: 3   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 53 
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 1.53E-05 2.65E-05 0.578795 0.5656
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 141505.1 236995.1 0.597080 0.5534
ROCE -614510.1 360262.6 -1.705728 0.0948
ROE 316546.9 293750.1 1.077606 0.2868
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000460 0.000238 -1.930817 0.0597
C 5366363. 1405702. 3.817569 0.0004
AR(1) 0.762069 0.100283 7.599157 0.0000
R-squared 0.672141    Mean dependent var 5214295.
Adjusted R-squared 0.629377    S.D. dependent var 2852641.
S.E. of regression 1736654.     Akaike info criterion 31.69532
Sum squared resid 1.39E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.95555
Log likelihood -832.9260    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.79539
F-statistic 15.71738    Durbin-Watson stat 3.348401
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .76
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 08/11/15   Time: 22:42  
Sample (adjusted): 2012 2014 
Periods included: 3   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 53 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
ROCE -616921.1 354298.3 -1.741248 0.0880
ROE 333883.7 286557.6 1.165154 0.2497
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000478 0.000231 -2.063480 0.0445
C 6068994. 1083386. 5.601876 0.0000
AR(1) 0.770364 0.085180 9.043992 0.0000
R-squared 0.667891    Mean dependent var 5214295.
Adjusted R-squared 0.640216    S.D. dependent var 2852641.
S.E. of regression 1711072.    Akaike info criterion 31.63273
Sum squared resid 1.41E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.81860
Log likelihood -833.2673    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.70421
F-statistic 24.13275    Durbin-Watson stat 3.412727
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .77   
 
E.7: FIXED PAY AND CEO DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 10/19/15   Time: 15:58  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014 
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 17 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 119 
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 1.42E-05 9.69E-06 1.463046 0.1464
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -5.34E-05 1.25E-05 -4.253635 0.0000
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -2.07E-05 6.73E-05 -0.307107 0.7594
C 4031843. 1756163. 2.295825 0.0237
GENDER_CODED -830136.5 224281.8 -3.701310 0.0003
AGEINYEARS -12215.48 28634.77 -0.426596 0.6705
DUMRACE1 1049664. 578486.8 1.814500 0.0725
DUMRACE2 1582107. 714425.7 2.214516 0.0290
DUMRACE3 985706.1 2529805. 0.389637 0.6976
JOB TENUREINYEARS 188522.6 40851.86 4.614786 0.0000
QUAL2_DUM -940228.4 496023.5 -1.895532 0.0608
QUAL3_DUM -361900.6 254390.3 -1.422620 0.1578
QUAL4_DUM -291791.3 794862.0 -0.367097 0.7143
AR(1) 0.872053 0.053254 16.37549 0.0000
R-squared 0.798233    Mean dependent var 3087910.
Adjusted R-squared 0.773253    S.D. dependent var 1376705.
S.E. of regression 655559.1     Akaike info criterion 29.73450
Sum squared resid 4.51E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.06145
Log likelihood -1755.202    Hannan-Quinn criter. 29.86726
F-statistic 31.95408    Durbin-Watson stat 2.638123
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .87   
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY 
Method: Panel Least Squares  
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Date: 10/19/15   Time: 16:13  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014  
Periods included: 8 
Cross-sections included: 17  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 119
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 1.31E-05 9.25E-06 1.417167 0.1593
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -5.37E-05 1.24E-05 -4.336097 0.0000
C 4265769. 1676500. 2.544449 0.0124
GENDER_CODED -824878.4 218934.2 -3.767700 0.0003
AGEINYEARS -18531.44 23895.97 -0.775505 0.4398
DUMRACE1 1130413. 548141.8 2.062265 0.0416
DUMRACE2 1672238. 682259.3 2.451030 0.0159
DUMRACE3 1196152. 2477520. 0.482802 0.6302
JOB TENUREINYEARS 189360.3 39325.78 4.815169 0.0000
QUAL2_DUM -838771.5 352743.2 -2.377853 0.0192
QUAL3_DUM -329068.2 234478.2 -1.403406 0.1634
AR(1) 0.874521 0.050862 17.19414 0.0000
R-squared 0.797834    Mean dependent var 3087910.
Adjusted R-squared 0.777051    S.D. dependent var 1376705.
S.E. of regression 650045.6    Akaike info criterion 29.70286
Sum squared resid 4.52E+13    Schwarz criterion 29.98311
Log likelihood -1755.320    Hannan-Quinn criter. 29.81666
F-statistic 38.38803    Durbin-Watson stat 2.631916
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .87   
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 10/19/15   Time: 16:15  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014 
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 17 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 119 
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 1.21E-05 9.25E-06 1.305692 0.1944
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -5.35E-05 1.23E-05 -4.359810 0.0000
C 4446008. 1672223. 2.658740 0.0090
GENDER_CODED -826086.4 217741.5 -3.793886 0.0002
AGEINYEARS -18614.95 23757.61 -0.783536 0.4350
DUMRACE1 1092078. 538944.3 2.026328 0.0452
DUMRACE2 1638475. 674549.6 2.428991 0.0168
JOB TENUREINYEARS 189213.8 39055.32 4.844765 0.0000
QUAL2_DUM -869831.6 344678.3 -2.523604 0.0131
QUAL3_DUM -332891.1 233388.8 -1.426337 0.1567
AR(1) 0.882283 0.048531 18.17990 0.0000
R-squared 0.797430    Mean dependent var 3087910.
Adjusted R-squared 0.778674    S.D. dependent var 1376705.
S.E. of regression 647674.9    Akaike info criterion 29.68805
Sum squared resid 4.53E+13    Schwarz criterion 29.94494
Log likelihood -1755.439    Hannan-Quinn criter. 29.79236
F-statistic 42.51500    Durbin-Watson stat 2.649728
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Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .88
 
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 10/19/15   Time: 16:17  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014 
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 144 
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 2.24E-05 8.43E-06 2.651663 0.0090
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -5.16E-05 1.47E-05 -3.518962 0.0006
C 2595019. 527410.6 4.920302 0.0000
GENDER_CODED -591643.6 232239.6 -2.547557 0.0120
DUMRACE1 1068968. 311822.1 3.428133 0.0008
DUMRACE2 1339961. 480840.9 2.786703 0.0061
JOB TENUREINYEARS 171249.5 32559.68 5.259558 0.0000
QUAL2_DUM -437461.7 293455.3 -1.490727 0.1384
QUAL3_DUM -169713.0 225719.4 -0.751876 0.4534
AR(1) 0.781210 0.056323 13.87015 0.0000
R-squared 0.712363    Mean dependent var 2971893.
Adjusted R-squared 0.693044    S.D. dependent var 1344702.
S.E. of regression 745014.0    Akaike info criterion 29.94711
Sum squared resid 7.44E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.15335
Log likelihood -2146.192    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.03091
F-statistic 36.87381    Durbin-Watson stat 2.597273
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .78
 
 
Size not significant  
 
Dependent Variable: CEOSALARY 
Method: Panel Least Squares  
 
Date: 10/19/15   Time: 16:20  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014 
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 17 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 119
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TURNOVERREVENUER000 1.17E-05 9.33E-06 1.254082 0.2126
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -5.34E-05 1.24E-05 -4.305318 0.0000
C 3042350. 2945625. 1.032837 0.3040
GENDER_CODED -812027.3 226824.4 -3.579982 0.0005
AGEINYEARS -17754.29 24006.44 -0.739564 0.4612
DUMRACE1 1108575. 544624.0 2.035487 0.0443
DUMRACE2 1707985. 690058.1 2.475132 0.0149
JOB TENUREINYEARS 189376.2 39395.50 4.807052 0.0000
QUAL2_DUM -884876.8 349286.1 -2.533386 0.0128
QUAL3_DUM -349589.9 240623.7 -1.452849 0.1492
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DUM_SIZE3 1413989. 2450275. 0.577074 0.5651
DUM_SIZE4 1368887. 2434449. 0.562299 0.5751
AR(1) 0.878970 0.049722 17.67770 0.0000
R-squared 0.798070    Mean dependent var 3087910.
Adjusted R-squared 0.775210    S.D. dependent var 1376705.
S.E. of regression 652723.8    Akaike info criterion 29.71850
Sum squared resid 4.52E+13    Schwarz criterion 30.02210
Log likelihood -1755.251    Hannan-Quinn criter. 29.84178
F-statistic 34.91117    Durbin-Watson stat 2.642848
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .88   
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.8: TOTAL REMUNERATION AND CEO DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 11/03/15   Time: 08:36 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014  
Periods included: 8 
Cross-sections included: 17  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 117
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 0.000303 8.91E-05 3.404308 0.0009
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000197 5.43E-05 -3.622865 0.0005
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 168311.7 152769.0 1.101740 0.2732
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000134 0.000158 -0.845848 0.3996
C 3989296. 3902606. 1.022213 0.3091
DUMRACE1 1993107. 1315448. 1.515155 0.1328
DUMRACE2 1921269. 1655191. 1.160754 0.2485
DUMRACE3 1975257. 3718170. 0.531244 0.5964
AGEINYEARS -24293.21 67588.45 -0.359428 0.7200
GENDER_CODED 256702.7 544958.4 0.471050 0.6386
QUAL2_DUM -525595.9 1116888. -0.470589 0.6389
QUAL3_DUM -1524025. 631215.7 -2.414427 0.0175
QUAL4_DUM 164361.2 1819417. 0.090337 0.9282
JOB TENUREINYEARS 224415.1 93053.10 2.411689 0.0177
AR(1) 0.790338 0.060673 13.02617 0.0000
R-squared 0.697994    Mean dependent var 4900455.
Adjusted R-squared 0.656542    S.D. dependent var 2662876.
S.E. of regression 1560587.     Akaike info criterion 31.47823
Sum squared resid 2.48E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.83236
Log likelihood -1826.477    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.62200
F-statistic 16.83866    Durbin-Watson stat 2.859279
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Inverted AR Roots       .79   
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 11/03/15   Time: 08:37 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014  
Periods included: 8 
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 142 
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 0.000303 8.05E-05 3.765225 0.0003
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000198 5.06E-05 -3.918655 0.0001
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 143818.3 107220.5 1.341332 0.1822
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000158 0.000136 -1.166257 0.2457
C 3730910. 1104920. 3.376635 0.0010
DUMRACE1 819211.1 625546.3 1.309593 0.1927
DUMRACE2 713627.7 984888.6 0.724577 0.4700
DUMRACE3 -364665.3 1470437. -0.247998 0.8045
GENDER_CODED 270503.4 467182.1 0.579011 0.5636
QUAL2_DUM -656805.1 609575.7 -1.077479 0.2833
QUAL3_DUM -1003480. 458363.8 -2.189265 0.0304
JOB TENUREINYEARS 192848.1 65035.77 2.965262 0.0036
AR(1) 0.779826 0.053396 14.60456 0.0000
R-squared 0.694210    Mean dependent var 4672678.
Adjusted R-squared 0.665765    S.D. dependent var 2561919.
S.E. of regression 1481124.     Akaike info criterion 31.34158
Sum squared resid 2.83E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.61219
Log likelihood -2212.253    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.45155
F-statistic 24.40490    Durbin-Watson stat 2.790597
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .78
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 11/03/15   Time: 08:45  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014 
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 142 
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 0.000319 7.79E-05 4.097989 0.0001
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000203 4.99E-05 -4.072856 0.0001
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 144143.4 106242.0 1.356746 0.1772
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000164 0.000134 -1.223636 0.2233
C 4203129. 855307.1 4.914175 0.0000
QUAL2_DUM -765780.5 549358.8 -1.393953 0.1657
QUAL3_DUM -1015897. 453844.6 -2.238425 0.0269
JOB TENUREINYEARS 182116.6 61638.86 2.954575 0.0037
 
DUMRACE1 565025.3 513607.2 1.100112 0.2733
AR(1) 0.770815 0.051318 15.02049 0.0000
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R-squared 0.692368    Mean dependent var 4672678.
Adjusted R-squared 0.671393    S.D. dependent var 2561919.
S.E. of regression 1468601.     Akaike info criterion 31.30534
Sum squared resid 2.85E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.51350
Log likelihood -2212.679    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.38993
F-statistic 33.00931    Durbin-Watson stat 2.796934
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .77
 
E.9: TOTAL REMUNERATION AND COMPANY SIZE 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 07/26/16   Time: 16:23 
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014  
Periods included: 8 
Cross-sections included: 18  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 142
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 0.000285 7.87E-05 3.617143 0.0004
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000185 5.23E-05 -3.535739 0.0006
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 123038.3 109143.3 1.127309 0.2616
ROCE -292645.3 269016.2 -1.087835 0.2786
DUM_SIZE3 1649044. 1930201. 0.854338 0.3945
DUM_SIZE4 2796956. 1895675. 1.475440 0.1425
C 2307917. 1825823. 1.264042 0.2084
TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000156 0.000139 -1.124065 0.2630
AR(1) 0.703716 0.058173 12.09695 0.0000
R-squared 0.667170    Mean dependent var 4672678.
Adjusted R-squared 0.647150    S.D. dependent var 2561919.
S.E. of regression 1521810.     Akaike info criterion 31.36998
Sum squared resid 3.08E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.55732
Log likelihood -2218.269    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.44611
F-statistic 33.32540    Durbin-Watson stat 2.727072
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Inverted AR Roots       .70
 
Dependent Variable: TOTALCEOPACKAGE  
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 07/26/16   Time: 16:29  
Sample (adjusted): 2007 2014 
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 18 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 142 
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EBITOPERATINGPROFIT_INCO 0.000286 7.86E-05 3.642462 0.0004
NETPROFITAFTERTAXR000 -0.000186 5.21E-05 -3.573453 0.0005
LIQUIDITYRATIOS 132127.4 108744.9 1.215022 0.2265
ROCE -286912.0 268396.5 -1.068985 0.2870
DUM_SIZE4 1263352. 696566.6 1.813685 0.0720
C 3781641. 687034.1 5.504299 0.0000
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TOTALIRREGULAREXPENDITU
R -0.000154 0.000138 -1.114989 0.2669
AR(1) 0.710573 0.057282 12.40476 0.0000
R-squared 0.665376    Mean dependent var 4672678.
Adjusted R-squared 0.647895    S.D. dependent var 2561919.
S.E. of regression 1520202.    Akaike info criterion 31.36127
Sum squared resid 3.10E+14    Schwarz criterion 31.52780
Log likelihood -2218.650    Hannan-Quinn criter. 31.42894
F-statistic 38.06415    Durbin-Watson stat 2.740563
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots       .71   
 
